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The subject matter of this submission for a PhD by publication is the rise of human resource 
management in the UK. It specifically examines the responsibilities of line managers and personnel 
specialist and the importance of rewards in identifying the nature of human resource management in 
the UK at the end of the twentieth century. The submission presents an overview of a number of books 
and papers previously published by the author concerning two areas of inquiry (1) profit sharing and 
share ownership schemes and (2) managers attitudes to human resource management.
Chapter 1 presents a critical appraisal of previous work on human resource management that places the 
stimulus for the research and selected publications in context. Also, it examines the rise of human 
resource management and theoretical models of human resource management. Chapter 2 explores the 
design and methodology of the two research endeavours and places these in the context of management 
research. Chapter 3 reviews the outcomes of the research particularly that concerned with the external 
environment and competitive advantage, responsibilities of line and personnel management and the 
integration of rewards. It also presents the main findings of the research and reaches conclusions on the 
nature of management, dissemination and utilisation of the research.
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I have had a long and continued interest in management. Firstly, as a personnel professional in the 
National Health Service and as a member of the Institute of Personnel and Development and secondly, 
as an academic specialising in the study of human resource management (HRM) and industrial 
relations. These roles have given me an insight of the personnel function from differing perspectives 
and informed my understanding of its role in modern organisations. My academic interest in HRM and 
industrial relations has led to a number of research projects which have subsequently been published in 
books, research reports, papers in refereed journals, academic conference papers and other means.
A selection of this work forms the major part of this thesis and is presented in Appendix B. The 
selection is based on specific criteria: (1) the coherence of the publications; (2) their quality and 
impact; (3) peer review and (4) they provide an original and significant contribution to knowledge. The 
selection focuses on two major research endeavours executed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Firstly, 
an inquiry into management and employee attitudes to profit sharing and share-holding schemes in 
Britain and secondly, an inquiry into management attitudes to HRM in Britain. I have chosen not to 
present these in chronological order but to place the research on profit sharing and share-holding 
schemes in the context of HRM.
The selected publications were co-authored with Michael Poole, now Professor of Human Resource 
Management at Cardiff Business School, University of Wales, Cardiff. The first author of these works 
was agreed prior to each project and has no other significance. Michael Poole like myself had a 
sociological background and an interest in management and industrial relations. Prior to our working 
together, he had considerable experience in directing and conducting research and had published 
extensively in industrial sociology and industrial relations (for example, Poole 1973, 1974, 1976, 1980, 
1982, 1986a, 1986b, 1989). For my part, I had obtained a M.Sc. (Econ.) by research in management 
and industrial relations from University College, University of Wales, Cardiff, where I received 
training in research methodology and statistical analysis. I too had experience in directing and 
conducting research and had published in the fields of industrial relations and unemployment (for 
example, Jenkins, 1979, 1981, 1982a, 1982b). My co-author and I held a similar view of the social 
world underpinned by an understanding of sociology, liberal-collectivist values, a belief in social
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justice and a profound interest in employee participation and the world of work. Appendix A provides 
evidence of the author's contribution to each publication according to the guidelines provided by the 
UK Council for Graduate Education (1966:11) together with a statement from Michael Poole on 
letterhead.
The following Chapters provide a review of this selection. Chapter 1 presents a critical appraisal of 
previous work that places the stimulus for the research and selected publications in context. Chapter 2 
explores the design and methodology of the research. Chapter 3 reviews the outcomes of the research 
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The Rise of Human Resource Management
Writing in 1970 Mclvering (1970:191) commented that:
'Since the definition of personnel management, published in 1944, hardly a year has passed without 
either some reappraisal of the nature of the personnel function or the role of the personnel 
manager...'
The 1980s and 1990s proved no different with the exception that the reappraisal resulted in a much 
more fundamental re-examination of the personnel function and role compared with our European 
partners (Brewster and Smith, 1990). Personnel management as a practice was, according to a range of 
commentators, under threat, required redevelopment, or was about to be integrated into general 
management by what some have considered to be a new approach for personnel managers - human 
resource management.
To say that HRM had a considerable impact on academic and corporate development in the 1980s and 
early 1990s would be an understatement. Interest in the subject increased at an unprecedented rate 
(Legge 1995). In UK academia, not only did we see an increase in the number of academic papers, 
articles and letters to the editors of professional journals compared with previous reappraisals, but also 
the appearance of a number of newly created professors of HRM and academic journals which adopted 
the title. The identification of corporate management with HRM was also indicated by a small but 
increasing number of personnel professionals and departments with the HRM title. Firstly in the USA 
and then in the UK the new genre took hold.
For Keenoy (1990) the rise of HRM was both remarkable and unnerving for three reasons. Firstly, it 
swept aside both personnel management and industrial relations orthodoxy and became the 'conceptual 
euphemism to describe all the apparently transformative changes in the management of the 
employment relationship in the 1980s.' (Keenoy, 1990:370). These include in particular:
market changes -the globalisation of markets, product markets and labour markets, changes in the 
workforce and the nature of work, the decline in trade union power and 'new realism' in industrial 
relations - and,
Changes in management - the availability of new models of management and personnel management, 
the failure of personnel management, the search for excellence, Japanese Janus, enterprise culture and 
the search for competitive advantage (see Legge, 1995:76-84; Guest, 1987).
Orthodox personnel management and industrial relations were compared unfavourably with the new 
approach to people management. A typical comparison was that from Guest. (1987:507) (See table 
1.1).
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Table 1.1: Stereotypes of Personnel Management and Human Resource Management
Personnel Management Human Resource Management
t£i-- ~ . .• • •

































Largely integrated into line 
management
Maximum utilisation (human asset 
accounting)
On this view, the long-term proactive, strategic and integrated approach of HRM is contrasted with the 
short-term, reactive, ad hoc and marginal approach of personnel management. The psychological 
contract of HRM is based on commitment as opposed to compliance under personnel management. 
The control systems of HRM are based on self-control and autonomy and the language of 
empowerment by contrast with the external controls of personnel management. From an employee 
relations point of view, the unitarist, individualistic and high trust approach of HRM is contrasted with 
the pluralistic, collectivist and low trust perspective of personnel management. The preferred 
organisational structures of HRM are organic and devolved with flexible roles compared with the 
bureaucratic/mechanistic and centralised models of personnel management with its formal, defined 
roles. HRM is largely integrated into line management, whereas personnel management comprises 
specialist/professional roles. Finally, the evaluation criteria of HRM involve maximum utilisation and 
human asset accounting as opposed to cost-minimisation under personnel management.
These stereotypes are valuable distinctions for classificatory purposes and for defining the precise 
nature and meaning of HRM but they greatly overstate the practical differences in differing socio-
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economic environments and the range of diversity in organisational forms and management (for further 
critical evaluation see Blyton and Tumbull (eds.), 1992).
Secondly, HRM's ascendancy was characterised by a lack of empirical evidence to support its 
theoretical and philosophical claims. Theoretical discourse and model building had jumped ahead of 
our understanding of personnel and managerial practice resulting in a distinction between the rhetoric 
and reality of HRM.
The view of people management was one where increasingly competitive advantage came to rest on the 
creative use of human talent; the optimum design and organisation of work; treating people as a valued 
resource and developing personal motivation and commitment (Brown, 1985; Buroway, 1985; 
Edwards, 1987: Guest, 1987; Marginson et.al., 1988). In short, HRM it was argued had become 'a 
critical investment in the organisation's current performance and future growth'. (Tyson and Fell, 
1986)
However, doubts were raised that little was new about HRM, with the exception that its identification 
with corporate management and the strategic role of personnel management and a new relationship 
with the line or general management (Guest, 1987; Hendry and Pettigrew, 1986; and Tyson and Fell, 
1986; Tyson, 1987). Each of these will be considered below.
Hendry and Pettigrew (1986), for example, provided a useful model for identifying the strategic role in 
terms of changes in planning, personnel policies and systems, links between personnel and corporate 
strategies and competitive advantage but there seemed little empirical support for this view.
For example, support for an increase in human resource planning was difficult to find (Hendry and 
Pettigrew, 1986; Cowling and Walters, 1990). The creation of integrated personnel policies and 
systems was a proactive exercise that the managers of labour in the UK were reticent to adopt. (See 
Donovan Commission, 1968:25; CIR, 1973:5; and Marginson et.al., 1988). The links with personnel 
initiatives and corporate strategic planning were also found wanting. Of particular note was the low 
priority training and development had had in overall business strategy. A survey by the Institute of 
Personnel Management on human resource planning concluded that there was some evidence of 
successful initiatives in training and development and competitive restructuring in the private sector, 
but 'of comprehensive and systematic manpower planning fully integrated into strategic planning there 
exist few examples at the present time.' (Cowling and Walters, 1990:8).
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Another example of the lack of empirical support came in defining the new relationship with line or 
general management. Firstly, the ambiguous nature of personnel management in the management 
hierarchy was an historical phenomenon that had received attention in all appraisals of the function 
including that of the 1980s and 1990s. (Legge 1978 and 1995; Thomason, 1988; Torrington and Hall, 
1987, Tyson, 1983 and Watson, 1986). For example, for Legge (1978) the ambiguity can be found in 
an organisational and political context. Others have sought to explain such ambiguity in more 
functional terms, for example, the construction analogy of Tyson and Fell (1986). While one of the 
bases for such ambiguity in personnel management rests on its relationship to general management 
(Watson, 1986).
Conflicting indications of this relationship had again been reported. For example, Alien (1991:43) in 
his examination of the attitudes of middle management to the personnel function in UK companies 
stated:
'The kindest conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the human resources function has 
some way to go before it is really part of management.'
While Torrington and Hall (1987) viewed HRM as more a part of management with some personnel 
functions being directed to line management (see also Storey, 1987, Brewster and Smith, 1990:40).
This shift in responsibility for people management to the line was not clearly spelled out. That certain 
elements of the personnel function were to be directed to the line was not new and had a number of 
historical precedents. Indeed there was evidence which pointed to a continued and more than minimal 
role of general management in personnel practice particularly in medium and small companies (Daniel 
and Millward, 1983:105-6,114; Edwards, 1987) For Edwards (1987), for example, general managers 
had a substantial influence on personnel decisions.
Also, there continued to be doubts as to whether personnel practitioners had initiated any changes in 
personnel practice in the 1980s and early 1990s. Storey (1992), for example, found that even proactive 
personnel practitioners (Changemakers) had not instigated changes in personnel practice but change 
came from other managers and/or outside of the organisation. The Price Waterhouse/Cranfield study 
(Brewster and Smith, 1990) found that at board level responsibility for human resource issues rested 
with other than a human resource specialist in over one-third of their sample. Poole (1989:123) 
examining the growth of profit sharing and share ownership in the UK found that the function most 
involved in the setting up of these innovative human resource measures were not the personnel
Chapter 1 • 12
directors of these companies but the company secretaries or finance directors (see also Ramsay, et.al.
1990). Also, in her analysis of survey data Karen Legge (1989) provided some qualitative support for 
changes that may account for the rise of HRM. However, none of the survey data she felt could shed 
light on the future development of HRM. Similarly, Poole and Mansfield's (1991) survey of general 
managers showed some indication of a transformation of the personnel role in the 1980s, particularly in 
training and development but no more than that.
The HRM debate in the 1980s was conducted at worst in an empirical vacuum and at best where 
evidence of the personnel manager's role in the developments that had influenced managerial practice 
was limited. It had led to an over use of metaphor and conjecture on the nature (or even existence) of 
the'new people management'. (Storey and Sissons, 1989:177; Dunn, 1990,Kennoy, 1991, Dunn,
1991). For the author, the empirical vacuum needed to be filled to evaluate human resource policy 
initiatives in the future and in particular the role of the personnel profession in these developments. In 
doing so, it hope to shed some light on the 'confusion and contradiction in the literature' (Keenoy, 
1990:370).
Thirdly, Keenoy identified HRM as a kind of testing ground for the ideological reconstruction of a 
newly legitimised managerial authority in the employment relationship. This was evident in its weak 
conceptualisation, its inherent contradictions and the ambiguity of the term itself where 'a term means 
whatever one chooses it to mean' or that the term has in each conception a double purpose and 
meaning (Keenoy, 1990:371). Indicative of this is Storey's (1987 and 1992) distinction between the 
'hard' and 'soft' approaches to HRM. The 'hard' approach is founded on 'utilitarian instrumentalism' 
where people are regarded as any other economic resource, any other factor of production; where 
quantitative and calculative aspects are emphasised; where there is a close integration between policies, 
systems and strategic objectives and where business strategy and manpower planning go hand in hand. 
Whereas the 'soft' approach is founded on 'developmental humanism' where people are regarded as 
having 'unique qualities' whose potential can be unlocked through a series of techniques which relate 
to motivational aspects, communications, personal development and continuous development; where 
employees are proactive rather than passive in the employment relationship and the issue of managerial 
leadership becomes of central importance in generating employee responses of flexibility, commitment, 
responsibility, quality, autonomy and performance (Hendry and Pettigrew, 1990).
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HRM could at one and the same time treat employees as a 'variable input and a cost to be minimised' 
and/or treat employees as valued assets, worthy of trust, development and collaboration (Legge, 
1995:66-7). It is not surprising that in this new vocabulary of people management, the question was 
posed: - Had these visible conceptual changes been correspondingly identified with a radical change in 
personnel policies and practices or had we seen only a change at an ideological level where existing 
practices had remained largely unchanged? (Guest, 1987; Storey (ed.) 1989; Keenoy, 1990). This 
question became central to the debate because unlike earlier appraisals both the meaning and 
theoretical significance of HRM in the UK became contested terrain.
Models of Human Resource Management
That model building had jumped ahead of our understanding of personnel and managerial practice is 
indicated by the production of a plethora of models of HRM during the period. Legge (1995) in her 
insightful analysis of the phenomenon identified four types of models of HRM (See Table: 1.2). Not all 
these models can be considered in the space available but an outline of the two most influential models 
is provided below. In the USA, the Havard model of HRM associated with the work of Beer, et.al. 
(1984 and 1985) and in the UK, that of Guest (1990).
The Harvard Model of HRM
Of the new models, the Beer, et.al. (1984 and 1985) or Harvard model of HRM stands out as a marker 
informing as it did not only some of the publications presented here but also the work of Guest and 
Hendry and Pettigrew. In the 1970's, the Harvard Business School developed a compulsory course in 
HRM. Part of its development coincided with the rise of manpower planning and organisation 
development. Also, economics and accountancy may have played their part with the development of 
human capital theory (Becker, 1964) and human resource/asset accounting (Groves, 1981). This led to 
a re-conceptualisation of the personnel role closely identified with the work of Beer, et.al. (1984 and 
1985).
The Harvard normative model was a radical departure from earlier understandings of the nature of 
people management. It followed hot on the heels of the Fobrum, Tichy and Devanna (1984) model of 
HRM which emphasised the coherence of personnel practices such as selection, appraisal, development





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and rewards and linked these with overall organisational performance and goals. However, the Harvard 
model was much broader in scope with HRM encompassing
'all management decisions that affect the nature of the relationship between the organisation and its 
employees'.
It had a pronounced human relations perspective focusing as it did on the individual rather than the 
collective characteristics of the employment relationship. This individual focus had implicit theoretical 
links with the works of McGregor (1960), Argyris (1964) and Likert (1967). However, HRM's claim 
for distinctiveness in practice from this perspective lies not in this socio-psychological pedigree but in 
the integration of the personnel role into strategic management.
The main substantive areas of the Harvard approach (Beer et. al., 1984 and 1985) to HRM are set out 
in Figure 1. It identifies the main HRM policy choices that management has to make in managing 
people. They are:
• Employee influence (involvement)
• Human resource flow (including development issues such as appraisal, training and careers)
• Reward systems
• Work systems


























Laws and societal values
A
i
Choices of which HRM policies to adopt or support are in turn influenced by situational factors: a 
mixture of business and societal expectations which aid comparative understanding across cultural 
boundaries. Stakeholder interests recognise organisational constraints on strategic policy and
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implementation but implicitly promotes a unitary frame of reference in that consensus between 
stakeholders is taken as given. Theoretically, HR policy choices arise from the consideration of a wider 
range of interests in the organisation. The ideal HR outcome is a highly competitive organisation based 
on commitment, competence, congruence and cost effectiveness where the employees are fully utilised 
and developed through work. The long-term consequences are envisaged to encompass individual well 
being, organisational effectiveness, and societal well being reflecting psychological, economic and 
social rewards. Feedback arises from consideration of these long term effects on both stakeholders and 
situational factors and the dynamic relationship between these and strategic policy choices.
The strength of the model arises from its emphasis on the importance of general management to the 
formulation of policy choices and its use as a comparative framework at organisational and societal 
levels (Boxall, 1992; Guest, 1997). These strengths were recognised by the author and the model 
provided the framework for the research on HRM but also inform the research on profit sharing and 
share-holding schemes in that two of the central policy choices - employee influence and reward 
systems - are both in principle enhanced via profit sharing. However, as Guest (1997) has emphasised, 
a major weakness of the model is the absence of a coherent theoretical basis for measuring the 
relationship between HRM inputs, outcomes and performance.
Guest's Model of HRM
For Guest (1990, 1992 and 1997) the distinctiveness of HRM rests on a number of elements:
Firstly, a Coherent Strategy where personnel policies and practices are integrated and applied in a 
coherent fashion. Secondly, the inputs of the system are the key policy levers of organisational job 
design, management of change, recruitment, selection, socialisation, appraisal, training and 
development, reward systems and communications. These in turn produce four key human resource 
policy goals or outcomes - strategic integration, commitment, flexibility and quality and organisational 
outcomes of high job performance, problem solving, change and innovation, cost effectiveness and low 
turnover, absence and grievance. As Guest (1990:378) states,
'Only when a coherent strategy, directed towards these four policy goals, fully integrated into business 
strategy and fully sponsored by line management at all levels is applied will the high productivity and 
related outcomes sought by industry be achieved.'
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For Guest a commitment based system of control is needed to evoke flexible, quality employees 
committed to organisational goals and behavioural outcomes of increased effort, co-operation, 
involvement and organisational citizenship (Guest, 1992 and 1997). For Guest then high employee 
commitment is a primary outcome for HRM because it distinguishes it from earlier orthodox personnel 
management practices which sought compliance (Guest, 1992 and 1997). (It is argued in Chapter 3 and 
elsewhere that profit sharing and share-holding schemes provide valuable inducements to obtain 
commitment from the workforce and to encourage some of those employee behaviours mentioned 
above.)
The cement that binds the system together is made up of three elements - Leadership, Culture and 
Strategy. According to Guest (1992) these ensure that the system is taken seriously within a given 
organisation.
One of the strengths of this model is that it puts considerable emphasis on the personnel role in terms of 
measurable performance outcomes. It also places the goal of employee commitment at the centre of 
personnel practice. However, its weakness lies in the cement, where the role of personnel managers in 
strategic and cultural integration is highly circumspect (Jenkins, 1995).
Conclusions
What is clear from the above discussion is that prior and after the research had been conducted more 
questions were raised about the nature and meaning of HRM than could be answered. For the author 
two issues which are presented in this thesis attempt to answer some of these questions. Firstly, 
questions raised of the importance of line management and general management in the development of 
strategic integration in HRM. Secondly, the importance of rewards exemplified by profit sharing 
schemes and share-holding schemes, a central policy area, and as a means by which motivation, 
commitment and organisational identification could be induced. This in turn raised a number of 
research questions:
1. To what extent have companies in the UK adopted various policies and practices in HRM?
2. Who has responsibility for these policies and practices - personnel or the line?
3. What does competitive advantage mean to managers generally?
4. What is the role and organisation of personnel management in the 1990s?
5. Are there differences between sectors?
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6. To what extent can such policies e.g. rewards, impact on employee attitudes and behaviour in the 
employment relationship in terms of satisfaction, commitment and organisational identification?
7. What form of commitment is this likely to take?
8. What effect is this likely to have on organisational and economic performance? 
These questions will be considered further in Chapter 3.
Chapter 1 • 19
Chapter 2
Approaches and methods in management research
Contents of Chapter 2
Management Research
The Choice of Study
The Choice of Instrument
The Choice of Data
The Choice of Unit of Analysis
The Studies
The PS Research Methodology
The HRM Research Methodology
Conclusions
Chapter 2 • 20
Management Research
Management research involves a wide-ranging and eclectic blend of skills and activities. As Gill and 
Johnson (1991) have noted, the skills and activities involved in the research process are similar to those 
required of the managerial process. To be a good social science researcher and to be a good manager, 
you have to be able to co-operate and work well with a wide variety of people; understand the specific 
methods used in decision-making and problem solving; understand the subject that you are studying; be 
able to convince someone to finance your studies; keep to a schedule and speak and write persuasively. 
However, for the social science researcher, it is an essential requirement that he/she 'develop and 
demonstrate powers of rigorous analysis, critical inquiry, clear expression and independent judgement' 
in researching an area of managerial activity (Gill and Johnson, 1991:4).
Gill and Johnson (1991) are also right when they state that the managerial and research processes are 
faced with risks and uncertainties and in order to reduce these risks and uncertainties both managers 
and social science researchers adopt specific strategies or approaches in any given environment. The 
choice of strategy in social research is found in the choice of research design (for an alternative 
classification of choices see Easterby-Smith et. ol., 1991:33-41) which in turn may be informed by the 
nature of the phenomenon being investigated (Morgan and Smircich, 1980), the resources available 
and/or the nature of the sponsor and, the experience of the researcher and their predisposition's to 
specific research methodologies and philosophies.
The choice of methodologies in the following studies was influenced first by technical considerations, 
by the nature of the questions asked and not by any predisposition to one methodological tradition 
(Walker, 1985:16 Bryman, 1988). Each author had experience of conducting research using 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. Further details on the strategies adopted, the nature of the 
phenomenon investigated, resources and sponsors are provided below.
The Choice of Study
Strategic choices have to be made of the type of study to undertake. Probably the vast majority of 
applied social research, particularly that in management studies, consists of descriptive and relational 
studies and those presented here were no exception. Some studies simply observe, here studies are 
designed primarily to describe what is going on or what exists, for example, to describe the percentage 
of people holding a particular opinion such as employees' views about holding shares in the
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organisation in which they work. These studies ask questions that are primarily descriptive in nature. 
Some studies are designed to explore relationships, to look at the relationship between two or more 
variables, for example, they attempt to compare what proportions of male and female employees invest 
in shares in the organisation in which they work. These studies ask questions that are primarily 
relational, for example, whether there is a relationship between gender and share ownership.
However, when a study is designed to determine whether one or more variables causes or affects one or 
more outcome variables, the study asks questions that are primarily causal in nature. We could 
undertake a market survey to try to determine whether a recent advertising campaign for a particular 
university changed 6* Form student preferences of which university they wished to undertake their 
studies. Here we would essentially be studying whether the campaign (cause) changed the proportion 
of 6th Form students who would elect to go to the university who conducted the campaign in preference 
to all other universities.
The three design questions can be viewed as cumulative. That is, a relational study assumes that you 
can first describe (by measuring or observing) each of the variables you are trying to relate. A causal 
study assumes that you can describe both the cause and effect variables and that you can show that they 
are related to each other. Causal studies are probably the most demanding of the three.
Another important choice in research design is how long the study will take to complete. This is 
primarily seen as a distinction between cross-sectional and longitudinal studies. A cross-sectional study 
is one that takes place at a single point in time. This involves taking a 'slice' or cross-section of what is 
being observed or measured. Both studies are of this type. On the other hand, a longitudinal study is 
one that takes place over time - this involves at least two (and often more) phases of measurement or 
observation.
The Choice of Instrument
Strategic choice in research design involves a choice of instruments (or instrumental presuppositions) 
such as questionnaires, attitude scales, tape and video-recorders, methods of observation, statistical 
formulae, etc. which have been developed to be sensitive to the phenomenon under, investigation. 
However, this is not a straightforward process particularly when the nature of the phenomenon being 
investigated is unknown (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992). Each instrument generates different kinds of
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The second research project was a study concerning the extent to which organisations in the UK had 
adopted various policies and practices in human resource management (the HRM research). This 
research was initiated by the authors and resourced by Cardiff Business School, Swansea Business 
School and the Institute of Management. It involved an examination of the role, organisation and aims 
of HRM, the extent of support for HRM policies and practices, organisational involvement in and 
managerial responsibility for HRM practices and environmental changes that impinge on the practice 
of HRM.
The context of the research was the rise of HRM in the UK and its relationships to a range of policies 
linked to competitive advantage including corporate development, training and development, 
communications and participation, employee welfare and rewards and performance. From this, the 
authors developed a number of specific themes including managerial responsibility for HRM practices, 
HRM and competitive advantage, HRM in manufacturing industry and reward management 
incorporating some of the earlier work on profit sharing and share-holding arrangements.
The PS Research Methodology
In the PS research, the research design involved a number of phases and a number of strategies. In the 
early design stage of the project, the sponsor by means of a research panel provided research advice. 
The first phase involved a two stage random sample survey of British companies that commenced in 
May 1985 with a series of short telephone screening interviews in 1,125 companies designed to obtain 
information on the extent of profit-sharing and share-holding schemes in Britain. From these 
companies 303 were randomly selected to provide a wide range of quantitative data on the operation of 
schemes and factors associated with their adoption. The results of this survey were published in Poole 
(1989). In 1986, the case study or second phase commenced and, from the sample of companies in the 
first phase (303), 22 companies who had adopted schemes were purposively sampled to provide 11 
firms in each of the two regions - (i) South Wales and the South West of England and, (ii) London and 
the South East of England - with a balance of firms in terms of sector and size of organisation.
hi the case study phase, both primary and secondary data were used. Firstly, secondary data was 
acquired from each company to identify changes over the previous ten years including present number 
of full-time and part-time employees broken down by sex, age, length of service, status and income; 
annual absenteeism and employee turnover rates; annual turnover or sales and profits; number of
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derived from the research exercise itself and secondary data derived from previous researches, 
publications or information.
Choice of Unit of Analysis
Much of management research is conducted in a social context. Researchers ask people questions, 
observe people interacting or measure the opinions of people in a group, organisation, sector, or region. 
Another important choice in research design is the choice of the unit of analysis, i.e. who will 
participate in the project. Units of analysis are related to questions of sampling. Pragmatically, in most 
projects researchers cannot involve all of the people they might like to involve. Therefore, researchers 
use sampling techniques to try to obtain a representative sample of such people. When sampling, 
researchers make a distinction between the theoretical population in the study, for example, all 
managers, and the final sample, for example, a representative random sample of the members of the 
Institute of Management. Usually the term unit of analysis refers to the people that are in the 
representative sample and from whom information is gathered, e.g. employees in a company. However, 
the units of analysis need not be people. For some projects the units are organisations, groups, or 
geographical entities like cities or towns. Also, sometimes our sampling strategy is multi-level: we 
sample a number of managers and within them personnel managers.
The Studies
The first research project was a study concerning the extent and impact of profit sharing and share­ 
holding schemes in British companies (the PS research). This research was initiated, resourced and 
sponsored by the Social Science Branch of the Department of Employment. The first phase of the 
project involved an assessment of the origins and development of profit sharing and share-holding 
schemes. This phase of the research programme sought a detailed exploration of the specific processes 
that lead companies to introduce profit sharing and share-holding schemes and the problems 
encountered developing schemes within organisations. The second phase involved an assessment of the 
schemes' consequences for the economic and industrial relations performance of companies, the degree 
of satisfaction of employees, and the extent to which their introduction of profit sharing and other 
related practices occasioned changes in work practices and organisational flexibility. The author was 
involved in both phases of the project but it is from the second phase that the publications arise.
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data with different characteristics and properties and it is no accident that choices of instruments are 
associated with particular theoretical perspectives and with the type of study undertaken. For example,
'The social survey grew out of a tradition which among other things, claimed that the proper 
application of the scientific method to the study of society could result in the rational reconstruction 
of society for the benefit of all. The major advantages of the survey, its ability to reach many 
thousands of widely distributed people, the statistical analyses that can be performed on its data, the 
use of experimental designs, and so on, places it very clearly in the tradition, though whether it 
successfully incorporates science is another debatable matter, which sees social science as 
following a path already trodden so firmly by the natural sciences.' (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992:7)
The path of the natural sciences is one that emphasises nomothetic methodologies (Burrel and Morgan, 
1979: 6-7). An emphasis on deduction, structure in research design using instruments to allow for the 
testing of hypotheses, the production of primarily quantitative data and, forms of explanation, via 
analysis of causal relationships, which encourage the development of laws or rules that pertain to the 
general case. Also, emphasis is placed on the importance of scientific rigour- the use of various 
controls both physical and statistical, upon systematic protocol and technique and the standardisation of 
the research instrument.
In contrast, ideographic methodologies take account of subjective meanings and interpretational 
systems of the 'actor' in order to explain by understanding the phenomenon in question. Here an 
emphasis is placed on induction. Minimal structure in research design using interview or observational 
instruments which allow access to and minimise the reactivity of the subjects of research, the 
production of primarily qualitative data, and forms of explanation grounded in the 'actor's' 
interpretation of reality upon which actions are based.
The Choice of Data
The choice of research design influences the type of data generated. Firstly, if the data is in numerical 
form, the data is referred to as quantitative data. Quantitative data in turn can be explained in terms of:
Nominal data or labelling of different categories, e.g. male or female;
Ordinal data or responses to a questionnaire that offer a range of answers (such as strongly agree,
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree) where the difference in response is
unknown and
Interval data where the difference in response is known, e.g. classification such as age, weight or
salary.
If it is not in numerical form, the data is referred to as qualitative data. Qualitative data can be words or
text, photographs, videos, sound recordings and so on. Distinctions are made too between pnmary data
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Abstract
The subject matter of this submission for a PhD by publication is the rise of human resource 
management in the UK. It specifically examines the responsibilities of line managers and personnel 
specialist and the importance of rewards in identifying the nature of human resource management in 
the UK at the end of the twentieth century. The submission presents an overview of a number of books 
and papers previously published by the author concerning two areas of inquiry (1) profit sharing and 
share ownership schemes and (2) managers attitudes to human resource management.
Chapter 1 presents a critical appraisal of previous work on human resource management that places the 
stimulus for the research and selected publications in context. Also, it examines the rise of human 
resource management and theoretical models of human resource management. Chapter 2 explores the 
design and methodology of the two research endeavours and places these in the context of management 
research. Chapter 3 reviews the outcomes of the research particularly that concerned with the external 
environment and competitive advantage, responsibilities of line and personnel management and the 
integration of rewards. It also presents the main findings of the research and reaches conclusions on the 
nature of management, dissemination and utilisation of the research.
disputes or stoppages per annum, numbers involved and duration, etc. Also, supporting documentation 
in the form of annual reports, brochures, policy documents, minutes, etc. were obtained from the 
companies where permissible. In addition, publicly available data from Companies House, Cardiff was 
used to validate information provided by the companies and also to provide additional measures of 
company performance.
Secondly, ideographic approaches were used. In each company, detailed personal interviews were 
undertaken by means of a Key Personnel Semi-Structured Interview Schedule with key respondents. 
This included senior management closely involved in the development of share schemes and the 
personnel manager. Also, a Trade Union Representative Semi-Structured Interview Schedule was used 
to interview full-time trade union officers and shop stewards in unionised case study companies. The 
numbers of key respondent and trade unionist interviews were determined by the size of the workforce. 
At the research design stage, each of the interview schedules was piloted on senior managers and trade 
unionists in local firms in Cardiff. Few changes were made to the schedules after the pilot but certain 
questions in the trade union interview schedule were redrafted. Responses were recorded in writing by 
the interviewer.
These semi-structured interviews were chosen because they had a number of advantages being a far 
more 'sensitive' form of research than the subsequent employee attitude questionnaire. In these 
interviews, the researcher worked directly with the respondent and had the opportunity to probe or ask 
follow-up questions. Also, interviews are generally easier for the respondent, especially if, as in this 
case, what is sought is opinions or impressions of the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the interviews were 
very time consuming and resource intensive with each interview being subsequently transcribed. Care 
was taken by the interviewer over each stage of the interview process, both in the recording and the 
interpretation of the inferences and nuances of the responses.
Thirdly, nomothetic strategies were adopted using a respondent-completed employee attitude 
questionnaire which was distributed by means of a random sample to the workforce in each company 
to elicit employee views of profit sharing arrangements. At the design stage, the employee attitude 
questionnaire was informed by Long's (1978) framework based on studies of employee attitudes to 
profit sharing arrangements in Canada. A pilot study was undertaken using employees from local firms 
in Cardiff. The pilot research allowed reaction to the questions set particularly in terms of language.
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style, order and sequencing. At this stage a number of potential problems were identified and corrected. 
The questionnaire included primarily closed questions but a small number of open-ended questions 
were also included. Also, the questionnaire used a number of scales including Likert -type scales. Care 
was taken over the format of the questionnaire and here the research panel provided help. The 
instrument was chosen because it was relatively inexpensive to administer when compared with 
interviews and the exact same instrument could be sent to a wide number of employees in the company 
who were able to fill it out at their own convenience. The quantitative data generated by this employee 
attitudes questionnaire was statistically analysed using frequencies, correlation analysis, t-tests and 
factor analysis (see Zeller and Carmines, 1980).
The HRM Research Methodology
In the HRM research publications the research design involved the use of a descriptive survey, a first 
attempt to explore and describe through quantitative analysis the nature of HRM in Britain.
The research instrument used was a respondent-completed postal questionnaire that was designed to 
shed light on a series of issues relevant to the rise of HRM. This included the role of HRM in the 
strategies of the firm; the adoption of human resource policies for gaining competitive advantage; 
employee involvement training and development, work and reward practices; the effects of the 
business environment on HRM together with demographic and other information. Questionnaires were 
posted to a random sample of fellows and members of the Institute of Management in January 1994 
and, to increase the response rate, there was a second posting in March 1994. From the original sample 
of 3,000 there were 909 usable returns (a response rate of 30.3 per cent).
In the design stage of the questionnaire a pilot study was undertaking. This involved distributing the 
questionnaire to managers enrolled on MBA programmes at Cardiff and Swansea Business Schools. By 
this method we were able to elicit managers interpretations and reactions to the questions set. At this 
stage a number of potential problems were identified and corrected particularly in the ordering of the 
questions. The questionnaire used primarily closed questions but a small number of open-ended 
questions were also included. Also, a number of scales including Likert -type scales were used. Care 
was taken over the format of the questionnaire and here help was provided by the Institute of 
Management in terms of proof-reading, presentation and natural sequencing, postal arrangements such 
as covering letter, stamped addressed return envelope and distribution. The instrument was chosen for
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its advantages namely it was relatively inexpensive to administer and the exact same instrument could 
be sent to a wide number of managers who were able to fill it out at their own convenience. But there 
are some disadvantages as well. Response rates from mail surveys are often very low and here the 
second posting was useful to boost the response rate to acceptable levels for a postal questionnaire. 
Also, because of the lack of open questions detailed written responses were limited and the 
questionnaire was highly structured. The quantitative data generated by this survey questionnaire was 
statistically analysed using frequencies, correlation analysis and t-tests.
Conclusions
The studies presented are of a cross sectional design aimed at eliciting attitudinal responses from 
managers and employees and using both methodological traditions in social science research. The 
studies highlight both the strengths and limitations of these methodologies (see Chapter 3) but also 
show that by varying methods of inquiry a richer picture of the phenomenon can be achieved. 
Moreover, the studies show that neither of the methodological traditions is 'perfect', that all research 
endeavours are value laden and that this should be recognised by all who wish to understand 
management practice.
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A Review of the Main Findings
The following provides a review of the main findings of the two studies and in doing so pays particular 
emphasis to those findings which the author believes have greater significance and more lasting 
consequences for future research in HRM.
The External Environment and Competitive Advantage
The external environment in the early 1990s was characterised by increasing competition and
improvements in total quality (Publication 6). Managers environmental concerns included greater 
governmental regulation particularly in the public sector, changing employee values, the increasing 
reliance on technology and changes in the workforce. Surprisingly, the European dimension had little 
impact. Whereas technological change was viewed as important by large private sector organisations.
A number of human resources policies were linked explicitly or implicitly to the search for competitive 
advantage including corporate development, communications and participation, employee welfare and 
the linking of rewards to performance. However, changes in personnel practices were circumspect. In 
employee involvement, for example, evidence was apparent of a widespread use of regular meetings 
with supervisors and work group/team briefings, newsletters and handling of individual grievances but 
more collective forms of involvement were less common. In training and development, appraisal and 
management development together with training needs analysis and competence-based training were 
generally adopted but other initiatives remained limited in scope.
A similar pattern was found in work practices, where quality control and employee feed back on 
performance were highly rated. Incentive-based schemes still dominated the climate of reward 
practices but with some emphasis on skill and knowledge based pay. However, our respondents 
concluded that the dominant factor was the rise in importance of equal pay for equal work stimulated 
by government regulation.
Also, Publication 9 highlights that these patterns are consistent across manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing sectors. However, Publication 7 re-emphasises that a range of policy initiatives is 
needed to enhance competitiveness including more employee responsibility, more support for skills 
development and training, more effective employee involvement practices, the recognition of wider
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influences on employee behaviour and the redesign of reward systems. It is argued that these HRM 
policy initiatives are more likely to promote sustained competitive advantage in British companies.
Responsibilities
The main conclusion arising from Publication 8 is line managers have considerable responsibility for
human resource practices, encompassing employee involvement, training and development and work 
systems. Indeed the findings of the HRM study support the view that line management have always 
had a significant responsibility for personnel practices in the UK. Personnel is more likely to be 
involved in reward management where there are government initiatives or where trade unions are 
relatively powerful. Moreover, trade union strength appears to be linked with a greater degree of 
personnel influence; particularly where employee involvement practices are based on the trade unions 
channels such as formal collective bargaining. Here the declining influence of trade unions provides a 
more consistent explanation of the dominance of the line rather than the rise of HRM.
The evidence does not support the central proposition that the rise of HRM is defined by a shift in 
responsibility from personnel to the line. Rather it is indicative of continuity in practice. The exception 
to this rule is reward management and this needs further explanation.
Rewards
In Chapter 8 it was concluded that factors such as size of organisations and whether the firm is growing
play an important part in the location of responsibility for reward practices and pointing to diversified 
approaches in HRM. Personnel/human resource departments play an important role in this area having 
most responsibility for reward practices particularly in company or plant wide schemes. Whereas line 
management have responsibility for incentive based practices. The importance of reward management 
to the rise of HRM cannot be underestimate and therefore needs further consideration.
Also, in Publication 6, for example, we learned that British managers are involved in a wide range of 
reward practices with particular importance given to equal pay for equal work as a consequence of 
external regulation. As noted above, incentive based pay arrangements remain dominant but changes in 
the composition of the workforce highlight the growth of skilled based and knowledge based pay 
arrangements. Of significance too is the finding that the growth in profit sharing and profit related pay 
schemes had peaked but remained popular.
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Publication 10 reinforces the importance of HRM in this area at policy level, where there does appear 
to be a significant reliance on merit and individual performance and the design of reward systems to 
reinforce customer service and quality, innovation and creativity and productivity. But, as far as actual 
practices are concerned, HRM type reward systems have not been implemented.
However, there is a coherence and integration in reward systems, particularly in performance related 
approaches, which leads to the conclusion that in firms in which 'new' pay policies are developing 
these may well be strategic in compass (see also Kessler and Purcell, 1994). There appears too to be a 
clear distinction between private and public sector arrangement in this regard with individualistic 
reward systems being offered more in the private sector (see also Burgoyne, Jenkins and Poole, 1999). 
This has implications, raised in Publication 8, regarding the status quo position where limitations to the 
transformation of the personnel role mean that existing structural features remain intact. Nonetheless, 
there is evidence to suggest that a proactive and strategic focus on reward policies is likely to promote 
policies linking rewards with performance but that this may be circumscribed at the level of 
implementation where line management is dominant.
It is in the remuneration of employees that HRM has made its impact felt particularly in company wide 
schemes and those linked with employee performance and where the adoption of a diverse range of 
policies are linked to the HRM role in the organisation. It is here that evidence of strategic integration 
and a proactive response to HRM issues has been found.
The development of profit sharing and share-holding schemes in the 1980s were thought to be 
indicative of the new HRM approaches to reward (see Publication 1 and 3) where the design of pay 
systems sought to engage the commitment of employees. In this superior relationship, employees do 
not 'compensate for their dissatisfactions with intrinsic rewards by demanding improvements in 
extrinsic rewards, particularly pay' (Beer et al, 1984) In this context the meaning attached to pay 
systems by employees becomes important in supporting the normative ideology of the firm. Reward 
systems that not only change attitudes and behaviour but 'praise those who serve the new values' 
(Ulrich, 1984). However, what is of salience here is whether such reward policies and practices can 
elicit changes in attitudes, behaviour and performance (see publications 2 and 5) by generating the 
commitment needed (Guest, 1992). If HRM has had the greatest impact on rewards then evidence of
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the development of HRM objectives should be apparent particularly in company wide schemes and 
where personnel departments are thought to have greater responsibility for implementation.
Firstly, Publication 4 notes that competitiveness is often the consequence of a series of small-scale 
improvements which have a significant cumulative effect and that profit sharing and share-holding 
schemes as part of a broad range of measures to improve competitiveness can have some impact. This 
may be seen in terms of improved employee motivation and commitment together with greater 
flexibility and adaptability resulting in higher levels of productivity and profitability. However, the 
introduction of such reward policies are likely to signal a change in the relationship between the 
manager and the employee particularly when the employee and manager are both part owners of the 
company. It is significant that here too the role of the line or general management is important as is the 
existence of participative or consultative managerial approaches noted in the HRM research.
Undoubtedly, the most important impact of profit sharing and share ownership arrangements is the 
improvement of organisational identification and commitment (see Publication 1). Improvements in 
communications and satisfaction clearly derive from such schemes but this relationship is founded on 
an instrumental orientation. Here commitment is not generated by developmental or humanist concerns 
but by more rational approaches that emphasise the need to promote and maintain company 
profitability. The interdependence of profitability and satisfaction generated by profit sharing and 
share-holding schemes does not result in changes in employee behaviour or improvements in individual 
performance (for a recent review see Pendleton, 2000). Such schemes may operate more at an 
ideological level in promoting a view of the firm that identifies with commercial values and concerns 
rather than broader societal values and concerns.
The claims that profit sharing and share-holding schemes invoke employee commitment may therefore 
be over exaggerated and other policy initiatives in this regard are likely to receive similar responses 
from employees. Indeed, the prevalence of instrumental values among employees as found in the PS 
study may produce diverse effects on HRM policies and practices overall.
These findings cannot answer all the questions posed in Chapter 1 but they do provide clear insights 
into the nature of the new orthodoxy in understanding the changes in the employment relationship in 
the UK.
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Reflections on the Nature of Management Research
We noted at the end of the methodological section the benefits of using insights from a variety of 
methodologies and perspectives. What Watson (1997:3-6) has referred to as a strategy of 'pragmatic 
pluralism' where conceptual frameworks are taken from various social science paradigms or disciplines 
and are developed into a single coherent perspective.
'... an approach whereby a researcher in producing an analysis of some aspect of social life, draws 
elements from various disciplines or perspectives to produce what amount to their personal 
paradigm - with its own ontological, epistemological and methodological integrity - to stand as the 
conceptual foundation for that particular piece of research.'
In reflecting on the nature of the research presented here it is useful to remember that the study of 
management is by its very nature interdisciplinary, pluralistic and embedded itself in managerial 
practices regarding the management of knowledge (Knights and Willmott, 1997). Management 
research has been a marriage, and at times not a comfortable one, between the 'traditional disciplines' 
of the social sciences - anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology - with that of the functional 
traditions in management including finance, marketing and personnel management. In this context, the 
incremental drift from traditional social science disciplines to generic processes or techniques such as 
HRM should not mean an abandonment of the traditional disciplines in favour of managerialism but the 
application of disciplinary standards, procedures and methods to provide a secure framework to 
approach management research. But in doing so, one must be aware of the limitations of social science 
research and in particular the methodological limitations of the studies presented.
Methodological Limitations
We have already noted that the survey instrument has particular strengths (Chapter 2). For example, the
HRM survey can be viewed as a cross sectional generalised picture of the role of HRM and of the 
support for a variety of policies and practices which go beyond the limitations of ideographic research 
in which the focus is likely to be on a few cases. However, the survey instrument is particularly subject 
to sampling and respondent biases. For example, the sampling frame of members of the Institute of 
Management restricts its representativeness in that not all managers belong to this body. Also, care had 
to be taken to ensure the sampling was systematic in that checks and balances were introduced not to 
over duplicate addresses thus providing a low probability of organisational specificity. Secondly, the 
respondents were biased toward male senior management and executives but all sectors are included 
and there is a wide range of size of organisation. Thirdly, the postal-questionnaire response rate is
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within acceptable limits but the survey may develop a picture representative of management or simply 
represent the views of a subset of respondents who, for unknown reasons, are more willing to respond 
to surveys of this type.
If this was not enough, it should be remembered that the natural science or positivist presuppositions 
that underlie the survey instrument are contested in the social sciences by the notion that
'.... all activities which pose as science can be traced to fundamental assumptions relating to 
everyday life and can in no way be regarded as generating knowledge with an 'objective', value- 
free status, as is sometimes claimed' (Burrel and Morgan, 1979: 255).
hi the social sciences then, the data derived from the survey, indeed any method, is not value free but 
informed by the values of the social researcher as well as those of the respondent. For many in the 
social sciences the questionnaire survey instrument imposes an external logic on the behaviour or 
attitudes of the respondent, in that the respondent's own interpretation of the phenomenon or the 
meanings which he/she places on them are not addressed. For example, in the case of the PS employee 
questionnaire and the HRM questionnaire employee and manager responses were constrained by the 
choices imposed by the researcher in the design of the questions both in terms of structure and 
language. Moreover, the questions posed are subjected to the internal logic of the respondent which 
may or may not be the same as that of the researcher e.g. did the employees really understand the 
questions asked of them? In this sense, the respondent's own interpretations of the language, structure 
or imagery of the question is not taken into account and the subjectivity of the response is unrealised. 
The HRM survey data has managers as the unit of analysis and presents managerial perceptions of the 
state of HRM. As such, responses to questions may be mediated by their understanding and perception 
of among other things, HRM itself, the image of themselves, their profession or their organisation.
However, Bryman (1988:101) has noted that:
... the extent to which investigations within this tradition are nomothetic is often exaggerated. 
Surveys are often not based on random samples and, even when they are, they refer to highly 
restricted populations.
In both these studies randomness while an aim is far from perfect. It should be recognised too that 
interviews such as that used in the PS study are as much a social encounter as any other discussion 
between individuals and as such cannot be exempt from the normal social processes that govern such 
encounters (Ackroyd and Hughes, 1992:113). In this context, each interview is unique and 'influenced' 
by the interviewer and by his/her previous experience of the schedule.
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These qualifications highlight the view that much of contemporary social research is based on 
probabilities. This means that the inferences we make in social research have probabilities associated 
with them—they are seldom meant to be considered covering laws that pertain to all cases. The use of 
statistical controls only allows us to estimate probabilities for the phenomenon under study.
In some areas of social research, the qualitative-quantitative dichotomy, together with the 
presuppositions underlying them, has led to protracted arguments with the proponents of each arguing 
the superiority of their kind of data over the other (for issues surrounding this debate see Bryman 
(1988) and Ackroyd and Hughes (1992): Chapter 2). Essentially, proponents of quantitative design 
argue that their data is 'hard', 'rigorous', 'reliable', 'credible', and 'scientific' while the proponents of 
qualitative design counter that their data is 'rich', 'deep', 'sensitive', 'detailed', and 'contextual'.
Ackroyd and Hughes (1992:30) argue that the choice between either is neither urgent nor necessary. 
There is no intrinsic virtue to either design for the following reason:
What we are being asked to choose between are promissory notes, not achievements. There is a 
great deal wrong with quantitative methods just as there is a great deal wrong with qualitative ones. 
Both kinds are, as it were, in much the same boat...both are still in their infancy and neither one 
markedly superior to the other in all respects. (Their emphasis.)
This kind of polarised debate obscures the fact that qualitative and quantitative data are intimately 
related to each other (Bryman, 1988) as can be seen in the PS research. As we have already noted, all 
quantitative data derived from people is based upon qualitative judgements (value, meaning, 
interpretation); and all qualitative data can be described and manipulated numerically, for example, 
NUDIST.
Conclusions
The HRM research was the first UK national survey to elicit the views of managers to solely HRM 
issues and is one of the major UK surveys on HRM carried out to date. The HRM research highlights 
the national development of HRM and provided a means to empirically explore and evaluate the nature 
of HRM in the 1990s both domestically and internationally. It has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of the rise of HRM from a managerial perspective and provides a number of insights 
into specific aspects of this phenomenon. More specifically, it has contributed to a theoretical 
understanding of the role of HRM, human resource polices and competitive advantage, responsibility
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and HRM and the theory of rewards. In the author's view, it will lead to a better empirical and 
theoretical under standing of HRM in the 21 st century.
The PS research was one of the major comprehensive inquiries into the development and impact of 
profit sharing and share-holding schemes in Britain in the post-war period. It reconceprualised the 
impact of profit sharing and share-holding schemes in industrial relations, organisational and economic 
contexts. It provided a theoretical model of how profit sharing and share-holding schemes impact on 
economic and financial performance together with an examination of industrial relations performance 
and organisational identity, commitment and performance.
However, it could be argued that both of these studies could only be measured in terms of their utility, 
on their impact on managerial action and the academic community.
The Utilisation and Dissemination of Research
Easterby-Smith et. al. (1991) emphasise that the link between management research and action is often
very weak. Management obtain ideas for organisational change and development from a range of 
sources e.g. from colleagues, from trade, from professional networks, from professional and academic 
journals, from conferences and from researchers both academic and consultant driven. For managers, 
questions of 'usefulness' or 'relevance' arise from the need to close the gap between theory and 
practice or to solve organisational problems. For the researcher, recognition by their peers is essential 
to further careers but arguably recognition of their work by managers is of equal importance. However, 
as Easterby-Smith et. al. (1991) point out 'usefulness' may not be a central expectation for academic 
researchers. Such expectations tend to be linked to the production of'knowledge' reflected in, amongst 
other things, successful PhDs, publications in refereed journals, books and research reports or even the 
RAE. Indeed, 'usefulness' may also be a minimum consideration in research design. Webb (1961) 
highlighted that the most common criteria for selection of a research project were:
Curiosity: Is the researcher interested?
Confirmability: Is it likely that answers are possible?
Costs: Can the research be funded?
Compassion: Will the research help?
Cupidity: What is the benefit or reward for the researcher?
Conformity: Is the topic in vogue?
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All researchers are influenced to varying degrees by these criteria and this researcher is no exception. 
Knight and Wilmott (1997:14) have stated that 'the ultimate test for usefulness is not some abstract 
formulation of usefulness' but rather 'the rhetorical skills to convince managers that this is so'.
'Usefulness' then may not be a suitable outcome for academic research though pressures from within 
and outside academia at the beginning of the 21-Century may point otherwise. As Richardson (1989) 
argues academic researchers should be judged not only on research results by their peers but also on the 
dissemination of their efforts from which 'usefulness' may arise. Researchers should be responsible for 
disseminating their research findings as widely and as imaginatively as possible; to prepare special 
material to fit the specific needs of the targeted audience and to build into the research design time and 
resources for dissemination. The author, while not claiming to have conformed to these responsibilities 
in all cases, would like to think that his efforts, as demonstrated in Appendix B and illustrated in the 
bibliography, have been consistent with their spirit.
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Appendix A
The Candidates Role in the Investigations
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This appendix contains a statement from the co-author Michael Poole on letterhead.
A table outlining the candidates contribution to each publication and is signed by both authors. The 
framework, according to the guidelines provided by the UK Council for Graduate Education (1966:11), 
identifies four stages:
1. Design of the investigation
2. Conduct of research
3. Analysis of the results
4. Preparation of the work for publication
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The Impact of Economic Democracy: Profit-sharing
and employee share-holding schemes, 1990.
Routledge, London. ISBN/ISSN: 0-415-03587-2
Abstract 
This book considered the impact of profit sharing and share-holding schemes at the company
level and is the core of the research on profit sharing and share-holding schemes presented 
herein. Reporting on the views of 2000 employees in 12 major companies, it provides an 
assessment of the consequences for the firm of adopting profit sharing and share-holding 
schemes in Britain in terms of their economic and industrial relations performance, the degree of 
satisfaction derived by employees who participate in the schemes and the extent to which the 
adoption of such schemes occasions changes in work practices and organisational flexibility.
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This is the second volume of a study concerning profit-sharing and 
employee shareholding schemes in the company. The first book 
involved an account of the origins and development of schemes, 
while the second entails an assessment of their consequences for 
the economic and industrial relations peformance of companies. 
the degree of satisfaction of employees, and the extent to which the 
introduction of profit-sharing and other related practices has 
occasioned changes in work practices and organizational flexibility.
The data presented in the two monographs derive from a project 
initiated in the Social Science Branch of the Department of 
Employment and sponsored by this particular governmental 
department. The early design work was undertaken by Gillian 
Smith who subsequently produced an article from (he survey stage 
of the research entitled 'Profit sharing and employee share owner­ 
ship in Britain' for the Employment Gazette (September 1986, pp 
380-5). There were two principal phases to the project: (1) a survey 
of companies in Britain; and (2) case studies of selected firms 
derived from the enterprises included in Stage 1.
The survey commenced with a series of short telephone screening 
interviews in i,125 companies that were designed to obtain infor­ 
mation on the extent of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding 
schemes in Britain and to provide a sample for subsequent detailed 
interviews. This was followed by the so-called 'main stage' survey 
of 303 firms in Britain in which a wide range of data was gathered 
on the operation of schemes and the factors associated with their 
adoption or non-adoption. The questionnaires for the survey were 
developed jointly by IFF Research Limited, DE Social Science 
Branch, and Michael Poole. The fieldwork was carried out in May 
1985 by IFF under the direction of Judy Morrell. In August 1985, a 
data tape was transferred to the University of Wales College of 
Cardiff (UWCC) to enable Michael Poole to conduct a more 
detailed analysis of the survey material. At this point, Joan Wright
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carried out the necessary computing work with considerable speed 
and skill.
At the design stage of the research, it was recognized that a 
further case study phase would be necessary in order to allow for a 
detailed exploration of the specific processes which lead companies 
to introduce profit sharing and the problems encountered develop­ 
ing schemes. Above all, it was considered important that an assess­ 
ment should be made of the views of employees. In consequence, 
the Department of Employment commissioned Michael Poole to 
carry out the case study phase which included: (1) detailed inter­ 
views with key management respondents; (2) interviews with full- 
time trade union officers and lay representatives; (3) the gathering 
of data on company performance; and (4) the administering of a 
questionnaire to a substantial number of employees (approximately 
2,000).
The case study phase of the research commenced in spring 1986 
and involved 22 companies selected from the 303 firms in the 'main 
stage' survey. To ensure a regional balance, the companies were 
divided equally between South Wales/the South West of England 
and London/the South East of England (further details and the 
methods used appear in the Appendices). The case study phase was 
directed by Michael Poole, while Glenville Jenkins and Michael 
Gasiorek provided research assistance.
During the survey stage of the research Francis Butler was 
integrally involved in the project and Peter Brannen chaired 
various meetings of both the survey and case study phases. 
Towards the end of the case studies, Neil Millward assumed chair­ 
manship of the steering committee meetings. At UWCC, Brian 
Moores and Andy Thompson provided valuable advice on statisti­ 
cal techniques for handling the survey data.
Throughout the survey and case study stages, Gillian Smith 
handled the project with considerable skill and thoroughness. 
Valuable comments were provided by members of the steering com­ 
mittee for the case studies and especially by Stephen Creigh, John 
Cullinane, Dorothy Green and Michael Lott. In the case study 
companies, there were many respondents who gave considerably of 
their knowledge and time and, without such assistance, the project 
could not have been a success. The comments of Euan Cameron 
were particularly insightful in this respect. Richard Long helped 
considerably by providing a copy of a questionnaire from his own 
research which helped to inform many of the items in the employee 
attitudes survey. IFF Research and, especially, Judy Morrell, 
offered very valuable assistance to the UWCC research team to 
secure contacts with the case study companies. Moreover, for their
r re face
considerable efforts in typing this monograph a special word of 
thanks is due to Marina Miller and Karen Owen.
It is hoped that the two volumes of this study on profit-sharing 
and employee-shareholding schemes, The Origins of Economic 
Democracy (published in 1989) and the current volume will help to 
shed considerable light on the operation of prof it-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes in Britain. The Department of Employ­ 
ment deserves particular gratitude for funding I lie research though, 
naturally, any views expressed are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the funding body.
Michael Poole and Glenville .lenkins
Chapter one
Introduction
Profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes may he inter­ 
preted from a number of distinctive vantage points. In Ilic first 
place, they may be uncleistood in terms of the spread of ownership 
rights to the workforce. On this view, the aim is to eradicate 
permanently the longstanding antagonism and opposition of 
capital and labour. Secondly, they may be linked with policies on 
employee participation and organizational democracy, witli the 
objective of increasing the sense of identity of employees with the 
companies in which they work. And thirdly, the case may be 
advanced in terms of competitiveness. Profit sharing and employee 
shareholding are seen to advance this through improved motivation 
and commitment of the workforce, together with greater flexibility 
and adaptability and higher levels of productivity and profitability. 
Moreover, these policies are further linked with the broader 
economic objectives of reducing unemployment 'uui inflation.
These various arguments in favour of employee financial partici­ 
pation are examined in depth and detail in this volume. But it is 
essential to point out at the outset that there are many and varied 
forms of this phenomenon, the effects of which will probably not 
be homogeneous. For example, ownership rights are likely to be 
enhanced most dramatically through producer cooperatives and 
worker buyouts. By contrast, profit sharing through share schemes 
may be sufficient to occasion a sense of participation. And cash- 
based forms of profit sharing are likely to have the mosl immediate 
and direct effects so far as competitiveness is concerned.
Financial participation by employees is thus a complex and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. The first volume on this issue, 
The Origins of Economic Democracy, was designed to uncover the 
forces which underpin the growth of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes and their varied rates of adoption by com­ 
panies. This second volume has a different focus: to examine the 
consequences of the introduction of schemes for company and
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individual performance. In the first chapter, the growing literature 
on this issue is examined in relation to the economic, industrial 
relations and organizational impact of schemes. This is followed by 
the specification of a number of analytical frameworks and models 
in Chapter 2. Evidence from the Department of Employment 
sponsored research of profit sharing and share ownership is then 
examined in relation to the impact of schemes. Following this 
analysis, the varied sets of data are interlinked by means of detailed 
case studies. Finally, an evaluation of the consequences of profit- 
sharing and employee-shareholding schemes is undertaken in 
relation to the main debates on this subject in Britain and overseas.
Profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes are connected with 
a number of diverse forms of industrial organization where at least 
part of the equity is owned by the workforce and/or part of total 
employee remuneration is linked with the profit performance as an 
addition to existing pay arrangements. In the first volume of this 
study we showed that the number of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes in the late 1970s and 1980s has expanded 
considerably, even though only a minority of employees is currently 
covered by schemes of this type. It was also observed that growth 
has particularly occurred in firms in the financial sector and in 
companies with managements broadly committed to developing 
employee involvement. Moreover, there is no doubt that the recent 
advancement of schemes has been stimulated by facilitative legisla­ 
tion and tax incentives. And the expansion of schemes can also be 
linked with the wider share ownership movement as a whole 
(Grout, 1987).
Turning, then, in this volume to examine the impact of schemes, 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes are widely held to have 
had a substantial potential effect upon economic and industrial 
organization. This potential : s embodied in a complex of economic, 
industrial relations, sociological and psychological interpretations. 
For economists, profit sharing is viewed as a way to improve a 
company's financial performance and to control inflation, increase 
levels of employment, improve the distribution of wealth and 
occasion economic stability. For the industrial relations scholar, it 
is seen as radically influencing the relationship between managers, 
employees and unions, redesigning methods of remuneration and 
reducing conflict and antagonism in the workplace. For the 
sociologist, the impact is in terms of changing the nature of social 
relations and attitudes to work. And, for the psychologist, 
improvements in morale and motivation of the workforce are 
envisaged resulting in higher output and productivity in the firm 
as a whole. The breadth of the potential impact thus makes an
understanding of (he more substantive consequences of piulil- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes a vital consideration.
For us there are three issues which are central to (he debates on 
the potential effects of profit sharing and shaic-ownciship 
schemes. These are: (!) fhe economic impact of profit sharing; 
(2) the impact on industrial relations; and (3) the effects on 
organizational performance expressed in lei ins of employee eflorts 
to work harder, to eliminate waste, to improve efficiency, to 
increase quality and to reduce costs.
Economic impart of profit sharing
The economic assessment of the consequences of profit-sharing 
and share-ownership schemes has been developed al both macro 
and micro levels. The fust refers to the wider economy and the 
second to (he firm or company level.
Macro-economic impact
To begin, with, then, economists have been concerned wiih the 
impact of profit-sharing arrangements on (lie macro-economic per­ 
formance of nations and have stressed that workers are being 
priced out of jobs because the present wages system is inflexible 
and inefficient. On this view, profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes occasion a reduction in unemployment and in inflation by 
making wages more responsive to changes in economic pei torm- 
ance. This occurs by means of the 'sliding scale' principle which 
links a proportion of wages to profits and/or sales of the company. 
As sales or profits decline so does profit related pay. Moreover, it is 
further argued that if labour costs are proportional to (otal costs, 
labour costs will have less of an impact on prices and create greater 
employment flexibility. As a consequence, employers will be 
unlikely to make workers redundant. Hence, a radical and universal 
reform of the remuneration system, where a proportion of wages is 
linked to profits or sales, would reduce both unemployment and 
inflation.
Undoubtedly the most influential assessment of I he macro- 
economic impact of profit sharing is contained in Weit/.man's The 
Share Economy (1984). However, Weitzman is best envisaged as 
part of a long tradition of economists who have advocated ihe 
introduction of some form of profit-sharing scheme, his pre­ 
decessors including Keynes (1940), Meade (1964) and Kelso and 
Adler (1958). Centra! to Weitzman's argument is that lack of wage 
flexibility is one of the basic causes of both unemployment and
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inflation. He thus proposes the transition from existing economic 
relations to a share economy where the labour market would 
experience a constant excess demand for labour and in which 
permanent full employment at competitive remuneration, no 
inflation and an improvement in working conditions and employee 
attitudes have been effected.
Weitzman's solution to wage inflexibility and thereby unemploy­ 
ment and inflation is thus to create a new universal remuneration 
system in which profit sharing plays an important role. This new 
system is made up of two components: (a) a base wage as under 
existing payment systems; and (b) a profit related wage - a 
proportion of the per capita profit earned by the company. Under 
(his payment system, an employer will hire more workers if the 
added llxed cost of each additional worker is less than the added 
revenue that this worker will produce. Although the hiring of more 
workers will reduce profit per worker (and hence their level of 
remuneration), tola! profits will increase.
However, there are many criticisms of Weitztnan's macro- 
economic analysis, and these centre on the problems of imple­ 
mentation and the extent of the schemes impact on existing 
economic relations. These are examined in lerrns of: (a) employee 
risk; (b) the arbitrary nature of profit sharing; and (c) the 
employment and inflationary impact.
In contrast to Weitzman's view, wage inflexibility may be 
explained in terms of wage stability which highlights the risk- 
adversity strategies of employees. In particular, contracts are 
entered into with the employer precisely to avoid the wage flexi­ 
bility that can have a substantial impact on the employee's own 
financial planning in the domestic sphere. Profit-sharing schemes 
can thus expose workers to a significant and unacceptable amount 
of income risk. And even if profit sharing is share based, the risk 
may be all the more substantial since a declining share price can 
lead to a dwindling rather than appreciating asset for the workers 
concerned. Moreover, profit-sharing schemes are potentially 
arbitrary and unfair in that the locus of decision-making over the 
distribution of income/profits lies outside employee influence and 
may bear only an indirect relationship with a particular worker's 
efforts.
Nevertheless, recent American research gives some indirect 
support to Weitzman's arguments concerning employment and 
suggests that employment growth is particularly likely in firms 
where employees have share option schemes and therefore own a 
proportion of the equity. Thus Rosen and Klein (1983) examined 
employment growth in 43 employee owned companies (including
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cooperatives) and found thai employment in these companies grew 
nearly three times as fast as in traditional firms.
However, it should be noted that growth in employment could 
occasion further problems. Current workers and Ihcir union repie 
sentatives may wish to prevent the firm from hiring extra indi- 
viduals because any expansion in employment drives down the 
existing employees' remuneration (Blanchllower and Oswald. 
1987; Mitchell, 1987). And large variations in pay between firms 
may conflict with the principle of equal pay for equal work 
(Derrick, 1969: 158; Mitchell, 1987). Employers may actually 
prefer more wage stability than employment stability for, under 
conditions of full employment, employees will, in the short run. 
quickly move to firms offering higher total wages. Fuilhcrmore. 
the increased level of employee turnover could he detrimental to 
economic efficiency in the short term. It is likely, therefore, thai 
employers and workers may have considerable opposition to such a 
fundamental change in (heir remuneration systems. Indeed, wage 
pressures on the share economy are likely to be considerable.
Moreover, so far as inflation is concerned, the share economy 
may be inherently unstable. Indeed it may be inflationary if a wage 
component is maintained and the profit component of pay com- 
prises an additional element in (he total remuneration package of 
employees (see Mitchell. 1987; Blanchflower und Oswald, 1987).
In principle, of course, opposition to change in (lie remuneration 
systems can be overcome by: (I) tax incentives in the short run; and 
(2) reduced employee involvement in the long run (Weitzman, 
1985a). But against this, such subsidies may turn out to be merely 
cosmetic with both management and unions colluding over pay and 
profit levels (see Burton, 1986; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1987). 
Secondly, an essential political component in the share economy is 
that employee involvement in decision making (and particularly on 
employment decisions) should be minimized. Above all, a reduction 
in the influence of trade union and collective bargaining machinery 
and other forms of employee organization which may affect the 
labour market is viewed as essential. Hence, (he reduction of 
employee participation, a cornerstone of Weitzman's argument, is 
a development which would run counter to ongoing trends in (his 
direction and to the tendency for various types of employee 
involvement to be interconnected (see Volume I).
Micro-economic impact
Economists have also been concerned with the micro-economic 
effects of profit sharing and particularly with the consequences for
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company performance. Briefly, both company profitability and 
worker productivity are seen as likely to improve following the 
introduction of profit-sharing schemes. Given such major claims 
for the impact of piofil-sharing schemes, it is thus important to 
examine in more detail Ihe micro-economic consequences of profit 
sharing.
A wide range of studies (and notably from the USA) have 
pointed to a relationship between profit-sharing and share-owner­ 
ship schemes and company economic and financial performance. 
Generally, firms which have profit-sharing arrangements have been 
shown to outperform non-profit-sharing firms. This applies to 
profits as a percentage of net worth and income, turnover, net 
worth, dividends and share price (Metger and Colletti, 1971; Conte 
and Tannenbaum, 1978). In (he UK, too, in an analysis of share 
valuations in the retail sector, Richardson and Nejad (1986) have 
argued that financial participation occasions a significant improve­ 
ment in company performance on Ihe stock market. Moreover, 
they provide some support for the proposition that a strong 
managerial commitment to profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes improves performance as well. Furthermore, as was shown 
in Volume i of our study, there is a clear link between the adoption 
of schemes, and trends in business volume and annual turnover of 
companies.
Yet, despite these and other research findings which we will 
examine shortly, there still remains some doubt as to whether com­ 
panies perform better because they have profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes; or whether (hey are successful companies 
which would perform well even without such schemes but fee! they 
should share the success of the company with their employees.
Profitability
To analyse these arguments further, the effects of employee 
financial participation on profitability and productivity are 
examined in greater depth. Although British research on the impact 
of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes on the economic 
performance of companies is relatively limited, in the USA several 
studies have examined this relationship. In one of the earliest of 
these, Conte and Tannenbaum (1978) compared the profitability of 
30 companies with employee ownership arrangements. They found 
that those companies with employee ownership arrangements were 
1.5 times more profitable than those firms of comparable size 
which did not have such arrangements. More recently, Wagner 
(1984) found that companies with at least ten per cent employee
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share ownership performed equally as well on oveiall returns on 
investment as other companies in the same industry. Moieovcr, on 
net operating margin, growth of sales, hook value/share and return 
on equity, firms with employee ownership outperformed (lie oihei 
companies studied by 62- 75 per cent.
However, the research findings are no! entirely consistent. 
Indeed, Livingstoneand Henry (1980), Uhagat, Hrickleyand Lease 
(1984) and Edwards (1987) discovered that, on average, employee 
share ownership had an adverse affect on profitahilily. Moreover, 
Brooks, Henry and Livings(onc(1982) found (hat employee share 
ownership schemes (ESOPs) had no significant effect on prolils. 
Similarly, in a survey of 1(X) companies with employee-ownership 
schemes, Tannenbaum, Cookc and Lohmann (1984) found thai 
profitability and financial growth did not differ significantly from 
firms without employee ownership schemes. Companies with 
schemes, however, were found to have a higher rate of survival 
during the period of the study (1976 to 1982).
None (he less, it should be stressed that some inconsistency in Ihe 
findings is not surprising, since employees' efforts in improving the 
profits of their firm may be counterbalanced by events outside (heir 
control. Indeed, the impact of external events on company profit 
ability may enhance or reduce profits within a typical firm 
regardless of the initiatives or efforts of (he majority of employees.
Productivity
The impact on productivity is primarily concerned with incentives 
and, according to Nuti (1987: 24), the viability of profit sharing 
'depends in large measure on these productivity-enhancing effects'. 
It is hypothesized that the introduction of profit-sharing schemes 
will create an incentive to work harder and more effectively in 
order to improve profits. Unlike traditional incentives which link 
individual effort to reward, profit-sharing schemes are a social or 
group incentive where the efforts of all employees contribute to 
improved rewards (either through cash or shares). This form of 
group incentive is organizationally based and, because it leaves 
considerable discretion to employees to avoid increasing their 
productive effort, il may increase the need for management super­ 
vision as well. None the less, such disadvantages can be avoided if 
the incentive is linked to work or peer groups at the level of the 
task, with employees acting as monitors of other workers' 
performance. As Nuti (1987: 23-4) as proposed:
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A productivity increase can be expected (at no cost to the 
workers) as a result of intelligent and effective use of any 
given individual level of effort, cooperating with other workers 
and management, and monitoring and supervising each other's 
effort, efficiency and cooperation.
Indeed, the impact on productivity may be particularly strong 
where there is: (a) a limited number of employees; and (b) indivi­ 
dual employees can link their increased effort or productivity 
directly to profits performance.
There is also some, albeit limited, empirical evidence to support 
the view that increased employee commitment in the profit-sharing 
firm raises productivity levels. This conclusion is suggested by 
American studies which have compared commitment and produc­ 
tivity in employee-owned plywood firms aud supermarkets with 
traditional firms in the same industries (Bellas, 1972; Greenberg, 
1984). Furthermore, Marsh and McAllister (1981) examined 128 
US companies with Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) 
schemes and found that, on average, productivity increased 0.78 
per cent per annum in these firms compared with an average 
decrease of 0.74 per cent for a weighted national sample of similar 
companies.
Impact on industrial relations
The case for extending employee financial participation has also 
been articulated in terms of the impact on industrial relations. 
There are a number of partly separate and partly interlinked 
arguments here which relate to: (a) management-union relations 
generally; (b) industrial conflict (including strikes and rates of 
absenteeism and labour turnover); (c) managerial authority 
relations; and (d) trade unions and collective bargaining.
Management-union relations
The change in employee status from employee to employee share­ 
holder may thus have implications for industrial relations within 
the company. !n principle, employee shareholders may be con­ 
sidered to be a fairly homogenous and identifiable group with 
common interests both in terms of their corporate investment and 
in their employment relationship with the company and, as such, 
their collective interests may differ from those of the ordinary 
employee. This has implications for existing channels of repre­ 
sentation and participation, particularly through trade unions.
Inirotlufiion
Above all, it is conceivable that, as a result of increasing their 
identification with other shareholders and wilh I lie company, 
employee shareholders may perceive lidle need for collective tepre- 
sentation of their inierests by trade unions, (his may mean thai the 
position of trade unions in the company could he weakened and a 
schism created between ordinary employees and employee share- 
holders, thereby reducing (he level of .solidarity in (he union (Webb 
and Webb. 1914). Alternatively, if employee shareholders retain ;m 
instrumental orientation to work, their attitudes may not difler 
markedly from those of ordinary employees and the importance ol 
the wage/effort bargain may still be dominant. On this \ic\\. ilie 
trade union traditional role will be little changed. However, 
employee shareholders, because of (heir common interest wilh 
other employees and improved slalus as shareholders, may seek 
additional individual or collective participation in decision making 
ihrough the union. And, if (he majority of employees me shaie 
holders, this could significantly change (he traditional adversarial 
or conflictual role ol trade unions to one of providing an alterna- 
tive to managerial expertise in the efficient nmmng of the 
company. Conversely, it could extend Ihe range ol' conflict lo 
encompass areas where management is viewed as not performing its 
traditional functions.
Turning more specifically to industrial conflict, ii has long been 
argued (hat one of the main effects of profit-shai ing schemes is the 
reduction of conflict in Ihe workplace (Webb and Wehh, 19(4). 
Some recent research has also pointed to this conclusion (I ong. 
1978a; Estrinand Wilson, 1986). However, there .still remains some 
ambiguity as to the impact of ownership on industrial conflict. 
While Long (1978a) and Estrii* and Wilson (1986) have suggested 
that employee ownership reduces conflict; others, such as Meade 
(1986), have argued that profit sharing could increase il. Hy 
contrast, Stern (V (?/ (1983) have proposed that industrial conflict 
will decrease in the short term because of the employees' efforts 
either to protect jobs or to increase profits or both; but increase in 
the long term and become more intense because of dissatisfaction 
with the control structures in (he enterprise that typically obtain 
under most profit-sharing and share-ownership arrangements.
But industrial conflict itself is a multidimensional phenomenon 
with both attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. It may well be. 
therefore, that any assessment of the impact of profil sharing and 
employee share ownership requires a detailed analysis of various
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aspects of conflict such as strikes, labour turnover and absenteeism 
(see, for example, Eslrin and Wilson, 1986). indeed, it may be the 
case thai there are variable consequences of the introduction of 
schemes on each of these (and on other) dimensions of conflict 
itself.
Managerial authority relations
Employee share ownership is also thought to have implications for 
managerial authority relations. Indeed, on one view, the employee 
is placed in a position to delegate the running of the company to 
management. However, in reality, the increasing diversification of 
share ownership effectively means that the status of the employee 
shareholder is litlle different from that of the small investor, whose 
impact on company affairs is undoubtedly marginal. Therefore, 
litlle real influence in the day-to-day running of the company can 
be expected from minority shareholders such as those in share- 
ownership .schemes.
Indeed, although employee financial participation and decision- 
making involvement are linked, share-ownership schemes are rarely 
accompanied by significant relocation of control as in the case of 
cooperatives or totally owned employee concerns (Woodworth, 
1981b; Russell, 1984). In certain cases, as in the majority of recent 
privatized companies in the UK, workers have received a sub­ 
stantial number of shares as a gift (or fringe benefit) but without 
gaining significant ground in exercising greater influence or par­ 
ticipation in decision-making. Furthermore, there is said to be little 
expectation of control under these arrangements (Hammer and 
Stern, 1980; Long, 1-981, 1982).
The legitimate basis for managerial authority to control the 
enterprise rests not only upon expertise in running the company but 
also on property rights. Employee share ownership potentially 
affects the property relation of managerial authority .when 
employees purchase shares in the firm. As shareholders, employees 
attain additional financial interests in their companies. However, 
as with other shareholders, the employee shareholder delegates 
operational responsibility to management for the efficient perfor­ 
mance of the company and a sufficient return on his or her invest­ 
ment. Employee shareholders have no joint ownership over the 
property or assets of the company or little direct influence over its 
personnel. Their rights remain limited to those of liability and 
interest on shares they own. Thus, particularly in large organiza­ 
tions, mere share ownership often amounts to a situation of little 
real influence by minority shareholders.
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Share ownership Joes, however, confer certain rights on I he 
shareholder such as electing (he board of directors, (lie ligln to 
financial information about the company and participation in the 
annual general meeting. Moreover, Long (1981: 4^) has argued thai 
employee shareholders are in a stronger position Ilian (he typical 
shareholder in a large company. This is because employee shaic- 
holders have access to much more information and knowledge 
about the company simply because they work llieie. L'.mployrc 
shareholders are concenlralcd wilhin ilic oigani/alion and noi 
dispersed as is the case wilh oilier shareholders. Employee share­ 
holders in the company are, therefore, a fairly homogenous and 
readily identifiable group wilh common interests based on a 
specific employment relationship, ll is possible, ihrreforc, that the 
collective representation of employee shareholders interests may. a\ 
we shall see, effectively counter manageiial expertise on certain 
issues either through shareholder institutions (the company hoard) 
or through traditional avenues of employee representation 
(collective batgaining).
But, so far as industrial relations are concerned, no issue is more 
fundamental than the potential impact of employee financial parti­ 
cipation on trade unions. As has been noted earlier, profit sharing 
and share-ownership schemes can effect a change in the character 
of the union's constituency from one of representing employees lo 
one of protecting the rights of employee shareholders (Sockell, 
1983). But this change is contradictory (o the development of 
traditional trade unionism, being fundamentally opposed to (he 
principles of collective bargaining and trade unionism (see Webb 
and Webb, 1897, 1914; Cole, 1957). To (he extent that profit- 
sharing schemes reduce labour turnover and labour mobility, they 
remove a necessary condition for the individual employee to make 
the best possible bargain with his ur her employer. And, as we 
noted in Volume 1, such schemes may destroy "the community of 
interests' on which collective bargaining depends by creating a 
vertical schism between employees. Hence, they may reduce trade 
union solidarity and bargaining power.
More recent evaluations of this pessimistic role for trade unions 
is provided by Hanson (1965), Bradley and Gelb (I983b) and 
Bradley (1986). Bradley and Gelb (198Jb: 57) thus nufe in Ihvir 
review that the:
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. . . transitions to employee ownership appear to be able 
potentially to weaken the nationwide, traditional role of trade 
unionism as representative of the working class through the 
mechanism of collective bargaining.
Bradley (1986: 60-1) has also suggested that profit-sharing 
arrangements form part of a general demise of union influence 
through traditional channels, in that:
With limited resources and tight monetary policy, traditional 
collective bargaining is seen as a zero sum (or negative sum) 
game, where one man's wage hike is another's unemployment. 
Thus, a new cooperalivism between trade unions and 
management is encouraged and the focus of industrial 
relations is shifted away from traditional collective bargaining.
None the less, there is evidence, notably from the American 
context, to suggest that employee share ownership has not led to a 
reduced perception for the need for trade unions (see Stern and 
Hammer, 1978; Long, 1979). This is particularly evident where 
power relationships continue to remain unequal, as characterized 
by unequal equity holdings among differing employee groups and a 
lack of democratic control within the firm. Indeed, in these 
instances, the perceived necessity for trade unionism may increase 
in the long term (Long, 1979).
But some changes in the union role under profit-sharing and 
employee ownership arrangements can be expected (Whyte, 1978 
and Jenkins, 1979 quoted in Sockell, 1983; Long, 1980a; Bradley, 
1986b; Mitchell, 1987). More specifically, it may be anticipated 
that the union's role will significantly change if a substantial 
proportion of wages is linked with profits performance. Paradoxi­ 
cally, however, this may not necessarily be to the detriment of the 
union. Indeed, shop stewards may increasingly have to deal with 
the problem of so-called 'accounting manipulation' (eg transfer 
pricing) in order to ensure that the relative share of profits accruing 
to the membership is reasonable (see also Webb and Webb, 1934). 
This would require even greater disclosure of information to unions 
or employee representatives than at present. Moreover, this level of 
provision would eventually give rise to increased managerial 
accountability and trade union assessment of management 
decision-making. As a consequence, the union's nonnai 'reactive' 
role (Crouch, 1982) in formal negotiation may change. Above all, a 
greater role in certain types of decision-making would be required 
to augment the size of the employees' share of the profits. And the
increased expertise needed, particularly with regard to piofii 
allocation, could require a more centralized union slturluie nnd 
possibly a move away from plant level bargaining arrangements.
Indeed, on another set of assumptions, profit sharing mny 
increase unionization. Thus, Mitchell has aigued thai a profit- 
sharing system puts non-union employees at a disadvantage in ilmi 
they have no voice in management decisions which affect ihcir 
share of the profils. He agrees with (he Webbs (1914) dial 
employees could not adequately verify the size of I he financial 
share without the union's organizational expcitise and baigaining 
power. Hence the union's claim to expertise could be crucial lu 
increasing its decision-making and regulatory role and thus iis 
ability to recruit membership amongst profit-sharing participants. 
But of course such a change would require a modification in tradi­ 
tional union policies towards profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes.
Organizational intpiict
Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that attitudes rather than 
behaviour are more affected by the introduction of profit-sharing 
and share-ownership schemes. Bell and Hanson (1984, 1987) have 
thus reported high levels of support by employees for profit sharing 
in principle and for company schemes and an increased interest in 
the profits and financial results of the company. Nearly a half of 
the respondents (47 per cent) said their loyalty to the firm had been 
strengthened and just over a half (51 per cent) felt that !hc schemes 
made people work more effectively (Bell and Hanson, 1984, 1987; 
see also Fogarty and White, 1988).
Turning to the third broad area where the impact of profit- 
sharing and employee-shareholding schemes has been examined, 
there are several issues of relevance to the potential consequences 
for organizations. These include: (1) employee involvement; (2) 
organizational identity; (3) employee satisfaction and commitment; 
and (4) attitudes to the employment relationship.
Employee in volvemen t
As we have seen in Volume 1, profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes may be initiated by management for a number of reasons 
among which are to improve the productivity of their employees, 
increase their sense of loyalty to the company or to augment the 
level of employees' direct participation in the company. As such 
they form part of a managerial strategy to influence the level of
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oulpul, the degree of commitment and the level of joint decision- 
making between management and employees. Furthermore, it is 
thought that profit-sharing and particularly share-ownership 
schemes offer employees the opportunity to increase their involve­ 
ment in the workplace, improve their level of financial under­ 
standing and the degree of communication between employees and 
management.
Employee participation in ownership has thus been viewed as a 
means for employees to influence company policy and to share in 
the rewards of work. For Tannenbaum (1983) and Long (1978a) in 
particular, employee ownership results in an increase in levels of 
worker participation and control. After all, through share owner­ 
ship, employees achieve certain control rights which they would 
otherwise nol possess. Long (1979), for example, has concluded 
that employee share ownership increases worker influence at 
organizational policy levels. The employee's desire for worker 
participation is increased by share ownership because ownership 
confers a legitimate right to participate in decision-making. It also 
increases 'organizational identification' which, in turn, leads 
workers to become more interested in the affairs of their places of 
work (Long, 1981: 851). These additional rights and stronger 
organizational identity thus increase the desire of workers for more 
influence in decision-making at policy, departmental and job levels 
in the company.
Studies of worker cooperatives have also pointed to improve­ 
ments in participative arrangements (see Russell, Hochner and 
Perry, 1979; Greenberg, 1980; Rhodes and Steers, 1981). And other 
investigations (Long, 1980b; Conte, Tannenbaum and 
McCullough, 1980; Tannenbaum, Cooke and Lohmann, 1984) 
have reported that the percentage of company shares owned by 
employees is positively related to increased employee participation. 
By contrast some analyses of individual firms (see eg Hammer and 
Stern, 1980) have found no significant relationship between 
employee ownership and perceived or desired worker influence. 
Indeed, for Hammer and Stern (1980), share ownership may be 
associated with a decline in the desire for worker influence (see also 
French and Rosenstein, 1984).
Hence the research findings on employee participation remain 
contradictory and do not clearly point to a conclusive relationship 
between ownership and employee participation in decision-making. 
However, such research clearly provides some, if limited, evidence 
of an association between ownership and participation (Klein and
Rosen, 1986).
Profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes, then, may impact
upon managerial practice and control in organi/alions by increas­ 
ing the degree of participation both directly (voting lor llie bouid 
of directors) and indirectly (increasing the level and degree of 
communications and managements' formal or informal icsponsive- 
ness to employees' collective interests) (Milchell, 1987). This may 
be further enhanced because, as Long (1981) notes, managerial 
attitudes towards worker participation may be influenced by 
employee share ownership. First, management may respond lo ihc 
changed basis of their authority and the increased desire for 
participation in decision-making broiighl about by workers' legiti­ 
mate properly rights and increased organizational idcniiiy. 
Secondly, employee share ownership may increase managerial per­ 
ceptions of the legitimacy of increased employee involvement. 
Thirdly, managers may believe that the perceived increase in 
commitment shown by workers results directly from employee 
share ownership and may promote further formal participation to 
enhance this development. And fourthly, employee share owner­ 
ship may occasion increased delegation of authority al all levels iu 
'he organization.
Further evidence (Rosen. Klein and Young, 1985) also confirms 
Long's emphasis on the importance of management's philosophical 
commitment to share ownership in significanlly enhancing the 
effects of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes with regard 
to employee involvement and commilmenl to the company. 
Moreover, it should be stressed that the effectiveness of profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes may have more lo do with 
managerial philosophy and style than with !he level of shaie owner­ 
ship per se (see also, Richardson and Nejad, 1986; 1'oolc, 1988).
Organizational identity
A further argument in the literature relates to organizational 
identity and to instrumental attachments to work. It is hypothes­ 
ized that when employees become shareholders they will have a 
further financial incentive to increase the woith of (heir share 
investment. This form of incentive has advantages over other forms 
in that, although indirect, it is thought to be long term and self- 
reinforcing (Copeman et al, 1984). Moreover, financial incentives 
are considered to be more effective when linked with ownership 
and, inasmuch as share ownership increases the employee's 
financial stake in his/her place of work, it also increases the instru­ 
mental importance of work. Thus, employee shareholders may be 
even more inclined to direct (heir individual and collective 
behaviour towards the corporate goal of increased profits rather
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than to the traditional worker's goal of higher wages and improved 
conditions of work (Meade, 1964; Copeman, 1976; Copeman etai, 
1984; Bradley and Gelb, 1983b).
However, employee share-ownership schemes involve more than 
just the reward/effort relationship. Employees who participate in 
these schemes can now be clearly identified in a fundamental way 
with other shareholders through their common investment in the 
firm. More than this, the schemes, in changing the employee's 
stains from one of 'employee' to 'owner' can occasion a link 
between employee interests and the interests of shareholders and 
the company (Nichois, 1964: 77-9; Wigbam, 1973: 528; Ramsay 
and Haworlh, 1984). Thus, in contrast with cash-based schemes, 
share-based arrangements (while also appealing to employees' 
instrumental orientations) purport to create a moral''commitment 
to work and organizational goals and to effect substantial changes 
in employee attitudes and behaviour by creating a broader 
'ownership identity' amongst employees generally {Long, 1981: 
851). The identity with the company is encouraged by increased 
communications between management and the employee share­ 
holder over and above that of the ordinary employee. Thus, 
employee shareholders receive the company's annual financial 
report and other shareholder information in addition to existing 
disclosure of information arrangements in the company (whether 
through management's own initiatives or through collective 
bargaining). Regardless of the employee's competence to evaluate 
such information, this involves an increase in communication of 
the financial status of the company and of important company 
policy. And, as such, it is scarcely surprising that Be!! and Hanson 
(1984, 1987) have reported high levels of support by employees for 
profit sharing iu principle and for company schemes and an 
increased interest in the profits and financial results of the 
company. Indeed, nearly a half of the respondents (47 per cent) 
said their loyalty to the firm had been strengthened and just over 
half (51 per cent) felt that the schemes made people work snore 
effectively (Bel! and Hanson, 1984, 1987; see also Fogarty and 
White, 1988).
In sum, it is thought that the combination of these factors may 
occasion art identification of employees with the firm and the 
products it produces. Indeed, the increased employee identification 
and commitment to the company and the enhanced interest in work 
may also influence either prospective employees to join, or existing 
employees to remain with, the company itself (Webb and Webb, 
1897; Copeman and Rumble, 1972).
Employee satisfaction and commitment
But does the introduction of profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes transform employee attitudes? So far as employee satisfac­ 
tion is concerned, there are thought to be at least two ways in which 
this may be improved through share ownership, i'irst of all share 
ownership may directly affect employee satisfaction in the sense 
that ownership itself confers benefits on employees (such as, 
increased financial rewards). Secondly, it may indirectly ailed 
employee satisfaction by increasing employee influence and 
involvement (Long, !978a).
Turning to the actual evidence. Long (!978a and b) and 
Hammer, Stern and Gurdon (1982) have found positive relation­ 
ships between employee ownership and employee satisfaction in 
individual firms. Also, a larger and more recent study by Roscn 
and Klein (1983) suggests that under the right conditions, employee 
share ownership can lead to increased employee satisfaction. 
However, other American studies have reported no significant 
difference in employee satisfaction between employee shareholders 
and non-shareholders (Hammer, Landau and Stern, 1981; Trench 
and Rosenstein, 1984).
The different findings may stem in part from the likelihood that 
satisfaction and commitment will be significantly influenced by the 
size of the company's contribution to the schemes (the amount of 
shares ihe participants receive and management's philosophical 
commitment to worker ownership). This would suggest that 
employees may regard the company's financial contribution as an 
important element in improving their morale and satisfaction at 
work (Rosen, Klein and Young, 1985). Other findings also suggest 
that the number of shares employees own, and the value of these 
shares, has some bearing on the perceived need for greater par­ 
ticipation and control. Indeed, in Hochner and Gramose's (1983) 
study of a proposed employee buyout, employees highlighted entre- 
preneurship (financial gain being prominent) and participation as 
the major benefits of employee ownership.
Satisfaction may also stem from improved financial benefits. 
Thus, in Long's (1978a) study, employees felt that the advantages 
of employee ownership were in order of preference: financial gain; 
the satisfaction of working for oneself; greater influence in 
decision-making; a chance to benefit from one's own efforts; and, 
better understanding between management and employees. And 
Rosen and Klein (1986) concluded (hat employees are primarily 
motivated and inspired by the potential financial rewards of the 
schemes than any other factor. More generally, too. there is
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evidence from other than North American sources that employees' 
perceptions of the benefits of schemes arise from instrumental 
orientations to share schemes. Goklstein's (1978) West Australian 
study suggests that improvements in overall satisfaction, commit- 
ment, application (effort) and responsibility are positively related 
to the economic performance of the company. As a consequence, 
employee share ownership is viable only so long as the company 
can maintain a reasonable level of performance. (For other 
supporting evidence of the importance of employees' instrumental 
orientations lo share schemes see Hammer and Stern, 1980; 
Greenberg, 1980; Rhodes and Steers, 1981; Rosen, Klein and 
Young, 1985.)
In short, the impact of employee share ownership on worker 
satisfaction links any improvements here to both the financial 
rewards of share ownership and to the possibility of enhanced 
employee participation. Moreover, what is clear is that there is an 
instrumental motivation of workers in becoming shareholders. 
However, this instrumentalism may take different forms such as 
protecting one's job, one's sole source of income (Stern and 
Hammer, 1978), or increasing financial awareness (French and 
Rosenstein, 1984).
Attitudes to the employment relationship
A final potential consequence of employee financial participation is 
that a change will be effected in employee attitudes to work, career 
and to social class relationships more generally. Not only is it 
hypothesized that employees will be more committed to productive 
efforts (see the section on the micro-economic impact of schemes) 
but also that they will wish lo remain with the company and hence 
develop an organizational, rather than an individual, career 
commitment (for relevant studies see Long 1978b, 1980; Russell, 
Hochner and Perry, 1979; Hammer, Stern and Gurdon, 1982; 
French and Rosenstein, 1984).
Above all, it is argued that possession of shares means that the 
employee owns productive wealth and a part of the means of pro­ 
duction. Against this, however, the employee's occupational 
position and his or her placement in the division of labour remain 
unchanged. Thus, employee shareholders differ theoretically in 
their class position from both ordinary employees and larger scale 
owners of capital. They occupy an ambiguous class position in that 
participants in share ownership schemes own the means of produc­ 
tion, sell their labour power to others and do not directly control 
the work of others. However, share ownership may not only make
Introduction
the worker more sympathetic with the institution of private 
property (Copeman, Moore and Arrowsmith, 1984) but also raise 
both material and intrinsic expectations (Goldstein, 1978). 
Paradoxically, this in turn may result in greater dissatisfaction at 
work and possibly increased industrial conflict if employers fail to 
meet these new expectations (Rothschild-Whin and Whitt, 198ft).
Chapter two
A model stud company economic 
and financial performance
So far. then, we have seen that profit-sharing and employee- 
shareholding schemes (together with developments in economic 
democracy more generally) have been advocated from a variety of 
standpoints. Indeed, economic, industrial relations and organiza­ 
tional arguments have all been marshalled to support the intro­ 
duction of schemes. However, we have also noted that research 
findings on the impact of schemes are not consistent and while, on 
balance, they indicate some irnproverrn .its in performance are 
likely to stem from the adoption of schemes, the effects would 
appear to fall substantially short of some of the more sweeping 
claims of ihe more ardent proponents of these practices.
At this juncture it is thus appropriate to examine in more depth 
and detail the impact of schemes based on the research findings of 
the Department of Employment project. We cannot of course use 
the data to test all the arguments which have been advanced in sup­ 
port of profit sharing {and, in particular, the macro-economic case 
is largely ignored). But the research material does allow a range of 
interesting and original findings to be brought to bear on the 
discussions on: (1) the economic and financial performance of 
companies; (2) the industrial relations implications of the introduc­ 
tion of schemes; and (3) organizational performance. Details of the 
methods used and the types of data available are set out in 
Appendix one.
This chapter begins with a research model to link theories and 
data. This is followed by an analysis of the impact of profit-sharing 
and employee-shareholding schemes on the financial performance 
of companies.
International research models
In the growing international literature on employee financial 
participation, a wide variety of models have been constructed that 
are based on different research objectives and assumptions.
A model and co/n/mny perjonnaine
In the USA, writers such as Hammer and Stern (1980), French 
(1987) and Pierce, Rubenfeld and Morgan (1988) have attempted to 
construct frameworks of profit sharing and its effects by focusing 
on a variety of instances at individual, group and company levels. 
By contrast, in Canada, in a series of articles, Long (1979, !98(>a, 
1980b, 1982), has concentrated on discovering (hose factors thai 
moderate the relationship between employee ownership and 
predicted outcomes at the level of the firm. More specifically, in 
Long's influential conceptual framework (1978a), the idea of 
organizational identification is viewed as being based on three 
interrelated phenomena: integration, involvement and commit­ 
ment. Following Argyris (1964), integration generally refers to the 
individual's perception of shared interests and goals with other 
members of the organization and in particular vertical integration. 
It is deemed to influence organizational performance by enhancing 
job effort and cooperation. Involvement is defined as a feeling of 
solidarity, a feeling of membership or belongingness. Involvement 
is hypothesized to be particularly apparent in three highlighted 
consequences of employee share ownership. These are: (a) that 
share acquisition leads to greater association with the firm; (b) mat 
communications are increased in that additional company informa­ 
tion is provided to the employee; and (c) that indirect involvement 
arises through integration. Further, in Australia, Goldstein (1978) 
has formulated a model of employee shareholder motivation linked 
with attitudinal responses at the level of the firm. Above all, based 
on the work of Vroom (1964), Goldstein has highlighted two major 
motivational factors or orientations resulting from employee share 
ownership; economic gain and intrinsic arousal.
A model for this research
For our part, the main elements of a research model on the impact 
of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes are set out in 
Figure 2.1. The adoption of profit sharing and employee share­ 
holding is seen, to encourage greater organizational identification. 
This may occur from higher levels of either intrinsic or extrinsic 
commitment. Intrinsic commitment arises from greater direct 
participation, security, status and job satisfaction. Extrinisic 
commitment potentially sterns from instrumental rewards, oppor­ 
tunistic gains or long-term investment advantages.
The main outcomes for companies are identified in terms of 
improved financial, industrial relations and organizational per­ 
formance. Financial performance includes high levels of profit­ 
ability and productivity. Industrial relations performance is 
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Survey data
In the survey stage of the research, a clear link between company 
growth and financial turnover on the one hand and the adoption of 
profit-sharing schemes was established (see Volume 1). Further 
information was also obtained on the perceived success of schemes, 
the results of which are set out in Table 2.1. Data are presented of 
success ratings using objectives of schemes considered lo be very or 
fairly important in establishing a type of arrangement. It will be 
seen that Approved Profit Sharing (APS) schemes in particular 
were regarded as fairly successful as a tax efficient reward (for both 
company and employee), for ensuring a greater profit conscious­ 
ness amongst employees and for resulting in employees benefiting 
from company profitability. However, the impact of schemes as an 
incentive for greater profitability and for increasing employees' 
understanding of financial issues were perceived to be far more 
restricted.




APS 5.1 1 £ share Cash
To make employee's feel lliey are part 
n(" I he company
To main' employees more prol'ii 
conscious
To inciea.se sense of cominilmeni to the 
company
To ensure Mini employees benefit from 
company profitability


















Incentive tor greater productivity
To increase sense of respect between
ivuiiiagemeiil ami workforce
To increase employees' understanding
of financial issues














Note: Mean success ratings on a bcale 5 lo 1 (5 = very successful) of objectives raled as very/ 
fairly important.
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Key respondents' views
Turning more specifically to the case study data, our interviews 
with key respondents reinforced and amplified these findings. 
Indeed, a number of respondents argued that, in their view, profits 
were affected by forces over which the ordinary employee had 
virtually no control. Profits were seen to stem either from tite 
sound policies and judgements of lop executives (and hence the 
favourable assessment of Executive Share Option (IESO) schemes 
for this level of employee), or from a series of external environ­ 
mental movements over which most organization members had no 
real influence. Forces of significance cited by the respondents 
include exchange rate movements, oil prices and the behaviour of 
foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, at one extreme, as the company secre­ 
tary of an oil exploration company noted, 'In this business, profit 
sharing and shaie ownership can have no real effect on profit­ 
ability'. Above all, key respondents noted considerable problems in 
measuring any direct consequences of schemes on profitability, 
because there are inevitably many other influences of potential 
consequences here. So far as the main types of schemes are con­ 
cerned, ESO schemes, and to a lesser degree APS schemes, were 
seen to be the most likely to impact upon profitability. As we have 
noted, this applied especially to ESO schemes because of their 
potential consequences for the behaviour of senior executives, APS 
schemes were also perceived as potentially, if indirectly, valuable 
because they could serve to reduce labour turnover amongst 
competent staff who were difficult lo replace.
At this juncture, it is also worth recalling the survey stage 
findings on trends in the workforce, wheie 67 per cent of firms with 
only APS schemes had experienced increases in employment in the 
last four years. This contrasted markedly with firms with only Save 
As You Earn (SAVE) schemes, where 35 per cent of companies had 
witnessed increases in the workforce (and 52 per cent had experi­ 
enced a decrease). Given that SAVE schemes are particularly linked 
with the industrial relations policies of companies, it is scarcely 
surprising that any impact of these schemes on profitability was 
seen as typically indirect. Managers in finance deparlmcnts 
appeared to be more hopeful that the schemes would impact upon 
profitability than their colleagues in personnel functions. But the 
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been unsuccessful in making employees more profit conscious/ 
more interested in the company's success; providing for a more 
efficient means of reward for employees and (he company and 
ensuring that the employees benefit from Ihe company's profit­ 
ability. However, in the majority of instances, schemes were 
typically judged to have been neither successful nor unsuccessful. 
This applies to acting as an incentive 1o greater productivity, 
helping to hold down wage claims and increasing employees' 
understanding of the financial rewaids of the company.
In order to assess the strength of significance of these data and 
their links/views on profit-sharing schemes factor analysis was 
employed. It will be seen from Table 2.6 that two factors were 
isolated that referred to financial incentives and financial rewards 
respectively.
In the first factor (financial incentives), highly significant 
relationships were found between attitudes to each scheme and 
maidng employees more profit conscious/more interested in (he 
company's success and increasing the sense of cooperation between 
management and workforce. However, the relationship was much 
stronger for share-based schemes. This would suggest that positive 
attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes, but par­ 
ticularly share-based schemes, leads to an identification with 
company goals and improved management/employee relations. 
Moreover, share-based schemes were also found to be similarly 
associated with increasing employees' sense of commitment to the 
company/making staff more likely to stay, acting as an incentive 
for greater productivity, making employees feel they are a part of 
the company and increasing employees' understanding of the 
financial issues that face the company. The exception was the 
association of schemes with helping to hold down wage claims, 
though this had a significant but weak association with executive 
share option schemes. Again, significant but weak associations 
were found between attitudes to cash-based schemes and making 
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10 11 11 20 8 4 8
42 47 38 42 29 27 22
33 29 36 8 38 34 52
4 3 5 3 7 11 6
4 3 3 7 10 17 4
3 3 3 14 3 6 4
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The impact of economic democracy
employees' understanding of the financial issues that face the 
company. Share based schemes do appear, therefore, to provide a 
financial incentive to employees and have more of an impact on 
employee altitudes than cash based schemes.
In the second factor (financial rewards), again the importance of 
share-based schemes can be noted. Highly significant relationships 
were discovered between views on share-based schemes and the 
adjudged success of schemes in providing a tax efficient means of 
reward for employees and for the company and in ensuring that 
employees benefit from company profitability. Although signifi­ 
cant relationships were identified between cash-based schemes and 
providing a tax efficient means of reward for the employees and the 
company for most of the items weaker associations were found. 
Again, then, the relationship between financial rewards and share- 
based schemes appears to be much stronger than that for cash-based 
schemes, suggesting the advantages of share type arrangements for 
developing an identification of employees with managerial goals 
and objectives in (he company as a whole.
In summary, then, although employers in general did not con­ 
sider that schemes had been particularly successful in achieving 
managerial objectives so far as financial performance is concerned, 
views on profit sharing schemes in general were linked with their 
assessments. And certainly positive views on share-based schemes 
are interlinked with the view that profit sharing has enabled 
management Io achieve a number of the financial objectives of the 
schemes themselves.
The relationship between profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes and economic performance of the companies remains a 
central issue in much of the literature. One way of assessing this 
relationship is by detailed analysis of individual cases where the 
relationship between the adoption of schemes and their impact on 
economic performance can be more readily observed. In the case 
study stage, we therefore examined, where possible, each 
company's financial performance over a ten year period on the 
basis of a number of indicators (annual profits after tax, annual 
turnover and sales, annual capital-labour ratio and annual earnings 
per share). Much of this information was provided by the 
companies themselves but, where necessary, information was 
gathered from existing published sources.
The analysis focuses on a single company within each industrial 
sector over a given period of time. More detailed comparative
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analysis of the data was not possible given that the data loi each 
company may differ slightly in terms of accounting practices, lighls 
issues, corporate reorganization and so on. These differences aic 
less serious, however, if the analysis concent rales on individual 
companies over a given time period. Moreover, given that we me 
concerned with examining (he relationship between (he impact of 
individual schemes or a combination of profit-sharing and shore- 
ownership schemes and company economic performance, case 
study material lends itself more readily to (his mode of analysis. 
Furthermore, in each context, the data provides a valuable 
indicator of the relationship between profit-shaiing and share- 
ownership schemes and economic performance.
The first case chosen is a finance sector company with a workforce 
of 2,800. The company had introduced an unapproved SAYK 
scheme in 1976 and had an unapproved CSO scheme running 
through from 1976 to 1984. An unapproved SAYE scheme was 
intioduced in 1980, an approved ESO scheme in 1984 and an APS 
scheme in 1985. What impact, if any, can we infer this adoption of 
schemes had on economic performance?
On the basis of the accompanying evidence (Table 2.7), it would 
appear (o be the case that while the unapproved schemes had link 
impact on company performance, the approved schemes had a far 
greater impact, and that this particularly applied to (he positive 
consequences of the SAYE and ESO schemes. Certainly the trends 
in after tax profits, turnover and earnings per share are suggestive 
of such a relationship. Indeed, after tax pmfits in the company rose 
spectacularly and consistently from {9.7 million in 1980 (o i'33J 
million in 1985. Turnover over the same period was {49.2 million 
and C138.7 million respectively, with earnings per TZIip share 
rising front 5.97p to 20.05p.
However, following the adoption of (he unapproved schemes in 
1976, there followed a period of static or declining economic per­ 
formance until 1980. Company performance then improved and 
was acfom/wmed by the introduction of a SAYE scheme and an 
impressive performance followed throughout the 1980s. The fact 
that the earlier unapproved schemes had little impact on economic 
performance suggests that the rVVnmg of schemes may be crucial to 
company success. Moreover, it could also he argued that the 
upwardly rising trend in fortunes provided a positive setting for (he 
development of ESO and APS schemes i:i (he mid-1980s which 
appeared, if anything, to (rigger further improvements in 1985-6.
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The introduction of schemes in the 1980s thus helped to reinforce 
an already expanding business with an impressive performance on 
profits, turnover and earnings per share. Significantly, the relatively 
later introduction of an APS scheme was associated with the aware­ 
ness of a potential loss of able personnel when it became clear to 
the company that many of their competitors were developing 
schemes. ESO schemes were seen as absolutely fundamental 
because key personnel who left the firm would typically take their 
clients with them. Hence, these had been set up in 1976 well before 
the 1984 Act and considerably prior to the substantial improvement 
in company profitability (which had been aided by the relaxation of 
exchange controls).


























































Nine: * 1986 change in share value from 25p to !2'/ip. 
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Case 2: A manufacturing company
This involved a large manufacturing concern with a workforce of 
over 57,000 employees. It had introduced an early profit-sharing 
scheme in 1954 and an unapproved SAVE scheme in 1979. In 1980, 
an APS scheme had been introduced followed by approved SAYE 
and ESO Schemes in 1984. The adoption of profit-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes paralleled changing economic fortunes 
for the company in question. In 1979, the firm's after tax profits 
were a healthy £490 million but fell to £361 million in 3980 and
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£167 million in 1982. A recovery in 1983 produced after tax profits 
of £418 million, £661 million in 1984 and £604 million in 1985 
(Table 2.8). Also, earnings per £1 share slumped from 79.2p in 
1979 to 22.lp in 1980 and remained relatively low until improve­ 
ments in 1983 which produced earnings per share of 65.3p, 98.2p 
and 86.4p in 1983, 1984 and 1985. However, turnover from sales 
rose slowly for most of the period from £2,332 million in 1979 to 
£3,011 million in 1985.
The after tax profits and earnings per share in this company are 
thus dominated by an abrupt decline in 1979 and the early 1980s on 
which the existing schemes for profit sharing and share ownership 
had little impact. Again, reinforcing the importance of external 
factors, the decline is explicable almost entirely by the unfavour­ 
able exchange rate movements of the period and the consequences 
that these had for a large number of British firms in manufacturing 
industry (this is suggested further by the fact that turnover 
remained fairly satisfactory throughout the period).

































































fJole: 1954 — SAYE (NA); 1980 — APS; 1984 — SAYE, ESO.
The company met the crisis it experienced in profitability and 
earnings per share by a major restructuring exercise, by substantial 
redundancies and by increasing significantly the extent of its 
overseas investments. Its ability to carry out such a major organiza­ 
tional change was recognized as having been assisted by a good 
industrial relations climate (in which employee involvement 
generally was a prominent feature). However, profit sharing and 
share ownership was in no way an insurance against a major decline 
in profitability occasioned by the adverse external conditions cited
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above. On the contrary, the company had adopted both SAVE and 
APS schemes at the crucial period of its decline and arguably it 
awaited the economic recovery in 1983 before the introduction of 
the SAVE and CSO schemes in 1984.
Case 3: A service sector company
In the services sector, a large company with a rapidly expanding 
turnover and level of profitability was selected. The firm had 
concerns in hotels, entertainments, gambling and a variety of other 
leisure activities with over 20,000 employees in the UK. In 1979, it 
introduced an APS scheme followed by an approved SAVE scheme 
in 1983. An ESO scheme was set up earlier in 1971 and adopted in 
1978 receiving approval from the Inland Revenue in 1984.
Although the APS scheme was introduced before the commence­ 
ment of our series of economic indicators, the approved SAVE and 
ESO schemes came on stream against a background of consistently 
rising I rends in after tax profits, turnover, capital-labour ratio and 
earnings per share (Table 2.9). Profits after tax were thus £32.5 
million in 1981 rising to £75.1 million in 1985. Turnover in these 
two years was £705.6 million and £1,342.6 million and earnings per 
lOp share 24.3p and 35.57p.
Part of this impressive economic performance can be explained 
by considerable merger and takeover activity during the period in 
question. Significantly, the schemes were noted by the company 
secretary as being potentially valuable in defusing opposition from 
employees in firms that were being taken over. However, this case 
study again reinforces the view that profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes tend to accompany rather than occasion expan­ 
sionary economic profiles.









































Nole: 1971 — fiSO (NA); 1978-84 - ESO (NA); )97V — APS; 1983 — SAVE; !984 ~ ESO.
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Case 4: A retail company
This company, though best known for its retailing activities also 
had a number of manufacturing units in which specialist goods 
were produced for its shops; it employed over II,(XX) employees. 
The size of the company had grown considerably in the 1980s 
largely through merger activities. The commitment of the founder 
member of the company was crucial to the early development of the 
non-approved APS and ESO schemes in 1976. An approved APS 
scheme was developed in 1985 and an approved SAVE scheme was 
introduced in 1987.
Table 2.10 shows the spectacular rise in after tax profits, turn­ 
over and earnings per share: profits rising from £2.7 million in 1980 
to £23.6 million in 1985, turnover from £58.2 million to £446.7 
million and earnings per !0p share from 8.3p to 22.3p. However, 
the effects of merger will be noted in the varied (and, at times, 
declining) capital-labour ratio of the company.
















































Noie: 1976-9 - APS (NA); 1976 84 - HSO (NA); 1979 - APS; 1984 - ESO.
The impact of specific schemes, as in all Ihese cases, is of course 
complicated by the variety of different schemes adopted at dif­ 
ferent times. There is some evidence to suggest that the earlier 
schemes had favourable affects on profitability and that the 1985 
ESO schemes followed a period of spectacular performance. How­ 
ever, it is our contention that the relationship between schemes and 
this spectacular economic performance are less direct and that the 
substantial gains in turnover and profits were almost certainly 
reflections of good management, product design and marketing 
and the mergers which took place with other viable and expanding 
companies.
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Case 5: An energy ('other') sector company
Our final case study is an oil exploration company with 122 
employees. In 1980 the company adopted an approved APS scheme 
and a non-approved ESO scheme. These schemes were followed by 
an approved SAYE scheme in 1982 and by an approved ESO 
scheme in 1984.
The economic performance indicators for the company are inter­ 
esting because of the fluctuations in profits, turnover and earnings 
per share during the time period covered. As can be seen from 
Table 2.11, after tax profits peaked at £41 million in 1981 (they 
were £36. 2, £24.9, £31.6 and £37.7 million in 1982, 1983, 1984 and 
1985 respectively). Turnover generally rose from £63.4 million in 
1979 to £348 million in 1985 but there was a fall between 1982 (£241 
million) and 1983 (£215.5 million). Earnings per share fluctuated 
but was higher in 1982 (36.7p per 25p share) than in 1985 (31.3p per 
25p share). The company generally became more capital-intensive 
(it had a very low ratio anyway), though there were marginal falls 
between 1981-2 and 1983-4.
The adoption of schemes does not necessarily relate in any 
obvious way to these variations. The 1980 and 1984 schemes fit the 
view that successful economic performance is a precursor for the 
development of schemes. However, the 1982 SAYE scheme was 
developed when profitability and turnover were both sluggish and 
which actually declined in the six months to one year period 
following their adoption.















































Note: 1980 - APS, FSO (NA); 1982 - SAYE; 1984 - ESO.
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Conclusion
In sum there would appear to be a highly complex pallcrn so far as 
the relationship between profit-sharing and share ownership 
schemes and (he economic and financial performance of companies 
is concerned. Broadly, as others have discovered, there is a link 
between economic success and (he adoption of profit-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes; but our specific case .study data suggests 
that for the most part, this relationship is not necessarily in the 
direction sometimes proposed.
Our examination of the economic performance of (he companies 
suggests that a favourable economic performance in the company 
often provides the basis for the adoption of schemes rather than the 
other way round. However, the introduction of schemes probably 
enables companies to continue with (and even enhance) a positive 
performance because there are then no potentially negative conse­ 
quences of a company making substantial profits and not being 
prepared to ensure that some part of the increased surplus returns 
to the workforce. This would partly explain our findings in Volume 
1, that 70 per cent of 303 'main stage' firms with all-employee 
schemes had experienced an increase in business volume compared 
with only 14 per cent which had witnessed a decrease. However, (he 
complex interconnections between profit-sharing and share-owner­ 
ship schemes on the economic and financial performance of 
companies should be stressed. There is almost certainly a positive 
and mutually reinforcing relationship. But the effects are often 
indirect and less marked than some of the proponents of profit 
sharing have advocated. And wider environmental influences (such 
as exchange rate movements, oil price movements and so on) can 
impact substantially on profitability as well.
39
Chapter three
As we have seen, the anticipated benefits of profit sharing and 
share ownership are not confined to economic and financial issues 
alone. On the contrary, a strong case has been made for developing 
schemes on the grounds of their positive impact on industrial 
relations performance. To assess this further argument we begin 
with an analysis of behavioural data from the ease studies. This is 
followed hv an examination of I lie impact of schemes on trade 
unionism in the firm.
.In I he case study siage of the research reported here we attempted 
to examine the impact of schemes on such issues as strike activity, 
absenteeism and labour turnover. At the outset, it should be 
emphasized that the time series data available in many of the 
companies studied was typically far from adequate and sometimes 
simply not available at all. Indeed, the data presented here should 
be regarded as indicative of probable patterns rather than com­ 
prising the basis for definite conclusions so far as absenteeism and 
labour Uunovei are concerned, instead of examining cases in 
different sectors, i! proved feasible lo focus on only manufacturing 
industry and lo make some detailed comparisons between two 
conhasting companies in (his particular sector. We begin, however, 
with an examination of the impact of employee ownership on strike 
aclivitv.
Strikes
Industrial relations performance is an elusive concept and by no 
means easy to measure satisfactorily. Strikes are clearly one index, 
but in any given year the vast majority of companies in Britain and 
overseas do not have any serious stoppages of work of this type. !t 
is thus hardly surprising that the bulk of the case study firms had 
been relatively free of stoppages. On the other hand, it is very 
difficult to conclude from out data that profit sharing and
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share ownership reduced strike propensity. Moreover, we do noi 
have information on stoppages in ihe case study companies lor the 
1960s and much of the 1970s. However, in a firm in the distribution 
sector, a major stoppage occurred only a year alter the adopiion of 
a scheme. In a manufacturing concern, the specialist director ot 
human resources policy and planning reported lo us I hat, in the 
previous year, there had been a dispute at one site which had lasted 
for six weeks and involved 275 people.
The relationship between proCil sharing or share ownership and 
strike activity is thus again complex. Amongst (be many well 
managed firms which we visited and which had no recent strike 
experience, part of Ihe explanation was probably the 'slyle' and 
approach adopted by managers to industrial relations generally. 
Moreover, some respondents did see the introduction of schemes as 
a part of their attempt to secure a good climate loi industrial and 
employee relations. Yet, ai best, schemes may be said to reduce 
disputes in a very modest way and largely as part of a much wider 
set of measures introduced by companies to create a posil ive atmos­ 
phere for employer-employee relationships as a whole.
Absenteeism and' labour turnover
Other indices of industrial relations performa-ce arc absenteeism 
and labour turnover. However, few key respondents noted any 
marked direct improvement in behaviour in these respects 
following the introduction of schemes. This applied particularly to 
absenteeism rates. A lypical response came from an insurance 
company where it was noted that, 'There is no firm iink between 
absenteeism and ihe introduction of schemes, other external faclors 
are more important.' For labour turnover the situation was a little 
different. One of the prescribed aims of profii-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes is to discourage labour turnover at least 
amongst senior and highly skilled staff. Moreover, the majority of 
firms which have profit-sharing and share -ownership arrangements 
limit participation in schemes to those employees who have been 
with the firm a while. And, ofcour.se, employees in some cases will 
lose financially if they leave the firms other than for such reasons as 
retirement or sickness.
Notwithstanding again the problems of measurement, many key 
respondents still noted that the characteristics of an industry, the 
levels of unemployment and so on were the most critical influences 
on labour turnover. For example, in a retailing firm, it was noted 
that there were inevitably high rates of turnover of staff and that 
the introduction of schemes could do no more than have a very
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modest impact. The chief personnel officer of a large manufac­ 
turing concern also noted that, 'Share schemes can only have a 
secondary effect on these factors and no direct effect. The overall 
industrial relations policy is far more important'. On the other 
hand, in some firms (especially in the finance sector) key 
respondents did suggest that some improvements in labour turn­ 
over had occurred following the introduction of schemes. In sum, 
when we asked key respondents — many of whom had invested a 
considerable personal effort into the development of schemes - to 
assess their actual impact on industrial relations performance, the 
predominant view was that the relationship with absenteeism was 
limited though some effects on labour turnover were anticipated. 
To assess these judgements in more detail, we examined the rates 
of absenteeism and labour turnover in the companies we visited. 
The first of the two manufacturing firms which we chose to analyse 
in more depth specializes in (he production of fashion clothing. It 
has a manufacturing site which we visited in (he South East and 
employs 7,700 people, it introduced APS and SAVE schemes in 
1984 following an improvement in profits performance. In Table 
3.1 the quarterly percentage absenteeism are set out. Essentially, it 
will be seen that in the key year of 1984 absenteeism rates were 
slightly higher than for the previous year. The 1985—6 figures show 
no appreciable and consistently declining trend and despite an 
improvement in ihe early part of the year, the overall percentage 
rate of absenteeism was slightly higher in 1985 than in 1984 (6.25 
per cent compared wilh 6.14 per cent).
Table 3.1 ManufacUiring company (A)
Absenteeism: quarterlyf percentages - 1979-86 (Siie in South East)







































[\dtes: '\- Every 13 weeks.
* Only six weeks.
** Plain closes down far 4 weeks.
In the case of a larger manufacturing concern, the data provided 
(see Table 3.2) was on an annual basis and covered male absentee­ 
ism rates for the group as a whole rather than for a single site. The 
main feature of the series is the consistently declining rate of
42
Industrial relations performance
absenteeism from 1980 (6.67 per cent) to 1984 (5.84 per cent) 
following a slight increase between 1976 (7.51 per cent) and 1979 
(7.65 per cent). Some of the company's schemes for employee 
financial participation were introduced well before 1979 and Ihe 
1984 schemes appear to have had no effect on absenteeism in ihe 
company at all (5.84 per cent, 1984; 5.85 per cent, 1985). Indeed, it 
is almost certain that the recession in manufacturing largely 
explained the overall patterns.
Table 3.2 Manufacturing company (B)
Absenteeism: annual percentages for the company as a whole (Male
employees)
Year 197f> 1977 197S 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Male 
absenteeism rafe 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 6.7 6.7 5.8 5.8 5.9
Table 3.3 Manufacturing company (A)
Labour turnover*: quarterlyf- percentages 1976-86 (Site in South East)


















































3.7 3.2 3.9 3.8 5.0 3.1 1.5 1.9 2.3 3.4
Notes: ^ Every 3 rnonlhs.
* i-orniuiii used: leavers in month x 100 mimher employed.
In some ways, however, the labour turnover rates are the more 
important set of statistics. After all, key managers generally appre­ 
ciated that any consequences of schemes for absenteeism were 
likely to be indirect and difficult to quantify. Vet, in some cases, 
there was hope expressed that profit sharing and share ownership 
could increase loyalty and reduce labour turnover rales.
From the data available from the fashion clothing manufacturer, 
however, there is little evidence to suggest that share-based profit 
sharing has any marked impact on labour turnover rates (see Table 
3.3). Indeed, taking the key date of 1984 (ie when the APS and 
SAVE schemes were introduced), the annual labour turnover rate 
(excluding redundancies) rose in the year following the introduc­ 
tion of schemes (2.27 per cent in 1984; 3.42 per cent in 1985).
The large manufacturing company had far more fluctuating rates 
of labour turnover (the uncertainties occasioned by a major
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restructuring exercise were almost certainly in part responsible). 
However, as Table 3.4 indicates, the introduction of an unapproved 
ESO scheme in 1979 and an approved APS scheme in 1980 had no 
obvious effect on this situation at all. Labour turnover (excluding 
redundancies) was 11.6 per cent in 1980 and 14.0 per cent in 1981. 
In short, our data suggest that labour turnover is influenced 
particularly by economic and organizational changes which are of 
greater consequence than the impact of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes. The adoption of schemes may have some 
relationship with outcomes and they can certainly prevent a move­ 
ment away from a given company to a competitor with schemes. 
But, as this comparison shows, profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes do not necessarily have far reaching implications for either 
labour turnover or absenteeism. Furthermore, they do not appear 
to counter in any major way the effects of other much more 
fundamental forces which impact on these aspects of industrial 
relations.
Table 3.4 Manufacturing company (B)
Annual percentage labour turnover for I he company as a whole* (Male
employees)
Yeur 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 i985
I.it hour 
turnover 9.7 8.7 9.0 11.6 14.0 7.1 12.7
Not 
6.7 available
i\'oie: * Formula used: leavers in year x l()0 - number employed.
Trade unions
A longstanding objective of profi! sharing has of course been to 
reduce conflict between trade unions and management in the firm. 
However, there is little detailed evidence available on the precise 
impact of schemes on trade unionism. In Volume 1, we noted that 
there was a positive relationship between the existence of trade 
unions in the firm and the presence of one or more of the various 
types of all-employee schemes for profit sharing and share owner­ 
ship. In the case study stage, following Long (1979), we attempted 
to measure in more detail the differing patterns of relationships 
between share ownership in the employing company and attitudes 
of employees, trade unionists and non-trade unionists to trade 
unions. Similarly, we also endeavoured to analyse the relationships 
that exisl between share ownership in the employing company and 
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fThis ilem lias been reversed so that a higher numerical \;iluc iiulica 
perceived need for the union. 
*= p 0.10, two-tailed. 
**= pO.05, two-tailed.
***= p 0.01, two-tailed.
***» = p 0.001, two-tailed.
Table 3.5 sets out data from the unionized case study companies 
and entails a comparison between employee shareholders and non- 
shareholders. The relatively large number of employee share­ 
holders stems from including participants in any type of scheme 
(APS, SAVE, other share-based). The table shows for the most 
part a similar set of attitudes of employee shareholders and non- 
shareholders. Where there are significant differences is in attitudes 
to union-management cooperation and the role of the union in
Notes: : les a higher
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decision-making. Employee shareholders generally feel more 
strongly (hat unions and managements should be able to work 
together and are more ambivalent with respect to the decision- 
making role of trade unions than that of non-shareholders. In 
short, although there are few significant differences between these 
two groups of respondent, it does appear that employee share­ 
holders arc particularly liable to stress that union-management 
relationships should be non-conflictual and are more prone than 
non-shareholders to emphasize that channels other than that of the 
union are the best way of obtaining a greater decision-making 
influence for the workforce as a whole. This does suggest that a 
modest change in the climate of industrial relations stems from 
employee shareholding, though it may be, of course, that 
employees with such views are more likely to avail themselves of the 
opportunities to participate in share-based schemes in the first 
place. However, the strategy of management of deploying SAVE 
and other share-based schemes to improve industrial relations does 
appear to have been at least partially successful so far as employee 
attitudes are concerned.
It could be objected that a better test of the impact of schemes on 
industrial relations is to contrast the views of trade-unionists and 
non-trade-unionists, and to link these with ownership or non- 
ownership of shares in the company, in Table 3.6, trade-unionists' 
attitudes to trade unionism are thus broken down by share owner­ 
ship. The data reinforce the arguments above since there are 
relatively few significant differences between these two groups of 
respondents. However, the employee shareholders amongst the 
trade unionists in our sample are more likely to stress cooperative 
management-union relationships and are less likely than non- 
shareholders to view the union as the best way of obtaining greater 
worker influence over decision-making in the firm.
There is no doubt, too, that the influence of share ownership on 
non-trade-unionists' attitudes in unionized firms is a significant 
factor affecting the views on trade unions as a whole. The relevant 
data are set out in Table 3.7 where it will be seen that the non- 
unionist employee shareholders are more likely to emphasize the 
similarity in union and management goals; to stress the potentially 
cooperative nature of relationships between unions and manage­ 
ment; to reject the view that, without unionism, employees would 
probably not get fair treatment from management; and to indicate 
that the union element of representation is not necessarily the most 
appropriate way of obtaining a greater worker influence over 
decision-making in the company.
In sum, our data suggest that there is probably an impact of the
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1.12 3.40 1.57 - 1.04
1.67 3.92 1.73 - 1.29
1.24 5.84 I.SI - 1.89*
1.14 5.28 1.38 2.92*
1.52 5.37 1.5.1 0.32
1.29 5.4K 1.23 0.88
1.72 4.78 1.54 2.33*
Noie.i: -(-This item has been reversed so Hint a 
perceived need for the union. 
*= p 0.10, two-tailed. 
**= pO.05, two-tailed. 
***= pO.OI, two-iailed.
liglier numerical value milk-am a higher
introduction of share-based schemes on attitudes to trade union­ 
ism. In most cases, this is not strong, but it is likely that schemes 
will improve the attiludinal climate of industrial relations to at least 
a modest extent. Moreover, the greatest impact would appear to be 
amongst non-trade unionists in unionized firms who are likely to 
emphasize that a relatively cooperative and non-conflictual mode 
of relationship between unions arid management in the firm is 
appropriate.
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perceived need for the union. 
*= p «.IO, two-tailed. 
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»**= p 0.01, two-tailed.
No study involving an assessment of altitudes to profit-sharing 
and employee-shareholding schemes would be complete, however, 
without some reference to the views of trade unionists and non- 
trade unionists respectively on actual schemes. Thus, in Table 3.8, 
trade unionists' attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes are presented. As is to be expected, employee shareholder 
trade unionists are shown to be less in favour of cash-based profit- 
sharing schemes than non-shareholding trade unionists. Again,
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Table 3.8 Trade unionists' support for profit-sharing and share owner­ 




































Notes: * = p 0, !0, Iw.Hailed.
** - p 005, two-tailed.
*** = pO.OI, iwo-lailed.
*«*» = p 0.001, two-tailed.
shareholding trade union members have a particular propensity 10 
favour share-based profit-sharing and SAVE schemes.
These findings are amplified in Table 3.9, which presents data on 
non-trade unionists' attitudes to profit-sharing and share-owner­ 
ship schemes. It will be seen that few significant differences in 
attitudes exist between shareholding and non-shareholding non- 
trade unionists to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes. 
However, as is to be expected, employee shareholders who are not 
union members are more favourable to SAVE schemes than their 
colleagues who hold no shares in their employing organization.
Table 3.9 Non-lrade unionists' support for profit-sharing and share- 


































Notes: * = p .10, two-tailed. 
** = p .05. two-tailed.
*** = p .01, two-tailed.
*"* = p Ml. two-iailed.
Furthermore, if is worth emphasizing that favourable altitudes to 
profit sharing and share ownership do appear to be related (o views 
on unions and the company. Hence, we asked employees whether 
they considered the best representative of their interests to be the
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union or the company. As will be seen from Table 3.10, with the 
exception of cash-based arrangements, positive views on profit 
sharing undoubtedly appear to be related to a greater identification 
with the company rather than the union.











Tlie hesl teptesenlalive of 
an employee's interests is 
(lie union not ihc company -0.12** - 0.25**
Nttles: Pearson product moment correlation coefficients - two-tailed significance. 
* Significant at 001 level. 
** Significant at 0.001 level.
Conclusion
So far as the impact of profit sharing and employee shareholding on 
industrial relations is concerned, then, a highly interesting set of 
conclusions emerges. Senior managerial personnel involved in the 
establishment of schemes indicated thai they hoped to accomplish 
an improvement in the climate of union—management relations, but 
did not expect major changes in behaviour arising from schemes. 
Our behavioural and attitudinal data lend considerable support to 
their judgement in this respect. With the possible exception of 
labour turnover, few marked effects of schemes on industrial 
relations behaviour were observed. However, with respect to atti­ 
tudes, employee shareholders were found to be consistently more 
likely to stress that a potentially cooperative and non-antagonistic 
relationship between unions and management was desirable. On one 
view, these data might be taken to imply some reduction of the 
union role stemming from the introduction of schemes. But given 
the positive correlation between trade unionism and profit sharing 
in the firm noted in Volume 1, our conclusions are rather more 
complex. That is to say, whereas the introduction of schemes may 
well produce a greater identification with the company's goals (and 
this applies particularly to non-unionists in a company where unions 
are recognized), it is unlikely that union activities will be completely 
undermined by profit sharing. But it is, in our view, important for 
unions to modify to some extent traditional sets of attitudes and 
assumptions in firms with profit sharing if they are to continue to 
retain an appeal to both trade unionists and non-trade unionists 
alike in the companies concerned.
Chapter four
Organizational commitment and 
performance
As we have indicated, it may well be that the effects of profit sharing 
and share ownership are greater on attitudes than on behaviour. To 
be sure, positive attitudes can, in turn, impact on practices in the 
company; but other factors (including those in the external environ­ 
ment of the firm) may well have a particularly pervasive impact on 
financial and industrial relations performance. In this chapter, this 
argument is further explored by an assessment of the consequences 
of schemes for organizational commitment and performance. 
Because of the importance attached to employee participation 
generally, we begin by examining the development of schemes in 
relation to involvement in decision-making in the company. This is 
followed by an assessment of the impact of schemes on organiza­ 
tional change and an examination of a wide range of employee 
attitudes themselves.
In Volume 1, we observed that the development of all-employee 
profit sharing and share ownership (and particularly SAVE 
schemes) is intimately connected with employee involvement in the 
company. Firms in which managements have adopted a con­ 
sultative approach to industrial relations are particularly likely to 
have schemes and this relationship extends to employee involve­ 
ment in actual decision-making on industrial relations issues and to 
the existence of union and non-union channels for employee 
participation. An important aspect of the case study phase was thus 
to assess the issue of employee participation in more detail. Indeed, 
in view of the centrality of this theme it was considered worthwhile 
to examine employee views on employee participation more 
generally, prior to a more specific review of their relationship to the 
presence of various schemes for profit sharing and share owner­ 
ship.
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Employee involvemenl
In the employee attitudes questionnaire we endeavoured to obtain 
information on the extent of involvement in decisions on the over­ 
all policies of the firm, in matters affecting both respondents' own 
departments and how jobs are done. Each of these areas of par­ 
ticipation was examined under four main headings: (1) how much 
say or influence did employees in general in the firm actually have 
over decisions; (2) how much say or influence should employees in 
genera! have over decisions; (3) how much say or influence had the 
respondent actually has over decisions; and (4) how much say or 
influence should the respondent have over decisions.
The results are set out in Table 4.1. So far as employees actual 
say is concerned, respondents generally contrasted the situation 
with respect to the overall policies of the firm (where there was little 
perceived involvement) with how jobs were actually done (where 
the majority indicated that there was either some say or a great deal 
to say). For the desirable level of employee participation, a rather 
different pattern emerged. Indeed, in every instance (including the 
overall policies of the firm as well as departmental and job level 
decision-making) respondents indicated that they would like to see 
at least some employee say or influence over decision-making.
This pattern of results was paralleled by the data on the indivi­ 
dual respondents' actual say over decision-making. As Table 4.1 
again indicates, the majority of respondents felt that although they 
themselves had very little influence on the overall policies of the 
firm, they did have a far higher degree of involvement in how their 
jobs were actually performed. Interestingly, too, the majority of 
respondents appeared to desire some personal influence over the 
overall policies of the firm and, less surprisingly, a substantial 
involvement in task-based decision-making.
These data thus reveal considerable interest amongst respondents 
in employee participation in general. At job level there is clearly 
widespread participation in decisions but this would appear seldom 
to extend to policy levels. However, at the levels of the job, the 
department and the firm, respondents typically wished to see not 
only greater employee involvement but also to be themselves active 
participants in this process.
In order to assess both the strength and significance of these 
items and their links with views on profit sharing and share owner­ 
ship, factor analysis was deployed and four factors were isolated. 
Table 4.2 shows employees' perception of actual and desired par­ 
ticipation both collectively and individually at a number of 






-, _ =sa ^ tja? 3> .!" ix
—— fl f) TJ ri r-j
O — — — oo :>
co -^ r--i






5 uI5 t c '
« "O d ^J -U
•> "= = C E^ 9 « u -
. O 2 -
UJ ——
>. o «?. -S
OJ 
C/) — <N I
52























































Factor 1- Desired par icipation 
Say or influence emplo ees shouldh v
5 Matters affecting th ir ow  departmen 
6 Howtheirn j bs are d n
Say or influence respondent shouldh v 12 Howrespondent's  j b isd e
Factor 2~ Actual individual p r icipation
\^ 5T
d O









Respondent's actual ay rinfluence 
8 Matters affecting theirow  depar men














Say or influence respondent should h v 11 Mattersaffecting respondent's ow  d ] Factor 3— Actualcollective p r i ipation
3S £
odd
* * •if * *
* W~l — *
t










Employees' actual say orinfluence 
1 Overall policies ffirm 
2 Mattersaffecting th ir ow  depar men 
3 Howtheirown j bs are d n









































































Notes: Pearsonproduct moment co relationc
* Significant at 0.01level. ** Significant at O.OOIlevel.
The fouractorsaccount o77.8p r e
referred to respectively as: (1) desired participation; (2) actual 
individual participation; (3) actual collective participation; and 
(4) participation in company policy.
Generally, the most significant relationships were found to be 
linked with views on share-based schemes. Moreover, the relation­ 
ships were strongest for actual individual and collective participa­ 
tion and weakest for desired participation and participation in 
company policy making. This would suggest that favourable 
employee attitudes to share-ownership schemes are interconnected 
with the actual existence of participative machinery in (he firm.
More specifically, as is indicated in Table 4.2, desired participa­ 
tion in how employees' own jobs are done, both collectively and 
individually, showed few significant relationships with attitudes to 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes. But it will be seen that 
a highly significant relationship was found between profit sharing 
with shares and SAYE-type schemes and desired individual partici­ 
pation at the lowest organizational level. This may well indicate 
that the more general share-based schemes increase the desire for 
direct individual participation, while the more selective share 
schemes do not.
In the second scale, as with the first, no significant relationships 
can be reported so far as the extent of participation and views on 
cash-based schemes are concerned. However, highly significant 
relationships were found between views on share-ownership 
schemes and actual participation at job and departmental levels. 
Weaker correlations were again found for SAYE-type schemes. 
This suggests that existing participative arrangements at these levels 
are again conducive to favourable attitudes to the more general 
share-based schemes.
In the third scale, highly significant relationships were found 
between actual collective participation at all organizational levels 
and views on executive share options (see again Table 4.2). Signifi­ 
cant relationships were also found between views on profit sharing 
with shares and SAYE schemes and actual collective participation 
at departmental and job levels. However, a negative association 
was found between respondents' assessments of cash-based profit- 
sharing schemes and actual collective participation.
In the fourth scale, no significant relationships were found 
between the attitudes to schemes and desired collective and 
individual participation in the overall policies of the firm but a 
significant relationship was found between actual individual 
participation at this level and views on all share-ownership 
schemes. As is to be expected, there was a highly significant 
relationship between attitudes to executive share option schemes
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and respondents' actual say or influence in the overall policies of 
the company. This would suggest that a favourable attitude to 
share-based schemes is linked with the employee's perception of his 
or her individual say or influence at policy making levels.
We also sought to establish how far attitudes to employee 
participation are linked with actual ownership of sb res in the 
company. The relevant data we set out in Table 4.3, ..here some 
very interesting findings are observable. As is to be expected, 
employee shareholders have a greater say in how their jobs are







Notes: * = pO.10, Iwo-tailed.
»* = p 0.05, two-lailed.
*** = p 0.01, two-tailed.
**+* = p 0.001, Iwo-tailed.
SD
Employees' actual say or
influence
1 Overall policies of firm
2 Matters affecting their own
department
3 How their own jobs are
done
Say or influence employees
should have
4 Overall policies of firm
5 Matters affecting their own
department
6 How their own jobs are
done
Respondent's actual say or
influence
7 Overall policies of firm
8 Mailers affecting own
department
9 How own jobs are done
Say or influence respondent
should have
10 Overall policies of firm
1 1 Matters affecting
respondent's own
department































































Organizational commitment and performance
done. Moreover, the differences are particularly pronounced so far 
as the individual respondent's actual influence is concerned. But 
what is especially noticeable is that share ownership is strongly 
linked with a desire for greater personal influence over decision- 
making (and this applies to the overall policies of the firm, as well 
as to matters affecting one's own department and how the 
respondent's actual job is done). In short, employees who 
participate in share schemes in the company are likely to want 
personally to participate in decision-making processes as well. And 
this of course reinforces a recurrent theme of this research project, 
that the various types of employee involvement (financial and 
decision-making) are interconnected.
Organizational change
Data i'rom the employee attitudes survey thus revealed some 
interesting linkages between views on profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes and participation in decision-making within the 
firm. But participation in decisions and employee financial involve­ 
ment have been widely advocated as means of achieving greater 
organizational flexibility and commitment in an increasingly 
competitive economic environment. Key respondents were thus 
asked to what extent the introduction of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes had contributed to the acceptance of organiza­ 
tional change.
In at least one case study company, it was found that a dramatic 
organizational change had been made smoother as a result of 
employee involvement practices in general, of which profit sharing 
and share ownership were a part. But the most interesting finding 
was that organizational change was often a stimulus for profit 
sharing and share ownership. This was manifested in three ways: 
(1) privatization; (2) merger and takeover; and (3) the movement 
towards more competitive market oriented strategies and the conse­ 
quences for organizational structure that this entailed. Indeed, it is 
obvious that privatization has important consequences for the 
potential development of employee share ownership, not least 
when employees are the receivers of shares accompanying a change 
in ownership. Moreover, merger and takeover can have substantial 
implications for employees if policy in these respects alters 
alongside a major reshaping of the structure of the constituent 
organization.
Furthermore, the case of a retail firm provided an indication of 
the implications of a change in management policy towards 
competitiveness and the growth of share-ownership schemes. This
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company wiinessed a major improvement in profits between 1982 
and 1985 (an increase of 138 per cent), accompanying a major 
reduction in the workforce (cut by half between 1980 and 1986). 
During this period, the original family owner lost control (though it 
still retained 45 per cent of share capital). The nature of the firm 
also changed and with it there was a move to a competitive market 
oriented policy of which profit sharing and share ownership were a 
part. In short, employee financial participation in this firm did not 
specifically facilitate organizational change, but part of the impetus 
for initiating share-ownership schemes arose from the major trans­ 
formation in company policy and structure which took place in the 
1980s.
Employee atliJudes
But to what extent, it may be reasonably asked, does profit sharing 
and share ownership impact upon attitudes to the employing 
organization? This central issue is now addressed in more detail, 
using data from the employee attitudes survey. We begin this 
analysis by an examination of the effects of ownership on attitudes 
to various types of schemes. This is followed by an account of 
perceived effects of schemes on various aspects of organizational 
performance.
Share ownership
There is no doubt first of all that ownership of shares in the 
company (and in other companies) is strongly associated with 
positive attitudes towards profit sharing and share ownership. The 
direction of this linkage is difficult to determine, and there are, in 
any case, likely to be interactive relationships. Correlation analysis 
was used to examine the relationship between employee attitudes to 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes and their ownership of 
shares in the employing company and in any other company. As is 
shown in Table 4.4, highly significant relationships were found 
between views on share-based profit-sharing and SAYE schemes 
both in terms of ownership of shares in (he employing company 
and in other companies.
These findings are amplified in Table 4.5, which reveals the 
differences between owners and non-owners of shares based on the 
mean scores of each group of respondents. It will be seen that there 
are highly significant differences in attitudes to both profit-sharing 
(share-based) and SAYE schemes depending on ownership or non- 
ownership of share in the company.
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Table 4.4 Ownership of shares and views of employees on profit sharing 
or share ownership
Owns share in company

















Notes: Pearson product moment correlation coefficients - two-lailcd significance. 
* Significant at 0.01 level. 
** Significant at 0.001 level.
Table 4.5 Employee attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership 






























Notes: * = p 0.10, two-tailed.
** = p 0.05, two-tailed.
*** = pO.Ol, two-tailed.
**** = p 0.001, two-tailed.
Impact on work practices
The introduction of share-based profit-sharing schemes in the 
company thus almost certainly impacts upon employee attitudes to 
profit sharing. But in many respects a more important issue is the 
impact on work practices. Respondents were asked to assess (on a 
seven point scale) to what extent the introduction of schemes had 
affected: (1) satisfaction and job security; (2) work effort; and 
(3) employee involvement and communications. As can be seen 
from Table 4.6, the majority of respondents detected little change 
in these respects, though satisfaction in working for the given 
concern was a marked exception. Nevertheless, there was generally 
a balance of positive over negative responses on such issues as com­ 
munications between management and worker, effort put into 
work, the amount of productive work done and the amount of 
effort other people put into their jobs. Clearly, then, profit sharing 
and share ownership had few negative consequences and may well 
have affected a series of worthwhile but modest improvements in 
employees' attitudes and work performance.
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Further analysis was undertaken by means of factor analysis to 
assess the relative strengths and significance of these items with 
views on profit-sharing and share ownership schemes. As will be 
seen in Table 4.7, two factors were isolated and referred respec­ 
tively to: (1) involvement in the company; and (2) increased 
productivity. It will be seen that there are highly significant associa­ 
tions between employees' attitudes to all piofit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes and employees' overall satisfaction in working 
for the firm. Moreover, the strongest associations are clearly with 
share-based schemes. In general, then, positive employee attitudes 
to share-based schemes are consistent with employees' perceptions 
of improved satisfaction and security at work together with 
improved employee involvement, both collectively and 
individually, at all organizational levels.
With respect to improvements in productivity, generally the 
associations are not as strong but they are significant for share- 
based profit sharing. In particular, a perception of increased 
amount of effort put into the job and the amount of productive 
work done is linked with views on profit sharing schemes more 
generally. Views on share-based schemes thus do relate to increased 
employee involvement, satisfaction and security at work and a 
perception of increased effort and the amount of productive work 
done in the organization.
Furthermore, we sought to establish hew far ownership of shares 
in the company is linked with attitudes to the impact of schemes. In 
general, there were few highly significant differences between 
owners and non-owners. However, employee shareholders were 
particularly likely to indicate that overall satisfaction in working 
for the firm had increased following the adoption of schemes by 
their companies (t = 4.89***).
Organizational identity
Respondents were also asked to indicate their views on a series of 
issues relating to company, work and career. Table 4.8 sets out 
employees' assessments of their sense of organizational identity 
and belongingtiess in the company. It will be seen that although a 
substantial number of respondents felt a sense of pride in working 
for their firms, at the same time, few had any real sense of owner­ 
ship and most indicated that they 'simply felt like an employee'. 
Clearly, then, the introduction of profit sharing in the company has 
not broken down entrenched attitudes to work of this type.
Further analysis (Table 4.9) showed that views on share-based 
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The impact of economic democracy
their status in the company. Clearly, profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes have not fundamentally altered certain basic 
sets of attitudes and produced personnel who no longer consider 
themselves to have the status of employees. However, views on 
schemes are related to broader attitudes on organizational identity 
and the extent to which employees' experience a sense of owner­ 
ship, self employment and pride in working for the company.
Work and career
We were concerned to discover whether the introduction of profit- 
sharing and shareholding schemes in the company impacted on 
attitudes to work and career. Table 4.10 sets out employees' views 
on these issues. It will be seen that there was less of an instrumental 
approach to work than probably exists in companies without 
schemes. After all, less than half of our respondents agreed or 
strongly agreed with the view that 'the most important element in 
any job is the pay'. Moreover, a substantial majority (72 per cent) 
considered it to be important for an employee to fee! part of the 
company.
The majority of respondents, however, did consider that work 
and home should be sharply separated. Given the earlier data on 
participation, there was perhaps less support for the view that 'it is 
essential for the employee to participate in decision -making' than 
might have been expected. There was in general a rejection of the 
statement that 'the best representative of the employee's interest is 
the union not the company'. The considerable importance attached 
to 'high trust' relationships between management and the work­ 
force is particularly noteworthy (two-thirds of respondents strongly 
agreeing with the statement that 'it is important for management 
and the workforce to trust one another'). Finally, there was 
probably a higher level of company rather than individual career 
commitment than might have been expected. Indeed, only a 
minority of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the view 
that 'a person's own individual career is more important than any 
loyally to a particular company'.
Of course it is difficult to know whether or not these attitudes 
would also be held by employees in companies without profit- 
sharing or shareholding schemes. But these data lend support to the 
view that employee attitudes are affected by financial participation 
and, in particular, that commitment to the company develops as a 
consequence.
And yet orientations to work and career are not strongly linked 
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relevant data are set out in Table 4.11. It will be seen that views on 
share-based profit sharing are again most closely linked with other 
sets of attitudes. Two factors referring to trust and instrumental 
relations respectively were isolated and a positive commitment to 
share-based schemes was found to be associated with: (1) an 
emphasis on the employee feeling fully a part of the company; and 
(2) relationships of trust between management and the workforce. 
Moreover, such attitudes were linked with a rejection of the view 
that the most important element in any job is the pay and the 
importance of individual career over loyalty to the company. 
Hence, while the relationship between views on profit sharing and 
trust and instrumental relations in the firm are in the expected 
direction, they are not substantial enough to support the argument 
that attitudes to work and career can be radically transformed by 
the adoption of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes.
Interrelationships between attitudes
In order to trace the links between employee attitudes and views on 
profit sharing in more detail, it is worth examining the underlying 
pattern of relationships between the composite variables identified 
by factor analysis. In Table 4.12, the results are set out based on 
four groups of composite variables. These are: (1) individual par­ 
ticipation and organizational identity; (2) economic rewards (see 
also Table 2.6); (3) productivity; and (4) trust.
Factor analysis of the composite variables shows that the 
strongest and most significant association is between employee 
attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes and what 
we have termed economic rewards. These, it will be recalled, relate 
to the views of employees on how far various financial objectives of 
management in introducing schemes have been met in practice (see 
Chapter 2). This suggests that the perception of the financial 
success of schemes is particularly central to a positive assessment of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes.
Weaker but highly significant associations were found between 
views on schemes, and individual and collective participation and 
organizational identity. Certainly, the existence of individual and 
collective means of participation favours a positive attitude to 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes in general and this 
participation is reinforced by an organizational identity among the 
employees. Relationships of similar strength and significance were 
also found in relation to increased employee involvement and 
productivity. This, as we have seen, indicates that a favourable 
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Chapter five
Detailed case study 
impact of scliemes
is of the
One of the most important findings of this investigation is that 
profit sharing and share ownership are a highly complex phe­ 
nomenon and that simple causal notions of the origins and impact 
of schemes do not reflect realities within companies. In the first 
volume, we were able to show that the genesis of employee 
financial participation stems from managerial strategic choices. 
But we also found that these are set within a wide range of environ­ 
mental and organizational conditions which are conducive to the 
emergence of given practices. In this second volume, we have 
observed that the consequences of profit sharing and share owner­ 
ship are very difficult to disentangle from other forces which may 
be of greater influence on actual outcomes. Moreover, even if it is 
reasonable to argue that schemes have a more direct and pro­ 
nounced impress upon attitudes than upon behaviour, it is still 
necessary to understand that this process is itself interactive and 
that a mutually reinforcing set of attitudes is readily identifiable in 
practice.
The case study stage of the research offered a unique opportunity 
to examine in more detail these interrelated patterns. Indeed, three 
main sets of data are available for analysis purposes. These com­ 
prise: (1) the views of key respondents on the objectives involved in 
setting up schemes and on a variety of issues associated with their 
actual operation; (2) time series data on the background financial 
circumstances when particular schemes in given firms were intro­ 
duced, coupled with the material on economic and industrial 
relations performance; and (3) the views of employees, not only on 
profit sharing and share ownership in general, but also on whether 
the introduction of schemes has had any marked effect upon their 
work performance and attitudes.
Indeed, the linkage of the various sets of data in a number of 
cases reveals a most interesting interrelationship between mana­ 
gerial objectives, the financial experiences of companies and
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employee views. In this chapter, then, three contrasting companies 
are examined in this rather different way. In each company, the 
objectives of managers in introducing schemes are first set out, 
followed by an examination of the financial profiles of firms and 
an outline and discussion of the views of the employees themselves.
Case I: A finance sector company
The first case to be examined is a leading bank in Britain. In 1985, 
it employed 66,243 employees, though its workforce had been 
slowly declining from a total of 71,800 employees in 1981. The 
company was one of the first to take advantage of profit-sharing 
and share-ownership legislation and, indeed, its APS scheme was 
introduced in 1979. It also had two SAVE schemes. The first (A 
scheme) had been established in 1979 (and enjoyed no concessions 
on income tax), while the second (B scheme) had been adopted in 
1981 under the 1980 Act provisions. There were also two Executive 
Share Option (ESO) schemes; the A scheme being yet again set up 
in 1979, with the B scheme coming into effect in 1985 under the 
1984 Act provisions.
The managerial objectives in introducing these various schemes 
differed somewhat depending on: (a) the diverse aims of managers 
in different functions; and (b) the types of scheme. The schemes 
originally emerged from a distinctive industrial relations policy and 
they were seen to form a significant benefit in terms of an overall 
'remuneration package' which the firm was developing. Currently, 
however, control of the schemes is under the aegis of the Adminis­ 
tration/Compensation Department and not the Industrial Relations 
Department and this would appear to have had implications for the 
different types of objectives which are now encompassed.
The original pressure from the Industrial Relations Department 
to establish schemes was thus clearly manifested in the types of 
scheme adopted and their objectives. To begin with, then, the 
introduction of both the A schemes was conceived in terms of a 
comprehensive reward and remuneration package for employees. 
In 1979, only the APS scheme enjoyed full tax concessions, but 
both the SAYE and ESO schemes were adopted in that year since 
they were deemed to be valuable as a means of extending the range 
of remuneration options for the company. It is also significant that 
such origins were associated with the early introduction of the 
schemes.
However, the transfer of responsibilities for the schemes to the 
more 'finance' oriented Administration/Compensation Depart­ 
ment was accompanied by a change in objectives perceived for
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the schemes themselves even though these did not appear to have 
been directly communicated to the employees. Indeed, in 1989, two 
main objectives were viewed as uppermost: (I) to remain 
competitive within the finance sector, where similar types of benefit 
for employees were being provided; and (2) to change employee 
attitudes so that they understood the make up of the company and 
the usefulness of share capital. Moreover, both A schemes were 
phased out, in 1981 and 1985, because they were seen as unneces­ 
sary, given the changes in legislation, and the subsequent B schemes 
that Ihe company had introduced.
This particular company was a valuable example of the different 
(but not necessarily competing) objectives of managers in the main 
functional specialisms of the firm with respect to profit sharing and 
share ownership. It also, as we shall see, highlighted well the 
relationship between a favourable financial performance and the 
introduction of schemes, and the way in which adverse circum­ 
stances can influence profitability irrespective of whether or not 
profit-sharing or employee share-ownership schemes have been 
introduced.
Turning to the relationship between financial performance and 
the introduction of profit sharing and share ownership in the 
company, Table 5.1 sets out the data on profits before and after 
tax, earnings per share and net ordinary dividend per share, for the 
years 1976-85 inclusive. It is striking that in the key year of 1979 
when APS, SAVE and ESO schemes were all adopted, pre- and 
post-tax profits were at a peak and that earnings per £1 share were 
higher than in any subsequent year. The stimulus provided by 
profitability for the introduction of schemes is thus once again 
reinforced. It is also particularly interesting that profits plummeted 
in 1984 because of the collapse of a foreign subsidiary bank, an 
exigency which was to occasion a fall in the share price inter­ 
nationally. Indeed management freely admitted that this dramatic 
circumstance had overridden any endeavours of employees them­ 
selves to improve productivity and profitability.
The firm recognized two unions (BIFU and ASTMS) and was 
about 50 per cent unionized. It had both collective bargaining and 
consultative arrangements for involving employees, although 
neither directly impacted upon the schemes. However, advance 
notice of the introduction of schemes was given to the unions and 
they were also consulted as the schemes developed. Full-time 
officials in both unions were contacted by the research team and 
the genera] view was that, although the unions had no overall 
policy on profit sharing and share ownership, they were not 
opposed to these developments so long as they did not impinge on
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collective bargaining. However, the officials would have liked to 
see the schemes negotiable in terms of both of their establishment 
and subsequent operation. Employees were informed directly 
about the schemes by means of a booklet and covering letter in a 
folder.
Table 5.1 A finance sector company: profits before and aflcr tax, 
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The employees' attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes in general were, for the most part, highly favourable. 
Indeed 95 per cent of employers were either in favour or strongly in 
favour of profit sharing through cash awards, 78 per cent 
supported profit sharing through shares in the company and 61 per 
cent endorsed SAVE schemes. There was also a balance of positive 
over negative views on the ESO schemes, though consistent with 
the pattern in other firms, the largest single group (49 per cent of 
respondents) were neither in favour nor against these types of 
arrangement.
However, given the adverse circumstances experienced by the 
firm occasioned by the collapse of the overseas subsidiary, it was 
particularly interesting to examine the levels of satisfaction of 
employees with the rewards of their particular company's schemes. 
Table 5.2 sets out the relevant information and it will be seen that, 
for the most part, employees were satisfied with their own com­ 
pany's schemes in this respect. However, few employees were 
highly satisfied and, a sizeable minority (23 per cent) considered 
that the rewards from the APS scheme were unsatisfactory (this is 
scarcely surprising in view of the uneven profits performance of the 
firm, which had little to do with the behaviour of the workforce). 
Employees in this firm, too, had a particularly marked preference
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for cash-bused entitlements (53 per cent preferring this method of 
allocation) and this is again not surprising given the dramatic 
alterations in the profitability of the firm over time and in earnings 
per share. It is also instructive that only 26 per cent of respondents 
participated in their firm's SAVE scheme.
Moreover, some particularly interesting findings emerged from 
the employees' attitudes in this firm with respect to their assess­ 
ments of the effects of schemes and on whether or not various 
managerial objectives had been fulfilled. The relevant data are set 
out in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 and, although, the overall pattern of 
responses is not markedly dissimilar from that of the sample as a 
whole, there is a clear tendency for this company's employees: (a) to 
emphasize the improvements in satisfaction, productive effort, 
employee involvement, and communications; but (b) to be 
especially likely to indicate that the schemes had been unsuccessful 
in achieving various managerial objectives.
In Table 5.3, then, although the majority of employees sampled 
in the firm indicated that few changes had stemmed from the intro­ 
duction of schemes, the marginal improvements detected by 
substantial minorities of respondents in the respects of overall satis­ 
faction in working for the firm, effort put into work, productive 
work done, amount of effort people put into their jobs and in com­ 
munication between management and workers are worth noting. 
But of special interest is to contrast these perceptions with views on 
how far various managerial objectives had been fulfilled (see Table 
5.4). Indeed, clear majorities of respondents indicated that, in their 
view, the company's schemes had been unsuccessful or not at all 
successful in making employees more profit conscious, in acting as 
an incentive to greater productivity, in providing a tax efficient 
means of reward for employees and the company and in ensuring 
that employees benefited from the company's profitability. More­ 
over, in each case, these percentages are higher I ban those applying 
for the overall sample of employees in the survey. And, although 
there may of course be several reasons for these differences, it is 
likely that part of the explanation lies in the adverse profits per­ 
formance of the firm in 1984 which must surely have led to several 
employees doubting the advantages of their company's schemes in 
terms of objectives associated with profitability and rewards. 
Furthermore, these data reinforce the view that employees' atti­ 
tudes towards their firm's schemes may become less favourable in 
adverse financial circumstances even if the workforce remains 
broadly committed to profit sharing and share ownership as a 
general principle.
























































































































































































































































































































2 1 1 0 0 1 5 2 1 2 2 2 3






















































i \ 0 4 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
O
th






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The impact of economic democracy
case in illustrating at least four main points. In the first place, it 
reveals how managers in different departments variously view the 
objectives of schemes and how priorities can change when there is a 
shift in responsibility for the schemes from industrial relations to 
finance-type departments. Secondly, it reinforces the view that a 
highly favourable financial performance in a given year is not 
infrequently associated with the introduction of profit-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes. Thirdly, it shows how major events 
(such as a collapse of a foreign subsidiary) can impact far more on 
profitability than profit-sharing or employee share-ownership 
schemes. And fourthly, it reveals how employee views can be 
affected by such adverse circumstances and, that despite remaining 
overwhelmingly favourable to schemes in general, they may well 
consider that various managerial objectives in introducing schemes 
in their particular firms have, as a consequence, been far from 
fulfilled in actual practice.
Case 2: A manufacturing company
For the second case, a leading brewing group in the UK has 
been selected for analysis, ft employed 21,866 fuli-tinie and 
25,255 part-time employees in 1986, the former being particularly 
concentrated in the brewing units and the latter in the licensed 
premises. The company had introduced an APS scheme in 1980, a 
SAVE share option scheme in 1975, and an ESO scheme had been 
set up in 1971. There were modifications to the SAVE and ESO 
schemes in 1981 and 1985 respectively following legislation. 
Furthermore, in 1986, for senior managers in North America, an 
ESO scheme was established. This, however, did not enjoy tax 
concessions in the UK, a situation which ensured that key managers 
were seeking changes in legislation to alter this state of affairs.
By comparison with the financial sector company examined 
earlier, there appeared to be a greater consistency in the policy and 
objectives of managers when the schemes were actually being intro­ 
duced. Indeed, the company secretary and group personnel director 
of the firm were both responsible for the schemes and the objectives 
underlying them were part of a coherent industrial relations 
strategy encompassed in a booklet provided to all employees and 
entitled the 'Brewco' Way (which also outlined the general 
philosophy/culture of the company and its views on its employees). 
Hence, the main aim of the schemes was seen to be to give the 
employees a share in the long term prospects of the company. The 
schemes were not regarded as an immediate bonus but as a 'long 
term incentive'. Ownership was viewed as more important than
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remuneration. And the schemes, it was hoped, would increase 
interest in the fortunes of the company and result in positive 
employee attitudes and behaviour to their employing organization.
Compared with the finance sector company examined earlier in 
this chapter, there was an important and remarkably consistent 
improvement in profits, earnings and dividends per share and 
annual turnover over roughly the same ten year period. The 
relevant data are set out in Table 5.5, which traces the pattern on 
these indices for the years 1975-86 inclusive. It will be seen that, 
with the exception of a slight reduction in earnings per share in 
1982 and 1983, in any given year the company's financial 
performance had improved from the previous one and that the 
typical pattern was of a steady rather than uneven advance.
So far as the timing of the introduction of schemes is concerned, 
there were no appreciable delays occasioned by an adverse profits 
performance. Moreover, the adoption of schemes was consistent 
with a progressive improvement in financial performance. But the 
development of schemes was related to an overall industrial 
relations policy and was part of a general aim lo increase the 
employees' sense of well being and commitment to the company.
Table 5.5 A manufacturing company: profits before lax, earnings and net 









































































The unions recognized by the company included the TGWU, 
GMBATU, the National Association of Licensed House Managers 
and USDAW, though only the first two were of course represented 
in the actual manufacturing (brewing) plants. In the firm as a 
whole, between 50 and 55 per cent of full-lime employees were 
unionized and there were local collective bargaining arrangements.
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Procedural arrangements were negotiated in approximately 40-50 
local units organized by geographical area and business sector. All 
bargaining units were largely independent of central control 
although both the share schemes and pension arrangements were 
organized on a national basis. The share schemes were not negoti­ 
able, though they were sometimes discussed in the consultative 
committees which had been established in the firm. The union 
officials in the TGWU and GMBATU took the view that, so long 
as the firm's schemes did not impinge upon collective bargaining 
they would be broadly supported. Employees were informed 
directly about the schemes through video, booklets and briefing 
sessions.
The employees surveyed were employed in a single manufactur­ 
ing site in South Wales. The TGWU was the principle union and 
although there was no closed shop agreement in the plant, the bulk 
of manual workers (and over 50 per cent of the workforce as a 
whole) were union members.
The attitudes of the employees here were particularly interesting 
because the work site combined the circumstances of: (1) a well 
established workforce in a traditional industry, with (2) an uninter­ 
rupted and impressive financial performance of the wider 
company, enabling it to provide secure employment and consistent 
benefits in a region with unemployment above the UK national 
average. Moreover, as we shall see, these twin conditions appeared 
to be related to considerable support for profit sharing and share 
ownership in general and for the particular company's schemes. 
Indeed, the level of commitment of the employees to their own 
firm's arrangements was appreciably greater than in the case of the 
finance sector firm which we have just examined (see Tables 5.2 
and 5.6), despite the different occupational and industrial sector 
characteristics of the two workforces. The importance of a firm 
making consistently good and, preferably rising, profits for a 
highly positive set of attitudes to a particular company's scheme 
thus appears to be underscored.
To begin with, employee attitudes towards profit sharing and 
share ownership in general were highly positive (over half of 
respondents in each case strongly in favour of profit sharing with 
cash awards, profit sharing through shares in the company and 
SAVE schemes, with hardly a respondent being negative in each 
case). The company's share-ownership (APS) and 'own as you 
earn' (SAVE) schemes were also typically supported in terms of the 
rewards actually accruing to employees (78 per cent of respondents 
considering the APS scheme to be either satisfactory or highly 
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and share-ownership schemes were incorporated in a booklet and 
these focused on the importance of giving employees 'a stake in the 
company 1 and being 'personally concerned about its profitability'. 
Again, however, some diverse perceptions about the objectives of 
profit sharing emerged from different personnel within manage­ 
ment. The company secretary emphasized the value of schemes in 
terms of their encouragement of a greater consciousness of the need 
to make profits. The personnel manager doubted whether they 
would have such an effect and saw their origins and development in 
terms of the change in company 'culture' and the different 
approach to employees that this had engendered. The manager of a 
depot (ie a line manager) and also a trustee of the APS scheme saw 
(he objectives of profit sharing in terms of an additional financial 
reward for employees and in leading to a more cost-conscious work­ 
force concerned with reducing waste. Again, these differing percep­ 
tions should not be regarded as necessarily competing but rather as 
having been selected from a number of aims and focused by the 
particular concerns of the occupants of the varying specializations 
and roles within management itself.
Turning to the financial performance of the company, in Table 
5.9 data are presented for the period when the firm became publicly 
quoted. It shows a marked improvement in profits, earnings per 
share, net ordinary dividends per share and turnover from the very 
low base of 1982. As has been mentioned, 1980-1 was a particu­ 
larly traumatic period for the company, involving substantial job 
losses. But by 1985 and 1986 new employees were again being 
recruited. Against this background the late adoption of the APS 
scheme can be readily understood (profits needed improving before 
profit sharing became a meaningful exercise). Arguably, too, the 
earlier establishment of the SAVE scheme (involving very little cost 
to the company as opposed to more broadly-based profit sharing) is 
also interpretable in part in tenns of the financial circumstances of 
the company in the 1980s.
Table 5.9 A retail company: profits before tax, earnings and net ordinary 




































Case studies of the impact of schemes
Turning, to the attitudes of the employees, the typical .support in 
the sample as a whole for profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes in general was reflected in this retailing firm. Indeed, 75 
per cent of respondents favoured profit sharing with cash rewards, 
81 per cent supported profit sharing through shares in (he company 
and 59 per cent endorsed Save As You Earn share ownership 
schemes. Moreover, there appeared to be some satisfaction with the 
firm's own schemes in terms of the rewards accruing to employees: 
46 per cent of respondents indicated that (he APS scheme was 
either satisfactory or highly satisfactory and 54 per cent expressed 
similar views on the SAVE scheme (see Table 5.10). However, these 
levels of satisfaction were not as high as in the case of Ihe brewing 
company and, given the different financial backgrounds of the 
firms, this was scarcely surprising. So far as information on 
schemes is concerned, 44 per cent of respondents indicated that 
they received this from a special memo and 35 per cent from the 
company booklet. Moreover, 24 per cent considered (his informa­ 
tion to be highly satisfactory, while a further 35 per cent regarded it 
as satisfactory (only 12 per cent viewed it as either unsatisfactory or 
highly unsatisfactory). Interestingly, too, 51 percent of respondents 
considered that managers and workers had benefited equally from 
the schemes (only 22 per cent regarded managers as Ihe main bene­ 
ficiaries). Moreover, this generally favourable set of attitudes was 
also reinforced by the preference of employees in this firm (against 
the pattern in the sample as a whole) for share-based (33 per cent) 
over cash-based (27 per cent) schemes. And 27 per cent of respond­ 
ents participated in their firm's SAVE scheme.
But were the non-unionized employees in the retail sector 
company distinctive in their assessment of the effects of schemes on 
aspects of their work and of the success of schemes in terms of 
achieving managerial objectives? Although our sample of employees 
in this firm was not large (n = 63) there did seem to be a tendency 
for respondents to be: (a) more positive in their estimates of the 
success of schemes on various aspects of their work; but (b) to be 
particularly sceptical about whether various managerial objectives 
in introducing schemes had been fulfilled.
Table 5.11 sets out the employees' perceptions of the effects of 
schemes on aspects of their work. Of particular note is that the 
majority of respondents (51 per cent) indicated improvements in 
overall satisfaction in working for the firm. And, although for the 
most part (as was the case for the sample as a whole) respondents 
typically indicated that there had been no change in work practices 
accompanying the introduction of schemes, the above average 
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job losses experienced by the company. Moreover, the mean scores 
on almost every index were slightly higher than for the sample as a 
whole, indicating that employees in this firm considered that 
schemes had been relatively effective.
The high degree of scepticism over the extent to which managerial 
objectives had been fulfilled by profit sharing and share ownership 
is of interest. The relevant information is set out in Table 5.12, 
where it will be noted that, with the exceptions of holding down 
wage claims and increasing the sense of cooperation between 
management and the workforce, the dominant view was (hat the 
company's schemes had been unsuccessful or not at all successful 
with respect to all five other issues. Moreover, relative to the sample 
as a whole, respondents in this particular retail firm were particu­ 
larly sceptical about the effects of profit sharing on employees' 
loyalty to the company, productivity, making people feel they are 
part of a company and increasing the employees' knowledge of the 
financial issues thai faced the company. And this may have been 
because of the change away from an older 'paternalistic' approach 
of the family-owned firm (when loyally and commitment to the 
company were encouraged). Moreover, the financial problems of 
the firm in the early 1980s had in any event occasioned considerable 
concern over productivity and, in such a milieu, employees were 
fully aware of the consequential nature of financial issues for the 
wellbeing of the firm, regardless of whether or not profit-sharing 
schemes had been introduced. In both respects, therefore, profit 
sharing and share ownership were unlikely to be seen as being by 
themselves of consequence in furthering managerial objectives.
The retail company examined in the third case was fhus of 
interest in consequence of being in a different sector, having a non- 
unionized workforce and having experienced considerable financial 
problems and job losses in the early 1980s. Moreover, the firm had 
experienced a substantial organizational change reflected in a 
movement away from the early family-owned 'paternalistic' 
approach and the growth of a more competitive, financially-aware 
enterprise with a rather different company 'culture'. These circum­ 
stances affected the experience of profit sharing by occasioning, 
above all, a delay in the introduction of the APS scheme. More­ 
over, so far as employee attitudes were concerned, although the 
firm's schemes were less favourably viewed than in the manufactur­ 
ing concern, the good profits of the two past years or so may have 
led to a recognition that managers and workers had benefited 
equally from schemes and to a preference for the financially 
rewarding share-based schemes. Nevertheless, the dramatic situa­ 
tion of the early 1980s (which was manifested above all in a halving
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of the workforce) would appear to have led to a considerable 
measure of doubt about the effectiveness of schemes in terms of 
inculcating employee loyally to the organization, not least when 
such characteristics in a workforce were no longer particularly 
valued by the management itself.
Conclusions
The data presented in this chapter thus help to reveal (he complex 
interrelationships between the financial and economic performance 
of companies, Ihe introduction of schemes and attitudes to par­ 
ticular types of arrangement. There is clearly an intricate and inter­ 
linked set of conditions within companies which impact upon actual 
practices. Detailed case study analysis has clearly helped to reveal 
these distinctive patterns and to amplify broader findings of a 
representative national survey. It is now appropriate to move on to 
a more detail review of the principal findings of this research 
project and to highlight general conclusions on the operation of 




For upwards of a century, in countries with diverse cultures and 
political economies, the notion of economic democracy has been 
widely advocated and a variety of practices encompassed by this 
concept have been established. In two interrelated volumes, we 
have been able to focus on one of its principal manifestations: the 
rise of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes. We 
have seen that interest in employee financial participation overall 
has become increasingly worldwide, with the acceleration of interest 
being particularly pronounced in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. By marshalling a rich range of data stemming from a 
research project conducted under tlv auspices of the Brilish 
Department of Employment, it has proved to be possible to 
uncover the main forces promoting this development and to 
examine, in deptli and detail, the actual impact of schemes within 
the company.
It is now appropriate to re-evaluate the principal findings of our 
enquiry and to examine the prospects for the advance of economic 
democracy in the years ahead. To accomplish these objectives, our 
conclusions embrace four main themes: (1) the theoretical analysis 
of economic democracy and a re-emphasis of ihe interrelated 
nature of the factors isolated in the main explanatory model of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes; (2) an outline of key 
findings focusing particularly on the impact of schemes; (3) a dis­ 
cussion of some general implications, arguments and propositions; 
and (4) a brief analysis of the prospects for the future.
Theories and models
In the first volume of this enquiry, it was argued that the develop­ 
ment of employee financial participation is best understood in 
terms of the notion of favourable conjunctures. That is to say, 
rather than a straightforward evolutionary or cyclical pattern being
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in evidence, the historical record is suggestive of a discontinuous 
but broadly advancing movement. Moreover, as we observed in 
Volume 1, the consolidated gains of the 1980s are, in our view, best 
understood against a background of facilitative legislation. Never­ 
theless, the varied pattern of adoption of schemes in companies 
requires a rather different explanation, with the most important 
factors being aspects of the economic infrastructure (the varied 
rates of development of different industrial sectors being relevant 
here), the choices of key managers reflecting distinctive styles of 
industrial relations, the industrial relations climate in the firm 
itself, and the support or otherwise of employee collectives (trade 
unions and staff associations).
In Volume 2, we have focused primarily upon the impact of 
schemes and have suggested an approach which views the adoption 
of profit sharing and share ownership in terms of the organiza­ 
tional identification of employees. This can comprise either 
intrinsic commitment stemming from improvements in participa­ 
tion, security and job satisfaction; or, alternatively, extrinsic 
commitment (notably improvements in instrumental rewards from 
work). But so far as outcomes are concerned, the impact of 
schemes can be assessed by reference to the financial performance 
of companies (profitability, productivity), industrial relations per­ 
formance (reduced conflict, labour turnover and absenteeism and 
improved management-employee relations), and organizational 
performance (improved employee involvement, satisfaction with 
the company, and adaptability and flexibility).
From a theoretical standpoint, then, we have been able to isolate 
the main issues associated with the impact of schemes. However, so 
far as broader economic consequences of profit sharing for 
inflation and unemployment are concerned, we cannot add signifi­ 
cantly to the arguments set out in the introduction. But in terms of 
model building, we have been able to highlight some interesting 
conclusions. Above all, it is clear that the impact of schemes is 
seldom direct and that complex interactive and multivariate inter­ 
pretations of profit sharing and share ownership are essential. The 
consequences of schemes for financial, industrial relations and 
organizational performance are affected by environmental influ­ 
ences. And although it is possible to establish links between the 
adoption of schemes and favourable attitudes to the organization, 
again a highly interactive pattern of relationships is observable.
In theoretical terms, it is clear that simplistic cause and effect 
models do not in any way represent actual patterns of conduct in 
organizations and that complex theories of the impact of employee 
financial participation are required. Moreover, as we have seen, a
Conclusion* and
favourable outcome so far as the impact of schemes arc concerned 
is iikely to encourage further developments in employee financial 
participation itself.
The impact of schemes
Turning, more specifically, at this point lo assess the impact of 
schemes, we are able to offer some insightful conclusions on (he 
links between the adoption of profit sharing and share ownership 
and the financial, industrial relations and organizational perform­ 
ance of companies. To begin with, there is almost certainly a 
positive relationship between company profitability and whether or 
not a firm has adopted profit-sharing schemes. However, there 
remains considerable doubt about the direction of this relationship. 
In particular, our data suggest that an improved profits perform­ 
ance is frequently the trigger mechanism for the adoption of 
schemes. This, in turn, enables a company to continue an onward 
advance in terms of profitability (not least because there are no 
negative effects of making substantial profits and not sharing these 
adequately with the workforce). Bul the time series data available 
to us showed that there was no direct necessary linkage between the 
adoption of schemes and an accelerated profits performance. And 
any effects here may be counterbalanced by environmental con­ 
ditions (such as exchange rate movements, oil price fluctuations, 
interest rates and so on). In short, our evidence suggests a highly 
complex and intertwined relationship between profit sharing and 
profitability. Ceteris paribus. firms introducing schemes can expect 
positive financial consequences, though these may well be indirect 
and mediated through organizational identification and commit­ 
ment. But there is not a direct linear relationship here or any 
certainty that firms introducing schemes will inevitably reap sub­ 
stantial financial benefits.
The same general conclusions apply to industrial relations per­ 
formance. Firms frequently introduce schemes as part of an 
attempt to improve their industrial relations climate, but our 
evidence suggests a complex pattern of relationships. Indeed, well- 
managed companies, with consultative-type employee relations 
policies, are in any case likely to experience lower levels of strikes 
and absenteeism and to have profit-sharing-type schemes. Indeed, 
it is clear from our interviews with key respondents and from data 
on strikes and absenteeism that the nature of a given industry could 
be particularly important in affecting outcomes. There were also 
some indications (though much of these were impressionistic) that 
labour turnover is reduced by the introduction of schemes. And
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certainly one of the managerial objectives for adopting both APS 
and ESO .schemes is to reduce labour turnover. But some types of 
industry (eg clothing, retailing) have high rates of labour turnover 
in any case and these are unlikely to be dramatically reduced by 
profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes. Indeed, the 
most important impact of profit sharing is almost certainly to 
improve organizational identification and commitment and hence, 
indirectly, to enhance industrial relations performance. But to 
expect a direct causal relationship between these variables is in our 
view unrealistic, and it is in any event not one which is by and large 
anticipated by the initiators of the schemes themselves.
The link between profit sharing, and employee shareholding and 
attitudes, rather than behaviour, was reinforced by an analysis of 
the impact of schemes on organizational performance. In our 
survey of the views of employees, we discovered that, while com­ 
paratively few respondents indicated that their productive work 
had noticeably increased following the introduction of schemes, 
both communications and satisfaction in working for (he company 
had shown a far more marked improvement. Moreover, attitudes 
to schemes for profit sharing and share ownership were found to be 
interlinked with positive views on the firm itself, in short, the 
strategy of improving the climate of management-employee 
relations by means of economic democracy would appear to be very 
soundly based and it is an important conclusion of our study as a 
whole.
General implications
The theoretical approach adopted in this enquiry and the data pre­ 
sented on the origins and impact of schemes for profit sharing and 
employee share ownership should, it is hoped, have shed light on an 
issue of current moment in political and economic debate. But, at 
this concluding juncture in our two volume study, there are a 
number of more general arguments and propositions which merit 
more detailed appraisal. These are: (1) the notion of a transforma­ 
tion of capitalist economies to property owning democracies; (2) the 
analytical significance and potency in economic development of the 
firm rather than the state or the market; (3) the salience of 
managerial style in the genesis and operation of schemes; (4) the 
complexities of practice and the importance of differentiating 
between the main forms of employee financial participation; (5) the 
international character of the movement towards economic democ­ 
racy; and (6) the interlinked nature of the forms of organizational 
democracy itself.
Conclusions and prospects
The first general argument to be addressed is to what extent does 
employee financial participation contribute to (he establishment of 
a so called property owning democracy? The case here has been 
cogently articulated by Copcman, Moore and Anowsrnith (1984), 
who have noted the productive power of the capitalist system and its 
ability to generate a high level of income for its participants. But, in 
their view, capital concentration has remained so high Ihal it has 
proved to be 'the Achilles heel of the free enterprise system - the 
shutting out of employees from participation in I he businesses' 
where they work (Copeman, Moore and Arrowsmith, 1984: 15). 
And this in lurn may well have contributed to the growth of political 
philosophies aimed at destroying (he free enterprise system.
For our part, although we have no direct evidence on the 
relationship (if one is present at ail) between employee shareholding 
and the adoption of particular political philosophies, we are 
reasonably certain that Hie current extern1 and depth of employee 
financial participation is no! sufficient to have such transformative 
qualities. More specifically, we have found that share ownership 
does not appear to have breached a predominant 'employee 
consciousness'. None the less, employees undoubtedly welcome 
share ownership and their chances of purchasing shares in 
companies other than, those in which they are employed has 
improved substantially in recent years. Moreover, ownership of 
shares is linked with other sets of attitudes and hence, leaving to 
one side the problems over the direction of this relationship, there 
may be a siow evolutionary change along the lines predicted by 
Copeman, Moore and Arrowsmith (1984). But a fundamental shift 
in employee attitudes to work, employment and society would 
require a far more extensive movement involving substantially 
greater shareholdings by employees than is currently the case.
Another intriguing argument which has developed around the 
notion of profit sharing has been the recognition of the firm as a 
key force in economic development. This in turn, implies a greater 
analytical significance for the enterprise rather than for the state or 
the market in explaining different patterns of advance in modern 
industrial societies. As Roseri, Klein and Young (1986) have 
observed:
After all these years of worshipping at the altar of Smith, 
Marx or Keynes, here is a whole new paradigm. Neither ('he 
market nor the state, nor even some combination, must 
assume the mythic dimensions and capabilities (hey often do in 
conventional theories. Instead, the firm becomes the vehicle 
for both economic growth and social justice.
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This is a proposition to which organizational behaviour and 
industrial relations scholars have been committed for a substantial 
period; but the focus on the 'shared economy' has reinvigorated a 
longstanding debate. Certainly our view is that an analysis at the 
level of the firm is essential for understanding the diverse patterns 
of development of profit sharing and share ownership. It is at the 
level of the enterprise that the key decisions to embark upon profit 
sharing and share ownership are formulated in the first place. And 
although these decisions are influenced by wider environmental 
exigencies, there is considerable choice, not only in the decision on 
whether or not to adopt a scheme, but also the specific arrange­ 
ments which are selected. Moreover, the impact of different 
schemes is also affected by a wide range of intra-organizationa! 
variables.
These broader arguments on the importance of the firm are 
linked with the recognition of the impact of managerial strategy 
and style in the adoption and operation of schemes for employee 
financial participation and for economic development more 
generally. Indeed, increasingly it has been understood that effective 
management at the level of the firm is basic to actual outcomes in a 
range of economic, social and industrial relations issues. For our 
part, the evidence presented in two volumes undoubtedly reinforces 
such a viewpoint. The managements of particular companies 
largely decide on whether or not to introduce schemes and on the 
details of the schemes adopted. The communications systems in 
companies which convey information are ultimately structured by 
the managements in particular firms. And the preferred style of 
management (and above all the support for consultative and 
employee involvement practices generally) is basic to understanding 
the genesis and operation of several forms of employee financial 
participation.
None the less, it is important to note that employee financial par­ 
ticipation is a highly complex phenomenon. Broadly speaking, it is 
possible to identify a number of levels of economic democracy 
ranging from managerial equity and executive profit sharing, to 
employee equity and all-employee schemes for profit sharing, to 
capital sharing and finally to pure economic democracy itself in 
which there is ownership of the enterprise by all the members of the 
firm (see Volume 1). But in every one of these general types, there 
are substantial variations and a number of different approaches. 
Some of the complications, such as with ESOPs, have arisen from 
the requirement to balance public, employee and employer 
interests. Others have developed from diverse managerial, employee 
or trade union strategies at the level of the firm. In the
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case of profit-sharing and ernployee-owneiship schemes there is a 
choice over whether to adopt cash- or share based schemes (or a 
combination of both). Decisions have then lo be taken over 
whether or not to develop Inland Revenue approved schemes and 
to trade off financial benefits against various lestriclion.s such as 
those imposed by Investment Protection Committees, l-uilher 
choices over APS or SAVE schemes have also to be made in UK 
companies. Anc 1 international variations in practice make the 
patterns of development more complex.
An important general conclusion of our study is thus thai profit- 
sharing and employee-shareholding schemes have highly diverse 
origins and modes of operation. Moreover, this is undoubtedly a 
consequential issue because it implies that there arc not unly 
different forces which underlie the growth of particular schemes (eg 
the APS or SAVE types of arrangement) but also diverse effects in 
terms of employee commitment, improved financial 01 industrial 
relations performance and so on which are implicit in the various 
approaches.
A further issue to be addressed is to what extent the development 
of profit sharing and employee shareholding is confined to 
countries such as the USA and UK and to what extent it is a 
genuinely international movement. There is no doubt that interest 
in this phenomenon lias become widespread and that developments 
have been rapid in North America and Europe in the 1980s. 
Moreover, particular types (such as the ESOPs) have become 
especially important as focal models for advances which have taken 
place outside their countries of origin. The Swedish commitment to 
capital sharing via Meidner plans has also been an influential 
approach. Nevertheless, there remains considerable diversity in 
international practice both in terms of the extent of development of 
profit sharing and employee shareholding and in (he actual types of 
practice adopted (the Sow levels of interest in West dermany until 
recently being particularly noteworthy in this respect). However, 
it is our considered view that developments in profit sharing 
and share ownership on a worldwide scale are likely to become 
increasingly marked in the years ahead. This is partly because of 
the improved competitiveness of companies which introduce 
schemes, but also because of current transformations in organiza­ 
tion and technology. After all, these are impelling firms to promote 
a variety of programmes in human resource management in order 
to attract and retain an adaptable core workforce to meet the 
requirements of emergent markets and their continuous and rapid 
change. Hence, while diversity in actual practice is likely to remain 
characteristic, there is every reason to suppose that piofit sharing
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and employee share ownership will become increasingly global in 
compass.
But how far, il may be reasonably asked, is economic democracy 
linked with industrial democracy and with the more genera! 
advance of organizational democracy itself?
The ideal of working men and women participating in and 
having a financial stake in the companies in which they are 
employed has of course captured the intellectual imagination for 
upwards of a century and has been particularly pronounced in the 
post-war period, in Volume 1, we were able to demonstrate that 
firms which introduce a variety of types of financial participation 
also (end to be those with relatively advanced practices for 
involving employees in other aspects of the company's affairs. 
They are also iikety to reach decisions on industrial relations issues 
after consultation or negotiation with the workforce. Further links 
have been demonstrated in this volume and, above all, we have 
found that employee shareholders typically have a greater say in 
how their jobs are done and that share ownership is slrongly linked 
with a desire for greater influence over decision-making. This was 
found to apply fo the overall policies of the firm, as well as to 
matters affecting an individual's department and how the job itself 
is actually done. So long as the modes of employee involvement are 
cognate, therefore, there are strong grounds for concluding that the 
various types of organisational democracy advance in parallel.
The future
Does this suggest that further substantial movement- towards 
greater employee financial and decision-making involvement are 
likely to develop in the years ahead? Our conclusions in this respect 
must be cautiously optimistic. There is no inexorable evolutionary 
trend towards organizational democracy but the 'favourable con­ 
junctures' of circumstance which have fuelled the growth of 
employee financial participation in the 1980s will almost certainly 
be augmented. Accompanying demographic changes, acute 
shortages of labour may well be evident in the advancing sectors of 
the economy and this will impel managements to formulate a 
variety of human resource strategies (including the introduction of 
share-based schemes) in order to ensure the maintenance of an 
adaptable, flexible and committed workforce. So far as com­ 
petitiveness is concerned, it is seldom fully appreciated that 
comparatively small advantages in terms of improvements in 
employee attitudes and behaviour can have highly significant long- 
term consequences in the international marketplace. And, in this
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respect, the positive consequences of (lie introduction of profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes for employee attitudes and 
behaviour may not only be more substantial than is commonly 
supposed but may also be sufficient to ensure an insistent and 
continuous pressure for further advances in the future.
None the less, progress is likely to remain uneven in different 
countries and across the various employment sectors. Unless thcie 
is mandatory legislation, employee financial and decision-making 
involvement will not be universal features of the modern industrial 
and post-industrial societies. While they may not be a panacea for 
all economic, industrial relations and oigani/.ationaf problems, the 
prospects for a growth in economic or industrial democracy in the 
years ahead are undoubtedly favourable. Hence our conclusion 
must be that, notwithstanding the diverse rationales for the 
advance, a variety of types of organizational democracy i.s likely to 
become increasingly widespread, not only in the 1990s, but above 
ail in the twenty-first century when the various and diverse sup­ 
portive conditions have come to their full fruition.
Appendix one
Case studies
Tile main aim of this volume has been to outline the principal 
findings of the case study phase of the Department of Employment 
sponsored project on profit sharing and share ownership and to 
assess the theoretical and empirical evidence on the potential 
impact of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes in the UK. 
The objectives of the case studies were:
(1) to obtain detailed and accurate information on the 
processes involved in setting up schemes and the managerial 
objectives in introducing them;
(2) to examine the relationship of schemes with the financial 
and industrial relations performance of companies, their 
degree of success (and the factors associated with this);
(3) to assess the role schemes play in relation to other 
employee involvement practices; and
(4) to identify and explore any obstacles to the development of 
profit sharing and share ownership.
In the design of the research, it was considered especially 
important to obtain information on employee views and on com­ 
pany performance as well as extending interviews with key 
respondents to include personnel in a number of managerial func­ 
tions and in trade unions. In particular, the following research 
design was proposed:
(1) To select about 20 case studies, covering a variety of 
companies, drawn from the Stage 3 sample in consultation 
with IFF Research Limited (the survey contractor).
(2) At least 14 of the case study companies would be operating 
all-employee Inland Revenue Approved schemes. The other 
cases would include companies with other types of profit 
sharing, or with schemes for specific groups of employees 




(3) At least six of the case study companies would have recent 
schemes (ie ones introduced prior to spring 1986); the others 
would include companies with schemes in existence for more 
than three years.
(4) Detailed interviews would take place with key management 
respondents (eg financial managers, personnel/industrial 
relations managers and line managers) and with trade union 
representatives.
(5) Information on company performance (including economic 
and industrial relations indicators) would be obtained, 
preferably over a ten year period.
(6) In general, the case studies were not meant to provide 
quantitative data since these had been provided by the overall 
survey in Stage 1. However, it was considered important (o 
gauge employee opinion by means of a self-completed 
questionnaire. This included personnel at all levels in the 
organization. This part of the research was conducted at 
establishment level (by contrast witli interviews with key 
managerial respondents, which were more typically at 
company headquarters). It was thus decided to carry out case 
study work both at company headquarter and at establishment 
levels.
In order to accomplish these objectives, there were thus three 
main parts to the case study phase: (1) interviews with key 
personnel; (2) the gathering of data on company performance; and 
(3) an employee attitude survey. Some of the important issues 
covered in each section are highlighted below.
(I) Interviews with key personnel
These were based on a semi-structured interview schedule and 
involved obtaining information from managers directly involved in 
the establishment and/or administration of profit-sharing/share- 
ownership schemes. Full details of the schedule are included in 
Appendix 2.
The data gathered from the management schedule included:
Detailed information on types of scheme adopted.
Views on legislation and possible changes.
A detailed exploration of the objectives of schemes.
A detailed assessment by respondents of problems encountered
in the operation of schemes.
Information on how employees leave schemes, taxation, the
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nature of employee shareholdings and the role of the
Investment Protection Committees.
A detailed analysis of links with other forms of employee
involvement.
An assessment of the effects of schemes on profitability,
employee adaptability, industrial relations practices and
workforce attitudes.
The views of trade union representatives were also examined. 
Indeed, a specific schedule was designed for this purpose and 
included questions on the assessment of the various types of Inland 
Revenue Approved schemes: profit-sharing schemes (APS), -Save 
As You Earn share-ownership schemes (SAYE), and Executive 
Share Option schemes (ESO), and their effects (see Appendix 3). 
We also sought to establish whether trade unions had formulated 
any general policies on profit sharing and share ownership.
(2) Da fa on company performance ('behavioural data')
In order to make some further assessment of the relationship of 
schemes with the financial and industrial relations performance of 
companies, data were also gathered on a number of relevant issues. 
These are referred to as 'behavioural data' to distinguish them 
from material based on the viewpoints of management and 
employees. The data here include annual absenteeism rates, annua! 
labour turnover, annual company turnover/sales, annual profits, 
industrial disputes, annual net dividend per share and annual 
capita!-labour ratio. So far as possible data were gathered over the 
last ten years.
(3) Employee attitudes
A key part of this phase of the research was of course to obtain 
information on employee attitudes (see questionnaire — Appendix 
4). The questions were designed to elicit employee views on profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes generally, experience within 
employing companies, the success or otherwise of schemes, 
information on schemes and how satisfactory this has been, and 
preferences for particular type of scheme and modes of distribution 
of profits. More specifically, too, we sought detailed information 
to assess the link identified in the survey phase of the research 
between these schemes and employee involvement more generally.
Appendices
The case study companies
In order to carry out the research it was necessary to select approxi­ 
mately 20 case study companies for detailed exploration. These 
were drawn from the 303 'main stage' firms of Phase I of the 
project and were included to reflect variations in types of schemes, 
the periods when particular schemes were introduced, the si/.e of 
enterprise, industrial sector and degree of unionization. In March 
1986, over 40 cases were selected from the data at iFF Research 
Limited. IFF Research Limited then sent a standard letter lo Hie 
companies involved to seek cooperation for the case sludy phase. If 
this was forthcoming, details of the company and a key respondent 
were passed on to the UWCC research team which then arranged 
initial headquarters-visits. Ultimately, it proved lo be feasible to 
obtain information from 22 cases in this way, divided roughly 
equally between London/South East of England and South Wales/ 
the South West of England and providing a good coverage of the 
varying characteristics of companies with respect to size, sector, 
unionization and so on. It was considered important to examine the 
experiences of firms in London/South East of England because 
Stage 1 suggested that companies in this region were particularly 
likely to have schemes; South Wales provided a valuable contrast 
since this region has had traditional heavy industries with a sub­ 
stantial degree of public sector employment. And, although this 
situation has been rapidly changing in recent years, with the estab­ 
lishment of new types of industry (particularly in electronics) and a 
variety of financial and service sector activities, there are still likely 
to be differences in the types of workplace in the two regions, 
which may have relevance to attitudes to profit sharing and share 
ownership.
Full details of the case study companies in these respects are set 
out in Table Al. For each of the firms, information is presented on 
type of scheme, date of introduction of schtrne, the existence or 
otherwise of other related incentive schemes, industrial sector, size 
of organization (measured by number of employees) and extent of 
unionization.
So far as type of scheme is concerned, it will be noted that 17 
firms have APS schemes, 14 firms approved SAYE schemes and 16 
firms approved ESO schemes. In addition, two firms had no 
approved schemes at all, and one firm had no APS scheme but, at 
the time of the interviews, was in the process of applying for Inland 
Revenue approval for its SAYE and ESO schemes. However, there 
is no neat division between firms with approved and non-approved 
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There is also a good representation of early and recent schemes 
amongst the case study companies: 13 of the approved APS or 
SAVE schemes had been introduced in 1981 or earlier and 11 had 
been adopted in 1984 or later (6 in 1985 or 1986). The distribution 
of firms by sector is as follows: finance (7), manufacturing (5), 
services (4), retail/distribution (4), other (2).
Companies of varied size and patterns of unionization are also 
included amongst the case studies. Thus, while 8 companies have 
fewer than 1,000 employees, 5 have more than 10,000 employees, 
with the balance of companies between these two figures. Eleven 
companies have no trade unions at all. Amongst those with unions, 
the levels of union density range between 4 per cent and 95 per cent 
(see again Table Al).
Interview with key personnel
Following the selection of firms, interviews with key respondents 
were arranged at headquarters level. In all the case study com­ 
panies, a full schedule was completed with at least one manager at 
this level. Typically, however, we sought a spread of headquarters 
managers (covering the company secretary/director of finance and 
group personnel manager) arid establishment-level managers. 
There were considerable variations amongst the cases depending on 
management structure. After all, in the smallest firms, there was 
only a relatively limited degree of specialization of management 
functions and there was typically only one establishment. However, 
in the largest companies, roles were well defined and it was neces­ 
sary to visit a number of establishments: (a) to carry out more 
detailed interviews with line managers/site personnel officers; 
(b) to contact union representatives in the unionized companies; 
and, (c) most important of all, to arrange for the distribution of 
employee questionnaires. So far as the main schedule is concerned 
(see Appendix 2), this was administered to a minimum of one and a 
maximum of 14 key respondents in the various case study firms.
Following the interviews with headquarters key respondents, we 
then entered into consultations on appropriate sites for distributing 
questionnaires and carrying out further interviews (including, 
where relevant, with union representatives). At this point, we did 
meet with some resistance from managements unwilling to allow us 
to survey employee attitudes but we were able to undertake this 
exercise in twelve companies. So far as trade union representatives 
are concerned, approximately 25 representatives were interviewed 
in the following unions: AEU, ASTMS, BIFU, CPSA, IPCS, 
NUTGW and TGWU. Moreover, seven full-time officers outside
the firms were interviewed (notably in ASTMS, BI1-U, CiMBATU 
and TGWU).
Company performance indicators
Key respondents at headquarters level were also asked to provide 
details on company performance covering both financial and 
industrial relations issues. However, whilst il proved possible to 
obtain a full set of information on annual profits after tax, annual 
turnover/sales, annual capital-labour ratio and annual earnings 
per share, the data on industrial relations performance were not so 
complete. For the number of stoppages per company this was 
scarcely surprising (after all, in any given year, the majority of 
British companies do not have strikes). But for annual absenteeism 
rates and annual labour turnover, although it was possible to make 
a number of inter-firm comparisons, the data supplied were far 
from comprehensive: (a) because some companies did not gatiier 
statistics of this type; (b) because in others the information applied 
variously to company or establishment level but not both; and 
(c) because some firms were prepared lo provide these data lor only 
a single year.
Employee questionnaires
The aim of the questionnaires was to elicit employee views at all 
levels in the organization and (he distribution was based on one or 
more establishments in a given company. The number of question­ 
naires distributed varied according to the size of company and was 
designed to produce roughly 2,000 completed schedules overall. It 
was necessary lo vary the contents of questionnaires slightly 
(particularly with respect to the section on trade unions) but, apart 
from this set of questions, relatively few modifications were 
suggested by management or union at establishment/headquarters 
levels.
The final total of employee questionnaires (1,931) is based on 
distributions in twelve companies with the establishments carefully 
selected to provide a roughly equal number of respondents in the 
London/South East of England and the South Wales/South West 
of England regions. Apart from establishments in London, in the 
first mentioned region, sites in Luton, Ipswich, Maidstone and 
Brighton were all included. Moreover, in South Wales/South West 
of England, establishments covered not only those based in Cardiff 
and Bristol, but also Ponlypool, Weston-super-Mare, Gloucester, 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interviews with key respondents
Check list
In each case study data is sought under the following three 
headings:
/ Interviews with key personnel
Interviews wiJI be conducted with key personnel in the company, ie 
senior management closely involved with share schemes, the 
personnel manager(s) and a senior employee representative(s). The 
numbers of key personnel interviews will be determined by the size 
of the workforce. Interviews will be conducted with the help of a 
semi-structured interview schedule to ensure comparability of data 
between companies. In addition, supporting documentation in the 
form of annual reports, brochures, policy documents, minutes etc, 
will be obtained where permissible.
2 Behavioural data
Behavioural data will be acquired from each case study to identify 
changes in company over the last ten years. This will include the 
following:
a) Present number of full-time and part-time employees broken 
down by sex, age, length of service, status and income.
b) Annual absenteeism rate.
c) Annual labour turnover.
d) Annual turnover/sales.
e) Annual profits.
f) Number of disputes/stoppages per annum, numbers 
involved and duration.
g) Annual net dividend per share, 
h) Annual capital-labour ratio.
Appendices
3 Employee attitudes
An employee questionnaire will be distributed to at least 10 per cent 
of employees in each case study to obtain broad views on profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes.
Key personnel semi-structured interview schedule
/ Type of schemes
a) Which scheme do you operate?
i) ADST (Approved Deferred Share Trust) 
ii) SAVE (Save As You Earn) 
iii) Cash based 
iv) Share based 
v) Mixed 
vi) Executive Share Option Scheme
b) Where and how did you hear about these schemes?
c) When were these schemes introduced? Who were the key 
people setting them up?
d) Have there been any recent changes in the schemes, eg Budget 
1986?
e) Are you in the process of introducing a scheme?
f) Were there any administrative problems in setting up these 
schemes?
2 Legislation
a) Is the present legislation easy to understand - by company/ 
employees?
b) Should the legislation be simplified?
c) What (other) changes to the legislation would you make (if 
any)?
d) Have there been any problems regarding approval by: 
i) The Inland Revenue? 
ii) The Investment Protection Committees?
e) Were there any problems regarding the time taken to get 
approval?
3 Objectives
a) What were your objectives in introducing these schemes?
b) Were there any other objectives you considered? What were
they?
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Interviewer only - Probe
i) As an alternative Industrial Relations strategy? ADST
SAVE ESO
ii) As a tax efficient means of rewarding employees? 
iii) To make employees more cost, and profit conscious? 
iv) To compete with other firms? 
v) As part of general Employee Involvement policy? 
vi) To keep down/substitute for wage increases? 
vii) To deter official/unofficial industrial action? 
viii) To increase loyalty/sense of commitment to the firm?
c) Have your objectives been met? If so, can you give an 
example?
d) Since introducing the scheme have you modified your 
objectives?
e) What are the advantages of the schemes to the company/ 
employee?
f) Are there any disadvantages you would like to mention?
4 Share Option Schemes (SA YE)
a) What is the minimum period shares must be left in scheme - 
5 or 7 years?
b) Who is eligible for the scheme? How did you decide on these 
criteria? Do they relate back to the objectives? Should they be 
changed, eg do you think they should be all embracing? Do 
they include part-timers?
c) How many employees have joined the scheme? Percentage of 
those eligible? Average saved? Length of option? Bonus other 
than tax concessions?
d) How is the individual share calculated? What is the average 
individual share?
e) Are there any limits on an individual share/savings? What are 
the maximum share earnings? What is the maximum saving?
f) What is the option price of the share? How many options? 
Percentage discount?
g) How much has been paid out to date?
h) What are the advantages of your scheme to company/
employees?
i) Are there any disadvantages? 
j) What changes, if any, would you make?
1 14
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5 Executive Share Option Scheme
a) What sort of scheme is on offer?
b) Who is eligible? Why did you decide on this criteria?
c) How many participated? Percentage of those eligible?
d) Is there any relationship between this and any oilier scheme?
e) Are the objectives for this scheme considerably different from 
the other schemes, or is it just an extension of the same 
principle?
f) Are there any limits on the individual share? What are they?
g) What changes, if any, would you make?
h) What is the option price of the shares? How many options?
Percentage discounts? 
i) Are there any disadvantages?
6 Profit Sharing Schemes (ADST)
a) Who are the trustees in the scheme?
b) Is one of the trustees a senior union/staff association 
representative?
c) How is the profit distributed under this scheme?
d) Is the distribution in the form of cash, shares or both?
e) Is this arrangement satisfactory?
f) Who is eligible for the scheme? How did you decide on these 
criteria? Do they relate back to the objectives? Should they 
be changed? Eg do you think they should be all embracing? 
Do they include part-timers?
g) How many employees have joined the scheme? Percentage of
those eligible?
h) What is the minimum period shares must be left in trust? 
i) Are there any limits on the individual share? What are
they? 
j) How many shares have been allotted? Total value of shares
in trust? Percentage of total share value? 
k) What are the advantages of your scheme to company/
employees?
1) Are there any disadvantages? 
m) What changes, if any, would you make?
7 Leaving the scheme
a) What arrangements are there for those who leave the scheme?
b) Are those arrangements satisfactory from the company/ 
employee point of view?
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8 Taxation
a) What are the tax advantages/disadvantages for your 
employee/company?
b) What improvements would you like to see regarding tax 
concessions for employees/company?
9 Shares
a) Should employee shares be differentiated from ordinary 
shares?
b) Have there been any problems regarding the market value of 
shares?
c) Should there be a link between employee and executive 
shares?
10 Investment Protection Committees
a) Were the 1PC restrictions an important consideration in 
setting up schemes?
b) Are these restrictions satisfactory?
c) What changes, if any, would you like to see?
11 Employee involvement
a) Do you have an overall industrial relations policy in the 
company? What contribution does profit sharing/share 
ownership make to this policy?
b) Are there any unions/staff associations which are recognized 
by your company? Which?
c) Percentage of employees those unions/staff associations 
represent? Which employees?
d) What collective bargaining and consultative arrangements do 
you have with these unions/staff associations? How do these 
impact upon profit sharing?
e) Are any of the schemes negotiable? Is this compatible with 
overall industrial relations policy?
f) Were the trade unions/staff associations consulted before the 
introduction of the schemes?
g) How did you inform your employees of the schemes - 
directly, through union/staff association channels? What 
mode did this take? Did employees find this satisfactory?
h) Were there any difficulties in understanding the schemes?
i) Have you continued to inform employees/advise them on the 
schemes subsequent to setting them up?
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j) Should employee shareholders have the same voting rights as
ordinary shareholders? What voting rights do they have al
the moment?
k) Was there any discernible opposition to (he schemes from: 




1) Have you had any other feedback on (lie schemes from any
of these? 
in) Has financial participation by employees:
i) increased profitability through improved efficiency?
ii) made organizational changes more acceptable by 
employees?
iii) reduced levels of absenteeism, labour turnover?
iv) improved employee attitudes at work? 
n) What other forms of employee involvement are there in the
company? To what extent do these link with profit sharing/
share ownership? 
o) Has the introduction of the scheme(s) affected/changed




1 Schemes - union policy
a) Does your union have a policy on profit-sharing/share- 
ownership schemes? National policy? District or Branch 
policy?
If no, do you think there is a need for such a policy?
If yes, have there been any recent changes in that policy?
b) Has the introduction of the schemes in this company caused 
any problems for you or your members?
c) What are the major advantages/disadvantages of the scheme 
for your members?
2 Legislation
a) Are you aware of the recent legislation on profit-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes (ie Finance Acts 1978, 1980 and
1984)? 
If yes, do you think this legislation is easy to understand?
b) What changes would you like to see in the legislation?
3 Objectives of management
a) What were the managements' objectives in introducing profit- 
sharing/share-ownership schemes in the company?
b) Do you think these objectives have been met?
If no, can you recommend any other alternative schemes 
which would be more likely to achieve these aims?
4 Schemes - specific
Ask same questions for all types of scheme: 
SA YE Share Option Schemes
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Executive Share Option Schemes 
Profit-sharing Schemes
a) Does your union approve of this type of scheme?
b) What are the advantages/disadvantages?
c) Any changes you would like made to this scheme?
5 Employee involvement
a) Are union/management relations in the company 
satisfactory?
b) Do you think profit-sharing/share-ownership schemes should 
be on the negotiating agenda?
c) Would you like to see profit sharing/share ownership form 
part of fixed income/wages/salary?
d) Have the members' attitude to the union changed since the 
schemes were introduced?
e) How did you hear about the schemes in the company?
f) Was your union consulted about the schemes? Was this 
satisfactory?
g) How did your members find out about the schemes? 
h) Was the information provided satisfactory? 
If not, how could it have been improved? 
i) Did your members have any difficulty in understanding the 
scheme?
If yes, how could the information/communication be 
improved?
j) Has financial participation by employees . . . 
i) Improved the efficiency of your members? 
ii) Changed their attitudes towards the union? 
iii) Changed their attitudes to work?
k) Has the introduction of the schemes changed management 
-union relations in any way?
Appendix four
Profit sharing and share
for employees
Employee questionnaire
Profiil sharing and share ownership for employees
1 The research into this highly topical issue is sponsored by the 
Department of Employment. It is concerned with the adoption of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes following recent 
legislation. The research is being carried out independently by a 
research team headed by Professor Michael Poole of the Cardiff 
Business School, the University College of Wales, Cardiff. We can 
thus assure you that the replies you give will be treated in the 
strictest of confidence. Indeed, the results will largely be reported 
in statistical summaries.
2 This questionnaire has been prepared to obtain views on profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes.
3 We realise that you have many demands on your time, so we 
greatly appreciate your help.
4 Most of the questions ask you to respond to a statement by 
circling a number of the response which you select.
The following is an example of a question. 
1 I enjoy the weather in Britain
Neither
Strongly Slightly agree nor Slightly Strongly 
disagree Disagree disagree disagree agree Agree agree 
1234567
If you agree with the statement '1 enjoy the weather in Britain' you 
would circle number 6. If you strongly disagree with the statement, 
you would circle number 1.
Some questions do not ask you to agree or disagree, but may ask 
you how often something happens or whether you think something
has increased or decreased or simply ask for factual information. 
Other questions are open ended to give you a chance to indicate 
your views.
5 If you have read a question carefully but still do not fully under­ 
stand it, just answer it as best you can. We are still interested in 
receiving your questionnaire even if you are doubtful about one or 
two questions.
Thank you very much again for your help.
Michael Poole BA (Econ) PhD
Professor
Cardiff Business School
University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology
Cardiff
CFI 3EU
The following question seeks your views on profit-sharing/and share-ownership schemes in general
/ To what extent are you in favour of the development of prof it-sharing/share-ownership schemes for 
employees in British companies?
Please respond to each category
(a) Profit sharing (with cash awards)
(b) Profit sharing (through shares in the 
company)
(c) Save As You Earn Share-Ownership Schemes
(d) Executive Share Schemes
The next group of questions relate to experiences in your own company
2 As a result of profit sharing/share ownership in your company, do you feel
Decreased Decreased Decreased Not Increased 
greatly considerably slightly changed
(a) Your overall satisfaction 
working for this firm 
has 1234
(b) Your feeling of job
security has 1 234
































that you put into your 
job has.1
(d) The amount of productive 
work you do has
(e) The amount of effort 
other people you work 
with put into their jobs 
has
(f) In general, employees' say 
in decisions concerning 
their own jobs has
(g) In general, employees' say
in decisions in their own
departments has 
(h) In general, employees' say
in overall policies of the
firm has 
(i) Your say in decisions
concerning your job
has 
(j) Your say in decisions in
your department has 
(k) Your say in decisions
concerning overall policies






3 How successful do you feel the schemes have been in terms of the following objectives?
Neither
(a) To make employees more 
profit conscious/more 
interested in the company's 
success
(b) To increase employees' sense 
of commitment to the 
company/make staff more 
likely to stay
(c) To act as an incentive for 
greater productivity
(d) To make employees feel that 
they are part of the company 
- working with it, not just 
for it
(e) To help hold down wage 
claims
(f) To provide a tax efficient 
means of reward 
for the employees 
for the company
(g) To ensure that employees 




































(h) To increase employees'
understanding of the
financial issues that face the
company 54 3 
(i) To increase the sense of
cooperation between
management and workforce 54 3
4 Whom do you feel profit sharing/share ownership benefit the most?
1 Workers 2 Managers 3 Undecided 4 Both equally
How did you find out about your company's scheme?
a) Via standard Inland Revenue booklet




f) Via union channels
g) Other (write /«)__—————______________












7 Please specify any improvements you would like to see in communications on profit-sharing or share- 
ownership schemes in the company
8 How satisfactory do you find your own company's schemes in terms of rewards for employees?
Neither 
Highly satisfactory nor Highly
(a) Profit Sharing (ADST) ^^ ̂ctory unsatisfactor Unsatisfactory unsatisfactory
(b) Share Ownership (SAYE) 1 2 3 45
(c) Executive Share Option 1 2 3 
9 (a) If you had a choice between a cash-based or a share-based profit-sharing scheme would you choose? 
(I) Cash-based 1 
(ii) Share-based 2 
(iii) Share-based (in a Trust) 3 
(iv) Mixed 4 
(v) Don't know 9
(b) How would you prefer your entitlement to be decided?
(i) Length of service 1
(ii) Grade of job 2
(iii) Salary/wage level 3
(iv) Flat rate equally 4
(v) Combination of above 5
(vi) Don't know 9
For employees in a company with a share-option scheme
10 Do you participate in the Save As You Earn scheme currently operating in your company? 
Yes 1 No 2
(a) If yes
Do you intend to keep your shares?
(i) for the minimum period necessary 1 
(ii) for the minimum period to qualify for any tax exemption 2 
(iii) for 1 -2 years after the minimum period 3 
(iv) for period to gain full exemption from income tax 4 
(v) for a substantial period of time 5 
(vi) indefinitely 6
(b) If no
Have you ever been part of the Save As You Earn scheme in your company? 
Yes 1 No 2
(c) If yes, why did you leave it?
The following questions relate to possible improvements or developments in types of scheme
11 In addition to current arrangements in your company, what other types (if any) of profit-sharing or share- 
ownership schemes would you like to see developed?
Please specify
12 What other types of incentive (if any) do you feel should be introduced to encourage the further spread of 
profit-sharing and/or share-ownership schemes in companies in Britain?
Please specify
The following questions ask you to rate how much say or influence there is in each situation beiow
13 How much say or influence do you feel that employees in general in this firm actually have in decisions about
No say Very Little Some Good deal Great deal Very great 
at all little say say say of say of say deal of say
(a) Overall policies of the firm 12345 6 7
(b) Matters affecting their own
department 12345 6 7
(c) How their own jobs are done  6 7
14 How much say or influence do 
you feel that employees in 
general should have in 
decisions regarding
(a) Overall policies of the firm 12345 6 7
(b) Matters affecting their own
department 12345 6 7
(c) How their own jobs are done  6 7
75 How much say or influence do 
you feel you actually have in 
decisions about
(a) Overall policies of the firm 12345 6 7
(b) Matters affecting your own
department 12345 6 7
(c) How your own job is done  6 7
16 How much say or influence do 
you feel you should have in 
decisions about
(a) Overall policies of the firm 12345 6 7
(b) Matters affecting your own
department 12345 6 7
(c) How your own job is done  6 7
The following questions seek your opinions about unions. Please answer these questions whether or not you are 
a union member
17
(a) Basically, the union and
management have similar goals
(b) It is difficult to be loyal to the 
company and to the union
(c) A union is not really necessary in 
this firm at this time
(d) There is no reason why the union 
and management cannot work 
together
(e) Without a union, employees 
would probably not get fair 
treatment from management
(0 The union works primarily for 
the best interests of its members
(g) The best way of obtaining 
worker say or influence in 
decision-making in this firm is 































The following questions ask you to rate the extent that you feei something
Little
18 At your company to what extent do you
(a) Feel a sense of ownership
(b) Simply feel like an employee
(c) Feel a sense of self employment
































(a) The most important element in any job
is the pay 12345
(b) It's important for an employee to feel
fully a part of the company 12345
(c) It's essential for the employee to
participate in decision-making 12345
(d) Work and home should be sharply
separated 12345
(e) The best representative of the employee's
interests is the union not the company 12345
(f) It's important for management and the
workforce to trust one another 12345
(g) A person's own individual career is more 
important than any loyalty to a 
particular company 12345
Information about yourself
The following information is needed to help classify and interpret your previous responses. It will not be used in 
any way to try to identify individuals. Please answer these questions by circling the number of the correct answer.
20 Are you
1 Male 2 Female




22 Do you have any educational/professional qualifications?
1 Yes 2 No 
If yes, circle as many as apply
(a) CSE, 'O' levels 1
(b) 'A'levels ]
(c), Technical qualifications (eg ONC, OND, HNC, HND) 1 
Degree
(d) Science *
(e) Technology 1 
(0 Other J 
(g) Higher degree 1 
(h) Professional qualifications 1
23 Are you
Married Single Widowed Divorced 
1234
24 How many dependents do you have? (Others who depend on you for financial support)
25 Do you hold shares
(a) In this company? 1 Yes 2 No 
If yes
(i) Did you purchase the shares? 1 Yes 2 No 
(ii) Were you given the shares? 1 Yes 2 No
(b) In another company? 1 Yes 2 No




1 Full-time employee 2 Part-time employee
28 How many hours do you work in an average week?
29 How long have you worked for this company?
1 Less than six months
2 Six months to eleven months
3 One year or more but less than two years
4 Two to five years
5 Six to ten years
6 Eleven to 15 years
7 More than 15 years




4 Clerical or secretarial
5 Skilled manual
6 Semi skilled manual
7 Unskilled manual
8 Other: please specify..............................................
31 How long have you been in your present job in this firm?
1 Less than one month
2 One to three months
3 More than three to twelve months
4 More than twelve months to three years
5 More than three years to six years
6 More than six years
32 Are you a member of a staff association
(a) Yes 1
(b) No 2
33 Are you a union member? 
1 Yes 2 No
(a) If yes, are you or have you ever been a sieward, or other union officer? 
1 Yes 2 No
(b) How regularly do you attend main meetings?
Always Frequently Regularly Occasionally 
1234
34 What is your age in years? ...........................................
Never
5
35 At the height of their -working careers into what category would your father's and your mother's occupation 
have fallen ?
Father's Mother's
(a) Professional or senior managerial (eg doctor, company
director) 1 1
(b) Semi-professional, middle or lower management (eg
school teacher, sales manager) 2 2
(c) Routine non-manual (eg clerk, typist) 3 3
(d) Skilled manual (eg electrician) 4 4
(e) Semi-skilled manual (eg machine operative) 5 5
(f) Unskilled manual (eg labourer) 6 6
(g) Not in a paid occupation 7 7
36 What country did your father and mother originally come from?
(a) United Kingdom (England, Scotland, Wales, N. Ireland)





(g) Africa (Asian origin)
(h) Africa (other)
(i) Don't know





























More than four 6
If there is anything you wish to add, particularly on profit-sharing/share-ownership schemes, please feel free to 
do so in the space below.
Many thanks again for your help.
Appendix five
List of trade unions referred to in 
the study
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial
Staffs
BiFU Banking, Insurance and Finance Union 
CPSA Civil and Public Services Association 
GMBATU General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trade
Union
1PCS Institution of Professional Civil Servants 
NALHM National Association of Licensed House Managers 
NUTGW National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers 
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers
Note: Names applicable at time of case study investigation.
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Abstract 
This paper assesses how far attitudes and behaviour have altered as result of the adoption of
profit sharing and employee share-holding schemes in the UK The main effects of profit sharing 
and share-holding schemes on employee attitudes are reported in terms of support, benefits, job 
satisfaction, type of scheme and communications. Also, it provides an assessment of employee 
preferences and the affect of such schemes on behaviour. It finds general support for such 
schemes (as long as they are across the board), general satisfaction with financial rewards, 
improvements in job satisfaction but not in work practices, and a preference for cash-based 
profit-sharing schemes. It concludes that such schemes are more likely to change attitudes rather 
than behaviour of the employees who participate in them.
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How employees respond 
to profit sharing
Companies which introduce profit-sharing and share ownership 
schemes hope they will help retain and motivate their workforce as 
well as increase productivity. But how far are these aims realised? 
Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins report on a study of employees' 
attitudes to these schemes and shed some light on their true effect
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T here is an increasing awareness of the potential benefits of profit sharing, and employee share ownership and their promotion is becoming a key theme in modern corporate strategy. Profit-sharing 
schemes may pay out in cash, or shares, or a mixture 
of the two. Employee share ownership can also be 
promoted in a number of ways.
The advance of share ownership has been assisted 
by income tax relief for employees in schemes 
approved by the Inland Revenue through the 
legislation of the Finance Acts 1978,1980 and 1984. 
More recently there has been legislation to 
encourage cash-based profit sharing, in the Finance 
(No 2) Act 1987 which introduced tax relief for profit- 
related pay received under a scheme registered by 
the Inland Revenue.
The potential advantages of these different types 
of scheme include increased employee motivation 
and satisfaction, higher levels of co-operation 
between groups and departments, the incentive 
among all members of the firm to maximise profits, 
an awareness of financial issues, greater employee 
involvement and the retention of a more committed 
workforce. Yet to what extent can companies expect 
these and other favourable outcomes if they 
introduce schemes? One way of assessing this is to 
examine how far employees' attitudes and behaviour 
have altered as a result of the adoption of profit 
sharing and employee share ownership in their 
employing organisations.
As part of a DE-sponsored research project on 
profit-sharing and employee shareholding schemes, 
we carried out an investigation of employee 
attitudes. The first part of the project, which 
concentrated broadly on how financial participation 
related to companies' personnel policies and style, 
was reported in Personnel Management last year.* 
This second stage was based on case studies of 22 
major UK companies, and the views of nearly 2,000 
employees in 12 of these firms are reported here. The 
largest single group of respondents (976) in this 
study, carried out in 1986, worked in the finance 
sector (whereprofit-sharingschemesareparticularly 
advanced), followed by 487 in manufacturing, 377 in 
services and 91 in other sectors including retail and 
distribution.
The firms featured in the case studies varied in 
size, industrial sector, degree of unionisation and in 
the type of share schemes they offered. Of those 
selected 17 had Inland Revenue-approved profit- 
sharing schemes, 14 had approved SAYE schemes, 
and 16 firms had approved executive share option 
schemes. In 14 firms there were non-approved 
arrangements which typically ran in parallel with the
approved schemes. There were three interrelated 
parts of the study involving interviews with key 
personnel, the gathering of data on company per­ 
formance and the employee attitudes survey. Quite a 
high proportion of respondents were participants in 
their firm's SAYE schemes, indicating a higher 
response rate among employees who were actively in 
actual schemes.
The key findings were:
• Employees generally supported schemes for 
profit sharing and share ownership so long as they 
covered a large section of the company's personnel. 
Support was widespread for profit sharing through 
cash awards, profit sharing through shares in the 
company and Save As You Earn share ownership 
schemes. However, views on the more restricted 
executive share option schemes were ambivalent.
• Most employees considered the financial rewards 
of their own firm's schemes to be satisfactory, 
particularly in the case of SAYE schemes. But more 
employees viewed managers rather than themselves 
as the principal beneficiaries of schemes.
• Improvements in job satisfaction and in commu­ 
nications within the company were seen to stem from 
the adoption of schemes. But less improvement in 
work practices and in other modes of employee 
involvement were reported by employees. The effort 
put into work did not alter significantly after a 
scheme's introduction, although they did recognise 
some modest improvements here.
• There was a slight preference for cash-based 
schemes, although a significant minority favoured 
share-based arrangements. The most appropriate 
criteria for the allocation of rewards were seen as 
ones which combined various elements (including 
length of service, grade of job, salary/wage level and 
flat rate). Encouragingly for proponents of SAYE 
schemes, about four-fifths intended to keep their 
shares for longer than the minimum period.
• Employees typically found out about their firm's 
schemes from either a company booklet or memo. 
And they generally considered that firms had been 
competent in communicating details of the schemes.
Overall views
Irrespective of their involvement in any of the 
schemes, respondents were asked to indicate to what 
extent they favoured four main schemes: profit 
sharing (with cash awards); profit sharing (through 
shares in the company); Save As You Earn share 
ownership schemes; and executive share schemes. 
As table 1 shows, there was generally a high level
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of approval of schemes in principle. This applied 
particularly to profit sharing with cash awards. Of 
course, this interpretation of widespread approval of 
cash-based awards should be tempered with the 
thought that some employees felt they were being 
asked if they preferred a free gift (as in the case of 
profit-sharing and executive scheme arrangements 
in some of the companies studied) as against 
nothing. But there was also overwhelming support 
for share-based profit sharing and very broad 
support for Save As You Earn schemes. The 
executive share schemes were the exception. 
However, it would be incorrect to suggest that 
employees typically opposed these types of 
arrangement, the most common response being one 
of indifference.
These findings were also supported by employees' 
views of their own company's schemes. We asked 
respondents to assess to what extent their company 
schemes had been satisfactory in terms of rewards. 
And, as can be seen in table 2, in each case (APS, 
SAYE, ESO) the majority expressed satisfaction. 
This applied especially to the SAYE share owner­ 
ship schemes.
At the same time, however, it was clear that 
respondents, by and large, considered managers to 
be the principal beneficiaries of schemes, although 
this could equally have applied to other employee 
relations matters. When respondents were asked 
who had benefited most from schemes (workers, 
managers, undecided, both equally and other 
groups), 41 per cent saw managers as the main 
beneficiaries, followed by both equally (31 per cent), 
undecided (18 per cent) and finally, workers 
themselves (5 per cent). The question could have 
been interpreted by respondents as meaning 
quantitatively 'who benefited most?' If so, 
managers would naturally benefit most in 
companies where having higher bonuses or other 
entitlements were linked pro rata to salary. 
Alternativelyj-as a group, management may have a 
higher participation rate than other employees and 
in some respects, as in the cases of executive 
schemes, are the sole participants.
Employee preferences
We asked respondents whether they preferred cash 
or share-based schemes (or a mixture of the two) and 
also whether entitlements should be based on length 
of service, grade of job, salary/wage level, flat rate 
(equally) or a combination of the above.
The preference for cash-based schemes was 
predominant, with just over 40 per cent of 
respondents supporting solely cash-based 
arrangements. However, a substantial proportion of 
survey respondents preferred either share-based 
schemes (25 per cent) or a mixture of share and cash 
arrangements (24 per cent).
Again, so far as entitlements were concerned, 
there was no overwhelming preference for any one 
mode of distribution. A combination of 
arrangements was the most common response (27 
per cent), followed by length of service (24 per cent) 
and a flat rate (equally) (21 per cent). Interestingly, 
there was clearly no overwhelming support for 
entitlement being based upon grade (9 per cent) or 
income (10 per cent).
We also attempted to assess in detail the 
experiences of employees who were participants in 
;heir firm's SAYE schemes. In particular, we asked
respondents how long they intended to keep their 
shares: encouragingly for the proponents of the 
SAYE schemes, only 20 per cent indicated that they 
intended to keep their shares for the minimum 
period. This contrasts with the 37 per cent of 
respondents who felt they would keep their shares 
for a substantial period of time, or even indefinitely.
Information on schemes
Companies took considerable trouble to inform 
employees about schemes. But how did employees 
actually obtain information, and what did they think 
of it?
Most employees obtained information on their 
firm's schemes through a special company booklet 
(57 per cent) or by a memo (32 per cent). Nearly 10 per 
cent stated that the information was passed on to 
them in staff meetings. However, union channels, 
videos and the standardised Inland Revenue 
booklets were seldom used. The great majority of 
employees considered the information they obtained 
to be satisfactory (62 per cent) or highly satisfactory 
(17 per cent). By contrast, only 7 per cent felt that the 
information was unsatisfactory, and a mere 2 per 
cent considered it to be highly unsatisfactory. In 
general, therefore, the efforts of companies to inform 
employees about schemes (and especially their own 
special booklets) appear to be a satisfactory means of 
communication which is broadly acceptable to the 
majority of employees.
Effect on behaviour
It is one thing for employees to be in favour of 
schemes but quite another to suggest that their 
introduction will have an impact on their work lives 
in any substantial way. So we set out to discover 
whether employees felt that the adoption of schemes 
in their own companies has affected their work and 
job environment.
Respondents were asked to assess (on a seven- 
point scale) to what extent the schemes had affected: 
job satisfaction and job security; work effort; 
employee involvement and communications. The 
results, set out in table 3, show that the majority of 
respondents detected no change other than in their 
overall satisfaction in working for the firm. 
Nevertheless, of those who reported an effect, more 
gave a positive rather than negative response. This 
applied also to job security, communications 
between management and worker, and, perhaps 
most interesting of all, effort put into work, amount 
of productive work done and the amount of effort 
other people put into their jobs.
On balance, however, there appeared to have been 
no widespread changes in productivity and 
employee involvement practices stemming directly 
from the introduction of schemes. But clearly profit 
sharing and share ownership had few negative 
consequences and, according to employees, almost 
certainly effected a series of worthwhile but modest 
improvements in attitudes and work performance.
SAYE schemes
Unlike approved profit-sharing or executive share 
schemes, SAYE schemes are not generally used by 
employers as a way of providing a 'fringe benefit' or 
'free gift' to their employees. So SAYE schemes 
require a more 'active' participative role by 
employees if they are to be successful. Because of 
this more proactive element in the scheme, one might
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expect a greater degree of commitment to the 
schemes and possibly a greater impact on their 
attitudes to work practices and behaviour. Indeed, 
SAYE participants showed a greater preference 
than the overall sample for share-based profit- 
sharing schemes and SAYE schemes in principle, in 
terms of reward and in their preference for schemes. 
They also tended to see a marginally greater effect on 
overall satisfaction at work and in communications 
between management and workforce.
However, when we assessed the degree of success 
of schemes in terms of a number of objectives a 
rather different picture emerged. The most 
important objectives identified were to make 
employees feel they were part of a company, to make 
them more profit-conscious, to increase their sense of 
commitment to the company and to ensure that 
employees benefited from company profitability. 
Employees were asked to estimate how successful 
the schemes had been in fulfilling these and other 
managerial objectives (on five-point scales, from 
very successful to not at all successful).
The results, shown in table 4, indicated that the 
schemes have been unsuccessful in the following 
respects: making employees more profit- 
conscious/more interested in the company's success; 
providing for a more tax-efficient means of reward 
for employees and the company; and ensuring that 
employees benefit from the company's profitability. 
In the majority of instances, however, schemes are 
typically judged to have been neither successful nor 
unsuccessful. This applies to increasing employees' 
sense of commitment to the company, acting as an 
incentive to greater productivity, making employees 
feel that they are part of a company working with it
(not just for it), helping to hold wage claims down, 
increasing employees' understanding of the financial 
rewards of the company and increasing the sense of 
co-operation between management and the 
workforce.
Implications for companies
These findings suggest that employees welcome the 
introduction of general schemes and feel that their 
own rewards from schemes are satisfactory. The 
adoption of a scheme may be accompanied by 
improvements in satisfaction and in 
communications in the firm, but there may be far 
more modest consequences for work practices (such 
as the effort put into work and productive work 
done). And, it is unlikely that the more grandiose 
claims for schemes, such as increasing levels of 
profit-consciousness among the workforce, will be 
fulfilled.
Profit sharing and employee share ownership is 
likely to be beneficial for the company, but on a far 
more limited scale than the more ardent advocates of 
these practices suggest. Indeed, the adoption of 
schemes is likely to improve attitudes and the 
'climate' in companies rather more than employee 
behaviour. Nevertheless, it is frequently argued that 
competitiveness in companies comes from a series of 
small-scale improvements which have a significant 
cumulative effect. Viewed in this light, the 
development of profit sharing and share ownership 
is likely to prove valuable so long as expectations of 
benefits are realistic. Above all, schemes must be 
viewed as part of a wide range of measures designed 
to improve company performance and not the sole 
key to securing a viable future. 1371
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Abstract 
This paper describes the impact of profit sharing and share-holding schemes in the context of
HRM. Following the Harvard HUM framework, it argues that profit sharing and share 
ownership enhances both employee influence and reward systems and has been one of the central 
policy choice areas for British firms. It concludes that growth in employee financial participation 
in Britain is associated with supportive legislation and cautiously predicts further substantial 
movements towards greater employee financial and decision-making involvement in the future.
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Human resource management and 
profit sharing: employee attitudes 
and a national survey
Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins
Introduction
Arguably few developments are as central to human resource management 
as profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes. Indeed, if we take 
ihe central policy choice areas of the familiar Harvard I1RM framework 
(Beer ei al., 1984) employee influence and reward systems are both in 
principle enhanced via profit-sharing. Moreover, to obtain commitment 
from a workforce and to encourage employee loyalty, profit-sharing and 
employee-shareholding schemes are in principle valuable inducements. 
However, it is one matter for firms to develop profit-shaimg (as indeed 
many have done so in the 1980s); but quite another to ensure that the 
workforce responds in the way managements hope for when they introduce 
schemes in the first place. Hence this contribution aims to assess employee 
attitudes to profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes based on 
original fieldwork.
The Department of Employment survey
The data presented in the paper derive from a project initialed in the Social 
Science Branch of the Department of Employment and sponsored by this 
particular UK governmental department (see Smith, 1986). There were 
two principal phases to the project: (1) a survey of companies in Britain; 
and (2) case studies of selected firms derived from the enterprises included 
in Stage 1. The survey commenced with a series of short telephone 
screening interviews in 1,125 companies that were designed to obtain 
information on the extent of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding 
schemes in Britain and to provide a sample for subsequent detailed 
interviews. This was followed by the so-called 'main stage' survey of 303 
firms in Britain in which a wide range of data were gathered on the
289
Michael Poolc and ClenvilleJenkins Human resource management antlpri>jil-.\l\(iring
operation of schemes and on the factors associated with their adoption or 
non-adoption.
At the design stage of the research, it was recognized that a further case 
study phase would he necessary in order to allow for a detailed exploration 
of the specific processes which lead companies to introduce profit-sharing 
and the problems encountered in developing schemes. Above all, it was 
considered im|>ortant that an assessment should he made of the views of 
employees. In consequence, a case study phase was carried out which 
included:
(1) detailed interviews with key management respondents;
(2) interviews with full time trade union officers and lay representatives;
(3) the gathering of data on company performance; and
(4) the administering of a questionnaire to a substantial number of 
employees (approximately 2.WX)).
The case study phase involved 22 companies selected from the 303 firms in 
the 'main stage' survey. To ensure a regional balance, the companies were 
divided equally between South Wales/the South West of England and 
London/the South East of England.
Research models
Turning to the actual research model, in the growing international 
literature on employee financial participation, a wide variety of these have 
been constructed that are based on different research objectives and 
assumptions. In the USA, writers such as Hammer and Stern (1980), 
French (1987) and Pierce, Rubenfekl and Morgan (1988) have attempted 
to construct frameworks of profit-sharing and its effects by focusing on a 
variety of instances at individual, group and company levels. By contrast, 
in Canada, in a scries of articles. Long (1979, 1980a. I980b, 1982), has 
concentrated on discovering those factors that moderate the relationship 
between employee ownership and predicted outcomes at the level of the 
firm. More specifically, in Long's influential conceptual framework 
(1978), the idea of organizational identification is viewed as being based 
on three interrelated phenomena: integration, involvement and commit­ 
ment. Following Argyris (1964), integration generally refers to the 
individual's perception of shared interests and goals with other members of 
the organization and in particular vertical integration. It is deemed to 
influence organizational performance by enhancing job effort and co­ 
operation. Involvement is defined as a feeling of solidarity, a feeling of 
membership or belongingness. Involvement is hypothesized to be particularly
apparent in three highlighted consequences of employee share ownership. 
These are:
(a) that share acquisition leads to greater association with the firm;
(b) that communications are increased in that additional company 
information is provided to the employee; and
(c) that indirect involvement arises through integration.
Further, in Australia, Goldstein (1978) has formulated a model of 
employee shareholder motivation links with attiludinal responses at the 
level of the firm. Above all, based on Ihe work of Vroom (1964), Goldstein 
has highlighted two major motivational factors 01 orientations resulting 
from employee share ownership: economic gain and intrinsic arousal.
A model for (his research
For our part, the main elements of a research model on the impact of 
profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes are set out in Figure I. 
The adoption of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding is seen to 
encourage greater organizational identification. This may occur from 
higher levels of either intrinsic or extrinsic commitment. Intrinsic com­ 
mitment arises from greater direct participation, security, status and job 
satisfaction. Extrinsic commitment potentially stems from instrumental 
rewards, opportunistic gains or long-term investment advantages.
The main outcomes for companies are identified in terms of improved 
financial, industrial relations and organizational performance. Financial 
performance includes high levels of profitability and productivity. Industrial 
relations performance is associated with reduced conflict and lower levels 
of absenteeism and labour turnover. And improvements in organizational 
performance include higher levels of employee involvement, greater job 
satisfaction, and adaptability and flexibility.
The model also accommodates the central explanatory arguments 
developed in the survey stage of the research (see Poole, 1989) on the 
origins of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes. It thus relates the 
adoption of employee financial participation to strategic choices linked 
with organizational and industlial relations factors and external, environ­ 
mental variables. Moreover, it suggests that improvements in company 
performance are likely to have a positive 'feedback' influence that can, m 
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Table 1 Perceived success of schemes: survey stage of research
Type of scheme
Success on different 
objectives
Other 
APS SAVE share Cash
To make employees feel they are part 
of the company
To make employees more profit 
conscious
To increase sense of commitment to
the company
To ensure that employees benefit from 
company profitability
Tax efficient means of reward to
employees
Incentive for greater productivity
To increase sense of respect between 
management and workforce
To increase employees" understanding 
of financial issues






































Note: Menu success rnlinys on a scule 5 lo 1 (5 = very successful) ol objectives ruled iis very/ 
fairly important.
greater profitability and for increasing employees' understanding of 
financial issues was perceived to be far more restricted.
Key respondents' views
Turning more specifically lo the case study data, our interviews with key 
respondents reinforced and amplified these findings. Indeed, a number of 
respondents argued that, in their view, profits were seen to stem either 
from I he sound policies and judgements of top executives (and hence the 
favourable assessment of Executive Share Option (ESO) schemes for this 
level of employee), or from a series of external environmental movements 
over which most organization members had no real influence. Forces of
Human resource iniiniigeinenl and profit-sharing
significance cited by the respondents include exchange rale movements, oil 
prices and the behaviour of foreign subsidiaries. Indeed, at one extreme, as 
the company secretary of an oil exploration company noted, 'In this 
business, prolit-shaiing and share ownership can have no real effect on 
profitability'. Above all, key respondents noted considerable problems in 
measuring any direct consequences of schemes on profitability, because 
there are inevitably many other influences of potential consequences here. 
So far as the main types of schemes are concerned, ESO schemes, and to a 
lesser degree APS schemes, were seen to be the most likely lo impact upon 
profitability. As we have noted, this applied especially to ESO schemes 
because of their potential consequences for the behaviour of senior 
executives. APS schemes were also perceived as potentially, if indirectly, 
valuable because they could serve to reduce labour turnover amongst 
competent staff who were difficult lo replace.
At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning the survey stage findings on 
trends in the workforce, where 67 per cent of firms with only APS schemes 
had experienced increases in employment in the lasl lour years. This 
contrasted markedly with firms with only Save As You Earn (SAVE) 
schemes, where 35 per cent of companies had witnessed increases in the 
workforce (and 52 per cent had experienced a decrease). SAVE schemes 
are particularly linked with the industrial relations policies of companies, 
and hence, it is scarcely surprising that any impact of these schemes on 
profitability was seen as typically indirect. Managers in finance departments 
appeared to be more hopeful that the schemes would impact upon 
profitability than Iheir colleagues in personnel functions. But the very 
qualified views of key respondents in this respect should be stressed.
Employee altitudes
We were further aware from past reseaich that the perceived employee 
rewards and company financial commitment to piofit-shaiing and share 
ownership schemes could be vital components if schemes were to have a 
positive impact on company economic performance. In our survey of 
employee attitudes in the case study phase, we first asked respondents to 
what extent they favoured four mam types of scheme:
(1) profit-sharing (with cash rewards);
(2) profit-sharing (through shares in the company);
(3) Save As You Earn share option schemes; and
(4) Executive share schemes.
The results are set out in Table 2 where it will be seen that, for the most 
part, there is a high level of commitment to schemes in principle. This
294 295














M"s 2 "C j=
'i " -s ^ = 
I "f I < 9
ll UJ
Human resource niiintigement anil profit-sharing
applies particularly to profit-sharing with cash awards. But there is also 
overwhelming support for share-based profit-sharing and Save As You 
Earn schemes. The only exception is provided by the Executive Share 
Option schemes. It would be inconect to suggest that employees typically 
oppose these lypes of arrangement but the most common response was one 
of indifference. Moreover, the negative and positive responses arc roughly 
balanced.
There is little doubt, then, that proponents of all-employee profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes arc attempting to introduce practices 
which are welcomed by the vast majority of the company's personnel. 
Notwithstanding a preference for cash-based arrangements, managements 
introducing schemes can be fairly secure in the knowledge that most types 
of profit-sharing and share ownership will be welcomed by a substantial 
number of employees. We then asked respondents to indicate to what 
extent their company's schemes had been satisfactory in terms of rewards 
and who they felt were the main beneficiaries of such schemes. As will be 
seen in Table 3 there was in each case (APS. SAVE, ESO) a balance of 
positive over negative responses and, in particular, SAVE share ownership 
schemes were deemed satisfactory by a majority of employees. However, 
respondents, when asked who had benefited most from the schemes 
(workers, managers, undecided, both equally and other groups), considered 
managers to be the main beneficiaries of the schemes (see Table 4).
More specifically, we assessed employees' perceptions of the impact of 
profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes by obtaining employee estimates 
(on five point scales, from very successful to not at all successful) of the 
success of schemes in terms of a number of economic objectives. The 
largest single group of employees, as shown in Table 5, indicated in each 
case that the schemes had been unsuccessful in making employees more 
profit conscious/more interested in the company's success; providing for a 
more efficient means of reward lot employees and the company and
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Table 4 Employees' views on principal beneficiaries of .schemes












Noit: Porcenliigc. n= 19.11.
ensuring that the employees benefit from the company's profitability. 
However, in the majority of instances, schemes were typically judged lo 
have been neither successful nor unsuccessful. This applies to acting as an 
incentive to greater productivity, helping to hold down wage claims and 
increasing employees' understanding of the financial rewards of the 
company.
In order lo assess the strength of significance of ihese data and their 
links/views on profit-sharing schemes factor analysis was employed. It will 
be seen from Table 6 that two factors were isolated that referred to 
financial incentives and financial rewards respectively.
In the first factor (financial incentives), highly significant relationships 
were found between attitudes to each scheme and making employees more 
profit conscious/more interested in the company's success and increasing 
the sense of cooperation between management and workforce. However, 
the relationship was much stronger for share-based schemes. This would 
suguest I hat positive attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes, but particularly lo share-based schemes, lead to an identification 
with company goals and improved management/employee relations. 
Moreover, share-based schemes were also found to be similarly associated 
with increasing employees' sense of commitment to the company/milking 
staff more likely to slay, acting as an incentive for greater productivity, 
and making employees' understanding of the financial issues that face the- 
company. The exception was the association of schemes with helping to 
hold down wage claims, though this had a significant but weak association 
with executive share option schemes. Again, significant but weak associations 
were found between attitudes to cash-based schemes and making employees 
feel they are a part of the company and increasing employees' under­ 
standing of the financial issues that face the company. Share-based 
schemes do appear, therefore, to provide a financial incentive to 
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Factor I Financial incentives
1 Make employees more 
profit conscious/more 
interested in the company's 
success .OK" .25*
2 Increase employee's sense of 
commitment to the 
company/make staff more 
likely to stay .05 .27*
3 Act as an incentive (or 
greater productivity .04 .23*
4 Make employees feel that 
they are a pait of the 
company - working with it. . 
not just for it .07*
5 To help hold down wage 
claims .02
y To increase employees' 
understanding of the 
financial issues that face the 
company .07* 
10 To increase the sense of 
cooperation between 
management and workforce .1)8**
Factor 2 Financial rewards
6 To provide a lax efficient 
means to reward tor the 
employees
7 To provide a tax efficient 
means of reward tor the 
company
8 To ensure that the employees 



























Notes: Pcarson product moment correlation cucfticicnls - two-tailed significance.
* Significant .it O.tll level. 
"• Significant at O.tXIl level. 
The two factors account (or Ml.y per cent nf the shared variance.
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In the second factor (financial rewards), again the importance ol share- 
based schemes can be noted. Highly significant relationships were 
discovered between views on share based schemes and the adjudged 
success of schemes in providing a tax efficient means ol tewaid tor 
employees and for the company and in ensuring that employees benefit 
from company profitability. Although significant relationships were identified 
between cash-based schemes arid pioviding a tax efficient means of reward 
for the employees and the company lor mosl of the items weaker 
associations were found. Again, then, the relationship between financial 
rewards and share-based schemes appears to be much stronger than that 
for cash-based schemes, suggesting the advantages ol share-type arrange­ 
ments for developing an identification of employees with managerial goals 
and objectives in the company as a whole.
In summary, then, although employees in general did not consider that 
schemes had been particularly successful in achieving managerial objectives 
so far as financial performance is concerned, views on profit-sharing 
schemes in general were linked with their assessments. And certainly 
positive views on share-based schemes are interlinked with the view ttial 
profit-sharing has enabled management to achieve a number of (he 
financial objectives of the schemes themselves.
Industrial relations and trade unions
A further argument is thai profit-sharing may improve the climate of 
industrial relations in the firm. Indeed, a longstanding objective of profit- 
sharing has of course been to reduce conflict between trade unions and 
management. However, there is little detailed evidence available on the 
precise impact of schemes on trade unionism. In the survey stage a positive 
relationship was found between the existence of trade unions in the firm 
and the presence of one or more of the various types of all-employees 
schemes for profit-sharing and share ownership. In the case study sta«e, 
following Long (1979), we attempted to measure in more detail the 
differing patterns of relationships between share ownership in the 
employing company and attitudes of employees, trade unionists and non- 
trade unionists to trade unions. Similarly, we also endeavoured to analyse 
the relationships that exist between share ownership in the employing 
company and the attitudes ol trade unionists and non-trade unionists to the 
schemes themselves.
Table 7 sets out data from the unionized case study companies and 
entails a comparison between emplovee shareholders and non-shareholders. 
The relatively large number of employee shareholders stems from 
including participants in any type of scheme (APS, SAVE, other share-
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Basically, the union and
management have similar
goals 3.23 1.72 3.21 1.50 0.15
It is iliHicull to be loyal
to the company ami lo
(he union 3.89 1.72 3.K9 1.69 0.00
tA union is really
necessary in this (inn at
this time 5.61 1.66 5.43 1.70 -1.31
There is no reason why
(he union and
management cannot work
together 5.63 1.19 5.19 1.33 4.16*"*
Without a union.
employees would
probably not get fair
treatment from
management 4.92 1.83 5.02 1.66 -0.73
The union works
primarily for the best
interests of its members 5.23 1.47 5.31 1.29 -0.76
The best way of obtaining •
worker say or influence
in decision-making in Ihis
firm is through increasing
the influence of the union 4.113 1.82 4.44 1.61 -2.98'**
Now. I'This item has been reversed so thai a higher numerical value indicates a higher 
perceived need fur Ilie union. 
* = p O.It), two-tailed. 
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based). The table shows for Ihe most part a similar set of altitudes of 
employee shareholders and non-shareholders. Wheie I here are significant 
differences is in attitudes to union-management cooperation and the role 
of the union in decision-making. Employee shareholders generally feel 
more strongly that unions and managements should be able lo work 
together and are more ambivalent wilh respect lo Ihe decision-making role 
of trade unions than that of non-shareholders. In short, although Ihere are 
few significant differences between these two groups of respondent, it does 
appear that employee shareholders are particularly liable lo stress that 
union-management relationships should be rioii-conilicttial and are more 
prone than non-shareholders lo emphasize that channels oilier than that of 
the union are the best way of obtaining a greater decision-making inlluence 
for the workforce as a whole. This does suggest that a modest change in the 
climate of industrial relations stems from employee-shareholding, though 
it may be, of course, that employees with such views are more likely to 
avail themselves of the opportunities to participate in share-based schemes 
in the first place. However, the strategy of management of deploying 
SAVE and other share-based schemes lo improve industrial relations does 
appear to have been at least partially successful so far as employee 
attitudes are concerned.
It could be objected that a better test of the impact of schemes on 
industrial relations is to contrast the views of trade-unionists and non- 
trade-unionists, and to link these with ownership or non-ownership of 
shares in the company In Table 8, trade unionists' altitudes to trade 
unionism are thus broken down by share ownership. The dala reinforce the 
arguments above since there are relatively few significant differences 
between these two groups of respondents. However, the employee 
shareholders amongst the Irade unionists in our sample are more likely to 
stress cooperative management-union relationships and are less likely than 
non-shareholders to view the union as the best way of obtaining greater 
worker influence over decision-making in Ihe firm.
There is no doubt, too, that the influence of share ownership on non- 
trade-unionsts' attitudes in unionized firms is a significant factor affecting 
the views on trade unions as a whole The relevant data are set out in Table 
9 where it will be seen that the non-unionist employee shareholders are 
more likely to emphasize the similarity in union and management goals; to 
stress the potentially cooperative nature of relationships between unions 
and management; to reject the view that, without unionism, employees 
would probably not gel fair treatment from management; and to indicate 
that Ihe union element of representation is not necessarily the most 
appropriate way of obtaining a greater worker inlluence over decision- 
making in the company.
In sum, our data suggest that there is probably an impact of the
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Basically, the union and
management have similar
goals 3.23 1.72 3.40 1.57 -1.04
ll is diflicult lo he loyal
to the company and lo
the union 3.7(1 1.67 3.92 1.73 -1.29
tA union is really
necessary in this firm at
this time 6.11 1.24 5.84 1.53 -1.89*
There is no reason why
the union and
management cannot work
together 5.65 1.14 5.28 1.38 2.92*"
Without a union.
employees would
probably not get fair
treatment from
management 5.42 1.52 5.37 1.53 0.32
The union works
primarily for the best
interests of its members 5.37 1.29 5.48 1.23 -0.88
The best way of obtaining
worker say or inlluence
in decision-making in this
lirm is through increasing
the influence of the union 4.41 1.72 4.78 1.54 -233"
Notes: tThis item has been reversed so Ihat a higher numerical value indicates :i higher 
perceived need for the union. 
*=p I). III. iwo-iniled. 
** = p 0.115. iwo-tailcd. 
*** = pO.OI. two-tailed.
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Basically, the union and
management have similar
goals 3.26 1.73 2.82 1.27
It is difficult to be loyal
to the company and to
the union 4.28 1.74 3.85 1.61
1A union is really
necessary in this lirm at
(his time 4.42 1.91 4.62 1.73
There is no reason why
the union and
management cannot work
together 5.55 1.29 5.07 1.19
Without a union.
employees would
probably not get fair
treatment from
management 3.71 1.95 4.37 1.70
The union works
primarily for the best
interests of its members 4.85 1.79 4.98 1.36 -0.58*
The best way of obtaining
worker say or influence
in decision-making in this
firm is through increasing
the influence of the union 3.11 1.71 3.78 1.55 -2.85***
Notes: tTliis item has hccn reversed so Ihat a higher numerical value indicates a higher 
perceived need for the union. 
*=p 0.10. Iwu-tailcd. 
•* = pl).()5. two-tailed. 
"* = p().01. Iwo-tailcd.
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introduction of share-based schemes on attitudes lo trade unionism. In 
most cases, this is nol strong, but it is likely that schemes will improve the 
altiliulinal climate of industrial relations to at least a modes! extent. 
Moreover, the greatest impact would appear to be amongst non-trade 
unionists in unionized firms who are likely lo emphasize that a relatively 
cooperative and non-confiictual mode of relationship between unions and 
management in Ihe firm is appropriate.
No study involving an assessment of attitudes to profit-sharing and 
employee-shareholding schemes would be complete, however, without 
some reference to the views of trade unionists and non-trade unionists 
respectively on actual schemes. Thus, in Table 10, trade unionists' 
attitudes lo profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes arc presented. As 
is to be expected, employee shareholder trade unionists are shown to be 
less in favour of cash-based profit-sharing schemes than non-shareholding 
trade unionists. Again, shareholding trade union members have a 
particular propensity to favour share-bused profit-sharing and SAVE 
schemes.
Table 1(1 Trade unionists' support for profit-sharing and share-ownership 































Notes: * = p 0. III. txvo-lailccl.
"* = p 0.01. two-tailed. 
"** = p (1.001. txvo-liiiled.
These findings are amplified in Table II, which presents data on non- 
trade unionists' altitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes. It 
will be seen that few significant differences in altitudes exist between 
shareholding and non-shareholding non-trade unionists to profit-sharing 
and share-ownership schemes. However, as is to be expected, employee 
shareholders who are not union members are more favourable lo SAVE 
schemes than their colleagues who hold no shares in their employing 
organization.
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Table II Non-trade unionists' support for profit-sharing and share 
ownership schemes b\' company share ownership
Shareholders 
N = 84
Profit sharing (cash) 






























Notes: * = p 0.111, two-tailed. 
** = p 0.115, two-tailed. 
*** = p(I.OI, two-tailed. 
"*" = pO.()lll. two-tailed.
Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing (lint favourable altitudes to prolit- 
sharing and share ownership do appear to be related to views on unions 
and the company. Hence, we asked employees whether they consideied 
the best representative of their interests to be the union or the company. 
As will be seen from Table 12, with the exception of cash-based 
arrangements, positive views on profit-sharing undoubtedly appear-to be 
related to a greater identification with the company rather than the union.
So far as the impact of profit-sharing and employee-shareholding on 
industrial relations is concerned, then, a highly interesting set of 
conclusions emerges. Senior managerial personnel involved in the establish­ 
ment of schemes indicated that they hoped to accomplish an improvement 
in the climate of union-management relations, but did not expect major











The best representative of 
an employee's interests is 
the union not the company -0.07 -0.19** -0.12 s -0.25
Notes: Pcarson product moment correlation coefficients - Ixvo-Uiilcil simiilicance.
* Significant ill 11.01 level.
*•' Significant at 0.001 level.
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changes in behaviour arising from schemes. However, with respect to 
altitudes, employee shareholders were found to he consistently more likely 
ID stress that a potentially cooperative and non-antagonistic relationship 
between unions and management was desirable. On one view, these data 
might he taken to imply some reduction of the union role stemming from 
the introduction of schemes. But given the positive correlation between 
trade unionism and profit-sharing in the firm, our conclusions are rather 
more complex. That is to say, whereas the introduction of schemes may 
well produce a greater identification with the company's goals (and this 
applies particularly to non-unionists in a company where unions are 
recognized), it is unlikely that union activities will be completely 
undermined by profit-sharing. But it is. in our view, important for unions 
to modify to some extent traditional sets of attitudes and assumptions in 
firms with profit-sharing it they are to continue to retain an appeal to both 
trade unionists and non-trade unionists alike in the companies concerned.
Organizational commitment and performance
As we have indicated, it may well be that the effects of profit-sharing and 
share-ownership are greater on attitudes than on behaviour. To be sure, 
positive attitudes can, in turn, impact on practices in the company; but 
other factors (including those in the external environment of the firm) may 
well have a particularly pervasive impact on financial and industrial 
relations performance. This argument is further explored by an assessment 
of the consequences of schemes for organizational commitment and 
performance. Because of the importance attached to employee participation 
generally, we begin by examining the development of schemes in relation 
to involvement in decision-making in the company. This is followed by an 
assessment of the impact on organizational change and an examination of a 
wide lange of employee attitudes themselves.
Elsewhere, we have observed that the development of all-employee 
profit-sharing and share-ownership (and particularly SAVE schemes) is 
intimately connected with employee involvement in the company (Poole, 
1989; Poole and Jenkins, 1991)). Firms in which managements have 
adopted a consultative approach to industrial relations are particularly 
likely to have schemes and this relationship extends to employee 
involvement in actual decision-making on industrial relations issues and to 
the exislence of union and non-union channels for employee participation. 
An important aspect of the case study phase was thus to assess the issue 
of employee participation in more detail. Indeed, in view of the cenlrality 
of this theme it was considered worthwhile to examine employee views on 
employee participation more generally, prior to a more specific review of
308
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their relationship to the presence of various schemes for profit-sharing and 
share ownership.
Employee involvement
In the employee attitudes questionnaire we endeavoured to obtain 
information on the extent of involvement in decisions on the overall 
policies of (he firm, in matters affecting both respondents' own departments 
and how jobs urc done. Bach of these areas of participation was examined 
under four main headings:
(1) how much say or influence did employees in general in the firm 
actually have over decisions;
(2) how much say or influence should employees in general have over 
decisions",
(3) how much say or influence did the respondent actually have over 
decisions; and
(4) how much say or influence should the respondent have over 
decisions.
The results arc set out in Table 13. So far as employees actual say is 
concerned, respondents generally contrasted the situation with respect to 
the overall policies of the firm (where there was little perceived involve­ 
ment) with how jobs were actually done (where the majority indicated thai 
there was either some say or a great deal to say). For the desirable level of 
employee participation, a rather different pattern emerged. Indeed, in 
every instance (including the overall policies of the linn as well as 
departmental and job level decision-making) respondents indicated that 
they would like to see at least some employee say or influence over 
decision-making.
This pattern of results was parallelled by the data on the individual 
respondents' actual say over decision-making. As Table 13 again indicates, 
the majority of respondents fell that although they themselves had very 
little influence on the overall policies of the firm, they did have a far higher 
degree of involvement in how their jobs were actually performed. 
Interestingly, too. the majority of respondents appeared lo desire some 
personal influence over the overall policies of the firm and. less 
surprisingly, a substantial involvement in task-based decision-making.
These data thus reveal considerable inleresl among respondents in 
employee participation in general. At job level there is clearly widespread 
participation in decisions but this would appear seldom to exlend to policy 
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assessments of cash-based profit-sharing schemes and actual collective 
participation.
In the fourth scale, no significant relationships were found between the 
attitudes to schemes and desired collective and individual participation in 
the overall policies of the firm hut a significant relationship was found 
between actual individual participation at this level and views on all share- 
ownership schemes. As is to be expected, there was a highly significant 
relationship between altitudes to executive share option schemes and 
respondents' actual say or influence in the overall policies of the company. 
This would suggest that a favourable altitude to share-based schemes is 
linked with the employee's perception of his or her individual say or 
influence at policy making levels.
We also sought to establish how far attitudes to employee participation 
are linked with actual ownership of shares in the company. The relevant 
data we set out in Table 15 where some very interesting findings are 
observable. As is to be expected, employee shareholders have a greater say 
in how their jobs are done. Moreover, the differences are particularly 
pronounced so far as the individual respondent's actual influence is 
concerned But what is especially noticeable is that share ownership is 
strongly linked with a desire for greater personal influence over decision- 
making (and (his applies to (he overall policies of the firm, as well as to 
matters affecting one's own department and how the respondent's actual 
job is done:). In short, employees who participate in share schemes in the 
company are likely to waul personally to participate in decision-making 
processes as well. And this of course reinforces a recurrent theme of this 
research project, that the various types of employee involvement (financial 
and decision-making) are interconnected.
Employee attitudes
But to what extent, it may be reasonably asked, does profit-sharing and 
share ownership impact upon attitudes to the employing organization? 
This central issue is now addressed in more detail, using data from the 
employee attitudes survey. We begin this analysis by un examination of the 
effects of ownership on attitudes to various types of schemes. This is 
followed by an account of perceived effects of schemes on various aspects 
of organizational performance.
Share ownership
There is no doubt fust of all that ownership of shares in the company (and 
in other companies) is strongly associated with positive attitudes towards
314
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Table 15 Attitudes towards employee /mrlicipation and to/n/niny shun: 
ownership
Shareholders Non-shareliolde rs 
N=<)53 N = KII
Employees' actual say or
influence
1 Overall policies of firm
2 Matters affecting their own
department
3 Mow their own jobs are
done
Say or influence employees
should have
4 Overall policies of firm
5 Matters affecting tlieir own
department
6 How their own jobs are
done
Respondent's actual say or
influence
7 Overall policies of firm
8 Matters affecting own
department
9 How own jobs are done
Say or influence respondent
should have
10 Overall policies of firm
1 1 Matters affecting
respondent's own
department



































































Notes: * = p 0.10. two-tailed. 
** = p 0.1)5. two-tailed.
*** = p 0.1)1, two-tailed.
**** = p 0.001. iwo-tailed.
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Null's: I'carsnii proiluel niiiincnt conviction i-ocflicienis - two-tailed significance.
* Significant a! (I.Ill level. 
' * Signiliciinl at II.IKtl level.
profit-sharing ;md share owncrsliip. The direction of this linkage is difficult 
to determine, and there are, in any case, likely to be interactive 
relationships. Correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship 
between employee attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership scheme 
and their ownership of shares in the employing company and in any other 
company. As is shown in Table 16, highly significant relationships were 
found between views on share-based profit-sharing and SAVE schemes 
both in terms of ownership of shares in the employing company and in 
other companies.
These findings arc amplified in Table 17. which reveals the differences 
between owners and non-owners of shares based on the mean scores of 
each group of respondents. It will be seen that there are highly significant 
differences in altitudes to both profit-sharing (share-based) and SAVE
Table 1 7 Employee attitudes to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes 
by company share ownership
Shareholders Non-sharehoklers



























*=p I). Id, two-lulled. 
" = p(ll)5. two-tailed. 
"* = p 0.1)1. two-tailed. 
**' = p().l)l)l. iwo-lailcd.
schemes depending on ownership or non-ownership of share in (he 
company.
Impact ou work practices
The introduction of share-based profit-sharing schemes in the company 
thus almost certainly impacts upon employee attitudes to profit sharing. 
But in many respects a more important issue is the impact on work 
practices. Respondents were asked to assess (on a seven point scale) to 
what extent the introduction of schemes had affected:
(1) satisfaction and job security;
(2) work effort; and
(3) employee involvement and communications.
As can be seen from Table 18, the majority of respondents detected little 
change in these respects, though satisfaction in working for the given 
concern was a marked exception. Nevertheless, there was generally a 
balance of positive over negative responses on such issues as communica­ 
tions between management and worker, effort put into work, the amount 
of productive work done and the amount of effort other people put into 
their jobs. Clearly, then, profit-sharing and share ownership had lew 
negative consequences and may well have affected a series of worthwhile 
but modest improvements in employees' attitudes and work performance.
Further analysis was undertaken by means of factor analysis to assess the 
relative strengths and significance of these items with views on profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes. As will be seen in Table 19, (wo 
factors were isolated and referred respectively to: (1) involvement in the 
company; and (2) increased productivity. It will be seen that there are 
highly significant associations between employees' attitudes to all profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes and employees' overall satisfaction 
in working for the firm. Moreover, (he strongest associations are clearly 
with share-based schemes. In general, then, positive employee attitudes to 
share-based schemes are consistent with employees' perceptions of 
improved satisfaction and security at work together with improved 
employee involvement, both collectively and individually, at all organiz­ 
ational levels.
With respect to improvements in productivity, generally the associations 
are not as strong but they are significant for share-based profit-sharing. In 
particular, a perception of increased amount of eflort put into the job and 
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schemes more generally. Views on share-based schemes thus do relate to 
increased employee involvement, satisfaction and security at work and a 
perception of increased effort and the amount of productive svork done in 
the organization.
Furthermore, we sought to establish hoxv far ownership of shares in the 
company is linked with altitudes to the impact of schemes. In general, 
there were lew highly significant differences between owners and non- 
owners. However, employee shareholders were particularly likely to 
indicate (hat overall satisfaction in working for the firm had increased 
following the adoption of schemes by their companies (1=4.89***).
Organizational identity
Respondents were also asked to indicate their views on a series of issues 
relating to company, work and career. Table 20 sets out employees' 
assessments of their sense of organizational identity and belonging in the 
company. It will be seen that although a substantial number of respondents 
felt a sense of pride in working for their firms, at the same time, few had 
any real sense of ownership and most indicated that they 'simply felt like an 
employee'. Clearly, then, the introduction of profit-sharing in the company 
has not broken down entrenched attitudes to work of this type.
Further analysis (Table 21) showed that views on share-based and 
executive share schemes were related to employees' attitudes to their 
status in the company. Clearly, profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes have not fundamentally altered certain basic sets of attitudes and 
produced personnel who no longer consider themselves to have the status 
of employees. However, views on schemes are related to broader attitudes 
on organizational idenlity and the extenl to which employees' experience a 
sense of ownership, self-employment and pride in working for the 
company.
Work and career
We were concerned to discover whether the introduction of profit-sharing 
and shareholding schemes in the company impacted on altitudes to work 
and career. Table 22 sets out employees' views on these issues. It will be 
seen that there was less of an instrumental approach to work than probably 
exists in companies without schemes. After all, less than half of our 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the view that 'the most 
important element in any job is the pay'. Moreover, a substantial majority
320
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relationships between the composite variables identified by factor analysis. 
In Table 24, the results are set out based on four groups of composite 
variables. These are: (I) individual participation and organizational 
identity; (2) economic rewards; (3) productivity; and (4) trust.
Factor analysis of the composite variables shows thai the strongest and 
most significant association is between employee altitudes to piofit-shaiing 
and share-ownership schemes and what we have termed economic 
rewards. These, it will be recalled, relate to the views of employees on how 
far various financial objectives of management in introducing schemes 
have been met in practice. This suggests thai the perception of Ihe financial 
success of schemes is particularly central lo a positive assessment of profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes.
Weaker but highly significant associations were found between views on 
schemes, and individual and collective participation and organizational 
identity. Certainly, the existence of individual and collective means of 
participation favours a positive attitude to profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes in general and this paiticipation is reinforced by an 
organizational identity among the employees. Relationships of similar 
strength and significance were also found m relation lo increased employee 
involvement and productivity. This, as we have seen, indicates that a 
favourable attitude to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes encour­ 
ages improved satisfaction, security and the perceived need for increased 
employee involvement in work (particularly in the form of increased 
communication between management and workforce). Moreover, although 
the links are weaker in the case of productivity, a positive attitude lo profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes docs indicate a positive view on Ihe 
effects of the introduction of schemes on productive effort.
Conclusions
In sum, our data suggest that there is a complex and interdependent set of 
employees' attitudes, of which views on profit-sharing and share-ownership 
are an integral component. There is no doubt that employee altitudes in 
the company are affected by employee financial participation. And positive 
views on schemes are certainly associated with a wide range of further 
favourable attitudes to the financial and productive performance of the 
firms, employee paiticipation and a perceived cooperative atmosphere 
between management and the workforce. Hence, notwithstanding the 
limitations lo the effects of profit-sharing and share ownership on 
behaviour in the company (arising not least from the impact of wider 






























































































O • — '
o o
1
r- ocO • — '
^
t


















































L s^ii — " > — 'i
Increased productivity



































Significani ut 0.01 level. *+ Significant a  0.01)1 lev The fouractorscount 1
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is linked with a positive set of attitudes on a wide range of aspects of 
company policy clearly received considerable support from this inquiry.
Does this suggest that further substantial movements towards greater 
employee financial and decision-making involvement are likely to develop 
in the years ahead? Our conclusions in this respect must be cautiously 
optimistic. There is no inexorable evolutionary trend towards organizational 
democracy but the 'favourable conjunctures' of circumstance which have 
fuelled the growth of employee financial participation in the I'JSOs will 
almost certainly be augmented. Accompanying demographic changes, acute 
shortages of labour may well be evident in the advancing sectors of the 
economy and this will impel managements to formulate a variety of human 
resource strategies (including the introduction of share-based schemes) in 
order to ensure the maintenance of an adaptable, flexible and committed 
workforce. So far as competitiveness is concerned, it is seldom fully 
appreciated that comparatively small advantages in terms of improvements 
in employee attitudes and behaviour can have highly significant long term 
consequences in the international marketplace. And, in this respect, the 
positive consequences of the introduction of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes for employee altitudes and behaviour may not only be 
more substantial than is commonly supposed but may also be sufficient to 
ensure an insistent and continuous pressure for further advances in the 
future.
Nonetheless, progress is likely to remain uneven in different countries 
and across the various employment sectors. Unless there is mandatory 
legislation, employee financial and decision-making involvement will not 
be universal features of the modern industrial and post-industrial societies. 
While they may not be a panacea for all economic, industrial relations and 
organizational problems, the prospects for a growth in economic or 
industrial democracy in the years ahead are undoubtedly favourable. 
Hence our conclusion must be that, notwithstanding the diverse rationales 
for the advance, a variety of types of organizational democracy is likely to 
become increasingly widespread, not only in the 1990s, but above all in the 
twenty-first century when the various and diverse supportive conditions 
have come to their full fruition.
Michael Poole
Professor of Human Resource Management
Cardiff Business School
University of Wales College of Cardiff
Glenville Jenkins
Senior Lecturer in Management
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Employees' preferences for payment 
systems: theoretical approaches and an 
empirical test
Aminu Mammon
It is of course central to human resource management to create an 
environment in which people are motivated to perform satisfactorily in 
their jobs and, by so doing, foster organisational as well as individual 
growth. Financial rewards and pay in particular have received considerable 
attention in these respects, being viewed by both managers and writers on 
organisational behaviour as amongst the most significant means of 
accomplishing these objectives. Besides, a host of everyday decisions in 
organisations have to be made about pay, which remains one of the 
mainsprings of motivation. As Huire and his colleagues have put it (1963):
The drive for private money gain - the profit motive produces the main 
ideological cleavage in the world today. Deep down, everyone assumes 
that we must work for money.
This statement seems to be as valid as when it was made more than twenty 
years ago. Indeed, modern authorities contend that although employees 
will work for both money and other rewards, they will not work without 
money (Bowey et «/., 1986).
Despite the familiarity and importance of pay to all concerned, 
remunerating employees for the services they render is not as straight­ 
forward an economic transaction as it may seem to be. After all, it is a 
transaction which involves sociological, psychological, political, and ethical 
as well as economic elements. Moreover, organisations have to cater for 
various interest groups with different backgrounds, expectations, qualities 
and above all, personal and psychological characteristics. Since employees 
have always been important parties to discussions on pay, the present study 
examines their attitudes (preferences) for the criteria that should determine 
their pay. Furthermore, the data presented are particularly interesting 
because they derive from a study in a developing country where systematic 
research on this theme has so far been limited.
329
'The Impact of Profit Sharing and Employee Share­ 
holding Schemes: A Critical Review', Journal of 
General Management, Vol. 16, No. 3, spring, 1991, pp. 
52-72. The Braybrooke Press Ltd. ISBN/ISSN: 0306-
3070
Abstract 
This paper assesses the benefits to the firm and its general management of the adoption of profit
sharing and share-holding schemes as part of a broad range of human resource strategies. It 
extensively reviews published research into the subject: the economic impact, the way schemes 
affect profitability and productivity, and - last but by no means least - what they do to industrial 
relations. It concludes that such financial involvement while producing positive changes in 
attitudes of employees also requires changes in the attitudes of general managers when employees 
and managers are part owners of the company. General managers are likely be central to the 
development of these emerging HRM strategies.
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Does profit-sharing really pay off? This paper summarises research findings and concludes 
that they can be valuable so long as expectations of benefits are realistic and schemes are seen 
only as part of a broad range of evolving human resource strategies.
In recent years, there has been an appreciable expansion in schemes for 
employee financial involvement both within British companies and overseas. 
However, managers seeking to establish profit-sharing and employee 
shareholding arrangements will seek value for money. Above all, they will 
wish to ask the following central questions. Are there likely to be tangible 
gains in terms of profitability and productivity? Are industrial relations 
likely to improve in respect of reduced conflict, and lower rates of labour 
turnover and absenteeism? And are employees likely to identify with the 
firm, to wish to reduce costs and to feel a greater sense of involvement and 
satisfaction?
The aim of this paper is to summarise a wide range of international 
research findings on the impact of profit-sharing and employee shareholding 
schemes with a view to answering these and other salient questions for the 
general manager. We begin by highlighting world-wide experience prior to 
a focus on three central issues. These are the economic impact of profit- 
sharing, the impact on industrial relations and the effects on organisational 
performance expressed in terms of employee efforts to work harder, to 
eliminate waste, to improve efficiency, to increase quality and to reduce 
costs.
Journal of General Management 
Vol. 16 No. 3 Spring 1991
The International Experience Of Profit-sharing
The development of employee financial involvement in the 1980s has been 
uneven in Europe, but has become extremely common on the North 
American continent with the growth in Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOPs). European experience of employee financial involvement has been 
particularly noted in France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
the UK. Further afield, the same development of employee financial 
involvement has also been noted in Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
European experience shows that while growth has been particularly 
marked in the UK, the adoption of employee financial involvement is by no 
means universal. In Germany, for example, employee financial involvement 
is a relatively rare phenomenon. This is partly explained by the lack of 
government support for employee stock-ownership schemes, the position 
of strong unions, the complexity of German company law and the high 
degree of formalisation of workplace industrial relations.
The most recent advance in the UK in profit-sharing thus cannot be 
considered in isolation, for it forms part of a much wider change in 
advanced industrial societies during the 1980s towards profit sharing and 
employee share ownership in the firm. While internationally the growth of 
profit sharing and employee share ownership has been disparate and 
highlights a rich variety of practices in employee financial participation, 
much of the recent advance can be traced in part to facilitative government 
measures [1].
Economic Impact Of Profit-sharing
It is important first of all that managers are aware of the economic 
consequences of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes, for their 
influence may be much wider than the development of the firm. The 
assessment of such consequences has been developed at both macro and 
micro levels. The first refers to the wider economy and the second to the firm 
or company level.
Macro-Economic Impact
To begin with, economists have been concerned with the impact of profit- 
sharing arrangements on the macro-economic performance of nations and 
have stressed that workers are being priced out of jobs because the present 
wages system is inflexible and inefficient. On this view, profit-sharing and 
share-ownership schemes occasion a reduction in unemployment and in 
inflation by making wages more responsive to changes in economic 
performance. This occurs by means of the 'sliding scale' principle which
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links a proportion of wages to profits and/ or sales of the company. As sales 
or profits decline so does profit related pay. Moreover, it is further argued 
that if labour costs are proportional to total costs, labour costs will have less 
of an impact on prices and create greater employment flexibility. As a 
consequence, employers will be unlikely to make workers redundant. 
Hence, a radical and universal reform of the remuneration system, where 
a proportion of wages is linked to profits or sales, would reduce both 
unemployment and inflation.
Undoubtedly the most influential assessment of the macro-economic 
impact of profit-sharing is contained in Weitzman's The Share Economy [2]. 
However, the general manager should appreciate that Weitzman is best 
envisaged as part of a long tradition of economists who have advocated the 
introduction of some form of profit-sharing scheme, his predecessors 
including Keynes [3], Meade [4] and Kelso and Adler [5]. Central to 
Weitzman's argument is that lack of wage flexibility is one of the basic 
causes of both unemployment and inflation. He thus proposes the transition 
from existing economic relations to a share economy where the labour 
market would experience a constant excess demand for labour and in which 
permanent full employment at competitive remuneration, no inflation and 
an improvement in working conditions and employee attitudes have been 
effected.
Weitzman's solution to wage inflexibility and thereby unemployment 
and inflation is thus to create a new universal remuneration system in 
which profit-sharing plays an important role. This new system is made up 
of two components: first, a base wage as under existing payment systems 
and second, a profit related wage - a proportion of the per capita profit 
earned by the company. Under this payment system, an employer will hire 
more workers if the added revenue cost of each additional worker is less 
than the added revenue this worker will produce. Although the hiring of 
more workers will reduce profit per worker (and hence their level of 
remuneration), total profits will increase.
However, there are many criticism of Weitzman's macro-economic 
analysis, and these centre on the problems of implementation and the extent 
of the schemes impact on existing economic relations. These are examined 
in terms of employee risk, the arbitrary nature of profit-sharing and the 
employment and inflationary impact.
In contrast to Weitzman's view, wage inflexibility may be explained 
in terms of wage stability which highlights the risk adversity strategies of 
employees. In particular, contracts are entered into with the employer 
precisely to avoid the wage flexibility that can have a substantial impact on 
the employee's own financial planning in the domestic sphere. Profit-
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sharing schemes' can thus expose workers to a significant and unacceptable 
amount of income risk.
Even if profit-sharing is share based, the risk may be all the more 
substantial since a declining share price can lead to a dwindling rather than 
appreciating asset for the workers concerned. Moreover, profit-sharing 
schemes are potentially arbitrary and unfair in that the locus of decision- 
making over the distribution of income/prof its lies outside employee 
influence and may bear only an indirect relationship with a particular 
worker's efforts.
Nevertheless, recent American research gives some indirect support 
to Weitzman's arguments concerning employment and suggests that 
employment growth is particularly likely in firms where employees have 
share option schemes and therefore own a proportion of the equity. Thus 
Rosen and Klein [6] examined employment growth in 43 employee owned 
companies (including cooperatives) and found that employment in these 
companies grew nearly three times as fast as in traditional firms.
However, it should be noted that growth in employment could 
occasion further problems. Current workers and their union representatives 
may wish to prevent the firm from hiring extra individuals because any 
expansion in employment drives down the existing employees' remuneration 
[7]; and large variations in pay between firms may conflict with the 
principle of equal pay for equal work [8]. Employers may actually prefer 
more wage stability than employment stability for, under conditions of full 
employment, employees will, in the short run, quickly move to firms 
offering higher total wages. Furthermore, the increased level of employee 
turnover could be detrimental to economic efficiency in the short term. It 
is likely, therefore, that employers and workers may have considerable 
opposition to such a fundamental change in their remunerative systems. 
Indeed, wage pressures on the share economy are likely to be considerable.
Moreover, so far as inflation is concerned, the share economy may be 
inherently unstable. Indeed it may be inflationary if a wage component is 
maintained and the profit component of pay comprises an additional 
element in the total remuneration package of employees [9J.
In principle, of course, opposition to change in the remuneration 
systems can be overcome by tax incentives in the short run and reduced 
employee involvement in the long run [10]. But against this, such subsidies 
may turn out to be merely cosmetic with both management and unions 
colluding over pay and profit levels. Second, an essential political component 
in the share economy is that employee involvement in decision-making 
(and particularly on employment decisions) should be minimized. Above
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all, a reduction in the influence of trade unions and collective bargaining 
machinery and other forms of employee organisation which may affect the 
labour market is viewed as essential. Hence, the reduction of employee 
participation, a cornerstone of Weitzman's argument, is a development 
which would run counter to ongoing trends in this direction and to the 
tendency for various types of employee involvement to be interconnected 
[12].
Micro-Economic Impact
Economists have also been concerned with the micro-economic effects of 
profit-sharing, particularly with the consequences for company performance, 
and these are likely to be of more interest to general management. Briefly, 
both company profitability and worker productivity are seen as likely to 
improve following the introduction of profit-sharing schemes. Given such 
major claims, it is important to examine in more detail the micro-economic 
consequences of profit-sharing.
A wide range of studies (the majority from the USA) have pointed to 
a relationship between profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes and 
company economic and financial performance. Generally, firms which 
have profit sharing arrangements have been shown to outperform non­ 
profit-sharing firms. This applies to profits as a percentage of net worth and 
income, turnover, net worth, dividends and share price [13]. In Europe, too, 
in an analysis of share valuations in the UK retail sector, Richardson and 
Nejad [14] have argued that financial participation occasions a significant 
improvement in company performance on the share market. Moreover, 
they provide some support for the proposition that a strong managerial 
commitment to profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes improves 
performance as well. Furthermore, there is a clear link between the adoption 
of schemes, and trends in business volume and annual turnover of companies 
[15].
Yet, despite these and other research findings which we will examine 
shortly, there still remains some doubt as to whether companies perform 
better because they have profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes; or 
whether they are successful companies which would perform well even 
without such schemes but feel they should share the success of the company 
with their employees.
Profitability
Although European research on the impact of profit-sharing and share- 
ownership schemes on the economic performance of companies is relatively 
limited, in the USA several studies have examined this relationship. In one
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of the earliest of these, Conte and Tannenbaum [16] compared the profitability 
of 30 companies with employee ownership arrangements. They found that 
those companies with employee ownership arrangements were 1.5 times 
more profitable than those firms of comparable size which did not have 
such arrangements. More recently, Wagner [17] found that companies with 
at least ten per cent employee share ownership performed equally as well 
on overall returns on investment as other companies in the same industry. 
Moreover, on net operating margin, growth sales, book value/share and 
return on equity, firms with employee ownership outperformed the other 
companies studied by 62-75 per cent.
However, the research findings are not entirely consistent. Indeed, 
others have noted [18,19,20] that, on average, employee share ownership 
had an adverse affect on profitability. Moreover, further research [21,22] 
found that employee share-ownership schemes had no significant effect on 
profits.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that some inconsistency in the 
findings is not surprising, since employees' efforts in improving the profits 
of their firm may be counterbalanced by events outside their control. 
Indeed, the impact of external events on company profitability may enhance 
or reduce profits within a typical firm regardless of the initiatives or efforts 
of the majority of employees.
Productivity
The impact on productivity is primarily concerned with incentives and, 
according to Nuti [23], the viability of profit sharing "depends in large 
measure on these productivity-enhancing effects'. It is hypothesized that 
the introduction of profit-sharing schemes will create an incentive to work 
harder and more effectively in order to improve profits. General management 
will be familiar with traditional incentives which link individual effort to 
reward. However, profit-sharing schemes are a social or group incentive 
where the efforts of all employees contribute to improved rewards (either 
through cash or shares). This form of group incentive is organisationally 
based and, because it leaves considerable discretion to employees to avoid 
increasing their productive effort, it may increase the need for management 
supervision as well. Nonetheless, such disadvantages can be avoided if the 
incentive is linked to work or peer groups at the level of the task, with 
employees acting as monitors of other workers' performance. As Nuti [23] 
as proposed:
'A productivity increase can be expected (at no cost to the workers) as 
a result of intelligent and effective use of any given individual level of effort, 
co-operating with other workers and management, and monitoring and
57;
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supervising each other's effort, efficiency and co-operation'.
Indeed, the impact on productivity may be particularly strong where 
there is a limited number of employees and individual employees can link 
their increased effort or productivity directly to profits performance.
There is also some, albeit limited, empirical evidence to support the 
view that increased employee commitment in the profit-sharing firm raises 
productivity levels, This conclusion is suggested by American studies 
which have compared commitment and productivity in employee-owned 
plywood firms and supermarkets with traditional firms in the same industries 
[24]. Furthermore, Marsh and McAllister [25] examined 128 US companies 
withESOP schemes and found that, on average, productivity increased 0.78 
per cent per annum in these firms compared with an average decrease of 
0.74 per cent for a weighted national sample of companies.
Impact on Industrial Relations
Both general managers and specialists in personnel management may be 
particularly interested in the case for extending employee financial 
participation in terms of the impact on industrial relations. There are a 
number of partly separate and partly interlinked arguments here which 
relate to management-union relations generally, industrial conflict (including 
strikes and rates of absenteeism and labour turnover), managerial authority 
relations and trade unions and collective bargaining.
Management-Union Relations
The change in employee status from employee to employee shareholder 
may thus have implications for industrial relations within the company. In 
principle, employee shareholders may be considered to be a fairly 
homogenous and identifiable group with common interests both in terms 
of their corporate investment and in their employment relationship with 
the company and, as such, their collective interes ts may differ from those of 
the ordinary employee. This has implications for existing channels of 
representation and participation, particularly through trade unions.
Above all, it is conceivable that, as a result of increasing their 
identification with other shareholders and with the company, employee 
shareholders may perceive little need for collective representation of their 
interests by trade unions. This may mean that the position of trade unions 
in the company could be weakened and a schism created between ordinary 
employees and employee shareholders, thereby reducing the level of 
solidarity in the union [27]. Alternatively, if employee shareholders retain 
an instrumental orientation to work, their attitudes may not differ markedly
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from those of ordinary employees and the importance of the wage/effort 
bargain may still be dominant. On this view, the trade union traditional role 
will be little changed. However, employee shareholders, because of their 
common interest with other employees and improved status as shareholders, 
may seek additional individual or collective participation in decision- 
making through the union; and, if the majority of employees are shareholders, 
this could significantly change the traditional adversarial or conflictual role 
of trade unions to one of providing an alternative to managerial expertise 
in the efficient running of the company. Conversely, it could extend the 
range of conflict to encompass areas where management is viewed as not 
performing its traditional functions.
Industrial Conflict
Turning more specifically to industrial conflict, it has long been argued that 
one of the main effects of profit-sharing schemes is the reduction of conflict 
in the workplace. Some recent research has also pointed to this conclusion 
[28], However, there still remains some ambiguity as to the impact of 
ownership on industrial conflict. While Long [29] and Estrin and Wilson 
[30] have suggested that employee ownership reduces conflict; others, such 
as Meade [31], have argued that profit-sharing could increase it. By contrast, 
Stern et al [32] have proposed that industrial conflict will decrease in the 
short term because of the employees' efforts either to protect jobs or to 
increase profits or both; but increase in the long term and become more 
intense because of dissatisfaction with the control structures in the enterprise 
that typically obtain under most profit-sharing and share-ownership 
arrangements.
But industrial conflict itself is a multidimensional phenomenon with 
both attitudinal and behavioural dimensions. It may well be, therefore, that 
any assessment of the impact of profit-sharing and employee share- 
ownership requires a detailed analysis of various aspects of conflict such as 
strikes, labour turnover and absenteeism [33], Indeed, it may be the case 
that there are variable consequences of the introduction of schemes on each 
of these (and on other) dimensions of conflict itself.
Managerial Authority Relations
Perhaps more importantly for the general manager, employee share 
ownership is also thought to have implications for managerial authority 
relations. Indeed, on one view, the employee is placed in a position to 
delegate the running of the company to management. However, in reality, 
the increasing diversification of share ownership effectively means that the 
status of the employee shareholder is little different from that of the small 
investor, whose impact on company affairs is undoubtedly marginal.
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Therefore, little real influence in the day-to-day running of the company can 
be expected from minority shareholders such as those in share-ownership 
schemes.
Indeed, although employee financial participation and decision making 
involvement are linked, share ownership schemes are rarely accompanied 
by significant relocation of control as in the case of co-operatives or totally 
owned employee concerns [34]. In privatized companies in the UK, workers 
have received a substantial number of shares as a gift (or fringe benefit) but 
without gaining significant ground in exercising greater influence or 
participation in decision making. Furthermore, there is said to be little 
expectation of control under these arrangements [35].
The legitimate basis for managerial authority to control the enterprise 
rests not only upon expertise in running the company but also on property 
rights. Employee share ownership potentially affects the property relation 
of managerial authority when employees purchase shares in the firm. As 
shareholders, employees attain additional financial interests in their 
companies. However, as with other shareholders, the employee shareholder 
delegates operational responsibility to management for the efficient 
performance of the company and a sufficient return on his or her investment. 
Employee shareholders have no joint ownership over the property or assets 
of the company or little direct influence over its personnel. Their rights 
remain limited to those of liability and interest on shares they own. Thus, 
particularly in large organisations, mere share ownership often amounts to 
a situation of little real influence by minority shareholders.
Share ownership does, however, confer certain rights on the 
shareholder such as electing the board of directors, the right to financial 
information about the company and participation in the annual general 
meeting. Moreover, Long [36] has argued that employee shareholders are 
in a stronger position than the typical shareholder in a large company. This 
is because employee shareholders have access to much more information 
and knowledge about the company simply because they work there. 
Employee shareholders are concentrated within the organisation and not 
dispersed as is the case with other shareholders. Employee shareholders in 
the company are, therefore, a fairly homogenous and readily identifiable 
group with common interests based on a specific employment relationship. 
It is possible, therefore, that the collective representation of employee 
shareholders' interests may, as we shall see, effectively counter managerial 
expertise on certain issues either through shareholder institutions (the 
company board) or through traditional avenues of employee representation 
(collective bargaining).
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Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining
But, as far as industrial relations are concerned, no issue is more fundamental 
than the potential impact of employee financial participation on trade 
unions. As has been noted earlier, profit sharing and share-ownership 
schemes can effect a change in the character of the union's constituency 
from one of representing employees to one of protecting the rights of 
employee shareholders [37]. But this change is contradictory to the 
development of traditional trade unionism, being fundamentally opposed 
to the principles of collective bargaining and trade unionism [38]. To the 
extent that profit-sharing schemes reduce labour turnover and labour 
mobility, they remove a necessary condition for the individual employee to 
make the best possible bargain with his or her employer. And, as we noted 
elsewhere, such schemes may destroy 'the community of interests' on 
which collective bargaining depends by creating a vertical schism between 
employees [39]. Hence, they may reduce trade union solidarity and 
bargaining power.
More recent evaluations of this pessimistic role for trade unions is 
provided by Hanson [40], Bradley and Gelb [41] and Bradley [42]. Bradley 
and Gelb [43] thus note in their review that the:
'Transitions to employee ownership appear to be able potentially to 
weaken the nationwide, traditional role of trade unionism as representative 
of the working class through the mechanism of collective bargaining'.
Bradley [44] has also suggested that profit-sharing arrangements 
form part of a general demise of union influence through traditional 
channels, in that:
'With limited resources and tight monetary policy, traditional collective 
bargaining is seen as a zero sum (or negative sum) game, where one man's 
wage hike is another's unemployment. Thus, a new co-operation between 
trade unions and management is encouraged and the focus of industrial 
relations is shifted away from traditional collective bargaining'.
Nonetheless, there is evidence, notably from the American context, to 
suggest that employee share ownership has not led to a reduced perception 
for the need for trade unions [45]. This is particularly evident where power 
relationships continue to remain unequal, characterized by unequal equity 
holdings among differing employee groups and a lack of democratic 
control within the firm. Indeed, in these instances, the perceived necessity 
for trade unionism may increase in the longer term [46].
But some changes in the union role under profit-sharing and employee
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ownership arrangements can be expected [47]. More specifically, it may be 
anticipated that the union's role will significantly change if a substantial 
proportion of wages is linked with profits performance. Paradoxically, 
however, this may not necessarily be to the detriment of the union. Indeed, 
shop stewards may increasingly have to deal with the problem of so-called 
'accounting manipulation' (e.g., transfer pricing) in order to ensure that the 
relative share of profits accruing to the membership is reasonable [48]. This 
would require even greater disclosure of information to unions or employee 
representatives than at present. Moreover, this level of provision would 
eventually give rise to increased managerial accountability and trade union 
assessment of management decision-making. As a consequence, the union's 
normal 'reactive' role [49] in formal negotiation may change. Above all, a 
greater role in certain types of decision-making would be required to 
augment the size of the employees' share of the profits. And the increased 
expertise needed, particularly with regard to profit allocation, could require 
a more centralized union structure and possibly a move away from plant 
level bargaining arrangements.
Indeed, on another set of assumptions, profit sharing may increase 
unionization. Thus, Mitchell has argued that a profit-sharing system puts 
non-union employees at a disadvantage in that they have no voice in 
management decisions which affect their share of the profits [50]. He agrees 
with the Webbs [51] that employees could not adequately verify the size of 
the financial share without the union's organisational expertise and 
bargaining power. Hence the union's claim to expertise could be crucial to 
increasing its decision-making and regulatory role and thus its ability to 
recruit membership amongst profit-sharing participants. But of course 
such a change would require a modification in traditional union policies 
towards profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes.
Organisational Impact
Management at all levels in the company should be interested in the effects 
of profit sharing on organisational commitment. Indeed, there is evidence 
to suggest that attitudes rather than behaviour are more affected by the 
introduction of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes. Bell and 
Hanson [52] and Fogarty and White [53] have thus reported high level of 
support by employees for profit-sharing in principle and for company 
schemes and an increased interest in the profits and financial results of the 
company.
Turning to the third broad area where the impact of profit-sharing 
and employee-shareholding schemes has been examined, there are several 
issues of relevance to general managers in terms of the potential consequences
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for organizations. These include: (i) employee involvement; (ii) organisational 
identity; and (iii) employee satisfaction and commitment.
Employee Involvement
Profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes may be initiated by 
management for a number of reasons, among which are to improve the 
productivity of their employees, increase their sense of loyalty to the 
company or to augment the level of employees' direct participation in the 
company. As such they form part of a managerial strategy to influence the 
level of output, the degree of commitment and the level of joint decision- 
making between management and employees. Furthermore, it is thought 
that profit sharing and particularly share-ownership schemes offer employees 
the opportunity to increase their involvement in the workplace, improve 
their level of financial understanding and the degree of communication 
between employees and management.
Employee participation in ownership has thus been viewed as a 
means for employees to influence company policy and to share in the 
rewards of work. For Tannenbaum [54] and Long [55] in particular, employee 
ownership results in an increase in levels of worker participation and 
control. After all, through share-ownership, employees achieve certain 
control rights which they would otherwise not possess. Long [56], for 
example, has concluded that employee share-ownership increases worker 
influence at organisational policy levels. The employee's desire for worker 
participation is increased by share ownership because ownership confers a 
legitimate right to participate in decision-making. It also increases 
'organization identification' which, in turn, leads workers to become more 
interested in the affairs of their places of work [57]. These additional rights 
and stronger organisational identity thus increase the desire of workers for 
more influence in decision making at policy, departmental and job levels in 
the company.
Studies of worker co-operatives have also pointed to improvements 
in participative arrangements [58]. And other investigations [59] have 
reported that the percentage of company shares owned by employees is 
positively related to increased employee participation. By contrast some 
analyses of individual firms [60] have found no significant relationship 
between employee ownership and perceived or desired worker influence. 
Indeed, for Hammer and Stern [61], share ownership may be associated 
with a decline in the desire for worker influence [62].
Hence the research findings on employee participation remain 
contradictory and do not clearly point to a conclusive relationship between 
ownership and employee participation in decision making. However, such
63
Journal of General Management 
Vol. 16 No. 3 Spring 1991
research clearly provides some, if limited, evidence of an association 
between ownership and participation [63].
Profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes, then, may impact upon 
managerial practice and control in organisations by increasing the degree 
of participation both directly (voting for the board of directors) and indirectly 
(increasing the level and degree of communications and managements' 
formal or informal responsiveness to employees' collective interests) [64]. 
This may be further enhanced because, as Long [65] notes, managerial 
attitudes towards worker participation may be influenced by employee 
share ownership. First, management may respond to the changed basis of 
their authority and the increased desire for participation in decision- 
making brought about by workers' legitimate property rights and increased 
organisational identity. Second, employee share ownership may increase 
managerial perceptions of the legitimacy of increased employee involvement. 
Third, managers may believe that the perceived increase in commitment 
shown by workers results directly from employee share ownership and 
may promote further formal participation to enhance this development. 
And fourth, employee share ownership may occasion increased delegation 
of authority at all levels in the organisation.
Further evidence [66] also confirms Long's emphasis on the importance 
of management's philosophical commitment to share ownership in 
significantly enhancing the effects of profit-sharing and share ownership 
schemes with regard to employee involvement and commitment to the 
company. Moreover, it should be stressed that the effectiveness of profit- 
sharing and share-ownership schemes may have more to do with managerial 
philosophy and style than with the level of share ownership per se [67].
Organisational Identity
A further argument in the literature relates to organisational identity and to 
instrumental attachments to work. It is hypothesized that when employees 
become shareholders they will have a further financial incentive to increase 
the worth of their share investment. This form of incentive has advantages 
over other forms in that, although indirect, it is thought to be long term and 
self-reinforcing [68]. Moreover, financial incentives are considered to be 
more effective when linked with ownership and, inasmuch as share 
ownership increases the employee's financial stake in his/her place of 
work, it also increases the instrumental importance of work. Thus, employee 
shareholders may be even more inclined to direct their individual and 
collective behaviour towards the corporate goal of increased profits rather 
than to the traditional worker's goal of higher wages and improved conditions 
of work [69].
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However, employee share ownership schemes involve more than just 
the reward/effort relationship. Employees who participate in these schemes 
can now be clearly identified in a fundamental way with other shareholders 
through their common investment in the firm. More than this, the schemes, 
in changing the employee's status from one of 'employee' to 'owner' can 
occasion a link between employee interests and the interests of shareholders 
and the company [70]. Thus, in contrast with cash based schemes, share- 
based arrangements (while also appealing to employees' instrumental 
orientations) purport to create a moral commitment to work and 
organisational goals and to effect substantial changes in employee attitudes 
and behaviour by creating a broader 'organisational identity' amongst 
employees generally [71]. The identity with the company is encouraged by 
increased communications between management and the employee 
shareholder over and above that of the ordinary employee. Thus, employee 
shareholders receive the company's annual financial report and other 
shareholder information in addition to existing disclosure of information 
arrangements in the company (whether through management's own 
initiatives or through collective bargaining). Regardless of the employee's 
competence to evaluate such information, this involves an increase in 
communication of the financial status of the company and of important 
company policy; and, as such, it is scarcely surprising that Bell and Hanson 
[72] have reported high levels of support by employees for profit sharing in 
principle and for company schemes and an increased interest in the profits 
and financial results of the company. Indeed, nearly a half of the respondents 
(47 per cent) said their loyalty to the firm had been strengthened and just 
over half (51 per cent) felt that the schemes made people work more 
effectively [73].
In sum, it is thought that the combination of these factors may 
occasion an identification of employees with the firm and the products it 
produces. Indeed, the increased employee identification, and commitment 
to the company and the enhanced interest in work may also influence either 
prospective employees to join, or existing employees to remain with, the 
company itself [74].
Employee Satisfaction and Commitment
But does the introduction of profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes 
transform employee attitudes? So far as employee satisfaction is concerned, 
there are thought to be at least two ways in which this may be improved 
through share ownership. First of all, share ownership may directly affect 
employee satisfaction in the sense that ownership itself confers benefits on 
employees (such as, increased financial rewards). Second, it may indirectly 
affect employee satisfaction by increasing employee influence and 
involvement [75].
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Turning to the actual evidence, Long [76] and Hammer, Stem and 
Gurdon [77] have found positive relationships between employee ownership 
and employee satisfaction in individual firms. Also, a larger and more 
recent study [78] suggests that under the right conditions, employee share 
ownership can lead to increased employee satisfaction. However, other 
American studies have reported no significant difference in employee 
satisfaction between employee shareholders and non-shareholders [79].
The different findings may stem in part from the likelihood that 
satisfaction and commitment will be significantly influenced by the size of 
the company's contribution to the schemes (the amount of shares the 
participants receive and management's philosophical commitment to 
workers' ownership). This would suggest that employees may regard the 
company's financial contribution as an important element in improving 
their morale and satisfaction at work [80]. Other findings also suggest that 
the number of shares employees own, and the value of these shares, has 
some bearing on the perceived need for greater participation and control. 
Indeed, in Hochner and Granrose's [81] study of a proposed employee 
buyout, employees highlighted entrepreneurship (financial gain being 
prominent) and participation as the major benefits of employee ownership.
Satisfaction may also stem from improved financial benefits. Thus, in 
Long's [82] study, employees felt that the advantages of employee ownership 
were in order of preference: financial gain; the satisfaction of working for 
oneself; greater influence in decision-making; a chance to benefit from one's 
own efforts; and, better understanding between management and employees. 
And Rosen and Klein [83] concluded that employees are primarily motivated 
and inspired by the potential financial rewards of the schemes than any 
other factor. More generally, too, there is evidence from other than North 
American sources that employees' perceptions of the benefits of schemes 
arise from instrumental orientations to share schemes. Goldstein's [84] 
West Australian study suggests that improvements in overall satisfaction, 
commitment, application (effort) and responsibility are positively related 
to the economic performance of the company. As a consequence, employee 
share ownership is viable only as long as the company can maintain a 
reasonable level of performance [85].
In short, the impact of employee share ownership on worker satisfaction 
links any improvements here to both the financial rewards of share ownership 
and to the possibility of enhanced employee participation. Moreover, what 
is clear is that there is an instrumental motivation of workers in becoming 
shareholders. However, this instrumentalism may take different forms 
such as protecting one's job, one's sole source of income [86], or increasing 
financial awareness [87].
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Conclusions
This survey of international arguments and data on the impact of profit- 
sharing and employee shareholding schemes indicates that there is a wide 
range of possible consequences. Overall, a note of caution is apposite. The 
effects of schemes appear to be broadly positive but they do typically fall 
short of the claims of the most ardent enthusiasts for employee financial 
participation. However, from a general manager's perspective, it should be 
stressed that competitiveness, in particular, is often the consequence of a 
series of small-scale improvements which have a significant cumulative 
effect. Viewed in this light, the development of profit-sharing and share 
ownership schemes is likely to prove valuable so long as expectations of 
benefits are realistic and schemes are seen as only a part of a broad range of 
measures designed to improve company performance itself.
The foregoing guide has provided information for the general manager 
on the likely impact of profit-sharing schemes on managerial practice. This 
is because profit-sharing and employee-shareholding schemes may be 
linked with policies on employee participation and organisational 
democracy, with the objective of increasing the sense of identity of employees 
with the companies in which they work; and second, as we have mentioned, 
the case may be advanced in terms of competitiveness. Profit-sharing and 
employee shareholding are seen to advance this through improved 
motivation and commitment of the workforce, together with greater 
flexibility and adaptability and higher levels of productivity and profitability. 
Moreover, these policies are further linked with the broader economic 
objectives of reducing unemployment and inflation.
More specifically, these policy choices can be said to have important 
implications not only for the overall economy but also for company 
performance, employee performance and employee attitudes to work. If 
the effects of such policies are fulfilled then the work of the general manager 
may be made that much easier for he/she is likely to work with a more 
satisfied, more committed, more flexible and more productive workforce. 
And it will be a workforce which identifies more with general management's 
objectives on human resource management generally. The likely impact of 
this identification will result in greater security for both management and 
employees and give rise to increased profitability and reductions in 
absenteeism and labour turnover. However, the introduction of employee 
financial involvement is also likely to require changes in the attitudes of 
general management themselves not only in the extent to which they are 
committed to the introduction of profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes but also a change in attitude toward the relationship between 
manager and employee, where the employee and manager are both part- 
owners of the company.
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So far as practice is concerned, firms should be reviewing profit- 
sharing as part of their evolving human resource strategies. Typically these 
strategies are moving towards a framework in which the role of the general 
manager is central. It is vital, therefore, for general managers both to be 
aware of international developments in this important field and to be 
sufficiently informed to make sensible policy choices in respect of the actual 
schemes which are adopted. For the positive aspects of these schemes to be 
fulfilled, general managers wiU have to be committed to these developments 
and to ensure that they have as much an impact as possible on actual 
practice.
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Abstract 
This paper assesses whether positive attitudes to profit sharing and share-holding schemes in
general are reflected in perceived changes and attitudes to work. It concludes that such schemes 
are likely to facilitate and reinforce positive attitudes but are unlikely to bring about changes in 
actual work practices.
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Employee Attitudes to Profit-Sharing and 
Employee Shareholding Schemes
MICHAEL POOLE AND GLEN JENKINS
The aim of this contribution is to assess the views of employees on proht- 
sharing and employee shareholding schemes. The paper will begin by a 
review of developments in profit-sharing in Britain. This will be followed by 
an examination of the key findings of the survey stage of a Department of 
Employment sponsored research project on profit-sharing and employee 
shareholding.
The main aim ol this chapter, however, is to report on the views of nearly 
2,000 employees derived from the case-study phase of the Department of 
Employment research project. Half of the employees worked in London and 
the south-east of England, while the other half were employed in South 
Wales and die south-west of England. The largest single group of respondents 
was employed in the finance sector, followed by manufacturing and the 
services.
The chapter begins with an account of employee attitudes to profit-sharing 
and employee share-ownership schemes covering four main types of arrange­ 
ment: profit-sharing through casli awards, profit-sharing through shares in 
die company, Save As You Earn (SAYE) schemes, and Executive Share 
option schemes. Male/female differences in attitudes are examined in this 
section. However, the main purpose is to assess whether positive attitudes to 
schemes in general are reflected in perceived changes and altitudes to work. 
Among the issues covered are:
1. Employees' estimates of die success of schemes in terms of a number 
of objectives.
2. Employees' estimates of the success of schemes on aspects of their work 
(including satisfaction, productivity, involvement, and communications).
3. Employees' estimates of a sense of belonging to the company.
4. Employees' views on work and career patterns.
5. Orientations to work.
6. Ownership identity.
7. Employees' views on employee involvement generally.
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In conclusion it is argued that a favourable attitude to share schemes has 
an important and significant impact on employee behaviour and identification 
with corporate goals. However, this must be qualified with the view that a 
favourable altitude, to schemes may be associated with the level of capital 
assets owned by the employees. Moreover, the importance of financial returns 
on investment in share-ownership or the possibility of financial gain is clearly 
the major underlying dimension or influence. This would confirm the view 
that employees see share-ownership primarily as a form of investment or 
economic reward and secondly as a means to increasing participation and 
involvement at work.
In recent years, there has been an upsurge of interest in profit-sharing and 
employee shareholding schemes accompanying an appreciable expansion in 
their operation within actual companies. This phenomenon has been especially 
evident in North America and Europe, but it has by no means been confined 
to these particular regions (Klein and Rosen, 1986; Poole, 1989). The aim of 
this contribution is to analyse this development in the UK by presenting 
original data on employee attitudes towards profit-sharing and share-ownership 
based on an investigation sponsored by the Department of Employment. This 
will help to reveal the actual impact of schemes themselves. An account of 
the development of profit-sharing and share-ownership in die UK will first 
be presented as a background to the study. Furthermore, a model of the 
origins and impact of schemes will be set out prior to an examination of the 
actual research findings.
The development of profit-sharing and share-ownership 
in the UK
For upwards of a century, the advance of profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes in the UK appeared to be uneven and subject to changes in the 
business cycle (Ramsay, 1977). In the waves of advance in die nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries the principal influences in the shape of the movement 
appeared to be: (1) a paternalistic outlook amongst certain employees, (2) 
economic buoyancy, (3) the rise of trade unions, and (4) labour unrest 
(Melling, 1983). The early developments (between 1865 and 1873, 1889 
and 1892, 1908-9 and 1912-14) closely parallelled the growth of welfare 
provisions in certain companies. But these were also conditions of economic 
buoyancy, the expansion of trade union activity and labour unrest. Indeed, in 
the intervening years of economic decline and trade union inactivity, many 
schemes fell into disuse (Poole, 1989: 8-14).
Between the wars, there was a strong increase in the adoption of schemes 
in 1919 and 1920. Following the onset of depression and a considerable 
reduction in both trade union density and industrial militancy, the rate of
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adoption of schemes was to decline appreciably. However, despite this decline, 
there were considerably more schemes in existence than had earlier been the 
case. Thus there were approximately 120 schemes in operation in the UK in 
1910, a figure which had expanded to roughly 250 in 1935 (this was below 
the inter-war peak of over 300 schemes in 1929) (Matthews, 1989).
Following the Second World War, (here was a further advance in profit- 
sharing and employee shareholding accompanying the more favourable 
economic circumstances of the period. In a survey carried out in 1954, 
the Ministry of Labour discovered that about 500 companies practised 
some form of profit-sharing. But the modem advance of employee financial 
participation was largely occasioned by favourable legislation which has ensured 
that companies which meet particular conditions can obtain Inland Revenue 
exemptions and hence secure a tax-efficient means of rewarding employees 
(Deloitte, Haskins & Sells, 1985).
Three key enactments (together with several other pieces of supportive 
legislation) have helped to fuel the modern advance. Under the provisions of 
the 1978 Act, approved profit-sharing (APS) schemes involve companies 
allocating profits to a trust fund which acquires shares in the firm on behalf 
of employees. The 1980 Finance Act facilitated the development of Inland 
Revenue-approved Save As You Earn (SAYE) share-option schemes, whereby 
the employee is given the option of buying shares at a fixed price provided 
that the shares are bought from the proceeds of SAYE contracts. The 
Finance Act of 1984 provided firms with a further major incentive to develop 
discretionary and particularly Executive Share-Option (ESO) schemes that 
allow senior personnel in the company to exercise options to buy shares. To 
take up this option, the employee pays on exercise die full market value of 
the shares at the time that the option was granted. The upshot has been a 
considerable expansion in profit-sharing and share-ownership schemes.
The most recent advance in the UK cannot be considered in isolation for 
it forms part of a much wider change in advanced industrial societies during 
die 1980s towards profit-sharing and employee share-ownership in the 
firm. While internationally the growth of profit-sharing and employee share- 
ownership has been disparate and highlights a rich variety of practices in 
employee financial participation, much of the recent advance can be traced in 
part to facilitative government measures (Poole, 1989).
A model of employee financial participation
To understand the origins and impact of profit-sharing and employee share­ 
holding schemes, die model set out in Fig. 8.1 is proposed. The origins of 
employee financial participation are seen to be linked wilh the strategic 
choices of managers in the firm to introduce schemes in the first place (for a
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development see Poole, 1989). These are, in turn, linked willi organizational 
and industrial relations factors and with external, environmental variables 
that facilitate (or constrain) but do not determine choices. Moreover, the 
model infers that any improvements in company performance are likely to 
have a positive 'feedback' influence that can in turn affect the broader 
context in which decisions to establish schemes are formulated. Such an 
eventuality can, for example, encourage competitor firms to introduce schemes.
The adoption of profit-sharing and employee shareholding is seen to be 
linked with greater organizational identification and this is one of die reasons 
why managers are interested in developing schemes. This may occur from 
higher levels of either intrinsic or extrinsic commitment.. Intrinsic commitment 
arises from greater direct participation, security, status, and job satisfaction. 
Extrinsic commitment potentially stems from instrumental rewards, oppor­ 
tunistic gains, or long-term investment advantages for the employee.
The main outcomes are identified in terms ol improved financial, industrial 
relations and organizational performance. Financial performance includes 
high levels of profitability and productivity. Industrial relations performance 
is associated with reduced conflict and lower levels of absenteeism and 
labour turnover. And improvements in organizational performance include 
higher levels of employee involvement, greater job satisfaction, and adaptability 
and flexibility (for a development of this model see Poole, 1989; Poole and 
Jenkins, 1990).
The Department of Employment research
But to achieve a higher level of economic, industrial relations and organ­ 
izational performance, the employees themselves have to be affected in 
appropriate ways by the introduction of profit-sharing and share-ownership 
schemes. Hence, a principal objective of a research project sponsored by the 
Department of Employment was to discover employees' views on the impact 
of schemes on dieir attitudes and behaviour.
There were two principal phases of die research: (1) a survey of companies 
in Britain and (2) case-studies of selected firms derived from enterprises 
included in the survey. The case-study phase with which we were concerned 
in this contribution included: (1) detailed interviews with key management 
respondents, (2) interviews with full-time trade union officers and lay represen­ 
tatives, (3) die gathering of data on company performance, and (4) the 
administering of questionnaires to a substantial number of employees (nearly 
2,000).
The case-study phase commenced in spring 1986 and involved twenty-two 
companies. To ensure a regional balance the companies were divided equally 
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research (Goklstein, 1978; Greenberg, 1980; Hamer and Stern, 1980; Rhodes 
and Steers, 1981, Rosen el a/., 1985; Klein and Rosen, 1986).
Employee preferences and participation in SAYE schemes
This brings us to a more specific issue of employee preferences lor particular 
types of schemes and entitlements. Employees were asked whether they 
preferred cash or share-based schemes (or a mixture of the two) and also 
whether entitlements should be based on length of service, grade of job, 
salary/wage level, flat rate (equally applied to all), or a combination of the 
above.
It was found that only 43.7 per cent of employees supported solely cash- 
based arrangements. Indeed, a substantial proportion preferred either share- 
based schemes (23.4 per cent) or a mixture of share and cash arrangements 
(22.8 per cent). Hence, although the largest single group of employees 
preferred cash-based schemes, there was no overwhelming preference for 
one particular type of arrangement.
As far as entitlements are concerned, again there was no overwhelming 
preference for any one mode of distribution. Indeed, a combination of 
arrangements was the most common response (26.2 per cent), followed by 
length of service (22.2 per cent), and a flat rate (equally applied to all) (21.8 
per cent). But, interestingly, there was clearly no overwhelming support ior 
egalitarian modes of distribution (21.8 per cent).
We also attempted to assess in detail the experiences of employees who 
were participants in their firm's SAYE schemes (35.5 per cent of respondents). 
This suggests, perhaps not surprisingly, that there was a higher response rate 
amongst employees who were actively involved in schemes. But it does 
provide a sufficient number of cases to assess employee intentions about 
SAYE entitlements.
Indeed, employees were asked how long they intended to keep their 
shares. Encouragingly for the proponents of the SAYE schemes, only 21.9 
per cent indicated that they intended to keep their shares for the minimum 
period. This contrasted with die higher overall proportion of employees who 
suggested that they would either keep shares for 1 -2 years after the minimum 
period (12.7 per cent), or for the period to gain full exemption from income 
tax (20.8 per cent), or for a substantial period of dine (20.4 per cent), or even 
indefinitely (14.5 per cent).
Employee involvement
Employee involvement has been an issue of central interest in the international 
literature on profit-sharing and share-ownership (Long, 1978; Hammer and
Employee Attitudes to Profit-Sharing 165
Stem, 1980; Tanuenbaum, 1983; French and Rosenstein, 1984; Klein and 
Rosen, 1986). Hence, an important aspect of the case-studies was to assess 
the issue of employee involvement and its links with profit-sharing. Following 
Long (1981), we endeavoured to obtain information on employee involvement 
in die overall policies of the firm, in matters affecting their own departments, 
and in how their own jobs were done.
Moreover, each of these areas of involvement was examined under four 
main headings: (1) how much say or influence do employees in general in the 
firm actually have over decisions; (2) how much say or influence employees in 
general should have over decisions; and (3) how much say or influence the 
respondent actual/}' has over decisions; and (4) how much say or influence the 
respondent should have over decisions.
It will be seen in Table 8.4 that, so far as the employees' actual say is 
concerned, respondents generally contrasted the areas of the overall policies 
of die firm (where there was little perceived involvement) with how jobs are 
done (where the majority indicated that diere was either some say or a great 
deal of say). For die desirable level of employee involvement a rather different 
pattern emerged. Indeed, in every instance (including the overall policies of 
the firm as well as departmental and job-level decision-making), employees 
indicated that they would like to see at least some employee say or influence 
over decision-making. And this was particularly pronounced at job level 
where roughly three-quarters of those questioned desired at least a good deal 
of say over decision-making.
This pattern of results was paralleled by die data on the respondents' actual 
say over decision-making. As Table 8.4 again indicates, the majority felt that 
although they had very little influence on the overall policies of the firm, they 
did have a far higher degree of involvement in how their jobs were actually 
performed. Interestingly, too, the majority of respondents appear to desire 
some personal influence over the overall policies of die firm and, less sur­ 
prisingly, a substantial involvement in task-based decision-making (see Long 
1981).
These data thus reveal considerable interest amongst employees in being 
involved in decision-making in general. At job level there is clearly widespread 
participation in decisions but this would appear seldom to extend to policy 
level. However, at the levels of the job, the department, and the firm, 
employees typically wished to see not only greater employee involvement but 
also to be themselves active participants in this process.
Company, work, and career
Employees were also asked to indicate their views on a series of issues 
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The Rise of Human Resource Management
The origins of this study stem from an interest in establishing the 
extent to which companies have adopted various policies and practices 
in human resource management. This is, in turn, linked with a 
growing recognition of the importance of the management of people 
for the competitiveness of companies and nations. But what, it may 
be reasonably asked, is human resource management? Why has it 
become such an important issue in recent years? And, how does it 
differ from traditional personnel management?
Human Resource Management________________
Most interpretations of human resource management may be traced 
to the definition of the so-called 'Harvard School' in which HRM is 
seen to involve 'all management decisions that affect the nature of 
the relationship between the organisation and employees - its human 
resources'.1 More fundamentally, human resource management is 
linked with the overall strategy of the company; it involves all 
managerial personnel (and especially those in line and general 
management); it regards people as the most important single asset 
of the organisation; it is proactive in its relationship with people and 
it seeks to enhance company performance, employee 'needs' and 
societal well-being.2
Human resource management has thus become increasingly recognised 
as important within business concerns for a number of reasons:
1. The increasingly proactive role of managers in human resources 






A concern over the motivation and commitment of employees 
as a consequence of:
• Increasingly open markets
• Demographic changes which will lead to there being far 
fewer young employees in most Western countries
• Major technological changes requiring rapid alterations in 
skills and aptitudes
• The vital importance of quality in international competition 
and the role of employees in bringing this into effect
• Delayering and downsizing as an important and unavoid­ 
able consequence of the 1990s recession.
The changing nature of the personnel function within the firm 
and in the wider profession.
The tendency for human resource management to be the 
generic label for the management of people at work.
The recognition of the vitalrole of human resource development 
(training, appraisal, coaching) in maintaining an adaptable 
and flexible workforce equipped to deal with the problems of 
the 1990s.
Models of Human Resource Management
In the debates on the rise and nature of human resource manage­ 
ment, it is usual to find fundamental differences between the con­ 
cerns of HRM and the earlier preoccupations of personnel 
management. A number of classifications have been developed to 
encompass the principal differences; the most influential being 
associated with the work of Guest3 (See Table 1).
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Table 1: Stereotypes of personnel management and 
human resource management
Naturally, these are stereotypes and they greatly overstate the practical 
differences (which may be no more than disparate labels for very 
similar modes of operation). But they are valuable distinctions for 
classification purposes and for defining the precise nature and 
meaning of human resource management.
To establish the main substantive areas of human resource manage­ 
ment, the Harvard School4 is again the starting point. Its model is 
set out in Figure 1, in which the key policy choices are seen as:
• Employee influence (involvement)
• Human resource flow (including development issues 
such as appraisal, training and careers)
• Work systems
• Reward systems-
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Figure 1: The Harvard School model of human resource management
We shall use the main policy choice areas in particular to structure 
the analysis in the four main chapters which follow.
Empirical Studies
Before doing so, however, it is important to note that there have been 
an increasing number of empirical studies in Britain and elsewhere 
in which attempts have been made to draw out some of the main 
developments, five of which are examined here: (1) Storey's study 
of major British employers5; (2) Purcell and Ahlstrand's investigation 
of multidivisional companies6; (3) analyses based on the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS 3) and especially Sisson7; (4) the 
Price Waterhouse - Cranfield European researches (Brewster and 
Hegewisch)8 and (5) the world-wide future oriented study conducted 
under the aspects of IBM and Towers Perrin9. It is not appropriate 
to deal with these investigations in depth but they are important as 
a prelude to our own survey.
Storey's study was based on an investigation of 15 leading British 
companies. It assessed the extent to which these firms incorporated 
various beliefs and assumptions of human resource management. 
The conclusion is that there has been an extensive take up of HRM- 
style approaches in mainstream British companies even though, in 
respect of employee relations, firms typically remained pluralistic
in approach. Moreover, line management was certainly seen to be 
a 'key player' so far as employment issues are concerned.
Purcell and Ahlstrand focused on multi-divisional companies and 
their study was conducted over a period of ten years of research. 
They were particularly interested in the styles of companies with 
respect to employee relations. They noted that strategic thinking in 
this area has been relatively rare in British companies. Moreover, 
so far as the personnel function is concerned, they detected a change 
to decentralised systems and a decline of the corporate personnel depart­ 
ment. This has had the effect, if anything, of a loss of voice for 
personnel in the upper echelons of the corporation.
Based on data from the representative Workplace Industrial Rela­ 
tions Survey (WIRS 3), Sisson however, did argue that some of the 
ideas and practices involved with HRM appear to be taking root and 
particularly the focus on individualism rather than collectivism and 
in the attention paid to participation and involvement. However, 
these and other so-called 'fragments of HRM' were found to be more 
likely to occur in union rather than non-union workplaces.
These British studies have been amplified by findings from cross- 
national researches. In Europe, the most important is the Price 
Waterhouse-Cranfield study. A rich range of human resource man­ 
agement practices have been analysed but an important focus has 
been on training and development. What is significant is the extent 
to which, in Europe, training is perceived as the prime objective of 
human resource strategy by personnel managers. Nonetheless, 
only a minority of organisations in Europe appear to conduct their 
training functions in a strategic manner, 10
The links between human resource management and competitive 
advantage have been the focus of a recent global study9. Respondents 
worldwide detected a move towards a more strategic and proactive 
human resource approach. In respect of actions for gaining competi­ 
tive advantage the communication of business directions, problems 
and plans; rewarding employees for customer service/quality; 
the identification of high-potential employees early; the reward of 
employees for innovation/creativity and the reward of employees 
for business/productivity gains were seen as particularly important
Background
The Institute of Management Survey
The objective of this research was to discover the extent of the 
take-up of human resource management practices in Britain and to 
discover the views of practising managers on aspects of competitive 
advantage.
The questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was designed to shed light on a 
series of issues of relevance to the rise of human resource management.
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Key Findings
The Organisation and Role of Personnel/
Human Resource Management ______________
• Approximately two thirds of respondents reported that the top 
personnel/human resource manager in their organisations had 
representation on the top policy committee or Board
• In 70 per cent of cases, centralised headquarters was the maj'or 
organisational unit responsible for setting strategic personnel/ 
human resource direction
• The human resource management role is clearly identified with 
the views and concerns of management (67 per cent) rather than 
the views and concerns of employees (6 per cent)
• More than seven in ten respondents also felt that the role should 
be geared to the organisation's internal business needs rather 
than involved in addressing societal issues outside the organi­ 
sation
• Over half the respondents saw the human resource management 
role as actively participating in strategic planning compared 
with only one in five who reported that the role concentrated 
primarily on operational issues
Competitive Advantage
• The need for a highly flexible workforce to meet the challenges 
of an increasingly changing environment is recognised by 78 per 
cent of respondents
• Over three quarters of respondents reported that their employer 
supported or strongly supported the policy of an equal oppor­ 
tunities culture
Key Findings Back to the Line?
The provision of skills training for employees features strongly 
with 77 per cent of respondents indicating that their firms either 
supported or strongly supported such a policy
To communicate business directions, policies and plans to 
employees is considered important (70 per cent of respondents 
noting that this applied in their organisations)
The promotion of a participative management style is also 
widely endorsed according to 67 per cent of respondents
The focus on a merit philosophy throughout the organisation 
and on individual performance is emphasised by 63 per cent of 
respondents
Fifty four per cent of respondents note that their organisations 
have a policy to encourage, recognise and reward employees for 
innovation and creativity
Employee Involvement
• Communications are important in UK companies. Sixty seven 
per cent of respondents reported that their organisations had 
either full or considerable involvement in respect of regular 
meetings between supervisors and workgroups/team briefing
• Almost fifty per cent of respondents reported that their organi­ 
sations made full or considerable use of internal newsletters
• Line managers rather than personnel/human resource managers 
are most likely to have responsibility for the main types of 
employee involvementwhichhavebeen adopted in organisations. 
This especially applies to smaller organisations and those in the 
private sector
Training and Development
• Appraisal is the most pervasive of training and development 
practices reported (66 per cent of respondents noted that there 
was either full or considerable involvement in their organisations 
in this respect)
Management development has also been widely implemented 
(according to 48 per cent of respondents)
Competence-based training in organisations is reported to have 
been either fully or considerably implemented by a further 48 
per cent of respondents. Over four in ten report considerable 
involvement in training needs analysis
Line management has more responsibility than personnel/human 
resource departments on most training and development issues
Work Practices
Quality control and informing employees of results (in terms of 
costs, yields, production, quality or customer complaints) are 
common working practices of the 1990s. Sixty per cent of 
respondents indicated that their organisations had full or con­ 
siderable involvement in giving employees responsibility for 
quality control
Over half the respondents reported that feedback to employees 
on results was an important feature of the work practices in their 
organisation
In most cases, line management retained responsibility for work 
practices or, at least, shared them with personnel/human resource 
managers
Rewards
Nearly half of the respondents indicated that their firms had 
either full or considerable involvement in equal pay for equal 
work
Larger rather than smaller organisations tended to emphasise 
equal pay for equal work, payment by results/performance 
related pay, executive share schemes and save-as-you-eam 
schemes
Key Findings Back to the Line?
m The distribution of responsibility for reward systems is quite 
diverse. Personnel /human resource managers rather than line 
managers are more likely to be responsible for save-as-you-earn 
schemes, fringe benefits, equal pay for equal work and executive 
share schemes
Changes in the Business Environment
• Increasing competition was noted by 85 per cent of respondents 
as a key characteristic of the business environment
• Eighty two per cent of respondents reported a heightened focus 
on total quality/customer satisfaction
• Seventy per cent of respondents noted increased government 
regulation
• Changing employee values, goals and expectations were iden­ 
tified by 62 per cent of respondents as having a major impact on 
their business environment
• Increased reliance on automation/ technology to produce goods 
and services was observed to be a key feature of the business 
environment by over 60 per cent of respondents
Profile of Respondents
A self-completion questionnaire (see Appendix 1) was sent to a random sample of 3,000 fellows and members of the Institute 
of Management in January 1994; 909 usable questionnaires were 
returned by the deadline, a response rate of 30 per cent.
The characteristics of the respondents and their organisations are 





















































Profile of Respondents Back to the Line?
Base: All respondents


















































































Organisation by number of employees




































Note: Percentages may not total 100 due to rounding
Table 2: Characteristics of respondents and their organisations
The largest single category of respondents was aged between 46 and 
55 (48 per cent) and was in senior management (44 per cent). 
Eighteen per cent of respondents earned £50,000 or over per year. 
Respondents are overwhelmingly male (93 per cent) and in terms 
of management function over a quarter (28 per cent) were in general 
management, the largest single grouping.
A quarter of respondents work in manuf acturing /production while 
30 per cent are employed in the public sector.
Almost one in four respondents work for organisations with up to 
100 employees while 17 per cent are in organisations with a work­ 
force of 10,000.
Respondents were predominantly from British organisations (54 
per cent) and nine per cent from newly established concerns.
12
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A large number of conceptual models exist concerning the role of 
personnel/human resource managers which provide insights into 
its complex and fragmented nature. As Sisson informs us, the role 
may differ depending on business strategy, organisational structure, 
degree of centralisation or decentralisation, ownership and age of 
organisation to name but a few.11 However, despite the level of 
complexity and fragmentation of the personnel role, three conflicting 
viewpoints can be identified.
The first is that because of the decline in trade union power, the role 
of personnel managers is in terminal decline and is being replaced 
by the line management function. Linked into this view is that the 
primary function of personnel managers in the post-war period was 
that of industrial relations. The decline in trade union power has 
meant that this specialist role is becoming obsolete. This has had 
implications beyond the industrial relations function and has led to 
a re-evaluation of the role and to the belief that personnel/human 
resource managers should no longer have responsibility for such 
key functions as recruitment and selection, but that these should be 
devolved down the line.
The second view is that personnel/human resource managers 
should become integrated into the management team and identify 
more closely with the overall aims of the organisation. They should 
also adopt a more strategic focus to the management of people and 
work closely with the line on operational issues. Central to this 
argument is the involvement of the personnel specialist on the board 
of directors or his/her participation in strategic decision-making at 
every level of the organisation.
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The third is that of the status quo; as Legge has concluded, the above 
views of the personnel/human resource management role are in­ 
compatible with existing UK industrial relations institutions and 
structures.12 A movement toward an integrative or 'HRM' approach 
in terms of initiatives such as communication, involvement and 
training is seen as feasible without changing fundamentally the 
nature of industrial relations management. A more significant 
change toward HRM would be evidence which pointed to strategic 
integration of a form which confronted the industrial relations 
institutions of the past ie flexibility, job design and reward systems. 
Where strategic integration can be identified, limitations exist at the 
level of implementation because of existing industrial relations 
structures which have remained largely intact.
These levels of ambiguity and diverse responses to change in the 
1990s are not new in the analysis of the personnel role. However, 
what is new is the changing pattern of authority and responsibility 
of the personnel specialist with regard to (a) the relationship with 
other members of the management team and in particular that of 
line management and (b) the relationship with organisational objec­ 
tives and the market.
These two questions remain central to the inquiries reported below 
and in subsequent chapters.
The Organisation of Personnel/Human 
Resource Management
Firstly, we felt it important ask the respondents whether the top 
personnel /human resource manager in their organisations had rep­ 
resentation on the top policy committee eg Board of Directors. 
Respondents reported a high incidence of such representation (64 
per cent).
Moreover, respondents were asked to identify the most senior 
personnel /human resource manager in their organisation from a 
selection of traditional designated titles extracted from the titles of 








Director of Group Personnel
Personnel Officer
Chief Executive
Head of Personnel Services
Head of Personnel
Director of Group Human Resources
Human Resources Manager
















Table 3: Designated title of most senior personnel/ 
human resource manager in organisation
The predominance of Managing Directors in particular should be 
noted. Perhaps, more significantly, 22 per cent of organisations did 
not have a traditional title for their head of personnel.
When comparing those with personnel in the title with those with 
human resource, the most popular designation is personnel (44 per 
cent) and human resource managers remain in a minority (17 per 
cent). Private sector organisations differed little from public sector 
organisations in this respect with the exception that those responsible 
for personnel in the private sector with under 500 employees were 
more likely to be called Managing Director (16 per cent) perhaps 
signifying less specialisation and a more direct link with line manage­ 
ment. Those organisations which were newly established and growing 
had similar designations.
Centralised headquarters was the major organisational unit re­ 
sponsible for setting strategic personnel /human resources direction 
and policy in 70 per cent of cases. Organisations with over 500 
employees were more likely to have centralised headquarters.
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Personnel departments, whether centralised or not, were reported 
to be primarily organised on a flexible basis ie around the work to be 
done (52 per cent) rather than a functional basis. However, public 
sector and large organisations were more likely to organise their 
personnel departments on a functional basis (57 per cent) but newly 
established growing organisations tended to have flexible personnel 
departments.
In the majority of personnel departments (51 per cent), the ratio of 
human resources staff to the total workforce over the last five years 
has remained stable. Nonetheless, a decrease was experienced in 21 
per cent of organisations and an increase in only 14 per cent, 
indicating a decline in personnel staff overall.
The greatest change was experienced in the public sector and large 
organisations.
The most important sources for recruiting staff to personnel depart­ 
ments were in order of importance:
• Experienced external HR managers
• Colleges and universities
• External managers (outside HR).
The private sector was more likely to recruit experienced external 
managers than the public sector and smaller organisations were 
more likely to recruit school leavers rather than graduates.
The Role of Personnel/Human Resource Management
Respondents were given a choice between alternative pairs of 
prescribed roles for human resource management and asked how 
they would identify the human resource management role in their 
organisation on a scale of 1 to 5. Table 4 shows the results.
Base: All respondents (%)
Role
Represents the views and 
concerns of the employee
Is proactive in creating and 
managing change
Focuses on the individual 
employee
Actively participates in 
strategic planning
Provides advice and 
counsel to line management, 
who are responsible for the 
effective management of 
all human resources
Is actively involved in 
addressing societal issues 
outside of the organisation
Supports the vertical 
management of employees 
in the traditional 
hierarchical structure
Centralises the personnel 
department in a staff 
department
12345
1 5 27 41 26
7 17 20 35 21
7 15 25 36 17
17 39 24 10 10
13 24 25 25 13
2 8 17 40 33
14 21 27 27 11
22 20 19 25 14
Role
Represents the views and 
concerns of management
Responds to what 
management wants to 
change




Assumes full responsibility 
for the effective 
management of all human 
resources





cultivation of all employees
Decentralises the 
personnel function in line 
management
The human resource management role is clearly identified with the 
views and concerns of management (67 per cent) rather than with 
the views and concerns of employees (6 per cent). Respondents felt 
too that the role should be clearly geared to the organisation's 
internal needs (73 per cent) rather than involved in addressing 
societal issues outside the organisation (10 per cent).
18
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Human resource management is primarily viewed as reactive in 
responding to what management wants to change (56 per cent) 
rather than proactive in creating and managing change (24 per cent). 
It is concerned with the management of collectives rather than indi­ 
viduals, focusing primarily on teams or groups of employees (53 per 
cent) rather than individual employees (22 per cent).
Responses clarified the strategic or operational divide in human 
resource management. Over half of respondents (56 per cent) saw 
the human resource management role as actively participating in 
strategic planning, compared with the 20 per cent who reported that 
the role concentrated primarily on operational issues.
The diversity of structures and styles within the personnel/human 
resource management function is reflected in the following findings. 
The personnel role typically operated for some in hierarchical struc­ 
tures (35 per cent) and for others within horizontal management 
structures and the cultivation of all employees (38 per cent). This is 
also reflected in the centralised personnel department (42 per cent) 
and decentralising the personnel function down the line (39 per 
cent). Respondents also remain ambivalent about the personnel role 
in terms of its responsibility for the effective management of all 
human resources (38 per cent) compared with personnel providing 
advice and counselling (37 per cent).
Further analysis, in Table 5, of differences between the role in the 
public and private sectors showed two significant differences.
Base: All respondents (%)
Role
Centralises the personnel 
department in a staff 
department
Supports the vertical 
management of employees 




24 27 17 24 8
Private sector
23 17 17 26 17
Public sector
19 25 31 21 4
Private sector
11 19 27 30 13
Role
Decentralises the 




cultivation of all employees
Human resource management was more likely to be centralised in 
staff departments (51 per cent) in hierarchical structures in the 
public sector (44 per cent) and more likely to be decentralised in line 
management (43 per cent) and to facilitate horizontal management 
and cultivation of all employees in the private sector (43 per cent). 
There were no other significant differences betweenpublic and private 
sectors on other aspects of the human resource management organ­ 
isation and role.
Analysis by size of organisation showed some interesting differ­ 
ences between large and small organisations.
Smaller organisations (up to 500 employees) were less likely:
To be so adamant about the human resources management
role representing the views of management (44 per cent 
against 66 per cent overall)
• To participate in strategic planning (47 per cent against 56 
per cent)
Smaller organisations were also slightly more likely to see the role 
as being:
• Proactive in creating and managing change (50 per cent 
against 56 per cent)
Moreover, smaller organisations tended to view the role as focusing 
more on the individual than larger organisations (over 500 em­ 
ployees). However larger organisations clearly viewed the role as 
focusing on teams/groups of employees.
No significant differences were found between organisations that 
were growing and those that were stable/declining.
Table 5: Alternative human resource management roles by public/private sector




A particularly strong argument in the case for organisations improving 
their human resource management policies and practices is that this 
is one of the major keys to competitive advantage.
Part of the rationale for this argument stems from the work of 
Michael E. Porter who, in the The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 
has argued that national prosperity is created, not inherited. In his 
view, the most important factor conditions of national competitiveness 
include skilled human resources and the scientific base and not, as 
the classical economic theory of comparative advantage suggests, 
factors of production (low cost of labour, land, natural resources, 
capital and infrastructure).13
Other important strands in this way of thinking have been the 
literature on 'excellence' and the parallel interest in Japanese man­ 
agement practices. 14 One of the lessons of books such as In Search 
of Excellence has been that organisations with equivalent technology 
and infrastructure vary greatly in competitiveness and mat this 
relates to the levels of 'excellence' achieved by the companies. This 
has been linked in important ways with organisational cultures and 
the types of human resource management policies and practices that 
have been introduced.15 Similar types of argument have been used 
to interpret the considerable success of Japanese organisations on a 
global scale.16 Essentially the advanced personnel and employment 
policies of Japanese companies have been viewed as important in 
underpinning their competitive advantage. In particular, the tradi­ 
tional (albeit changing) policies on lifetime employment and on 
seniority-based reward systems have been seen as related to the 
organisational commitment of employees and their willingness to 
identify strongly with the company and hence to further its success.
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More recently, the argument has emerged that sustained competitive 
advantage is also linked with human capital resources. Essentially, 
it is possible to define human resources 'as the pool of human capital 
under the organisation's direct control in a direct employment 
relationship'. Human resource practices 'are the organisational 
networks directed at managing the pool of human capital and 
ensuring that the capital is employed towards the fulfilment of 
organisation goals'. In order to qualify as a source of sustained 
competitive advantage, however, the resource must add value to 
the organisation, it must be rare, it must be inimitable and there must 
be no adequate substitutes.17
For the purposes of our own survey, we examined: (1) corporate 
development (2) training and development (3) communications and 
participation (4) employee welfare and (5) rewards and performance. 
The evidence from each of these broad categories is presented in the 
analysis that follows.
Corporate Development
We were concerned first of all to establish the extent to which our 
respondents' organisations supported a series of human resource 
management policies with respect to corporate development.
The results are set out in Table 6 in which the items are ranked 
according to the extent to which respondents' organisations either 
strongly supported or supported a given human resource manage­ 
ment policy.
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Table 6: Extent of support for various human resource 
policies linked with corporate development
It is dear that the need for a highly flexible workforce to meet the 
challenges of an increasingly changing environment is recognised 
by a substantial majority (78 per cent) of our respondents' organi­ 
sations.
Equal opportunities is also an issue which is high on the agenda of 
UK companies: over three quarters of respondents reported that 
their organisations either supported or strongly supported such a 
policy.
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Delayering and wider spans of control have radically affected middle 
managers especially since the early 1990s. This is evident according 
to 63 per cent of respondents.
The commitment to flexibility is also evident in two further respects: 
(1) the promotion of flexible cross-functional teams and action 
workgroups and (2) the utilisation of a non-permanent workforce 
to reduce labour costs (the latter policy, incidentally, runs counter 
to traditional human resource management policies in which con­ 
siderable job security has been emphasised).
Fifty nine per cent of respondents reported that their organisations 
either supported or strongly supported policies to promote flexible 
cross-functional teams and action workgroups. More than half (52 
per cent) endorsed the use of a non-permanent workforce to reduce 
labour costs.
The development of a committed and satisfied workforce is obviously 
important to competitive advantage. In this respect, it is interesting 
that half the respondents reported that the policy in their organisation 
was to enlarge the definition of opportunity to include autonomy 
and the use of creative skills. Just under half (47 per cent) of 
respondents suggested that their organisations supported (or strongly 
supported) policies to promote employee empowerment through 
ownership and accountability.
The provision of full employment (lifetime job security) does not 
now feature prominently in the UK. It is true that 28 per cent of 
respondents did indicate support for such a policy, but 33 per cent 
reported that their employers were either against, or strongly 
against such a policy. Indeed, the conclusion is that organisations 
are more likely to be lukewarm (neither being in support of or 
against) to full employment policies (39 per cent of respondents 
indicating that this was the case). Japanese-style permanent employ­ 
ment policies are not accorded a high priority in the human resource 
management policies of the typical UK organisation.
Training and Development
The creation of a highly skilled, trained and developed workforce 
is also seen as integral to competitive advantage. In terms of actual 
practices within companies, this is an issue to which we shall return 
in Chapter 4.
Table 7 shows the extent of support for various human resource 
policies linked with training and development.
Training and development 
Base: All respondents




Require employees to 
self-monitor and self-improve 
through their careers
Identify high potential 
employees early and develop 
them quickly
Require (non-optional) 
continuous training and 
retraining of all employees
Use graduate recruitment 
schemes
Active corporate involvement 
in public education issues to 
ensure a quality workforce
























































Table 7: Extent of support for various human resource policies linked 
with training and development
It is clear that the provision of skills training for employees features 
strongly in this rank order, with 77 per cent of respondents indicat­ 
ing that their organisations either supported or strongly supported 
such a policy.
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There is no doubt, too, that organisations are much more aware of 
the importance of developing their managers than was once the case: 
hence 70 per cent of respondents reported that their organisations 
endorsed management development policies. Career development 
also appears to feature prominently. Thus, 63 per cent of respondents 
reported support or strong support for the policy that employees 
should be required to self-monitor and self-improve through their 
careers.
Employee as well as management development also appears to be 
a policy which is subscribed to in UK organisations: 58 per cent of 
respondents indicated that their organisations either supported or 
strongly supported identification and fast track development of 
high potential employees. Encouragingly 55 per cent of respon­ 
dents reported a requirement for continuous training and retraining 
of all employees.
Of rather less saliency to the policies of UK companies appears to 
be external training and development issues (though in all cases 
positive scores outweighed negative ones). Forty seven per cent of 
respondents indicated that their organisation's policy was to use 
graduate recruitment schemes while 38 per cent supported active 
involvement in public education. Furthermore, 28 per cent of respon­ 
dents reported that their organisations had a policy to recruit from 
non-traditional labour markets.
Communications and Participation
Another important aspect of competitive advantage is the involvement 
of employees in matters relating to their working lives and with the 
affairs of the organisation as a whole. This is an issue which will be 
developed further in Chapter 3 when the actual practices operating in 
respondents' organisations are assessed.
Table 8 shows the extent of support for various human resource 
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Table 8: Extent of support for various human resource policies linked 
with communications and participation
Seven in ten respondents work for organisations that communicate 
business directions, problems and plans to its employees and two 
thirds claimed that a participative management style was endorsed-
Just under half (49 per cent) the respondents noted that it was 
organisational policy to support or strongly support the provision 
of more direct access to information systems by employees.
The use of advanced technology for communicating information to 
employees was typically neither supported nor opposed (42 per 
cent of respondents indicating that this was their organisation's 
policy). But generally, at the policy level, it is dear that UK companies 
are supportive of a variety of programmes for advancing commu­ 
nication and participation (though, as we shall see in Chapter 3, in 
terms of actual practice, the adoption of schemes is rather less than 
would be anticipated from the above findings).
Employee Welfare
The success of Japanese companies on a global scale has been 
recognised to be linked, at least in part, with advanced employee 
welfare policies. Respondents were thus asked to what extent their
28
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organisations endorsed a variety of policies in this respect and Table 
9 shows the results. Rewards and Performance
Employee welfare 
Base: All respondents
Offer assistance and services 
to help employees meet family 
and personal needs
Ensure employees and their 
families aggressively pursue 
good health
Provide a wide range of 
flexible retirement policies
Development of innovative 
or flexible outplacement 



































Table 9: Extent of support for various human resource policies linked 
with employee welfare
It is dear that UK organisations are attempting to further the policy 
of offering assistance and services to help employees meet family 
and personal needs (43 per cent of respondents indicated that this 
policy was either supported or strongly supported by their employer).
In most cases, however, there appears to be neither support nor 
opposition for employee welfare policies. Forty seven per cent of 
respondents indicated this applied to ensuring that employees and 
their families aggressively pursued good health; while 49 per cent 
reported that this was the case for the provision of a wide range of 
flexible retirement policies. A similar proportion stated that this 
applied to the development of innovative or flexible outplacement 
programmes for all employees. Indeed, for the last two policies, 
negative scores outweighed the positive. It appears then, that the 
Western concept of individualism and the separation of personal 
and work experiences appears to be strong. Hence, in UK organi­ 
sations, while various employee welfare policies are not typically 
opposed, equally they are not generally advocated and enthusiasti­ 
cally supported.
Modern human resource management approaches also emphasise 
the importance of linking rewards with performance if an organisa­ 
tion is to become fully competitive. So far is actual practices are 
concerned, this is an issue to which we shall return in Chapter 6. 
Table 10 shows the extent of support for various human resource 
policies linking rewards and performance.
Rewards and performance 
Base: All respondents
Focus on merit philosophy 
throughout the organisation; 
emphasise individual 
performance
Encourage, recognise and 
reward employees for 
customer service and quality
Encourage, recognise and 
reward employees for 
innovation and creativity
Encourage, recognise and 
reward employees for 
productivity gains
Encourage, recognise and 
reward employees for 
enhancing their own skills or 
knowledge
Promote the sharing of both 
the rewards and risks of 
business
Adopt performance appraisal 
systems using customer 
ratings
























































Table 10: Extent of support for various human resource policies linked 
with rewards and performance
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Clearly a substantial number of human resource management policies 
on rewards and performance are supported within British organi­ 
sations. The focus on merit is thus noticeable in that 63 per cent of 
respondents reported that it was their organisation's policy either 
to support or strongly support this policy. The increasing awareness 
of the importance of the customer is also evident in the finding that 
54 per cent of respondents noted that their organisation had a policy 
to encourage, recognise and reward employees for customer service 
and quality.
The management of innovation and creativity on the one hand and 
productivity on the other was also noticeable. Fifty two per cent of 
respondents indicated that it was the policy within their organisation 
to support or strongly support measures to encourage, recognise 
and reward employees for innovation and creativity; while the same 
proportion reported that employees were also encouraged and 
rewarded for productivity gains.
In other respects, however, the policy within UK organisations to 
relate rewards and performance is less noticeable. It is the case that 
the encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for 
enhancing their skills and knowledge is quite strong (48 per cent of 
respondents indicating that this was the policy in their organisation). 
Only 36 per cent of respondents indicated, however, that it was the 
policy of their organisations to support or strongly support the 
promotion of the sharing of both the rewards and risks of business 
and 35 per cent felt that the adoption of performance appraisal 
systems using customer ratings was supported.
There are, then, varied findings on the extent to which organisations 
in the UK support a series of human resource management policies 
which (either explicitly or implicitly) are designed to further com­ 
petitive advantage.
Given that sustained competitive advantage is intimately linked with 
these organisational policies, there are some grounds for supposing 
that these policies will continue to be supported within UK organi­ 




Human resource management has, as one of its central tenets, the 
assumption that employees are the single most important asset of 
the organisation. To the extent that this is the case, to facilitate 
greater employee influence or involvement is clearly fundamental 
to successful human resource practices in the organisation. As the 
Harvard School has noted in the classic book, Human Resource 
Management:
This policy area (employee influence) has to do with a key 
question that all managers must ask How much responsibility, 
authority and power should the organisation voluntarily 
delegate and to whom?18
There are three principal routes to greater employee involvement 
The first is by legislated standards on employee participation (eg 
Works Councils, support for employee financial participation). The 
second is the traditional trade union mode of involvement linked 
with formal and informal collective bargaining. The third is initiatives 
by management to support employee participation in the work itself 
and to provide opportunities for employees to voice their views on 
developments and problems.
Typically British management has supported individualistic task- 
based practices, but has been more opposed to collectivist, trade 
union-based participation.19
In the last decade or so in the UK, earlier ideas for industrial 
democracy have ceased to be a part of the political agenda, but 
various European initiatives (particularly with respect to Works 
Councils) have recently re-emerged. Moreover, trade union-based 
forms of employee involvement have tended to decline alongside a
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reduction in union power and influence. However, legislative 
encouragement for employee involvement did stem somewhat 
fortuitously from the House of Lords amendment to the Employment 
Act, 1982. This section has made it a statutory requirement that, in 
every directors' report (in organisations with more than 250 em­ 
ployees), a statement must be included describing the action taken 
during the year to introduce, maintain and develop arrangements 
aimed at:
• Providing employees systematically with information of 
concern to them as employees
• Consulting employees or their representatives on a regular 
basis so that the views of employees can be taken into 
account in making decisions which are likely to affect their 
interests
• Encouraging the involvement of employees in the organ­ 
isation's performance through an employees' share scheme 
or by some other means
• Achieving a common awareness on the part of all employees 
of the financial and economic factors affecting the per­ 
formance of the organisation.
Moreover, it does appear to be the case that managers have encouraged 
a number of forms of direct employee involvement (such as two- 
way communications and quality circles) while eschewing board 
level representative practices. Furthermore, one very important 
element in the changes in industrial relations in the 1980s has been 
the rise of (and legislation for) profit sharing and employee share­ 
holding schemes. (These practices are dealt with in Chapter 6.)
Employee Involvement in Practice
To try and establish how far these practices have been adopted in 
British organisations, we asked respondents about the extent to 
which their organisations were involved in a variety of forms of 
employee involvement The results are set out in Table 11.
Base: All respondents
Regular meetings between 
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union representatives








































































































Table 11: Extent of involvement in employee involvement practices
It will be seen that involvement through communications is particu­ 
larly common. Thus 67 per cent of respondents reported that their 
organisations were fully or considerably involved in regular meetings 
between supervisors and workgroups/ team briefing. Moreover, 50 
per cent of respondents indicated that their organisations made full 
or considerable use of organisation newsletters.
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The next most common group of practices comprised various trade 
union-based or consultative modes of employee involvement. 
Thus, 40 per cent of respondents reported either full or considerable 
involvement in the handling of individual grievances brought by 
union representatives; the relevant figures for joint consultation 
with employees and for formal collective bargaining, were 45 per 
cent and 30 per cent respectively.
About a quarter of respondents made full or considerable use of 
suggestions schemes, job redesign, employee attitude surveys, 
management committees and quality circles. There are, however, 
also a substantial number of practices which have not been fully 
adopted. For example, nearly five in ten reported no involvement 
in Works Councils and six in ten no involvement with productivity 
bargaining. It is dear, therefore, that the development of employee 
involvement practices in Britain is varied and, in some cases, the 
take up of given practices is limited.
Table 12 examines the differences between the public and private 





































































Table 12: Extent of involvement in employee involvement practices 
by public/private sector
Taking organisations in which there is either full or considerable 
involvement in particular practices, it will be seen that quality circles 
are especially likely to occur in the private sector. Public sector 
organisations were found to be particularly likely to have:
• Management committees where there is employee or union 
representation
• Experience of handling individual grievances brought by 
union representatives.
Size of organisation is more important than public/private sector 
differences in determining the adoption of various employee involve­ 
ment schemes. Consistently, the larger organisations are more likely 
to have one or more of these various practices.
Larger organisations (with more than 500 employees) were thus 
prone to be fully or considerably involved in:
• Organisation newsletters
• Individual grievances
• Formal collective bargaining
• Management committees where there is employee or union 
representation
• Suggestion schemes.
It is clear, too, that those organisations with union-type employee 
involvement channels (collectivebargaining, management commit­ 
tees and individual grievances) were less likely to be growing and 
more likely to be stable or declining. This may stem of course in 
part because the newer expanding organisations are less likely to be 
unionised. This does suggest a link between employee participation 
channels based on unions and the prospects of organisations being 
expansionary or stable/declining.
Responsibility for Employee Involvement Practices
Another important issue entails the extent to which line management 
or personnel /human resources departments have responsibility for 
the various practices.
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Although not shown in table form, the central findings are:
• In terms of responsibility, line management is more 
important than personnel/human resource departments 
formostpractices. This applies to regular meetings between 
supervisors and workgroups/team briefing, job redesign 
involving employees, suggestions schemes, joint consult­ 
ation with employees, new technology agreements, works 
councils, productivity bargaining and collective bargaining.
• Personnel/human resource departments are typically more 
responsible than line management for formal collective 
bargaining and for employee attitude surveys
• Shared responsibility between personnel/human resource 
departments and line management is particularly common 
for the handling of individual grievances brought by union 
representatives
• Responsibility for organisation newsletters is fairly widely 
spread across various functions but is most commonly 
assumed by a staff department other than personnel/ 
human resource management.
In more detail, then, for regular meetings between supervisors and 
workgroups/team briefing (the most widespread of the identified 
employee involvement practices), 70 per cent of respondents indi­ 
cated that line management had responsibility. Other key areas of 
responsibility for the line were:
• Quality circles (59 per cent)
• Job redesign (43 per cent)
• Suggestion schemes (42 per cent)
In only two cases did personnel /human resource departments have 
more responsibility than the line:
• Formal collective bargaining (33 per cent) 
• Employee attitude surveys (32 per cent)
Moreover, shared responsibility between personnel/human resource 
departments and the line was most common in the case of handling 
individual grievances brought by union representatives (37 per
cent). Organisation newsletters were most commonly organised by 
another staff department (25 per cent). Overall, though, it is clear 
that line management is particularly central in so far as responsibility 
for various employee involvement practices in the UK is concerned.
Responsibility is more likely to be vested in a personnel/human 
resource department or other staff departments in public sector 
organisations, while in private sector organisations, line management 
is more likely to be responsible for various employee involvement 
practices. There is a tendency for private sector organisations to 
have a relatively dominant line management so far as responsibility 
for the following employee involvement practices is concerned:
• Job redesign
• Suggestion schemes
• New technology agreements
• Informal collective bargaining
• Works Councils
• Management committees where there is employee or un­ 
ion representation.
Smaller organisations (up to 500 employees) are more likely than 
larger organisations (over 500 employees) to have personnel/human 
resource management responsibility for regular meetings between 
supervisors and workgroups/team briefing (17 per cent) than larger 
organisations (2 per cent). By contrast, larger organisations are likely 
to have personnel/human resource management responsibility for:
• Formal collective bargaining
• Employee attitude surveys
• Productivity bargaining





Smaller rather than larger organisations typically have greater line 





• Informal collective bargaining
• Formal collective bargaining
• Employee attitude surveys
• Individual grievances
• Organisation newsletters.
As is to be expected, however, the cases are fewer where line 
management responsibility is greater in the larger rather than smaller 
organisations. This pattern applies to regular meetings between 
supervisors and workgroups/team briefing (76 per cent) and quality 
circles (64 per cent).
Typically, then, although the pattern is varied, specialisation of roles 
is more likely in the larger organisations and this reduces the extent 
of line management responsibility for the various types of employee 
involvement practices in these organisations.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the propensity for different 
functions to be responsible for employee involvement practices in 
the organisation appears to be largely unrelated to whether or not 
the organisation is expanding or stable/declining. Employee involve­ 
ment may be a vital component of human resource management 
practices but responsibility at least does not appear to be closely 
linked with the expansionary profiles of UK organisations.
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4. Training and 
Development
Introduction
Recent debates on the competitive advantage of nations and organ­ 
isations have focused increasingly on human resource development, 
as well as on human resource management issues. For instance, in 
the USA, John T Dunlop has argued that economic growth and 
improvement in productivity depend on four basic factors:
• Research and development
• Investment in plant and equipment
• Investment in infrastructure
• Investment in human resources development.
In his view, human resources development and the creation of a 
more productive, skilled and adaptable workforce in turn depends 
on six factors:
• The education system
• Health care
• Training and retraining
• Family policy
• Labour management policies at the workplace
• The general health of public service in the country .
In addition, in a major survey of Western European nations, human 
resource development was found to be the most important personnel 
function in all the main countries covered and more important than, 
say, compensation (rewards), industrial relations or productivity 
management.22
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Training and development of the workforce is thus seen as a key to 
competitive advantage. However, in the last decade, the situation 
in Britain has been a cause of considerable concern; so much so that 
Ewart Keep has referred to a so called 'training scandal'.23 In the 
1990s, there have been various attempts to overcome the problem, 
but whether or not these have been sufficiently substantial to im­ 
prove the situation remains debatable.
Training and development can be defined as forms of activity aimed 
at the improvement of human capital within an organisation and 
can be viewed as either a cost or an investment. For governments 
the main issue is to ensure a better education system and a better 
trained and more adaptable workforce as a means of aiding national 
wealth creation. For employers, the concern is to improve the 
capacity of existing employees to perform a reasonably well-defined 
set of activities. For employees, the interest is likely to be in maxi­ 
mising the returns to the individual from skill acquisition. From 
the point of view of human resource development, the central thrust 
is that training should be regarded as a vital investment and not as 
a drain on the resources of the organisation.
In consequence, a wide range of practices have emerged in Britain 
in recent years in respect of human resource development. Five 
main emergent trends may be isolated: (1) appraisal (2) management 
development (3) career development (4) European issues and (5) the 
major public initiatives covering areas such as Investors in People, 
S/NVQs and credit accumulated learning. These are briefly com­ 
mented on prior to an analysis of key findings from the survey.
The appraisal of employees has developed considerably in Britain 
and is viewed not only as a means of conveying aspects of the central 
strategy of the organisation but as a major means of identifying 
training and development needs. It is still more commonly used for 
managerial, supervisory and white collar employees than for manual 
employees, but it has spread rapidly in Britain over the last decade ,24 
In addition, coaching, counselling and mentoring practices which 
allow for greater empathy, congruence and interest in the concerns 
of the employee have also emerged.25
Management development is arguably of special importance to 
management and organisations and this has been recognised in a 
series of reports (eg Constable and McCormick26 and Handy etal ). 
These led above all to the emergence of the Management Charter 
Initiative which has committed British organisations to: (1) the 
development and application of high standards of modem manage­ 
ment practice and organisation skills and (2) the development of a 
widely recognised system of professional management standards as a 
source of motivation to individuals. Moreover, although it has been 
argued that management development may be traced to American 
notions of the 'trainability' of 'management' as a distinct activity 
(less evident in countries such as France and Germany), this in no 
way diminishes the importance of the growth of interest in these 
issues in Britain over the last decade.
One of the main assumptions of human resource development is that 
employees should be regarded as assets and encouraged to commit 
themselves to the organisation. To facilitate this, career management 
programmes should be developed which identify and attempt to 
match the individual's needs, abilities and goals and the organisation's 
job demands and job rewards. An organisation's career development 
programme will typically consist of planned job progression, career 
information systems and career planning models. In practice, how­ 
ever, individuals may develop a number of career paths including 
conventional, self-directed, externally-directed and impeded. 
Moreover, whatever the rhetoric, it does appear that inter-organisation 
mobility has actually increased rather than diminished in the last 20 
or so years in Britain. But this, in turn, may have stimulated some 
organisations to take a special interest in career path development 
and other related policies and programmes.
The development of the European Union (EU) and the emergence 
of the European organisation have also resulted in some organisations 
being aware of the importance of the provision of information and 
training to improve the quality of inter action with business partners 
in Europe. Moreover, developments such as Works Councils have 
led organisations to be increasingly cognisant of the importance of 
a European dimension to their activities. The extent to which this 
is confined merely to an awareness of the importance of the issue 
or, to genuine and concerted attempts to provide requisite training, 
is, however, currently difficult to determine.
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Public awareness and concern over the quality of training in Britain 
has undoubtedly grown in recent years and is manifested in a wide 
range of initiatives. Arguably the most important has been 'Investors 
in People' in which an organisation makes a public commitment 
from the top to develop all employees to meet its objectives. It 
commits itself to review regularly the training and development 
needs of all employees and, in particular:
• The resources for training and developing employees 
should be clearly identified in the organisation plan
• Managers should be responsible for regularly agreeing 
training and development needs with each employee in 
the context of organisation objectives, setting targets and 
standards linked, where appropriate to the achievement 
of National Vocational Qualifications (or relevant units) 
and, in Scotland, Scottish Vocational Qualifications (SVQs).
Various assessment indicators are used to help Training and Enter­ 
prise Councils (TECs) and local enterprise companies (LECs) in 
Scotland decide whether or not an organisation measures up to the 
national standard.
So far as NVQs and SVQs are concerned, there are a number of 
national education and training targets which are linked with the 
network of TECs and LECs. These cover both foundation learning 
and lifetime learning skills and cover five basic levels linked with 
diverse competences.
Moreover, in actual organisations themselves there have been a 
range of interlinked approaches to the development of compe­ 
tences, open learning and related measures of which the Ford 
Employee Development and Assistance Programme (EDAP) is 
probably the most celebrated. Credit accumulated learning and 
negotiated learning programmes denned through an appraisal system 
have also featured in some British organisations. Some companies 
have gone even further - Unipart has developed its own 'university'.
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Involvement in Training and Development Practices
The following conclusions may be drawn from the survey results:
• Appraisal is very widely practised
• Management development has been widely instituted
• Competence-based training also features quite strongly
• Training needs analysis (which can of course be linked 
with appraisal) has been quite well developed
• The Investors in People initiative has some support but has 
not so far been widely developed in British organisations
• Relatively few organisations have much involvement in 
negotiated learning programmes, credit accumulated 
learning, European issues on training and development 
and the assessment of prior learning.
The evidence is set out in Table 13 overleaf where it will be seen that 
appraisal featured as the most pervasive of all the listed training and 
development practices.
Indeed, two thirds of respondents indicated that, in their organisations, 
there was either full involvement or considerable involvement in 
appraisal. Only 10 per cent of respondents said that there was no 
involvement in these practices.
Management development also appears to be well entrenched, with 
48 per cent indicating full or considerable involvement and only one 
in ten suggesting no involvement in this important practice in their 
organisations. Competence-based training appears to be widespread, 
with 48 per cent indicating either full or considerable involvement 
and only 14 per cent indicating no involvement in this practice in 
their organisations. Over four in ten respondents reported full or 
considerable involvement with training needs analysis.

















































































































Table 13: Extent of involvement in training and development practices
So far as the important recent public initiatives in S/NVQs and 
Investors in People are concerned, the involvement of British organ­ 
isations appears to be less well developed than in the case of the 
other practices. In respect of S/NVQs, 30 per cent of respondents 
reported full or considerable involvement but a further 30 per cent 
indicated that their organisations were not involved at all. It was 
reported by 28 per cent of respondents that for the Investors in 
People initiative there was either full or considerable involvement
in their organisations, but at the other extreme, 39 per cent reported 
no involvement.
Three further training and development practices are at least rea­ 
sonably common in British organisations. Thus 38 per cent of 
respondents reported either full or considerable involvement in 
coaching, counselling and mentoring while continuous self-develop­ 
ment was widespread in about a third of organisations.
Several recently well publicised practices in training and development 
do not yet appear to feature prominently in British organisations. 
Almost four in ten of respondents reported that their organisations 
had no involvement in open learning and almost half reported no 
involvement in the assessment of prior learning. A further 56 per 
cent indicated that there was no involvement in European issues in 
training and development and the respective percentages for credit 
accumulated learning and negotiated learning programmes were 58 
per cent and 61 per cent. There is clearly, therefore, a very uneven 
picture in respect of the adoption of these human resource develop­ 
ment practices with some forms featuring strongly but others not 
being present (other than in superficial ways) at all.
We now move on to analyse some of the differences between 
training and development practices in: (a) the public and private 
sectors (b) according to the size of the organisation and (c) according 
to whether or not the enterprise is a growing or a stable/declining one.
There are first of all, then, some significant public/private sector 
differences between training and development practices. For those 
fully or considerably involved, the following training and develop­ 
ment practices are far more likely to be extensive in the public sector 
than in the private sector:
• Coaching, counselling and mentoring
• S/NVQs
• Investors in People initiative
• Open learning
• Credit accumulated learning
• Negotiated learning programme.
4. Training and Development
There is no doubt, too, that the size of the organisation has a strong 
influence on whether or not various types of training and development 
practices are adopted. The relevant data are set out in Table 14 
where all the significant differences between organisation size and 
the training and development practices identified in this study are 
listed.
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Table 14: Extent of involvement in training and development practices 
by size of organisation
Back to the Line?
Taking the cases where respondents reported either full or consid­ 
erable involvement by their organisations, larger organisations are 
consistently more involved in a wider range of training and devel­ 
opment practices, especially coaching, counselling and mentoring; 
training needs analysis; career path development and competence- 
based training.
Responsibility for Training and Development Practices
A further issue arising in debates on human resource management 
is the extent to which responsibility for training and development 
is vested in a personnel/human resources department or with line 
management. Line management is consistently seen to have re­ 
sponsibility for the training and development practices listedbelow; 
comparisons with personnel /HR shown in italics alongside.
• Appraisal (43 per cent; 9 per cent).
• Coaching, counselling and mentoring (41 per cent; 11 per cent)
• Continuous self development (37 per cent; 10 per cent)
• Career path development (32 per cent; 14 per cent)
• Competence-based training (32 per cent; 16 per cent)
• Negotiated learning programmes (32 per cent; 20 per cent)
• Assessment of prior learning (31 per cent; 22 per cent)
• Credit accumulated learning (31 per cent; 22 per cent)
By contrast, in only two cases is the personnel /human resources 
department likely to have greater or the same responsibility with 
that of line management. This applies to the Investors in People 
Initiative and European issues on training and development. Shared 
responsibility is typically the case for management development (35 
per cent).
4. Training and Development
Overall our conclusion must be that line management has very 
marked responsibilities for most training and development practices 
(either on its own or in conjunction with personnel /human resource 
departments). However, whether this represents a 'devolution to the 
line' or has always been the case for UK organisations cannot be 
determined on the basis of our data.
We now turn to analyse differences in patterns of responsibility for 
various training and development practices according to whether 
or not the organisation is: (a) in the public or private sector (b) large 
or small in terms of number of employees and (c) either growing or 
stable/declining.
Taking first the public/private sector distinction, there are several 
significant differences in responsibilities for various training and 
development practices. The broad pattern is for personnel/human 
resource departments and line management to be more dominant 
in the private sector. Other staff departments (or a sharing of 
responsibility between personnel/human resource and another 
staff department) is correspondingly more likely in the public sector.
The relative dominance of line management for responsibility for 
the various types of training and development practices in the 
private sector is also readily discernible. It is only with other staff 
departments (and to some extent the sharing of responsibilities 
between personnel/human resource departments and another staff 
department) that the pattern is radically different. The pattern 
consistently shows the dominance of other staff departments in the 
public sector.
Line management in small companies tends to be typically far more 
responsible than in the larger organisations for the range of training 
and development practices with the exception of coaching counselling 
and mentoring (41 per cent).
It should be noted, however, that the different patterns of responsi­ 
bility indicated above do not apply at all in respect of whether or 
not organisations are growing and expanding or stable /declining. 
Certainly, it is not the case that either a strong personnel/human 
resources department or strong line management responsibility is 
linked with the various training and development practices identified 
in this study.
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5. Work Practices
Introduction
Two major approaches dominate our examination of work organi­ 
sation and practice: Scientific Management or Taylorism and the 
strategies of 'responsible autonomy' and 'flexible specialisation'.
The former hasbeen associated with tradihonal models of personnel 
management and its role in the development of more sophisticated 
work design methods involving more humane work practices under 
Taylorism - generally referred to as the Quality of Working Life 
(QWL) movement. The latter in contrast has been associated with 
developments in strategic human resource management, functional 
flexibility and the encouragement of employee 'responsibility' and 
'commitment'.
Work design methods based on theories of motivation in terms of 
composite roles or autonomous work groups and job enrichment 
were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. Of these methods, job 
enrichment has been easily the more popular in practice. Its popularity 
may have something to do with its goal of improving motivation 
and performance of employees without increasing wages and leaving 
organisational structures and managerial authority intact. In contrast, 
autonomous work groups require, at least, a re-evaluation of mana­ 
gerial authority in the work place and the delegation of authority to 
the employee.
These work design methods have had limited impact in the UK. As 
Weir has noted:
...work design has tended to be regarded and applied as an 
isolated management technique aimed at local organisational 
problems and at individual jobs and workgroups, rather than 
realising that it must be part of the whole organisation phi­ 
losophy, through all levels, if it is to be really successful.30
5. Work Practices
However, Buchanan identifies three developments which may lead 
to a re-assessment of work design in the 1990s:
1. Increased competition for trade - both domestically and 
internationally
2. The impact of stress on work performance
3. The introduction of new technology .
Two of these have a bearing on the second theme namely, the 
strategy of flexible specialisation. New technology and market­ 
place competitiveness are dearly transforming workplace relation­ 
ships. In response to these developments, managers have introduced 
flexible working strategies to respond to these changes and have also 
made use of the new technologies to improve competitive advan­ 
tage; no more so than in work design.
Traditional forms of Taylorism, by far the most common model, 
appear from this perspective to be inappropriate for handling such 
change. For example, granting employees wider responsibilities to 
use their broader skills in the more complex technological forms of 
work requires management to relinquish a good deal of direct 
control, but still leaves strategic control in its hands. The release of 
such control requires a greater degree of commitment by the employee 
to the task at hand and also to the managerial strategy and organi­ 
sation employed. There is some scope for optimism, as Guest informs 
us, 'commitment appears to be higher among those whose job 
provides scope for responsibility and for self-expression. X32
The extent to which the partial adoption of these forms of work 
practices are reflected in work experiences of the 1990s remains 
unclear and the following can only, at most, point to areas of continuity 
and change and not to the substantive debates in this area.
52
Back to the Line?
Involvement in Work Practices
We asked respondents the extent to which their organisations were 
involved in a number of work practices. As can be seen from Table 
15, quality control and informing employees of results (in terms of 
costs, yields, production, quality or customer complaints) are common 
working practices of the 1990s.
Work practices 
Base: All respondents
Employee responsibility for 
quality control






















































































Table 15: Extent of involvement in work practices
Indeed, 60 per cent of respondents indicated that their organisations 
had full or considerable involvement in giving employee responsi­ 
bility for quality control. Similarly, 51 per cent of respondents 
reported that feedback to employees on results was an important 
feature of the work practices in their organisations.
5. Work Practices Back to the Line?
Job design and giving responsibility to employees for scheduling 
work and budgeting were also significant with positive scores 
outweighing negative scores. Thus, 40 per cent of respondents 
reported full or considerable involvement in job design and 38 per 
cent in giving employees responsibility for scheduling work.
Other working practices have not been so widely adopted with 
negative scores outweighing positive scores. Indeed, a range of 
work practices remain minority practices for our respondents 
including employee responsibility for budgeting, broadly defining 
jobs, employee responsibility for inventory control, combining 
tasks, job enlargement, job enrichment and autonomous work 
groups.
The introduction of modern aspects of work organisations is more 
limited than one would anticipate and many innovative working 
practices seem to have had little impact on work organisation in the 
UK. What is dear is that quality control and communicating the 
results of their endeavours to employees are central to working 
practices today.
Few significant differences existed between private and public sec­ 
tors in the range of working practices cited here. Table 16 shows that 
for those with considerable or full involvement in these practices, 
the private sector organisations were more concerned with quality 
control (64 per cent compared with 50 per cent in the public sector). 
Public sector organisations were more concerned with giving employ­ 











































Again, few significant differences were found in relation to size of 
organisation. Only quality control is likely to be linked to size of 
organisation. Using full or considerable involvement scores, 57 per 
cent of those from larger organisations (over 500 employees) 
reported employee responsibility for quality control compared 
with 63 per cent from smaller organisations (up to 500 employees). 
Clearly some smaller organisations have taken the message of 
employee responsibility for quality on board.
No significant differences were found in the adoption of various 
work practices in relation to whether the organisations was growing, 
stable or declining.
Responsibility for Work Practices
Table 16: Extent of involvement in work practices by public/private sector
Respondents were asked who was responsible for these practices.
• In most cases, line management retained or shared respon­ 
sibility with personnel/human resource departments. The 
dominance of the line was particularly apparent where 
employee responsibility and feedback of results were con­ 
cerned
• The personnel/human resource departments made some 
inroads in the design, enrichment and enlargement of jobs 
or the quality of working life issues
• Line management dearly plays a dominant role in the effec­ 
tiveness of the majority of these practices and personnel/ 
human resource departments have little direct responsibility 
for the working practices identified. The autonomy of the 
personnel/human resource department may be severely 
restricted should it wish to undertake a proactive approach 
in these areas.
In more detail, (see Table 17) the dominance of line management 
was exemplified in employee responsibilities in the areas of sched­ 
uling of work (72 per cent), inventory control (69 per cent), quality 
control (68 per cent), budgeting (65 per cent) and in providing 
feedback on results (62 per cent).
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Table 17: Responsibility for work practices
What is most significant here is the relevant weakness of the person­ 
nel/human resources department in relation to line management.
Public/private sector differences (see Table 18) in responsibility for 
various work practices pointed to significant differences in job 






























































Table 18: Responsibility for work practices by public/private sector
In each of these areas the importance of the line in the private sector 
is amplified as is the contrasting role of the personnel /human 
resource department.
Clearly significant differences exist in the distribution of responsi­ 
bility in these areas between the public and private sectors. How­ 
ever, the dominance of the line is apparent in both.
Generally smaller organisations are more likely to have person­ 
nel/human resource management responsibility for most work 
practices with the exception of broadly defined jobs. Other staff 
departments are likely to have greater responsibilities for this area 
the smaller the organisation. Moreover, the larger the organisation, 
the more likely it is that line management will share responsibility 
with personnel/human resources departments.
Where line management is concerned the extent of responsibility 
varies with the size of the organisation. Smaller rather than larger 







• Broadly denned jobs
• Job design.
Whereas, larger rather than smaller organisations have greater line 
management responsibility in the cases of:




• Feedback to employees on results.
No significant differences were found between the responsibility for 
work practices and whether the organisation was growing, stable 
or declining.
58
Back to the Line?
6. Rewards
Introduction
According to Armstrong and Murlis, 'reward management strategies 
and policies are driven by corporate and humanresource management 
strategies'.33 All employers use financial rewards as a basic means 
of motivation and control and they also provide an incentive to 
performbetter. A number of pay strategies are available to manage­ 
ment in the 1990s including production based pay, skill based pay 
and knowledge based pay.
Firstly, production based pay or job based pay is associated with 
Taylorist methods of mass production and incorporates such systems 
as job evaluation and piece rates. Associated with this tradition is 
the 'rate for the job' and notions of equity expressed now in public 
policy in the Equal Pay Act. More recently, output or production 
rather than the job has become the central focus with performance 
related schemes dominating British practice.
Secondly, skill based pay allocates differentials in pay based on 
differences in skills or competencies of non-managerial employees. 
The employee's skill, not the outcome of the job, forms the basis of
pay. 34
Finally, knowledge based pay is a form of skill based pay but 
typically applies to managerial, professional and R & D employees. 
Pay is determined by the acquisition of knowledge eg in terms of 
the depth of knowledge needed in a particular area.35
In Britain, management strategies in the reward of employees in the 
1980s and 1990s has placed a heavy reliance on incentives such as 
payment by results and performance pay. However, reward strategies 
not only involve remuneration but also non-monetary rewards. The 
benefits of the reward package encapsulates this. They form the 
core of any reward package and generally the structure of the 
reward package is related to the job, the expectations of the employee 
and labour market conditions.
6. Rewards Back to the Line?
One of the salient features of the 1980s and 1990s has been govern­ 
ment intervention in the management of remuneration in terms of 
tax incentives for profit sharing and profit related pay schemes. The 
promotion of these forms of remuneration in the 1980s led to a 
upsurge in the take up of such schemes.36 Growth has also been 
noted in harmonisation policies, particularly in greenfield sites 
which attempt to break away from the incentive led strategies of the 
post-war period.
Involvement in Reward Practices
We asked respondents the extent to which their organisations were 
involved in a variety of reward practices. Table 19 shows the diversity 
of approaches operating in respondents' organisations.
Rewards 
Base: All respondents
Equal pay for equal work









Profit sharing (with cash 
awards)
Profit related pay
Profit sharing (with shares 
in the organisation)
Production based pay























































































Qearly equal pay for equal work has become a dominant feature of 
payment systems in the 1990s, with performance related pay and 
skilled based pay still major approaches. Moreover, the importance of 
individual bonus schemes and fringe benefits has not waned. More 
surprisingly, government supported schemes of profit sharing and 
profit related pay appear to have reduced in importance. Given the 
importance of employee responsibility for quality initiatives in 
changes in work practices, reward for quality plays an insignificant 
role in reward management.
Again, using the full or considerable involvement scores, there 
remain differences in emphasis between public and private sectors, 
the public sector placing greater emphasis on equal pay (54 per cent; 
47 per cent) than the private sector. The public sector appears to be 
considerably involved in the practice of performance related pay 
with 53 per cent of respondents reporting involvement in this area.
Many of the reward practices cited here are primarily found in the 
private sector eg those related to profit, and this is clearly indicated 
in the responses. Indeed, the private sector has a more varied 
number of reward practices and it is more likely that new develop­ 
ments in remuneration will be developed here.
In more detail, in order of importance using the full and consider­ 
able involvement scores, the private sector is particularly involved
in:
Equal pay for equal work





Profit sharing with cash awards
Profit sharing with shares in the organisation
Table IB: Extent of "involvement in reward practices
6. Rewards
• Profit related pay
• Production based pay
• Plant wide bonus schemes
• Payment for quality.
When we examine, using the full or considerable involvement 
scores, the size of organisation and the involvement in reward 
practices, then larger rather than smaller organisations tend to 
emphasise:
• Equal pay for equal work
• Executive share schemes
• Save-as-you-earn schemes
• Payment by results/performance related pay
• Profit sharing with cash awards
• Profit sharing with shares in the organisation.
When we examine, using the full or considerable involvement 
scores, the adoption of various reward practices and whether the 
organisation is growing or stable/declining, then growing organi­ 
sations tend to emphasise:
• Payment by results/performance related pay
• Individual bonus schemes
• Profit sharing with cash awards
• Profit related pay.
By contrast, stable/declining organisations tend to emphasise save- 
as-you-earn schemes.
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Responsibility for Reward Practices
The distribution of responsibility for reward systems is much more 
diverse than expected.
The sharing of responsibility for rewards between personnel/human 
resource departments and line management is also quite common. 
However, as in other areas, the importance of line management 
should not be underestimated. Line management has responsibility 
for reward practices in the following areas; comparison with per- 
sonnel/HR shown in italics alongside.
• Payment for quality (39 per cent; 17 per cent)
m Production based pay (37 per cent; 16 per cent]
m Individual bonus schemes (35 per cent; 19 per cent)
m Plant wide bonus schemes (34 per cent; 21 per cent)
• Payment by results/performance related pay 
(33 per cent; 17 per cent)
• Profit sharing (with cash awards) (33 per cent; 24 per cent)
• Profit related pay (32 per cent; 26 per cent)
m Skill based pay (31 per cent; 19 per cent)
m Knowledge based pay (31 per cent; 19 per cent)
Further analysis of public/private sector differences in responsibility 
for reward practices shows only one significant issue - that of skill 
based pay. Line managers in private sector organisations have much 
greater responsibility for skill based pay than their counterparts in 
the public sector (33 per cent against 18 per cent). Shared responsibility 
and the responsibility of other staff departments was also greater in 
the public sector.
Greater differences existed when examining size of organisation. 
Smaller rather than larger organisations tended to delegate respon­ 
sibility to the line, whereas larger organisations tended to give 
responsibility to the personnel/human resources department. 
Larger organisations also tended to share responsibility between the 
line and the personnel department on these issues.
6. Rewards Back to the Line?
7. Implications of 
Change
Introduction
Over the past decade significant changes have taken place in organ­ 
isation environments in which the practice of human resource 
management takes place.
Firstly, the importance of rapidly changing national, European and 
global markets and the consequent increase in competition has 
forced organisations to re-evaluate technological and organisational 
practices in order to respond to such changes and meet the chal­ 
lenges of the new market place.
The global economy has undergone two major recessions in the 
early 1980s and early 1990s. These brought with them problems 
concerned with growth and unemployment. Other significant 
changes are the creation of the single European market in 1992 to 
maintain European competitiveness, the accelerated growth of far 
Eastern economies, the continued expanding share of output of 
multi-national enterprises and the promotion of free trade.
At a European level, Western European economies have undergone 
a structural transformation identified in movements from manufac­ 
turing to service industries, from predominantly manual to white 
collar employment and from traditional heavy industries to those 
of the micro-electronics and capital goods industries. Such move­ 
ments have led to concerns about the composition of the labour 
market and shortfalls in labour, particularly in terms of skill and 
educational attainment.
Within the UK, the election of successive Conservative governments 
has seen the promotion of policies emphasising privatisation, 
deregulation and a greater emphasis on individualism in the work­ 
place. In contrast, the European Union has promoted a range of
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collective and individual rights of employees in which the UK plays 
no part.
Managerial responses to such changes reflect a flattening of organ­ 
isational structures and a movement to decentralised organisational 
structures together with greater numerical and functional flexibility. 
Management has also promoted quality as a key element in the 
competitive strategy with a consequent increase in new technology 
and responsibility for the employee. In the IBM /Towers Perrin report 
the following key environmental factors affecting personnel/human 
resource management were identified:
• Corporate initiatives to compete more effectively, such as 
focusing on quality and customer satisfaction or globalising 
corporate business structures
• Broad economic changes, such as the globalisation of the 
economy or heightened competition in national and inter­ 
national markets
• Societal and demographic changes, such as fewer entrants 
to the workforce and changing employee values
• Natural resource availability issues such as concerns 
about pollution and the environment or increased energy 
costs
• Political issues, such as increasing regulation or the appli­ 
cation of cross border rights37.
This chapter is concerned with these and other issues in the business 
environment which impinge on the practice of human resource 
management. The following presents those issues which managers 
feel are important change indicators of the 1990s and beyond.
Implications of the Business Environment______
We asked respondents to indicate what impact a series of prescribed 
changes would have on the management of people in the future (see 
Table 20). A scale of 1 to 5 was used, where 1= major impact and 5= 
no impact.
Changes in the Business Environment 
Base: All respondents (%)
Increasing competition
Heightened focus on total quality/customer 
satisfaction
Increased governmental regulation
Changing employee values, goals, and 
expectations eg less loyalty to employer
Increased reliance on automation/ 
technology to produce goods and services
Inadequate skills of entrants into the 
workforce
Fewer entrants into the workforce
Growth in non-traditional business structures 
eg organisation alliances, joint ventures
Globalisation of the economy/breakdown of 
trade barriers
European application of employee rights
Europeanisation of corporate business
Positive attitudes of society toward business
Changing composition of the workforce with 
respect to gender, age, and/or ethnicity
Greater concerns about the confidentiality 
of personal information












































































Table 20: Human resource implications of various changes 
in the business environment
Changes which were seen as having a major impact on business were:
• Increasing competition (85 per cent)
• Total quality (81 per cent)
• Increased government regulation (71 per cent)
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• Changing employee values etc (62 per cent)
• Increased reliance on technology (61 per cent)
• Inadequate skills of entrants into the workforce (57 per cent). 
Major impact scores outweighed no impact scores on:
• Growth in non-traditional organisation structures 
(46 per cent)
• Globalisation of the economy (43 per cent)
• European application of employee rights (42 per cent)
• Positive attitude of society toward business (37 per cent)
• The changing composition of the workforce (35 per cent)
No impact was generally reported for greater concerns about the 
confidentiality of personal information. Low impact was reported 
for European issues.
The private sector saw greater impact than the public sector on such 
issues as:
• Increased reliance on automation/technology (65 per cent)
• Growth in non-traditional business structures (51 per cent)
• Globalisation of the economy (50 per cent)
• Europeanisation of corporate business (37 per cent) 
The public sector saw greater impact from:
• Increased governmental regulation (78 per cent)
However, this was also seen as having an impact by respondents in 
the private sector (67 per cent). This could be considered high 
following a long period of government committed to deregulatory 
policies.
The size of organisationhadsomeimpact on the responses to change 
in the organisation environment. Taking scores 1 and 2 together, 
respondents from larger organisations were marginally more con­ 
cerned than their counterparts in smaller organisations about:
• Increased competition
• Heightened focus on quality
• Increased reliance on automation and new technology
• Changing employee values
• Fewer entrants to the workforce
• European application of employee rights
• Changing composition of the workforce.
Only on one issue was this pattern reversed (that of inadequate skills 
of entrants to the workforce). This latter issue may be explained by 
the larger organisations being more successful in recruiting the 
more skilled individuals into their employ.
Further analysis of organisations growing or stable/declining isolated 
only one significant issue - increased governmental regulation. 
Respondents in stable/declining organisations tended to emphasise 
this aspect of change (74 per cent versus; 62 per cent). The difference 
may account for the large number of stable/declining organisations 
in the public sector where employment levels are falling. Nonetheless 
respondents in these organisations saw governmental regulation as 
a significant change in the foreseeable future.
So far as key issues in the business environment are concerned, there 
is no doubt that managers in Britain foresee ever growing competition 
and that this is likely to be a dominant theme of the future. Globalisa­ 
tion of markets has dearly heightened interest in quality and customer 
satisfaction and these are also likely to remain. Paradoxical]y,however, 
increased government intervention is likely to accompany these 
changes. Rapid advances in technology will continue to have a 
dominant impact on the business organisation. Alongside these 
changes, according to managers, the values, goals and expectations 
of employees are likely to shift and to result in less loyalty to the
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employer. All in all, the environments of businesses are likely to be 
increasingly challenging for general managers as well as for person­ 
nel/human resource managers over the next decade.
Conclusions
The management of people in organisations has become a critical issue in recent years. This has stemmed not least from a concern 
over competitiveness and the recognition of the potential impor­ 
tance of a committed, competent and well-motivated workforce in 
achieving an advantage in this respect.
A range of important concerns covering these matters has been 
highlighted by this survey. Notwithstanding the rise of human 
resource management, perhaps surprisingly it was found that the 
most senior personnel manager in the organisation is likely to be a 
director and to have personnel in his /her title. Personnel departments 
are still typically organised centrally. They are more likely to be 
based on a flexible rather than a functional basis in private organi­ 
sations and vice versa in public organisations. Indications are that 
the staffing of personnel departments is declining but, where recruit­ 
ment is going on, experienced managers are at a premium. The 
personnel management role in the UK economy is clearly identified 
with the needs of the organisation and the concerns of management 
generally. It is still somewhat reactive, but is increasingly linked 
with strategic planning, However, the personnel function remains 
fragmented.
It was also found that a series of human resource management 
policies which (either explicitly or implicitly) are designed to further 
competitive advantage appear to be supported in UK organisations. 
These include: corporate development, communications and partici­ 
pation, employee welfare and the linking of rewards to performance. 
However, in actual practice, not all of these polities have been fully 
implemented.
This is the case, for instance, in employee involvement. Regular 
meetings between supervisors and workgroups/team briefing, 
organisation newsletters and the handling of individual grievances 
are all quite widespread in UK organisations. But such practices as 
suggestion schemes, employee attitude surveys, quality circles, 
Works Councils, new technology agreements, informal collective
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bargaining and productivity bargaining are far less common. 
Moreover, line management rather than personnel/human resource 
management departments are the most likely to be responsible for 
whatever employee involvement practices have been implemented.
The development of human resources is also of consequence for the 
modern organisation, given rapidly changing environments and 
increasingly open and competitive markets.
In UK organisations there is an awareness of the significance of 
training and development initiatives; appraisal, as a means of isolating 
individual needs in these respects, is undoubtedly widely practised. 
The awareness of the importance of the performance of management 
is also recognised in that management development is a prominent 
feature. Competence-based training and training needs analysis 
have also been implemented in a substantial number of cases. 
However, it still seems that relatively few organisations have much 
involvement in a wide range of further initiatives such as negotiated 
learning programmes, credit accumulated learning, European 
initiatives on training and development and the assessment of prior 
learning.
Moreover, although the Investors in People initiative has some 
support, it has still so far not been widely developed in British 
organisations, despite the emphasis placed on this proposal in 
public debates and by government. The importance of line manage­ 
ment, in so far as the responsibility for training initiatives is concerned 
is also evident from our survey.
In modern organisations, there have been many changes in work 
practices designed to meet flexibly the demands of the modern 
workplace. Our survey indicated, however, only a limited impact 
many of the innovative work practices of the 1990s. Employee 
responsibility for quality control and feedback to employees on 
performance are quite widespread. But such practices as employee 
responsibility for inventory control, composite roles, job enlarge­ 
ment, job enrichment and autonomous work groups do not appear 
to be widely practised in the modern UK organisation. In the 
majority of cases, line management has responsibility or, at the most, 
shares it with personnel/human resource departments.
UK organisations are, however, involved in a wide range of reward 
practices with the major initiative of the 1990s being equal pay for 
equal work. The overall importance of this practice may be indicative 
of the impact of European legislation in this area and the legal 
requirements imposed. Incentive based pay arrangements still 
dominate the reward management scene, but changes in the compo­ 
sition of the workforce point to the growth of skill-based and 
knowledge based pay arrangements. Of significance too is that the 
survey findings point to a possibility that the growth in profit 
sharing and profit related pay schemes has peaked. What is clear is 
that these are still popular methods of reward within large private 
sector organisations and those growing organisations in the economy.
Turning to the responsibility for reward practices, personnel/human 
resource departments play an important role in this area particularly 
in company or plant wide schemes, whereas line management tends 
to have responsibility for incentive based practices. Factors such as 
size of organisations and whether the organisation is growing play 
an important part in the location of responsibility for reward prac­ 
tices, showing a diversified approach in this area of human resource 
management.
Clearly the increase in competition generated by the external envi­ 
ronment and total quality are dominant themes which will be of 
concern to managers in the future. Increased government regulation, 
changing employee values, the increased reliance on technology 
and new entrants to the workforce are factors germane to the needs 
of organisation stemming from the environment of the 1990s. Sur­ 
prisingly, however, the European dimension is not considered by 
the majority of respondents to be a major issue of the future. The 
importance of technological change to larger organisations in the 
private sector is also significant Whereas, in the public sector the 
emphasis is on an increased level of government regulation.
These, then, are some of the main condusions from our broad 
ranging survey of the management of people in organisations in 
modern Britain. Given its importance to competitiveness we can be 
reasonably certain that the main issues raised in our report will be 
of increasing importance in the latter part of the 20th century and 
even more so as the 21st century develops and unfolds.
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The development of an organisation's key resource - its employees - is probably the biggest 
responsibility and challenge facing British managers. In the uncertain climate created by 
recession, technological change, increased competition and shifting public policy, human 
resource issues are moving more and more to the forefront of organisational policy making.
The Institute of Management in conjunction with Cardiff Business School and Swansea Institute 
of Higher Education, is therefore seeking to examine the experiences of, and attitudes towards, 
key human resource issues among practising managers in the 1990s.
Your help in completing the enclosed questionnaire is vital to understanding human resource 
management issues as we approach the 21st century.
The information you give will be treated in strictest confidence and all replies are of course 
anonymous.
Please return the completed questionnaire in the enclosed reply-paid envelope by 28 February to:
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Human Resource Policies for Gaining Competitive Advantage
B. To what extent does your organisation support the folio
1 Strongly supports
2 Supports
»uig HRM policies according to the scale below?













Radically increase spans of control;
eliminate extensive layers of middle
management 
Require flexibility of employees to
change jobs, skills, and/or location
Utilise non-permanent workforce
(vendors, parl-lirtt£ employees, retirees) 
to reduce fixed labour costs
Promote an equal opportunities 
culture
Provide hill employment (life- time
job security) with the organisation 
Promote employee empowerment
through ownership and accountability 
Promote flexible cross-functional
teams and action work groups
Enlarge the definition of opportunity
to include autonomy and the use of
creative skills







































3 Neither supports nor against
4 Against
5 Strongly against
[Please lick ONE box in each line]
Training and Development
9. Recruit from non-traditional labour
markets
10. Use graduate recruitment schemes
11. Provide skills training for new
employees
11 Identify high-potential employees 
early and develop them quickly
13. Require dit>t optional) continuous
training and retraining of all
employees
14. Increasing management development
15. Require employees to self-monitor 
and self-improve throughout their
careers
16. Active corporate involvement in















































Human Resource Policies for Gaining Competitive Advantage
8. (continued) To what extent docs your organisation support the following HRM policies according to the scale below?
1 Strongly supports
2 Supports
3 Neither supports nor against
4 Against
5 Strongly against
[Please tick ONE box in each line]
Communications and Participation
17. Promote a participative management
style
18. Communicate business directions,
problems, and plans to employees
19. Use advanced technology for
communicating (electronic bulletin
boards, tfidco news programmes)
20. Provide employees with more direct
access to information systems
Employee Welfare
21. Offer assistance and services to help
employees meet family and personal 
needs
22. Ensure employees and their families
aggressively pursue good health 
23. Develop innovativeor flexible out 
placement programmes for all 
employees






















































3 Neither supports nor against
4 Against
5 Strongly against
[Please tick ONE box
Rewards and Performance
25. Promote the sharing of both the
rewards and the risks of business
26. Focus on merit philosophy throughout
the organisation; emphasise individual
performance
27. Encourage, recognise, and reward
employees for productivity gains
28. Encourage, recognise, and reward
employees for enhancing their own
skills or knowledge
29. Encourage, recognise, and reward
employees for innovation and 
creativity
30. Encourage, recognise, and reward
employees for customer service and 
quality
31. Adopt performance appraisal systems 
usuig customer ratings

































































































































Human Resource Implications of 
Changes in the Business Environment
13. Many observers have predicted significant changes In the work and 
business environment for the 21st century. Some of these changes are 
listed below. Please indicate the impact these changes might have on 
the management of people on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = major impact 
and 5 a no impact
[Pisase tick ONE box in each line)
1. Increasing competition D D D D D
2. Increased governmental regulation O D D Q D
3. Europeanisalion of corporate business O Q D D D
4. Growth in non-traditional business D D O D D 
structures e.g. business alliances, 
joint ventures
5. Globalisation of the economy /break- D D D D D 
down of trade barriers
6. Increased reliance on automation./ O Q D D O 
technology to produce goods and 
services
7. Positive attitudes of society toward D D D D D 
business
8. Heightened focus on total quality/ D Q D D D 
customer satisfaction
9. Changing employee values, goals, O Q O D D 
and expectations e.g. less loyalty to 
employer
10. Fewer entrants into the workforce D D D D D
11. Inadequate skills of entrants into the D D D D D 
workforce
12. European application of employee O U Q D D 
rights
13. Changing composition of the D D D D D 
workforce with respect to gender, 
age, ai\d/or ethnicity
14. Greater concerns about the confi- O D Q D D 
denh'ality of personal information
Your Job















15. What is your management function ?
{Please lick your must ret^nl ntanagtnient 
function if you an currently not working!
Administration/company secretary D 1
Management services Q 2




Operations management D 7
Computing/IT D 8
Development/strategic affairs D 9
Marketing/sales D 10
Purchasing/contracting O 11
Corporate affairs/public relations D 12
Management consultancy D 13
General management* D 14
Other (P/eosL' specify)........................................................................... D 15























Do you own shares in:





























Fiixancial services n 4
Retail/distribution/transport Q 5




Professional/scientific/ consultancy n IQ
QH\ei (Pleasespecify)............................................................................ Q u



















22. Is your organisation....
Well established 
Newly formed
!Please tick ONE box onlyl
C 1
C 0
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Abstract 
This paper considers the link between sustained competitive advantage and human resources,
and identifies five groupings of HRM policies and practices that are germane to competitive 
advantage. Reports on the role of HRM in organisational strategies and work practices. 
Tabulates the extent of support for various HRM policies associated with corporate development. 
Concludes that the greatest support is for the promotion of an equal opportunities culture. 
Support is also given for training and development (the strongest being for the provision of skills 
training for new employees), communications and participation, employee welfare (assistance to 
help employee with personal and family needs) and rewards and performance.
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Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins
Competitive strategy based on human resources can be less easy to copy.
There are many ways in which companies can gain a competitive edge or a 
lasting and sustained advantage over their competitors, among them being 
the development of comprehensive human resource management policies. 
Indeed, the adoption of sophisticated human resource management policies 
and practices is seen as one of the major keys to competitive advantage in 
the modern world. This is not least because such practices can be formidable 
weapons in highly competitive environments because of the inability of 
competitors to formulate an effective response in the short term.
Part of the rationale for this argument stems from the work of Michael 
E. Porter [1] who, in The Competitive Advantage of Nations, has argued that 
national prosperity is created not inherited. Moreover, in his view, the most 
important factor conditions of national competitiveness include skilled 
human resources and the scientific base and not, as the classical economic 
theory of comparative advantage suggests, factors of production (low cost 
of labour, land, natural resources, capital and infrastructure).
Other important strands in this way of thinking have been the 
literature on 'excellence' and the parallel interest in Japanese management 
practices. One of the lessons of pace-setting books like, In Search of 
Excellence [2], has been that firms with equivalent technology and 
infrastructure vary greatly in competitiveness and that this relates to the 
levels of 'excellence' achieved by the companies. Moreover, this has been 
seen to be linked in important ways with organizational cultures and the 
types of human resource management policies and practices that have been
Michael Poole is Professor of Human Resource Management at 
Cardiff Business School and Glenville Jenkins is Principal Lecturer 
in Management at Swansea Business School, United Kingdom.
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introduced. Similar types of argument have been used to interpret the 
considerable success of Japanese firms on a global scale [3]. Essentially the 
advanced personnel and employment policies of Japanese companies have 
been viewed in important ways to underpin their competitive advantage. In 
particular, the traditional (albeit changing) policies on life-time employment 
and on seniority-based reward systems have been seen to be related to the 
organizational commitment of employees and their willingness to identify 
strongly with the company and hence to further its success.
More recently, too, the argument has emerged that sustained 
competitive advantage is also linked with human capital resources. 
Essentially, it is possible to define human resources 'as the pool of human 
capital under the firm's direct control in a direct employment relationship'. 
Moreover human resource practices 'are the organizational networks directed 
at managing the pool of human capital and ensuring that the capital is 
employed towards the fulfilment of organization goals' [4]. However, in 
order to qualify as a source of 5w.yto>7e<^competitive advantage, the resource 
must add value to the firm, it must be rare, it must be inimitable and there 
must be no adequate substitutes. And, on all these counts human capital may 
be regarded as a particularly valuable resource for achieving sustained 
competitive advantage.
The Study
The aim of this paper is to examine the extent to which managers in Britain 
consider that their firms have adopted or support various human resource 
policies aimed at improving competitive advantage. The data reported in the 
article are based on a postal survey of fellows and members of the Institute 
of Management. Questionnaires were sent to a random sample of fellows 
and members of the Institute of Management in January 1994 and, to 
increase the response rate, there was a second posting in March 1994. From 
the original sample of 3,000 there were 909 usable returns (a response rate 
of 30.3 per cent). This is not untypical of postal surveys and, in absolute 
terms, provides a substantial number of respondents upon which to base our 
conclusions. The largest single group of respondents was in general 
management (28 per cent), with the remainder spread amongst a wide range 
of other functional areas.
Eight main categories of issue were encompassed in the questionnaire:
1) The role of human resource management in the strategies of the 
firm; the nomenclature, organization and recruitment of the 
personnel/human resource department, and details on the human 
resource management role.
2) The adoption ofhumanresourcepolicies forgainingcompetitive 
advantage focusing on: corporate development; training and 
development, communications and participation, employee
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welfare and rewards and performance.
3) Employee involvement concerning areas as diverse as 
communications and joint consultation, collective bargaining 
and employee attitude surveys.
4) Training and development encompassing appraisal, 
management development and a variety of modern career, 
training and development approaches including Investors in 
People and National Vocational Qualifications (S/NVQ's).
5) Work practices such as job enrichment, broadly defined jobs 
and employee responsibility for quality control.
6) Human resource management approaches to rewards including 
profit sharing, profit related pay, payment for quality and equal 
pay for equal work.
7) The effects of the business environment on future developments 
in personnel/human resource management such as increasing 
competition, changing employee values and European 
applications and developments.
8) Demographic and other information on such issues as 
respondents' jobs, functions, their educational backgrounds 
and inter-firm mobility [5].
Competitive Advantage
Broadly speaking, five major groupings of human resource management 
policies and practices that are germane to competitive advantage have been 
identified : culture, organizational structure, performance management, 
resourcing, communications and corporate responsibility. Various operational 
indices of these policies were developed in a major world-wide survey 
conducted under the auspices of the IBM Corporation and Towers Perrin 
entitled, Priorities for Gaining Competitive Advantage [6]. In summary, it 
is possible to identify a number of elements in each cluster.
Culture:
~ Promoting an empowerment culture;
~ Promoting diversity and an equality culture.
Organizational structure and control:
~ Emphasis on flexible organizations/work practices;
~ Emphasis on utilising IT to structure the organization;
~ Emphasis on horizontal management;
~ Emphasis on increasing and promoting customer service;
~ Emphasis on rewarding innovation/creativity;
~ Link between pay and individual performance;
~ Shared benefits, risks and pay for team performance.
Resourcing:
~ Emphasis on external resourcing;
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~ Emphasis on internal resourcing - training and careers; 
~ Emphasis on internal resourcing - managing outflows.
Communication/Corporate responsibility:
~ Emphasis on communication;
~ Emphasis on corporate responsibility.
These were adapted to the British context and informed a series of 
items in the questionnaire. For the purposes of our own survey, we examined: 
(1) corporate development, (2) training and development, (3) communications 
and participation, (4) employee welfare, and (5) rewards and performance. 
The evidence from each of these broad categories is presented in the analysis 
that follows.
Corporate Development
The term 'corporate development' is used here to categorise a variety of 
organizational change programmes or initiatives that have developed in 
response to a variety of environmental conditions. Over the past decade and 
more, significant changes have taken place in the business environment in 
which the practice of human resource management takes place.
First, the importance of rapidly changing national, European and 
global markets and the consequent increase in competition has forced firms 
to re-evaluate technological and organizational practices in order to respond 
to such changes and meet the challenges of the new market place. The global 
economy has undergone two major recessions in the early 1980s and early 
1990s bringing with them problems concerned with growth and 
unemployment. Other significant changes are the creation of the single 
European market in 1992 to maintain European competitiveness, the 
accelerated growth of far Eastern economies, the continued expanding share 
of output of multi-national enterprises and the promotion of free trade.
At a European level, western European economies have undergone a 
structural transformation identified in movements from manufacturing to 
service industries, from predominantly manual to white collar employment 
and from traditional heavy industries to those of the microelectronics and 
capital goods industries.
With in the UK, the election of successive Conservative administrations 
has seen the promotion of policies emphasising privatisation, deregulation 
and a greater emphasis on individualism in the workplace. In contrast, the 
European Union has promoted a range of collective and individual rights of 
employees to which the UK plays little or no part.
Managerial responses to such changes reflect a flattening of 
organizational structures and a movement to decentralised organizational
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structures, together with greater numerical and functional flexibility. 
Management has also promoted quality as a key element in the competitive 
strategy with a consequent increase in new technology and responsibility for 
the employee.
The continued response to such pressures has driven most organizations 
to review their structures. Frequently such restructuring is reflected in the 
practices of delayering and downsizing - most recently of middle management 
- developing a flexible and adaptable workforce, promoting empowerment 
and creativity together with equal and life-long employment opportunities.
In the light of such changes, we were concerned first of all to establish 
the extent to which our respondents' organizations supported a series of 
human resource management policies with respect to corporate development. 
The questionnaire items included: (1) radically increasing spans of control 
(eliminating extensive layers of middle management), (2) flexibility of 
employees, (3) utilising non-permanent workforces, (4) promoting an equal 
opportunities culture, (5) providing full employment, (6) promoting employee 
empowerment, (7) promoting flexible, cross-functional teams and action 
work groups and (8) enlarging the definition of opportunity to include 
autonomy and the use of creative skills.
The results are set out in Table 1 in which the items are ranked 
according to the extent to which respondents' organizations supported, or 
not, a given human resource management policy. It will be noted that the 
need for a highly flexible workforce to meet the challenges of an increasingly 
changing environment is clearly recognised by the substantial majority of 
our respondents' companies. Thus, 77.6 per cent of respondents indicated 
that their companies either supported or strongly supported the idea of a 
flexible workforce.
Interestingly, too, equal opportunities is clearly an issue which is high
on the agenda of Britain's companies. Thus, 76.9 per cent of respondents 
reported that their firms either supported or strongly supported the policy of 
an equal opportunities culture. This may stem in part from the considerable 
interest in these issues in Britain in recent years and it is, in any event, an 
interesting finding. Another concern in recent years, in Britain, has been to 
increase spans of control and to have a policy of 'delayering' which has 
radically affected middle management in Britain. This is again clearly 
evident from our findings, because 63.2 per cent of respondents indicated 
that their firms supported or strongly supported pol icies to increase radical ly 
spans of control and to eliminate extensive layers of middle management. 
This can, of course, create considerable stress and uncertainty amongst those 
affected (or likely to be affected). Butthe extent of commitment to this policy 
in Britain is clearly noticeable.
The commitment to flexibility is also evident in two further respects:
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(1) the promotion of flexible cross-functional teams and action work groups 
and (2) the utilisation of a non-permanent workforce to reduce labour costs 
(the latter policy, incidentally, runs counter to traditional human resource 
management policies in which considerable job security has been 
emphasised). Thus, 58.9 per cent of respondents reported thattheir companies 
either supported or strongly supported policies to promote flexible cross- 
functional teams and action work groups: and, 52.1 per cent of respondents 
indicated that their firms endorsed the use of a non-permanent workforce to 
reduce labour costs.
Table 1: Extent of Support for Various Human Resource 
Policies Linked with Corporate Development (percentages)
Corporate Development
Require flexibility of employees to 
change jobs, skills, and/or location
Promote an equal opportunities 
culture
Radically increase spans of 
control; eliminate extensive layers 
of middle management
Promote flexible cross-functional 
teams and action work groups
Utilise non-permanent workforce 
(vendors, part-time employees, 
retirees) to reduce labour costs
Enlarge the definition of 
opportunities to include autonomy 
and the use of creative skills
Promote employees' empowerment 
through ownership and 
accountability
Provide full employment (life-time 


















































The development of a committed and satisfied workforce is obviously 
important to competitive advantage. And, in this respect, it is interesting that 
the majority of respondents (50.3 per cent) reported that the policy in their 
firm was to enlarge the definition of opportunity to include autonomy and 
the use of creative skills. Positive scores outweighed negative ones in the 
case of empowerment; hence, 46.7 per cent of respondents suggested that 
their firms supported (or strongly supported) policies to promote employee 
empowerment through ownership and accountability.
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The provision of full employment (life-time job security) within the 
organization does not, however, feature prominently in British companies. 
It is true that 27.7 per cent of respondents did indicate that the firms 
supported such policies; but 33.2 per cent reported that their companies were 
either against or strongly against such a policy. Indeed, the predominant 
conclusion is that firms in Britain are more likely to be lukewarm ( neither 
being in support of or against) full employment policies (39.2 per cent of 
respondents indicating that this was the case). But it is clear that Japanese- 
style permanent employment policies are not typically accorded a high 
priority in the human resource management policies of the typical British 
company.
Training and Development
Modern debates on the competitive advantage of nations and companies 
have focused increasingly on human resource development as well as on 
human resource management issues. For instance, in the USA, John T 
Dunlop [7] has argued that economic growth and improvement in productivity 
depend on four basic factors: research and development, investment in plant 
and equipment, investment in infrastructure and investment in human 
resources development. Moreover, in his view, human resources development 
and the creation of a more productive, skilled and adaptable workforce in 
turn depends on six factors:
1) The education system;
2) Health care;
3) Training and retraining;
4) Family policy;
5) Labour-management policies at the workplace, and
6) The general health of public service in the country.
In addition, in a major survey of Western European nations, human 
resource development was found to be the most important personnel 
function in all the main countries covered, and more important than, say, 
compensation, industrial relations or productivity management. [8].
So far as management in the actual enterprise are concerned, apart 
from industrial relations policies, the training and development of the 
workplace in thus viewed as a key to competitive advantage. However, in 
recent years, the situation in Britain has been a cause of considerable 
concern; so much, so, indeed, that Ewart Keep [9] has referred to a so-called 
' training scandal'. In the 1990s, there were various attempts to overcome the 
problem, but whether or not these have been sufficiently substantial to 
improve the situation remains debatable. Training and development can 
obviously be defined as forms of activity aimed at the improvement of 
human capital within an organization, and can be viewed as either a cost or 
an investment. For governments, the main issue is to ensure a better
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education, better trained and more adaptable workforce as a means of aiding 
national wealth creation. For employers, the concern is to improve the 
capacity of existing employees to perform a reasonably well-defined set of 
activities. For employees, the interest is likely to be in maximising the 
returns of the individual from skill acquisition. The central thrust of the case 
for human resource development, however, is that training should be 
regarded as a vital investment and not as a drain on the resources of the firm.
Returning to the survey, respondents were asked to what extent their 
organizations supported various training and development policies that 
included (1) recruiting from non-traditional labour markets, (2) the use of 
graduate recruitment schemes, (3) the provision of skilled training for new 
employees, (4) identifying high-potential employees early and developing 
them quickly, (5) requiring continuous training and retraining of all 
employees, (6) increasing management development, (7) requiring employees 
to self-monitor and self-improve throughout their careers and (8) active 
corporate involvement in public education issues to ensure a quality 
workforce.
The results are set out in Table 2, where the items are again ranked 
according to the extent of which respondents indicated that their firms 
supportedaparticularpolicy.lt is clear, first of all, that the provision of skills 
training for employees features strongly in this rank order, with 76.5 percent 
of respondents indicating that their firms either supported or strongly 
supported such a policy.
There is no doubt, too, that firms in Britain are much more aware of 
the importance of developing their managers than was once the case. Hence, 
it is scarcely surprising that 69.8 per cent of respondents reported that their 
firms endorsed management development policies. Career development 
also appears to feature prominently. Thus, 62.8 per cent of respondents 
indicated that the firms either supported or strongly supported the policy that 
employees should be required to self-monitor and self-improve through 
their careers. Employee as well as management development also appears 
to be a policy which is subscribed to in British companies. Thus, 58.3 per 
cent of respondents indicated that their firms either supported or strongly 
supported the policy of identifying high potential employees early and 
developing them quickly. Moreover, 54.5 per cent of respondents reported 
that their firms required the continuous training and retraining of all 
employees.
Of rather less saliency to the policies of British companies, however, 
appears to be external training and development issues (though in all cases 
positive scores outweighed negative ones). Thus, 47.2 per cent ofrespondents 
indicated that their firm's policy was to use graduate recruitment schemes, 
while 37.5 per cent said their companies supported active involvement in 
public education. Furthermore, 27.9 per cent ofrespondents reported that
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their organizations had a policy to recruit from non-traditional labour 
markets.
Table 2: Extent of Support for Various Human Resource Policies 
Linked with Training and Development (Percentages)
Training and Development




Require employees to 
self-monitor and self-improve 
through their careers
Identify high potential 
employees early and develop 
them quickly
Require (non optional) 
continuous training and 
retraining of all employees
Use graduate recruitment 
schemes
Active corporate involvement in 
public education issues to ensure 
a quality workforce




















































Another important aspect of the competitive advantage of companies is the 
involvement of employees in matters relating to their working 1 ives and with 
the affairs of the company as a whole. Human resource management has, as 
one of its central tenets, the assumption that employees are the single most 
important asset of the organization. To the extent that this is the case, to 
facilitate greater employee participation or involvement is clearly basic to 
successful human resource practices in the firm and, hence, to competitive 
advantage.
There are three principal routes to greater employee participation in 
organizations. The first is by legislated standards on employee participation 
(e.g. works councils, support for employee financial participation). The 
second is the traditional trade union mode linked with formal and informal 
collective bargaining. And the third are initiatives by management to
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support employee participation in the work itself and to provide opportunities 
for employees to voice their views on developments and problems.
In the last decade or so in Britain, earlier ideas for Industrial Democracy 
have become no longer a part of the political or legislative agenda, but 
various European initiatives (particularly with respect to works councils) 
have recently re-emerged. However, legislative encouragement for employee 
involvement has developed in the UK such as that for profit sharing and 
employee share holding schemes, and the House of Lords amendment to the 
Employment Act, 1982. The latter places a statutory requirement that, in 
every directors' report (in companies with more than 250 employees), a 
statement must be included describing the action taken during the year to 
introduce, maintain and develop arrangements aimed at:
~ Providing employees systematically with information of
concern to them as employees; 
— Consulting employees or their representatives on a regular
basis so that the views of employees can be taken into account
in making decisions which are likely to affect their interests; 
~ Encouraging the involvement of employees in the company's
performance through an employees' share scheme or by some
other means; 
~ Achieving a common awareness on the part of all employees of
the financial and economic factors affecting the performance of
the company.
Trade union-based forms of participation have tended to decline 
during this period alongside a reduction in union power and influence. 
Typically, management in Britain have promoted individualistic task-based 
practices, and have been more opposed to collectivist, trade union-based 
participation [10]. Managers have also encouraged a number of 
'communications' forms of direct employee involvement (such as two-way 
communications and quality circles) while eschewing board level 
representative practices.
Firms can, of course, have a variety of co-existing forms of employee 
participation. This is usually referred to as the employee involvement mix 
and may encompass downward communications (e.g. team briefing), upward 
problem solving techniques (e.g. quality circles), financial involvement 
(e.g. profit sharing) and representative participation (e.g. joint consultation) 
[11]. Moreover, typical reasons for the introduction and maintenance of 
employee involvement practices include: information and education, 
commitment, securing enhanced employee contributions, recruitment and 
retention of labour, conflict handling and stability, and various external 
forces (e.g. facilitative and legislation). There is also widespread support for 
measures to enhance employee participation, despite disagreements on the 
desirability of given forms [13].
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In respect of the policies of companies, respondents were asked to 
indicate to what extent their organizations supported the policies of: (1) 
promote a participative management style, (2) communicate business 
directions, problems, and plans to employees, (3) use advanced technology 
for communicating (electronic bulletin boards, video news programmes) 
and (4) provide employees with more direct access to information systems.
The findings are set out in Table 3, where the extent of support for 
various human resource policies linked with communications and 
participation is indicated. It is evident first of all that, in British companies, 
it is a clear policy to communicate business directions, problems and plans 
to employees (69.8 per cent of respondents noting that this applied to their 
firms). The promotion of a participative management style is also widely 
endorsed, for 66.6 per cent of respondents indicated that their organizations 
either supported or strongly supported this policy. Again, 49.3 per cent of 
respondents noted that, in their organizations, it was the policy to support or 
strongly support the provision of more direct access to information systems 
by employees. The use of advanced technology for communicating 
information to employees was typically neither supported nor opposed (42.3 
per cent of respondents indicated that this was their organization's policy). 
But generally, at the policy level, it is clear that British companies are 
supportive of a variety of programmes for advancing communication and 
participation.
Table 3: Extent of Support for Various Human Resource Policies 
Linked with Communication and Participation (percentages)
Communications and 
Participation
Communicate business directions, 
problems and plans to employees
Promote a participative 
management style
Provide employees with more
direct access to information
systems
Use advanced technology for
communicating (electronic bulletin 






























The success of Japanese companies on a global scale has been recognised to 
be linked, at least in part, with advanced employee welfare policies [14]. 
Such policies take two forms: retrospective and proactive. Retrospective
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policies, sometimes referred to as Employee Assistance Programmes (EPAs), 
which are a growing feature in the UK, cater for a range of employee health 
problems including simple and chronic illnesses, stress, emotional illness, 
alcohol or drug abuse, family disturbances, financial and legal concerns, 
etc.. They are generally viewed has helping employees to cope with personal 
problems and are seen by management as an investment in human resources 
designed to maintain and enhance workers' productive capacity. Proactive 
policies or 'wellness' or fitness programmes are an offshoot of EAPs, and 
relatively uncommon in the UK. They tend to be centred on maintaining or 
improving the health of the workforce through a variety of programmes 
including fitness centres, cholesterol screenings, on-site health fairs, cash 
incentives for participating in exercise programmes, and incentives to stop 
smoking. Here, criteria such as weight, consumption of tobacco, blood 
pressure, cholesterol and other health criteria are used to identify and correct 
health problems in the workforce. Both these types of policies promote 
physical and mental health but in different ways [15].
The impact of delayering and downsizing has also led to a growth in 
policies related to outplacement or procedures which provide comprehensive 
approaches to dealing with employees who face redundancy. One of the 
aims of outplacement is to reduce the stress and trauma of those made 
redundant by assisting them to obtain other employment and providing 
emotional and, sometimes, financial support. It also helps, however, to 
maintain the morale and motivation of those who remain, and reduce the 
damaging effects of restructuring on the organization [16]. Similarly, part 
of the response to such restructuring has also been the increasing use of 
flexible retirement packages, assisting the employee to come to terms with 
the stress of retirement.
Respondents were thus asked to what extent their organizations 
endorsed a variety of pertinent policies that included: (1) offering assistance 
and services to help employees meet family and personal needs, (2) ensuring 
employees and their families aggressively pursue good health, (3) developing 
innovative or flexible outplacement programmes for all employees and (4) 
providing a wide range of flexible retirement opportunities.
The evidence is presented in Table 4, where the extent of support for 
these various human resource policies linked with employee welfare are set 
out in a ranked order. It is clear that, in British firms, there is an attempt to 
further the policy of offering assistance and services to help employees meet 
family and personal needs (52.7 per cent of respondents indicating that this 
policy was either supported or strongly supported by their companies).
In most cases, however, there appears to be neither support nor 
opposition for employee welfare policies. Thus, as will be seen in Table 4, 
47.9 per cent of respondents indicated this neutral category applied to 
ensuring that employees and their families aggressively pursued good
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health; 49.3 per cent that this was the case for the provision of a wide range 
of flexible retirement policies, and 49.0 per cent that this applied to the 
development of innovative or flexible outplacement programmes for all 
employees. Indeed, for the last two policies negative scores outweighed 
positive ones. It appears then, that the western concept of individualism and 
the separation of personal and work experiences appears to be strong. Hence, 
in British companies, while various employee welfare policies are not 
typically opposed, equally they are not generally advocated and 
enthusiastically supported.
Table 4: Extent of Support for Various Human Resource Policies 
Linked with Employee Welfare (percentages)
Employee Welfare
Offer assistance and services to
help employees meet family and
personal needs
Ensure employees and their
families aggressively pursue good
health
Provide a wide range of flexible 
retirement policies
Development of innovative or
flexible out-placement






























Modern human resource management approaches also emphasise the 
importance of linking rewards with performance if a firm is to become a fully 
competitive organization. According to Armstrong and Murlis [17],'reward 
management strategies and policies are driven by corporate and human 
resource management strategies'. All employers use financial rewards as a 
basic means of motivation and control, and to provide an incentive to 
perform better. A number of pay strategies are available to management in 
the 1990s, the more important of which are production-based pay, skilled- 
based pay and knowledge-based pay.
First, production-based pay or job-based pay is associated with 
Taylorist methods of mass production and incorporates such systems as job 
evaluation and piece rates. Associated with this tradition, too, is the 'rate for 
the job' and notions of equity expressed now in public policy in the Equal 
Pay Act. More recently, output or production rather than the job has become 
the central focus, with performance-related schemes dominating British 
practice.
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Second, skilled-based pay allocates differentials in pay based on 
differences in skills or competencies of non-managerial employees. The 
employee's skill, not the outcome of the job, forms the basis of pay. Finally, 
knowledge-based pay is a form of skilled based pay but typically applies to 
managerial, professional and R & D employees. Pay is determined by the 
acquisition of knowledge e.g. in terms of the depth of knowledge needed in 
a particular area [18].
In Britain, management strategies in the reward of employees in the 
1980s and 1990s have placed aheavy reliance on incentives such as payment 
by results and performance pay. Indeed, Brown [19] has described the 
importance of pay and hours of work in the reward package as:
'By their nature quantifiable, and, thus, generalizable across all 
manner of jobs and employees, pay and hours provide, however misleading, 
the only common language of reward. They provide the natural focus for 
collective bargaining and the obvious channel into which discontents over 
the more intangible aspects of work can be displaced. They may be only a 
part of the reward package, but they are the principal part open to 
transaction between employers and employees, and especially employee 
organizations. Consequently, the satisfactory management of employment 
requires the satisfactory management of remuneration as a necessary, if not 
a sufficient, precondition.'
However, reward strategies not only involve remuneration but also 
non-monetary rewards, encompassed in an overall reward package. 
Generally, too, the structure of the reward package is related to the job, the 
expectations of the employee and labour market conditions.
Since the mid-1980s, British firms have attempted to raise managerial 
salaries/bonuses in order to reduce the gap in relation to firms in other 
advanced industrial economies. Moreover, according to Edwards' [20] 
survey of general managers in large firms, just over 50 per cent of managers 
receive bonus payments or a share in the profits - but these rarely depend on 
the performance of the manager's own firm and they only constitute on 
average an additional 13 per cent to salaries.
One of the salient features of the 1980s and 1990s has been government 
intervention in the management of remuneration in terms of tax incentives 
for profit sharing and profit related schemes. The promotion of these 
schemes in the 1980s [21 ] led to an upsurge in the take-up of such schemes. 
Growth has also been noted in harmonisation policies, particularly in 
greenfield sites which attempt to breakaway from the incentive-led strategies 
of the post-war period.
In respect of their organization's policies on rewards, respondents 
were asked to what extent the following human resource management
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policies were supported: (1) promote the sharing of both the rewards and 
risks of business, (2) focus on merit philosophy throughout the organization; 
emphasise individual performance, (3) encourage, recognise, and reward 
employees for productivity gains, (4) encourage, recognise and reward 
employees for enhancing their own skills and knowledge, (5) encourage, 
recognise and reward employees for innovation and creativity, (6) encourage, 
recognise and reward employees for customer service and quality, (7) adopt 
performance appraisal systems using customer ratings and (8) provide 
flexible benefit packages.
Table 5: Extent of Support for Various Human Resource Policies 
Linked with Rewards and Performance (percentages)
Rewards and Performance
Focus on merit philosophy 
throughout! the organization; 
emphasise individual performance
Encourage, recognise and reward 
employees for customer service 
and quality
Encourage, recognise and reward 
employees for innovation and 
creativity
Encourage, recognise and reward 
employees for productivity gains
Encourage, recognise and reward 
employees for enhancing their own 
skills or knowledge
Promote the sharing of both the 
rewards and risks of business
Adopt performance appraisal 
systems using customer ratings


















































The findings presented in Table 5, above, show the extent of support 
for various human resource policies linked with rewards and performance. 
The items are again ranked according to the degree of support indicated by 
respondents. It is clear that a substantial number of human resource 
management policies on rewards and performance are supported within 
British companies. The focus on merit is thus noticeable in that 62.8 per cent 
of respondents reported that it was their organization's policy either to 
support or strongly support this policy. The increasing awareness of the 
importance of the customer is also evident in the finding that 54.5 per cent 
of respondents noted that their organization had a policy to encourage, 
recognise, and reward employees for customer service and quality. The 
encouragement of innovation and creativity on the one hand, and productivity
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on the other, was also observable. Thus, 51.8 per cent of respondents 
indicated that it was the policy within their company to support or strongly 
support measures to encourage, recognise and reward employees for 
innovation and creativity; while 51.7 per cent of respondents reported that 
the same applied for the encouragement, recognition and reward of employees 
for productivity gains.
In other respects, however, the policy within Britain's companies to 
relate rewards and performance is less noticeable. It is the case that the 
encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for enhancing their 
skills and knowledge is quite strong (47.8 per cent of respondents indicating 
that this was the policy in their company). But only 36.5 per cent of 
respondents indicated that it was the policy of their organizations to support 
or strongly support the promotion of the sharing of both the rewards and risks 
of business; 35.4 per cent that the adoption of performance appraisal systems 
using customer ratings was supported; and 27.4 per cent that the provision 
of flexible benefit packages was endorsed.
Conclusions
There are, then, varied findings on the extent to which companies in Britain 
support a series of human resource management policies which (either 
explicitly or implicitly) are designed to further competitive advantage. The 
key conclusions are:
~ Managers' understanding of corporate development clearly 
includes emphasis on policies concerned with flexibility (both 
functional and numerical), equal opportunities, increasing spans 
of control and developing a committed and satisfied workforce. 
Issues of less saliency are empowerment and full employment 
policies.
~ With regard to training and development policies, the provision 
of skills training for employees is of central interest. 
Management development, career development, the 
development of high potential employees and support for 
continuous training and retraining were seen as core elements 
in the development of competitive advantage in the respondents' 
organizations. Less support was seen for graduate recruitment, 
active involvement in public education and recruitment from 
non-traditional labour markets.
~ As far as participation and communications are concerned, 
managers are very supportive of communicating information 
to employees and of giving direct access to employees of such 
information. However, advanced technology for such provisions 
was not given overall support. Support was also forthcoming 
for participative management styles.
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~ Few organizations in our survey adopted a welfare approach to 
employees in the search for competitive advantage. Only 
employee assistance programmes are strongly supported in this 
area. Other features of welfare associated with health care 
programmes, outplacment and retirement were not fully 
supported.
~ The importance of rewards and performance in gaining 
competitive advantage is recognised in the emphasis on merit 
as a basis for reward. Rewarding, among other items, awareness 
of the customer, productivity, innovation and creativity are also 
seen to be given considerable support.
Over the past decade, there have of course been significant changes 
in organizational environments which have enhanced the importance of 
competitiveness for managers in Britain and elsewhere. There have been 
dramatic transformations in national, European and global markets that have 
forced managements to re-evaluate technological and organizational practices 
in order to respond to such changes and to meet the challenges of the new 
market-place. At a European level, the creation of a single market was 
designed not least to enhance European competitiveness. Moreover, the 
accelerated economic growth of the Asia-Pacific region, the continued 
expanding share of output of multi-national enterprises and the promotion 
of free trade have all been fundamental developments of the modern era.
In this milieu, as our findings indicate, managerial responses have 
been varied. There has certainly been a flattening of organizational 
structures and a movement to decentralised organizational forms, together 
with greater numerical and functional flexibility. Managements have also 
promoted quality as a key component in their competitive strategies, with a 
consequent emphasis on making employees more responsible for a variety 
of work outcomes. But it is also clear that further advances will be required 
as global competition intensifies.
These wider environmental forces imply that the find ings of our study 
are especially consequential for the general manager. In policy terms it also 
is clear that, although managers in Britain have made a series of advances 
to enhance competitiveness, several further developments in respect of 
human resources are also indicated. These include:
~ More employee responsibility and more active encouragement
of employee - customer linkages. 
~ More practical rather than rhetorical support for skills
development and retraining, and more active involvement in
public education and training ventures. 
~ More effective employee involvement practices including the
important aspect of participation in the distribution of economic
rewards.
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~ A greater recognition of the saliency of the whole lives of 
employees (including health and domestic issues) for work 
performance; and far greater sensitivity over outplacement and 
redundancy issues.
~ The re-design of reward systems to match the recognition of 
the importance of an awareness of the customer, productivity, 
innovation and creativity for competitive success.
More generally, too, given the growing recognition that not only 
competitive advantage but, above all, sustained competitive advantage is 
intimately linked with the human resource management policies of firms, 
there are strong grounds for supposing that many of these policies will be 
increasingly supported within British companies. There are, of course, 
many obstacles to a full and comprehensive implementation of human 
resource policies aimed at securing a sustained competitive advantage. But 
firms adopting such policies are likely to benefit substantially in the 
international market -place in the latter part of the 20th century, and even 
more so as the 21st century develops and unfolds.
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Abstract 
Examines the extent to which line management has actual responsibility for various human
resource practices. Addresses particularly those management practices associated with employee 
involvement such as joint consultation, training and development, work practices such as job 
enrichment and HRM approaches to rewards such as profit sharing. Concludes that line 
management is for more responsible for human resource practices than was anticipated, being 
dominant in terms of responsibility for most employee involvement practices, most types of 
training and development and most work systems - only in respect of rewards does the personnel 
department have a greater role. It won the Journal's Award for Excellence for the most 






evaluations of investments in health 
promotion programmes. Also contributes to 
the evaluation of the Swedish work life 
experiment in the beginning of the 1990s, and 
the establishment of the Swedish Work Life 
Fund (SWLF). States that perceptions of the 
profitability of investments in work life- 
oriented rehabilitation, including changes in 
work organization, changes in work methods 
and competence development, were 
investigated in 108 randomly selected 
organizations. The findings indicate that the 
investments, which were partly financed by
grants from the SWLF, contributed to a 
reduction in sick-leave and an increase in 
productivity. The median value of the pay­ 
back period was estimated to be 3.0 years. 
Public organizations, a considerable number of 
employees, a high percentage of women 
employees, a significant reduction in sick-leave 
and an ongoing organizational change, are 
some of the characteristics of investments with 
a short pay-back period. Concludes that the 
findings further indicate that grants from the 
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Many of the recent debates on human resource management (HRM) have 
emphasized its differences from traditional forms of personnel management. 
Indeed, within both national and organizational contexts there exists extensive 
differentiation, diversity and ambiguity in personnel/human resource practices. 
The differentiation in practice is linked with environmental and organizational 
characteristics including size of organization, industrial sector, economic 
activity, managerial ideology, role of the state, national culture, business 
strategy, organizational structure, organizational culture, the degree of 
centralization or de-centralization, ownership and age of organization (Sisson, 
1989). The diversity of practice is reflected in the wide range of models of 
personnel/human resource management and the variable influence on strategic 
management and management accounting (Armstrong, 1989; Beer et al, 1984; 
Fombrun et al, 1984; Guest, 1992; Storey, 1992; Thomason,1991a. 1991b; 
Torrington and Hall, 1987; Tyson, 1995). Similarly, such practices are a 
reflection of the ambiguity synonymous with the function and its lack of 
integration into the mainstream of managerial activity (Drucker, 1968; Legge 
and Exley, 1975; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994; Skinner, 1981; Tyson, 1987; 
Watson, 1986).
However, a common and core feature of these debates is the centraltty of 
general and line management. Also, the decentralization of responsibilities to 
the line has been viewed as a key characteristic of the alleged distinctiveness of 
modern forms of HRM (Kirkpatrick et al., 1992). There are of course a number 
of intertwined arguments here; but the central thrust is that whatever the 
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its effective practice. This is first of all because the implementation of human 
resource strategy is seen as best effected through departmental managers and 
supervisors. Second, there is the supposition that line management is critical for 
motivation and the nurturing of high commitment in any given workforce. And 
third, it arises because changes in jobs, resulting not least from new 
management control systems, place great emphasis on the expertise of lower 
level managers and supervisors. As Lowe (1992, pp. 1-48) has argued more 
1 generally:
The rule of line management is no longer restricted to monitoring and organizing production 
but also achieving the HRM goals of commitment, quality, flexibility and ultimately the 
profitability of subordinates. Thus it is implied, both implicitly and explicitly, that the role of 
hue management is expander! or redefined so that it incorporates "people responsibilities" 
rather than purely "technical responsibilities".
Moreover, line management has been viewed as increasingly taking 
responsibility for HRM initiatives and practices in the 1990s (Cunningham and 
Hyman. 1995; Hutchinson, 1995; Hutchinson and Wood, 1995; IKS, 1994; Storey, 
1992). Line managers have increasingly to improve viability and effectiveness 
and to implement cultural change with a new emphasis on communication, 
quality initiatives, customer orientation, innovation and competitiveness.
So far as actual behaviour in the enterprise is concerned, however, the extent 
to which personnel/human resource managers or line managers have 
responsibility for various personnel practices has been a source of considerable 
controversy. There are four central and contrasting arguments.
The first is traditional in that line management has almost certainly always 
had a significant responsibility for personnel practice in British firms. The 
importance of the line in the management of people has been traditionally 
recognized (CIR, 1973; Poole, 1973, 1976). That has applied not only to 
recruitment and selection and other "people management" functions within 
non-unionized firms, but also to informal collective bargaining with shop 
stewards and other plant-based union representatives within unionized firms. 
Moreover, it has been noted that little has probably changed in the varied and 
occasionally inimical attitudes of line management to the responsibilities of 
personnel managers (Alien, 1991; Cunningham and Hyman, 1995; Legge, 1978; 
Storey, 1992).
The second approach is cyclical and it infers that responsibility by personnel 
departments as opposed to line management is subject to considerable 
variation over time. Thus, Legge and Exley (1975) have argued that in periods 
of decline in the economic cycle, the personnel function is likely to adopt a 
"conformist innovator" approach. This involves a range of technical expertise 
rather than attempts to establish links with other managers or groups of 
employees. Personnel (the producer) ultimately accepts line management's (the 
consumer) definition of how organizational activities should be evaluated (e.g. 
in financial terms, performance and productivity). In contrast, the "deviant 
innovator", associated with periods of growth, adopts a more "resourceful 
humans" approach.
If Legge and Exley are correct in their assessment, then in the recession of 
the early 1990s in the UK, we should see a rise in the conformist innovator with 
more responsibility being directed down to the line than to the personnel 
specialist. Personnel managers should be in a relatively weak position in 
relation to other managers and tend to behave primarily as advisers (Storey's 
classification) (Hutchinson, 1995; Storey, 1992). Such practitioners can be 
regarded as reactive, acting as "internal consultants" and leaving the running 
of personnel to the line and general management. This conflicts quite markedly 
with those practitioners (change makers) who adopt a very proactive IIRM style 
geared to generating employee commitment and identification with the 
organization. Here line management responsibility for HRM becomes a 
subordinate element and strategic integration and high commitment take 
prominence (Wood, 1995).
A third argument is that line management has undoubtedly assumed a 
greater responsibility for personnel issues in recent years but that this reflects 
a secular rather than cyclical trend associated with the rise of strategic HRM 
itself (Storey, 1992). The relationship between human resource strategy and the 
integration of personnel with other members of the management team has been 
identified as a crucial variable in the adoption of HRM in the UK (Guest and 
Hoque, 1994; Storey, 1992). In addition, Tyson (1995), has viewed strategic 
decision making as a political process involving the integration and 
involvement of a number of senior managers, with a mix of responsibilities and 
functional specialisms. He has also noted that in employee relations, at least, 
such decision making is unusually dependent on gaining the support of other 
managers and/or access to and sponsorship of a higher authority. Similarly, 
Storey (1992) identified the different forms this could take in the political make­ 
up of the managerial team and the importance of the role of the human resource 
manager. More specifically loo, the greater the extent to which senior personnel 
directors are able to influence strategic decision making, the more likely it is 
that the firm will advance modern HRM policies and, paradoxically, the greater 
will be the propensity for actual practice to become the day-to-day responsibility 
of the line and general management. Moreover, because of the importance of 
motivation and flexibility of the workforce, HRM has assumed a greater 
consequence and is being increasingly implemented via the line.
A final perspective is that emphasizing diversity both within Britain and 
internationally in the extent to which there is line or personnel department 
responsibility for personnel/human resource practices Thus as Farnham 
(1986, pp. 106-7) has noted:
... in some organizations line managers have full executive authority for all personnel matters 
in their departments, with the personnel department acting only as an adviser to line 
management. In others, by contrast, full executive authority, such as in certain aspects of 
industrial relations and training, for example, is given to a senior personnel manager or 
personnel executive. In these cases, such persons have both the authority and responsibility to 





nel These differences may stem in part from variations in the political make-up of 
the managerial team and the importance of the role of the personnel/human 
resource manager in that context. Such forms have a wider significance in a 
European context where responsibility for major policy decisions on 
personnel/HRM appeal's to vary considerably between that of line management 
and human resource/personnel management (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1993; 
Brewster and Mayne, 1995; Gunnigle et al, 1994; Morley and Heraty, 1995). 
Indeed, in the British context HRM could signify a significant change in the 
pattern of responsibility of personnel managers in relation to line management 
and members of the management team, not only at the strategic level but more 
significantly, at the level of practice which this paper seeks to address 
(Edwards, 1987; Legge and Exley, 1975; Storey, 1992).
The aim of this paper then is to shed light on these issues by examining the 
extent to which line management has actual responsibility for various human 
resource practices. The data which we report derive from a national UK survey 
of fellows and members of the Institute of Management (see Poole and Jenkins, 
1996). Essentially, the objective of the research was to discover the extent of 
take-up of HRM practices in Britain and to isolate the views of fellows and 
members of the institute on aspects of competitive advantage.
The questionnaire was thus designed to shed light on a series of issues of 
relevance to the rise of HRM. More specifically, information was sought on 
which group within management had responsibility for a series of practices 
concerning:
Employee involvement covering areas as diverse as communications and 
joint consultation, collective bargaining and employee attitude surveys.
Training and development encompassing appraisal, management 
development and a variety of modern career, training and development 
approaches including Investors in People and National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQ).
Work practices such as job enrichment, broadly-defined jobs and 
employee responsibility for quality control.
• HRM approaches to rewards including profit sharing, profit-related pay, 
payment for quality and equal pay for equal work.
Questionnaires were posted to a random sample of fellows and members of the 
Institute of Management in January 1994 and, to increase in the response rate, 
there was a second posting in March 1994. From the original sample of 3,000 
there was 909 usable returns (a response rate of 30.3 per cent). This is not 
untypical of postal surveys and, in absolute terms, provides a substantial 
number of respondents on which to base our conclusions.
So far as the characteristics of the sample are concerned, 28 per cent of 
respondents were in general management, 13 per cent in operations 
management, 8 per cent in production/manufacturing, 8 per cent in 
marketing/sales, 5 per cent in personnel/human resources/industrial relations,
with the remainder spread over a wide range of management functions. A 
quarter of respondents worked in manufacturing/production, while 30 per cent 
were employed in the public sector. Respondents were predominantly from 
British-owned organizations (84 per cent).
As a background to the analysis which follows, it is worth noting that 
approximately two-thirds of respondents reported that the senior 
personnel/human resource manager in their organizations had representatives 
on the top policy committee or board. When compared with those with 
"personnel" in the title with those with "human resource", the most popular 
designation in British companies is still personnel (44 per cent) and human 
resource managers remain in a minority (17 per cent). Centralized headquarters 
was identified as having the major organizational responsibility for setting 
strategic personnel/human resources direction and policy in 70 per cent of 
cases. The HRM role is clearly identified with the views and concerns of 
management (67 per cent) rather than the views and concerns of employees (6 
per cent). Finally, respondents felt that the role should be clearly geared to the 
organization's internal needs (73 per cent) rather than involved in addressing 
societal issues outside the organization (10 per cent).
Turning more specifically, then, to responsibility for actual personnel/human 
resource practices, a word is in order first of all about the definition and 
measurement of the term responsibility. For the authors, responsibility implies 
a degree of formal decision-making control over a given set of issues. It can of 
course imply the initiation as well as actual operational responsibility for any 
given issue. Moreover, it can involve responsibility not only for establishing, but 
also for amending or withdrawing from specific human resource practices. On 
the basis of a questionnaire, we were only able to focus on operational 
responsibility as reported by respondents. Indeed, respondents were asked 
which of five main groups in their organizations are the most responsible for 
various practices. These comprised:
(1) the personnel/human resource department;
(2) another staff department;
(3) shared between personnel/human resource and other staff departments;
(4) shared between personnel/human resource and line management; and
(5) line management.
To isolate the main personnel/human resource practices, the "Harvard School" 
key policy-making areas were first isolated. These are:
• employee influence (involvement);
• human resource flows (including development issues such as appraisal, 
training and careers);










Specific practices were then identified under each heading to reflect, more 
specifically, the British situation (see Poole and jenkins, 1996, for further 
details).
Responsibility for employee involvement practices
HRM has, as one of its central tenets, the assumption that employees are the 
single most important asset of the organization. To the extent that this is the 
" case, to facilitate greater employee influence or involvement is clearly basic to 
successful human resource practices in the firm. However, there are three 
principal routes to greater employee involvement. The first is by legislated 
standards on employee participation (e.g. works councils, support for employee 
financial participation). The second is the traditional trade union mode of 
involvement linked with formal and informal collective bargaining. The third is 
initiatives by management to support employee participation in the work itself 
and to provide opportunities for employees to voice their views on 
developments and problems (see Beer et al, 1984; Poole and Mansfield, 1993). 
These are, in turn, linked with three principal systems of workplace governance 
based on either direct or representative forms of participation or a mixture of 
both:
(1) the legislated works council systems;
(2) voluntary union management joint agreements; and
(3) the non-union high commitment system (Cutcher-Gerschenfeld and 
Venna, 1994).
Respondents were asked to identify patterns of responsibility for various 
employee involvement practices that included elements of all three systems of 
workplace governance. The overall findings are set out in Table I, where it will 
be seen that, in terms of responsibility, line management is more important than 
personnel/human resource departments for most of these practices.
In more detail, then, for regular meetings between supervisors and 
workgroups/team briefing (the most widespread of the identified employee 
involvement practices), 70 per cent of respondents indicated that line 
management had responsibility. If a firm had quality circles, it was again highly 
probable that the line would be most responsible (58.5 per cent of respondents 
indicated this pattern). And the line was again highly involved in responsibility 
for job redesign (42.6 per cent of cases) and suggestion schemes (41.3 per cent of 
cases). The percentage figures were lower for joint consultation (36.2 per cent of 
cases), new technology agreements (34.9 per cent of cases), works councils (34.7 
per cent of cases) and informal collective bargaining (30.6 per cent of cases).
But in only two cases did personnel/human resources department have more 
responsibility than the line (formal collective bargaining, 33 per cent; and 
employee attitude surveys, 32 per cent). Moreover, shared responsibility 
between personnel/human resource departments and the line was most 
common in the case of handling individual grievances brought by union
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representatives (37 per cent). Organization newsletters were most commonly 
organized by another staff department (25 per cent). Overall, though, it is clear 
that line management is particularly central as far as responsibility for various 
employee involvement practices in Britain is concerned. 
A further analysis conducted at this point traces:
public-private sector difference in responsibility for various employee 
involvement practices;
variations relating to size of firm; and
• any linkage with whether or not the firm is expanding or 
stable/declining.
Taking the public-private sector differences, the significant differences are set out 
in Table II. The broad pattern is that responsibility in public sector organizations 
is relatively more likely to be vested in a personnel/human resource department 
or other staff department. In a private sector company, line management is 
particularly likely to be responsible for various employee involvement practices. 
Moving to size of firm, there are some interesting and not entirely consistent 
differences in patterns of responsibility reported by our respondents (see Table 
III). As is to be expected, however, the cases are fewer where line management 
responsibility is greater in the larger than in the smaller firms. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that the propensity for different functions to be responsible 
for employee involvement practices in the firm appears to be largely unrelated 
to whether or not the firm is expanding or stable/declining. Employee 
involvement may be a vita] component of HRM practices, but responsibility at 
least does not appear to be linked with the expansionary profiles of companies.
Training and development
A systematic policy on human resource development is also a key component of 
an integrative and systematic approach to HRM. So far as this particular study is 
concerned, it was not feasible to identify all the elements encompassed here. 
Hence, it was decided to concentrate on a range of training, development and 
career issues. Indeed, recent debates on the competitive advantage of companies 
and nations have increasingly focused on human resource development practices. 
Thus, in the USA, Dunlop (1992) has argued that resource development is basic to 
economic growth and development. And, in a recent rigorous study, Koch and 
McGrath (1996) were able to demonstrate that firms which systematically train 
and develop their workforces are more "likely to enjoy the rewards of a more 
productive workforce". Moreover, in Europe, based on the Price Waterhouse- 
Cranfield research, Hilb (1992) found human resource development to be the most 
important personnel practice in all the nations covered.
In Britain, there has been a long-standing debate on the problems faced by 
the British economy stemming from a deficiency in the skills of typical 
workforces. Indeed, in a variety of studies, the low levels of educational and 
training qualifications of British employees compared with their counterparts
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in competitor nations has been identified (Silver, 1991). However, there have 
undoubtedly been attempts to rectify this problem both at company level and 
by way of national and local institutional provision. Indeed, a wide range of 





(4) European issues; and
(5) the major public initiatives covering areas such as Investors in People, 
NVQs and credit accumulated learning.
Turning to our actual findings, respondents were asked to identify which of the 
five identified groups was largely responsible for these major practices in their 
organization. The details of these responses are set out in Table IV It will be 
noted that appraisal is an area where line responsibility occurs in 43 per cent of
ninel
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respondents' companies compared with only 9 per cent of cases where it is the 
responsibility of the personnel/human resources department (though in 35 per 
cent of cases there is a sharing of responsibilities here). Line management is also 
more typically responsible for coaching, counselling and mentoring (this was 
the case in 41 per cent of respondents' firms) compared with 11 per cent of firms 
where personnel/human resources department had responsibility. And a
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similar pattern is evident in respect of continuous self-development (37 line 
management; 10 per cent personnel/human resources department). In the case 
of many of the other practices, too, although the differences are less marked, line 
management is still typically more important than the personnel/human 
resources department. The relevant percentages for the following practices are 
thus: career path development (32 per cent; 14 per cent); competence-based 
training (32 per cent; 16 per cent); assessment of prior learning (31 per cent; 22 
per cent); negotiated learning programmes (31 per cent; 20 per cent) and credit 
accumulated learning (31 per cent; 22 per cent).
By contrast, in only two cases is the personnel/human resource department 
likely to have greater responsibility than line management. This thus applies to 
the Investors in People Initiative (28 per cent compared with 25 per cent) and 
European issues on training and development (28 per cent compared with 28 
per cent). But in neither case is the difference very marked. Shared 
responsibility is, however, rather more common and is typically the case for 
management development (35 per cent of respondents' companies) and career 
path development (35 per cent of respondents' companies). But overall our 
conclusion must be that line management has very marked responsibility for 
most training and development practices (either on its own or in conjunction 
with personnel/human resource departments).
Differences in patterns of responsibility for various training and 
development practices were also analysed according to whether or not the firm 
is:
(1) in the public or private sector;
(2) large or small in terms of number of employees; and
(3) either growing or stable/declining.
Taking first the public sector - private sector distinction, there are several 
significant differences in responsibilities for various training and development 
practices. But the broad pattern is for personnel/human resource departments 
and line management to be more dominant in the private sector. Other staff 
departments (or a sharing of responsibilities between personnel/human 
resource and another staff department) is correspondingly more likely in the 
public sector.
Competence-based training is to some extent an exception for whereas, in the 
public sector, 18.2 per cent reported the responsibility was under the aegis of 
the personnel/human resource department, only 15.8 per cent of colleagues in 
the private sector reported the same pattern. The figures for the various other 
practices are entirely consistent and for the Investors in People Initiative were 
(public sector 23.8 per cent; private sector 29.7 per cent); for NVQs (public 
sector, 21.4 per cent; private sector 28.4 per cent); training needs analysis (public 
sector 13.9 per cent; private sector 18.0 per cent); continuous self-development 
(public sector 7.9 per cent; private sector 10.7 per cent); credit accumulated 
learning (public sector 19.7 per cent; private sector, 24.3 per cent); negotiated
learning programmes (public sector, 16.9 per cent; private sector, 23.0 per cent); 
assessment of prior learning (public sector, 17.3 per cent; private sector, 25.6 per 
cent); and open learning (public sector 18.3 per cent; private sector 24.4 per 
cent).
The relative dominance of line management for responsibility for the various 
types of training and development practices in the private sector is also readily 
discernible. Thus, taking the private sector figures first and the public sector 
figures second in each case, the figures are as follows: competence-based 
training (34.1 per cent, 22.0 per cent); Investors in People initiative (27.5 per cent, 
16.9 per cent); NVQs (26.9 per cent, 23.3 per cent); training needs analysis (33.8 
per cent, 25.7 per cent); continuous self-development (38.2 per cent, 33.5 per 
cent); credit accumulated learning (37.3 per cent, 21.8 per cent); negotiated 
learning programmes (34.1 per cent, 25.7 per cent); and open learning (29.2 per 
cent, 21.5 per cent).
Moving next to examine the size of the firm and various types of training and 
development practices, not surprisingly, in the small firms (up to 500 
employees) line management tends to be typically more responsible than in the 
larger firms (more than 500 employees). The relevant percentages (taking the 
smaller firms first and the larger ones second in each case) are thus: 
competence-based training (42.6 per cent, 22.9 per cent); NVQs (34.5 per cent, 
20.2 per cent); coaching, counselling and mentoring (40.9 per cent, 42.5 per cent); 
career path development (38.8 per cent, 26.3 per cent), credit accumulated 
learning (41.8 per cent, 22.5 per cent); assessment of prior learning (39.9 per 
cent, 24.5 per cent); open learning (37.7 per cent, 20.2 per cent); management 
development (33.1 per cent, 15.0 per cent); and European issues on training and 
development (35.5 per cent, 21.9 per cent).
However, it should be noted that the different patterns of responsibility 
indicated above do not apply at all in respect of whether or not firms are 
growing and expanding or stable/declining. Certainly, it is not the case that 
either a strong personnel/human resources department or strong line 
management responsibility is linked with the various training and development 
practices identified in this study, and, in turn, with an expansionary profile of 
the firm itself.
Rewards
An inclusive and effective HRM strategy has a coherent approach to rewards as 
one of its central components (Armstrong and Murlis, 1991). Ideally, reward 
management strategies are interlinked with corporate strategies and comprise 
not only a basis for motivation and control; but also an incentive for higher 
productivity. A number of more specific pay strategies are available, including 
production-based pay, skill-based pay and knowledge-based pay (Brown, 1989). 
f'irst, production-based pay or job-based pay is associated with Taylorist 
methods of mass production and incorporates such systems as job evaluation 
and piece rates. Associated with this tradition, too, is the "rate of the job" and 








More recently, output or production rather than the job has become the central 
focus with performance-related schemes dominating British practice. Second, 
skill-based pay allocates differentials in pay based on differences in skills or 
competences of non-managerial employees. The employee's skill, not the 
outcome of the job, forms the basis of pay. Finally, knowledge-based pay is a 
form of skill-based pay but typically applies to managerial, professional and 
R&D employees. Pay is determined by the acquisition of knowledge, (e.g. in 
• terms of the depth of knowledge needed in a particular area (Lawler, 1990)).
In Britain, management strategies in the reward of employees in the 1980s 
and 1990s have placed a heavy reliance on incentives such as payment by 
results and performance pay. Indeed, in both the private and public sectors, 
performance-related pay (PRP) has been increasingly adopted. For instance, 
almost the whole of the Civil Service is now covered by performance pay and in 
1988, PRP was introduced into the Inland Revenue. Under this scheme staff 
could be awarded accelerated increments or so-called "range points" (i.e. up to 
three increments added to the top of the incremental scale) (Marsden and 
Richardson, 1994).
But who, it may be reasonably asked, has responsibility for the reward 
systems actually adopted by companies? Let us turn to our survey results, the 
distribution of responsibility for the reward systems which were identified as 
diverse (see Table V). Personnel/human resources departments have 
responsibility or reward practices in the following areas: save-as-you-earn share 
schemes (37 per cent), equal pay for equal work (36 per cent), fringe benefits (33 
per cent), and executive share schemes (32 per cent). However, as in other areas, 
the importance of line management: should not be underestimated. Line 
management has responsibility for reward practices in the following areas: 
payment for quality (39 per cent), production-based pay (37 per cent), individual 
bonus schemes (35 per cent), plant-wide bonus schemes (34 per cent), payment 
by results/performance-related pay (33 per cent), profit sharing (with cash 
awards) (33 per cent), profit-related pay (32 per cent), skill-based pay (31 per 
cent), knowledge-based pay (32 per cent), and profit sharing (with shares in the 
organization) (29 per cent).
Further analysis of public sector and private sector differences in 
responsibility for reward practices shows only one significant issue - that of 
skill-based pay. Line managers had much greater responsibility for skill-based 
pay than (heir counteiparts in the public sector. Also shared responsibility and 
the responsibility of other staff departments was also greater in the public 
sector. Greater differences existed in examining size of organization. Smaller 
rather than larger organizations tended to delegate responsibility to the line, 
whereas larger organizations tended to give responsibility to the 
personnel/human resources department. This may be partly to do with the 
growth of organizations and the need for personnel specialists to deal with 
organizational complexity. Larger organizations also tended to share 
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The allocation of responsibility for reward practices to the personnel/human 
resources department also appeared to be linked to stable/declining 
organizations rather than with growing organizations in the following areas: 
equal pay for equal work (39.6 per cent, 24 per cent); save-as-you-earn share 
schemes (41.5 per cent, 17.7 per cent); and profit sharing wilh shares in the 
organization (32.7 per cent, 15.9 per cent). Whereas where these responsibilities 
were shared with other staff departments organizations tended to be growing 
rather than stable/declining. This was the case for equal pay for equal work 
(16.4 per cent, 12.0 per cent); save-as-you-earn share schemes (19.0 per cent, 12.2 
per cent) and profit sharing with shares in the organization (32.7 per cent, 15.9 
per cent). Also, growing organizations tended to place greater responsibility for 
reward practices on line management.
Work practices
A fourth area encompassed in a comprehensive human resource strategy is the 
structuring of work activities to enhance high commitment. Part ly this links 
with traditional job design methods but it is also associated with various "new 
paradigms" such as flexible specialization, post-Fordism and lean production. 
In any event, new forms of work organization are undoubtedly emerging linked 
with new forms of technology and increasingly open markets.
Two major approaches still dominate the analysis of work organization and 
practice: scientific management or Taylorism (Littler, 1982; Taylor, 1911); and 
the strategies of "responsible autonomy" and "flexible specialization" (Piore 
and Sable, 1984; Sable, 1982; Trist et al, 1963). The former has been associated 
with traditional models of personnel management and its role in the 
development of more sophisticated work design methods involving more 
humane work practices under Taylorism - generally referred to as the Quality 
of Working Life (QWL) movement. The latter in contrast has been associated 
with developments in strategic HRM, functional flexibility and the 
encouragement of employee "responsibility" and "commitment".
Personnel policies in the area of work design were first concerned with 
aspects of job rotation and enlargement. These were the first work design 
techniques to be advocated as an antidote to Tayloristic methods. For example, 
job enlargement involves the recombination of tasks previously separated by 
Taylorism. In periods of full employment they were probably viewed as simple 
ways of reducing the costs of turnover, absenteeism and conflict generated by 
Taylorist methods.
Work design methods based on theories of motivation in terms of composite 
roles or autonomous work groups and job enrichment were introduced in the 
1960s and 1970s. But these work design methods have probably had limited 
impact in Britain. As Buchanan (1989, p. 92) notes:
... work design has tended to be regarded and applied as an isolated management technique 
aimed at local organizational problems and at individual jobs and work groups, rather than 









However, Buchanan (1989) identifies three developments which may lead to a 
re-assessment of work design in the 1990s:
(1) increased competition for trade, both domestically and internationally;
(2) the impact of stress on work performance; and
(3) the introduction of new technology.
. New technology and marketplace competitiveness are clearly transforming 
workplace relationships. In response to these development managers have 
introduced flexible working strategies to respond to these changes and have 
also made use of the new technologies to improve their competitive advantage; 
not more so than in work design.
In relation to these themes, in our survey respondents were asked who was 
responsible for various practices and it is clear that there is line dominance in 
almost all areas (see Table VII). In more detail, the dominance of line 
management was exemplified in employee responsibilities in the areas of 
scheduling of work (72 per cent), inventory control (69 per cent), budgeting (68 
per cent), quality control (65 per cent) and in providing feedback on results (62 
per cent). Moreover, line management still has considerable responsibility in 
work practices, even when shared with the personnel/human resources 
department.
The analysis of public-private sector differences in responsibility for various 
work practices pointed to significant differences in job enlargement and 
employee responsibility for budgeting and quality control. In terms of job 
enlargement, respondents reported private sector line management having 
greater responsibility for job enlargement than their counterparts in the public- 
sector (47.3 per cent and 35.3 per cent, respectively). With regard to employee 
responsibilities for budgeting, line managers in the private sector clearly have 
greater responsibility than their counterparts in the public sector (69.5 per cent 
and 58.2 per cent, respectively). The private sector also provides for greater line 
responsibility for quality control than the public sector (71.4 per cent and 61.1 
per cent). Clearly significant differences exist in the distribution of 
responsibility in these areas between the public and private sectors. However, 
the dominance of the line is apparent in both sectors.
Generally (and perhaps surprisingly) smaller firms are somewhat more 
likely to have personnel/HRM responsibility for work practices with the 
exception of broadly-defined jobs. Moreover, other staff departments are likely 
to have greater responsibility in this area, the smaller the size of the 
organization. Also, the larger the organization, the more likely line management 
has to share responsibility with personnel/human resources departments. But 
overall, the differences are small and line management dominance remains the 
norm regardless of size of enterprise. Moreover, no significant differences were 
found in the responsibility for work practices and whether the organization was 
growing, stable or declining.
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So far, then, on the basis of the results from a national survey, the important 
degree of responsibility of line management, as opposed to personnel/human 
resource departments, for various practices encompassing employee 
involvement, training and development, rewards and work systems, has been 
charted. It remains to develop those conclusions to which special saliency is 
attached and to draw out various implications of our findings for ongoing 
debates on the patterns of responsibility for personnel/HRM practices in the 
modern enterprise.
Overall, our first conclusion must be that line management is far more 
responsible for human resource practices than might have been supposed. They 
are dominant in terms of responsibility for most employee involvement 
practices, most types of training and development and most work systems. It is 
only in respect of rewards that the personnel/human resource department 
appears to have a far greater role and even here line management's role is 
important. To be sure, we cannot comment on whether or not this applies at a 
policy level; but our findings are highly instructive about modern practices.
There are, also, public-private sector differences which merit comment. 
Broadly speaking, there is a greater role for personnel/HRM departments in the 
public sector, partly because of bureaucratization, partly because of enterprise 
size and partly because of the higher levels of union activity. This is not 
overwhelmingly the case but there are clearly inter-sector differences in 
responsibility for human resource practices in Britain.
Not surprisingly, too, there is an effect of size of enterprise. Essentially the 
larger firms are more likely to have a greater role for (he personnel department. 
However, even in larger firms, line dominance is the central pattern in respect of 
operational responsibility for most personnel/human resource practices. But, 
little relationship was found between the expansionary profiles of firms and 
whatever or not particular modes of human resources practice were under the 
aegis of line management.
Turning to the main approaches to understanding the relative impact of 
personnel/human resource departments and line management on actual 
practice, the first proposition which stresses a historically strong role for line 
management is almost certainly sustainable. Indeed, our data in this respect are 
broadly consistent with the limited findings which have appeared in earlier 
studies. This thus lends weight to the view that, in British firms, line 
management has traditionally assumed a major responsibility for actual 
practices and especially for employee involvement, training and development, 
and various methods of work organization and design.
On the face of it, a "cyclical" view is persuasive but there is little hard 
evidence to sustain it. Of course, cross-sectional data of the type reported here 
are not a sound basis for assessing complex historical measurements. But on 
the basis of our data which revealed a very circumscribed effect of the 
expansionary profiles of companies on responsibility for personnel/human
resource practices, it would be difficult to argue for major shifts in pattern 
depending on expansionary periods in the overall economy.
But has there been a secular shift to the line in terms of responsibilities for 
personnel practices in Britain in recent years? One way of conceptualizing Ihis 
is on the basis of the hard and soft versions of HKM used by Storey (1992) and 
to argue that:
(1) the evidence points to the hard version becoming increasingly dominant; _ 
and
(2) that the basis for efficiency in the utilization of human resources is via
the line.
Moreover, it would appear to be the case that the more modern human resource 
practices (e.g. for training and development and work organization) do appear 
to have an especially marked pattern of line involvement. 1 lowever, a stronger 
indication from the evidence is that the personnel department is likely to be 
actually involved when either there are strong state initiatives which require 
systematic handling at local levels or where trade unions are relatively powerful 
or where there is a combination of these two sets of influences. Hence, relatively 
significant personnel department involvement was discovered for such issues 
as the Investors in People initiative on the one hand, and equal pay for equal 
work, save-as-you-earn schemes and executive share schemes on the other, 
where there are complex legislative provisions which require sophisticated 
handling at local levels (Poole, 1989; Poole and Jenkins, 1990). Moreover, trade 
union strength appears to be linked with a greater personnel department role 
and this applies particularly to employee involvement practices based on the 
trade union channel, such as formal collective bargaining. In short, if there has 
been any shift to the line, it is almost certain that an important part of this 
explanation is the declining influence of trade unions in the actual enterprise 
itself.
The final argument in the various debates on the role of the personnel 
department addresses the issue of diversity and stresses complex patterns of 
practice both internationally and between companies in Britain. It is clear, first 
of all, that there are some important effects of whether or not the organization is 
in the public or private sector and of the size of the enterprise. Indeed, as we 
have seen, personnel department responsibility is typically greater in the public 
sector and in the larger rather than the smaller companies. Nevertheless, the 
overall pattern is, as we have argued, still one of considerable line dominance in 
respect of responsibility for most personnel practices. Indeed, even when the 
differences between sectors and according to enterprise size are significant they 
do not generally indicate a highly contrasting pattern. It is more accurate to 
view these differences as a matter of degree in the extent to which an overall 
pattern of line dominance obtains in respect of responsibility for operational 
practices.
Nonetheless our overall conclusion is that it remains likely that one of the 









as opposed to personnel departments) has been overstated. To be sure, at least 
in respect of actual practice, the pattern in Britain at least seems to be typically 
one of line dominance, but this has almost certainly been historically the case 
rallier than it representing a new wave or a "new movement" associated with 
the rise of HRM itself.
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Trade unions and the training
of health and safety
representatives
Challenges of the 1990s
David Walters
Centre for Industrial and Environmental Safety and Health, 
South Bank University, London, UK
Introduction
The role of health and safety representatives and the importance of training in 
supporting their activities is relatively neglected in both the academic and 
professional literature. In studies that have considered the detailed operation of 
the Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977 in the UK, 
training has been shown to make an important supportive contribution to the 
effectiveness of representatives^ ,2]. The most significant providers of this 
training are the TUC and its affiliated trade unions.
In October 1996 new legislation on consultation of employees and their 
representatives in health and safety came into force. There has already been 
some discussion concerning the likely impact of the new provisions on 
workplace health and safety representation in general[3-7], but the specific 
relevance of training to the future implementation and operation of the new 
provisions has not been discussed in depth.
This article focuses on some of the influences that have helped to shape the 
content and provision of trade union training during recent years and those that 
will influence its future development, including the introduction of the new 
legislative provisions for employee representation. The paper is based on 
research sponsored by the Trade Union Technical Bureau for Health and Safety 
and undertaken in 1995 in Britain and several other countries during a 
European survey of provisions for education and training in health and safety 
offered by trade unions. The research examined the provision of mainstream 
trade union education in health and safety through interviews with trade union 
educators and health and safety officials in eight countries including Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK, as well as through 
the examination of documentary material. The full report of the survey fully 
describes its extent and methodology[8], and a recent article based on the 
survey .has discussed the role of training in health and safety in relation to the 
changing pattern of industrial relations in Europe in the 1990s[9].
Drawing on the same material, the present article focuses on:
•' organization of trade union training in the UK with particular reference 
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Abstract
Compares the human resource management practices adopted by the manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing sectors in the UK, establishing the extent to which various policies and practices 
have been developed. Concludes that few difference can be found in human resource 
management practices between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, with the noted 
exception of the continued use of trade union-based forms of employee involvement in 
manufacturing concerns coupled with the use of collective rather than individual reward systems.
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Developments in human resource 
management in manufacturing in modern 
Britain
Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins
Abstract In this paper, developments in human resource management in manufacturing 
in modern Britain based on a national sample are examined. The organization and role of 
human resource management, employee involvement, training and development, work 
practices and rewards are all targeted tor an assessment of current practices. This is a 
prelude for a contrast between manufacturing and non-manufacturing. The conclusion is 
that the similarities between manufacturing and non-manufacturing substantially out­ 
weigh the differences. By inference, too, developments in human resource management 
practices are likely to reflect changes in the broader environment of businesses (and 
differences between companies) rather than being specific to the main industrial 
sectors.
Keywords Human resource management, organization and role, employee involve­ 
ment, training and development, work practices, rewards, manufacturing and [Kin- 
manufacturing
Introduction
Does manufacturing really matter? In certain fundamental respects this is incontestable 
in that: (a) advanced successful economies arguably have strong tiers of supporting 
activities (agriculture, manufacturing, services); (b) world trade is predominantly 
in manufacturing; and (c) technological advances are particularly important in the 
manufacturing sector. However, in respect of employment relations, there remains a 
basic issue of whether general trends ami patterns in given socio-political and eco­ 
nomic contexts transcend differences between the main employment sectors. Moreover, 
in respect of the adoption of human resource management policies and practices in 
modem Britain, our general conclusion, from an original database, is that the 
similarities between manufacturing and non-manufacturing (at least within the private 
sector) are almost certainly substantially greater than Ihe differences.
The aim of this paper, then, is to examine the patterns of adoption of human resource 
management policies and practices in Britain focusing on the manufacturing sector. Its 
origins may be traced to an interest in establishing the extent to which, in companies in 
Bntain, various policies and practices in human resource management have been 
developed. There have, of course, been an increasing number of empirical studies in 
Britain in which attempts have been made to draw out some of the main patterns (e.g. 
Storey, 1992; Purcell and Ahlstrand, 1994; Sisson, 1993); and these have been 
augmented by major international studies (e.g. the Price Waterhouse/Cranfield 
European researches and the world-wide future-oriented study conducted under the 
auspices of IBM and Towers Perrin). But there have been few genuinely national
0985-5192 © Chapman & Hall 1997
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sluiiies, in which the main issues involved here have been the focal points of the 
investigation.
The survey
The 'methodological' basis of this paper is a survey of fellows and members of the 
Institute of Management conducted in J994. Eight main categories of issue were 
encompassed in the questionnaire.
1 The role of human resource management in the strategies of the firm, the 
nomenclature, organization and recruitment of the personnel/human resource depart­ 
ment and details on the human resource management role.
1 The adoption of human resource policies for gaining competitive advantage focusing 
on: corporate development, training and development, communications and participa­ 
tion, employee welfare and rewards and performance.
3 Employee involvement concerning areas as diverse as communications and joint 
consultation, collective bargaining and employee attitude surveys.
4 Training and development encompassing appraisal, management development and a 
variety of modern career, training and development approaches, including Investors 
in People and National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs).
5 Work practices such as job enrichment, broadly defined jobs and employee 
responsibility for quality control.
o Human resource management approaches to rewards, including profit sharing, profit- 
related pay. payment for quality and equal pay for equal work.
7 The effects of the business environment on future developments in personnel/human 
resource management, such as increasing competition, changing employee values and 
European applications and developments.
8 Demographic and other information on such issues as respondents' jobs, functions, 
their educational backgrounds and inter-firm mobility.
Questionnaires were posted to a random sample of fellows and members of the Institute 
of Management in January 1994 and, to increase the response, there was a second 
posting in March 1994. From the original sample of 3,000 there were 909 usable returns 
(a response rate of 30.3 per cent). This is not untypical of postal surveys and, in 
absolute terms, provides a substantial number of respondents upon which to base our 
conclusions. In respect of manufacturing, 25 per cent of respondents indicated that the 
activity of their organizations was manufacturing/production. But, if we confine our 
unalysis to private manufacturing organizations, there were 218 valid cases in all.
Debates and findings
The original data presented in this paper are designed to amplify many of the central 
debates on actual human resource management practices in manufacturing in Britain. 
We begin by examining the nomenclature and structure of the personnel/human 
resources department. Four main areas have then been targeted for more detailed 
analysis: employee involvement; training and development; work practices and 
rewards. We examine first the patterns of adoption of various practices under each of 
these heads. This is a prelude to a more detailed analysis of the issue of whether the 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors have different experiences in these 
respects.
Developments in human resource nitiiuigenicnl in nuiiiufiii'liiring 843 
Human resource management: organization and role
A larae number of conceptual models exist concerning the role of personnel/human 
resource managers and these provide insights into its complex and tragmenled nature 
As Sisson (1989) informs us, the role may differ depending on business strategy, 
organizational structure, degree of centralization or de-centralization, ownership and 
age of organization, to name but a few. However, despite the level of complexity 
and fragmentation of the personnel role, three conflicting viewpoints can be 
identified.
The first is that, because of the decline in trade union power, the role of personnel 
managers is in terminal decline and is being replaced by the line management (unction. 
Linked into this view is that (he primary (unction of personnel managers in the posl-ivar 
period was that of industrial relations. The decline in trade union power has meant that 
this specialist role is becoming obsolete. This has had implications beyond the industrial 
relations function and has led to a re-evaluation of the role and to the belief that 
personnel/human resource managers should no longer have responsibility for such Key 
functions as recruitment and selection but that these should be devolved down the 
line.
The second view is that personnel/human resource managers should become 
integrated into the management team and identify more closely with the overall aims of 
the organization. They should also adopt a more strategic focus on the management 
of people and work closely with the line on operational issues. Central to this argument 
is the involvement of the personnel specialist on the board of directors or his/her 
participation in strategic decision making at every level of the organization.
The third view is that of the status quo. As Legge (1989) has concluded, the above 
views of the personnel/human resource management role are incompatible with existing 
UK industrial relations institutions and structures. A movement towards an inlegrative 
or 'HRM' approach in terms of initiatives such as communication, involvement and 
training is not seen as feasible without changing the nature of industrial relations 
management fundamentally. A more significant change towards HRM would be 
evidence which pointed to strategic integration of a form which confronted the 
industrial relations institutions of the past, i.e. flexibility, job design and reward 
systems. However, where strategic integration can be identified, limitations exist at the 
level of implementation because of existing industrial relations structures winch in 
manufacturing, arguably, have not altered so fundamentally.
First, then, we felt it important to inquire of the respondents whether (he top 
personnel/human resource manager in their organizations had representation on the top 
policy committee, e.g. board of directors. Respondents reported a high incidence of 
such representation (67.9 per cent).
Moreover, respondents were asked to identify the lop personnel/human resource 
manager in their organization from a selection of traditional designated titles extracted 
from the titles of members of the Personnel Professional Lead Body. Table 1 shows the 
designated tides of the most senior personnel manager within their manufacturing 
organizations. The importance of directorates in this role, and in particular, managing 
directors, should be noted. Interestingly, !7.9 per cent of manufacturing organizations 
did not have a traditional title for their head of personnel. When comparing those with 
personnel in the title with those with human resource, the most popular designation is 
personnel (47.9 per cent) and human resource managers remain in a minority (18.5 per 
cent).
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Centralized headquarters was the major organizational unil responsible for setting strategic 
personnel/human resources direction and policy in 56 per cent of cases. Personnel 
departments in manufacturing, whether centralized or not, were reported to be primarily 
organized on & flexible basis, i.e. around the work to be clone (51.8 per cent) rather than 
•a functional basis i.e. specific areas like recruitment (41.3 per cent). In the majority of 
personnel departments (56 per cent), the ratio of human resources staff to the total work­ 
force over (he last five years has remained stable. None the less, a decrease was experienced 
in 18.3 per cent of manufacturing organizations and an increase in only 11-9 per cent, 
perhaps indicating a decline in personnel staff overall.
Employee Involvement
Human resource management has, as one of its central tenets, the assumption that 
employees are Ihe single most important asset of the organization. To the extent that 
Ihis is the case, lo facilitate greater employee influence or involvement is clearly basic 
to successful human resource practices in the firm. As the Harvard group has noted in 
the classic book Human Resource Management;
This policy area (employee influence) has to do with :\ key question that all managers 
must ask: how much responsibility, authority, and power should the organization 
voluntarily delegate and to whom? If required by government legislation to bargain wilh 
unions or consult with worker councils, how should management enter into these 
institutional relationships? Will they seek to minimise the power and influence of these 
legislated mechanisms? Or will they share influence ami work to create greater 
corigruencies of interests between management and the employee groups represented 
through Ihese mechanisms? The managerial task here is to develop the organisation's 
policy regarding the ainount of influence employee stakeholders have with respect to 
such diverse matters as business goals, pay, working conditions, career progression, 
employment security, or the task itself; and to attempt to implement these policies. 
Inevitably, decisions about employee influence affect traditional management decisions 
whether they are made explicitly, or as is often the case, implicitly.
(Beer et a/., 1985: 8)
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There are three principal routes to greater employee involvement. The first is by 
legislated standards on employee participation (e.g. works councils, support for 
employee financial participation). The second is the traditional union mode of 
involvement linked with formal and informal collective bargaining. The third is 
initiatives by management to support employee participation in the work itsell and to 
provide opportunities for employees to voice their views on developments and 
problems. Typically British management has supported individnalislic task-based 
practices, but has been more opposed to collectivism trade union-based participation 
(see Poole and Mansfield, 1993).
To try and establish how far these practices have been adopted in British 
manufacturing organizations we asked respondents about the extent to which tiieir 
organizations were involved in a variety of forms of employee involvement. The results 
are set out in Table 2. It will be seen thai the communications forms of involvement 
were particularly common. Thus, 59.1 per cent of respondents reported that their 
organizations were fully or considerably involved in regular meetings between 
supervisors and work groups/team briefing. Moreover, 44.6 per cent of respondents 
indicated that their organizations made full or considerable use of organization 
newsletters.
But a common group of practices in manufacturing remains various trade union- 
based or consultative modes of employee involvement. Thus, 46.3 per cent of 
respondents reported either full or considerable involvement in the handling of 
individual grievances brought by union representatives. Also, Ihe relevant figures for 
joint consultation with employees and for formal collective bargaining were 43.2 per 
cent and 41.6 per cent respectively. Moreover, it is of interest to note the limited 
involvement in quality circles, works councils and suggestions schemes. After all, m Ihe 
rhetoric of best practice in manufacturing, quality circles and suggestions schemes are 
frequently stressed. This could be because Britain still lags behind world-wide best 
practice, but it may be that the adoption of these employee involvement practices has 
been overstated.
About a quarter to a third of respondents reported that their manufacturing firms 
made full or considerable use of suggestions schemes, job redesign, employee attitude 
surveys, management committees and quality circles. Moreover, works councils and 
productivity bargaining featured in roughly six in ten firms in manufacturing.
Training and development
Turning to human resource development issues, recent debates on competitive 
advantage have focused increasingly on these matters. For instance, in the USA, Dunlop 
(1992) has argued that economic growth and improvement in productivity depend on 
four basic factors: research and development, investment in plant and equipment, 
investment in infrastructure and investment in human resource development. In his 
view, human resources development and the creation of a more productive, skilled and 
adaptable work-force in turn depends on six factors: (I) the educational system, (2) 
health care, (3) training and retraining, (4) family policy, (5) labour management 
policies at the workplace and (6) the general health of public service in the country. In 
addition, in a major survey of Western European nations, human resource development 
was found to be the most important personnel function in all the main countries 
covered, and more important than, say, compensation, industrial relations or productiv­ 
ity management (Hilb, 1992).
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A wide range of practices have emerged in Britain in receni years in respect of 
human resource development. Five main emergent trends may lie isolated: (I) appraisal. 
(2) management development, (3) career development, (4) European issues and (5) the 
major public initiatives covering areas Such as Investors in People, National Vocational 
Qualifications (NVQs) and credit accumulated learning. An Investor in People in Ihe 
UK is a firm which not only regularly reviews the training and development needs of 
employees but also takes action to train and develop individuals on recruitment and 
throughout their employment. It also makes a public commitment from the top to 
develop all employees to achieve business objectives. National Vocational Qualifica­ 
tions are based on standards set by industry and are designed to be flexible. They are 
placed in a framework according to work and level (of which there are five with 
advancing competencies). These various practices were analysed in our survey and the 
evidence is set out in Table 3 where it will he seen that appraisal featured as the most 
pervasive of ail the listed training and development practices in modern manufacturing. 
Indeed, 58 per cent of respondents indicated that, in their organizations, there was cither 
full involvement or considerable involvement in appraisal. Only 12.7 per cent of 
respondents said that there was no involvement in these practices.
Management development also appears to he well entrenched, with 41 per cent 
indicating full or considerable involvement and only 12.7 per cent suggesting no 
involvement in this important practice in their organisations. Competence-based 
training appears to be widespread, with 40.2 per cent indicating either full or 
considerable involvement and only 16.9 per cent indicating no involvement in this 
practice in their organizations. And, with training needs analysis, 40.6 per cent of 
respondents reported full or considerable involvement, with only 17 per cent reporting 
no involvement.
As far as the important recent public initiatives in NVQs and Investors in People are 
concerned, the involvement of British manufacturing organizations appears to be less 
well developed than in the case of the other practices which we have so far identified. 
In respect of NVQs, 28 per cent of respondents reported full or considerable 
involvement, but a further 33.8 per cent indicated lhat their organizations were not 
involved at all. It was reported by 22 per cent of respondents that for the Investors in 
People Initiative there was either full or considerable involvement in their organiza­ 
tions, but, at the other extreme, 40.7 per cent reported no involvement.
Three further training and development practices are at least reasonably common in 
British organizations. Thus 25.6 per cent of respondents reported either full or 
considerable involvement in coaching, counselling and mentoring, while continuous 
self-development and career path development were widespread in aboui a fifth of 
organizations.
Several recently well-publicized practices in training and development do not appear 
to feature prominently in British manufacturing organizations. Over four in ten of 
respondents reported that their organizations had no involvement in open learning; and 
over a half reported no involvement in the assessment of prior learning. A further 60.8 
per cent indicated that there was no involvement in European issues in training and 
development and the respective percentages for credit accumulated learning and 
negotiated learning programmes were 62.3 per cent and 68.7 per cent. There is clearly, 
therefore, a very uneven picture in respect of the adoption of these human resource 
development practices, with some forms featuring strongly but others not being present 
(other than in superficial ways) at all in modern manufacturing organizations.





> co ri co co
^ o r-i —i i— CN oo oo
j ^- ai oo •/") r 
! in r-i o os v
« 'C
c 2
oa - -S ^ -a
c c rt ^j c'S ^ ?; •= 3 "
g'&P?^
u rt ;—"8 1 e-.s
• Wj c
S .£ § S-e
£ ^i E th'c r
o S « 2 '§ 3•5 G — D. b -u
> g* o o» £
•o T, 'S .S c
-il'^«5w.g^-s^SS
• *£ "D C cjj2 C'c" Cg c^'c ^i w CQ c~"
O-E'S '•'^"j^co QJ C — -- - — n,
-JuHS-SZCJOOO^ZWC."
Work practices
Two major approaches dominate the analysis of work organization and practice: 
scientific management or Taylorism (Taylor, 1911; Liltler, 1982) and the stiategie.s of 
'responsible autonomy' and 'flexible specialization' (Trist, 1963, Sabel, 1982; Piore 
and Sabel, 1984). The former has been associated with traditional models of personnel 
management and its role in the development of more sophisticated work-design 
methods involving more humane work practices under Taylorism - generally referred to 
as the quality of working life (QWL) movement. The latter, in contrast, has been 
associated with developments in strategic human resource management, functional 
flexibility and the encouragement of employee 'responsibility' and 'commitment'.
Personnel policies in the area of work design were first concerned with aspects of job 
rotation and enlargement. These were the (irst work-design techniques to be advocated 
as an antidote to Tayloristic methods. For example, job enlargement involves the 
recombination of tasks previously separated by Taylorism. Jn periods of full 
employment they were viewed as simple ways of reducing the costs of lumovei, 
absenteeism and conflict generated by Taylonst methods.
Work-design methods based on theories of motivation in terms of composite roles or 
autonomous work groups and job enrichment were introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Of these methods, job enrichment has been easily the more popular in practice. Us 
popularity may have something to do with its goal of improving motivation and 
performance of employees without increasing wages and leaving organizational 
structures and managerial authority intact. In contrast, autonomous work groups rei|uire. 
at least, a re-evaluation of managerial authority in the workplace and the delegation of 
authority to the employee. These work methods have had limited impact in the UK As 
Buchanan notes:
Work design has lended to be regarded and applied as an isolated management technique aimed at local organisational problems and at individual jobs and work groups, rather than realising that it must be part of the whole company philosophy, through all levels, if it is to be really successful.
(Buchanan, 1989: 92)
However, Buchanan identifies three developments which may lead (o a reassessment of 
work design in the 1990s: (1) increased competition for trade, both domestically and 
internationally; (2) the impact of stress on work performance; (j) the new 
technology.
Two of these have a bearing on the second theme, namely, the strategy of flexible 
specialization. New technology and matketplace competitiveness are clearly transform­ 
ing workplace relationships. In response to these developments, managers have 
introduced flexible working strategies and have also made use of the new technologies 
to improve their competitive advantage, no where more so than in work design.
We asked respondents the extent to which their organizations were involved in a 
number of work practices. As can be seen from Table 4, quality control and informing 
employees of results (in terms of costs, yields, production, quality or customer 
complaints) are common working practices of the 1990s. Indeed. 67.6 per cent of 
respondents indicated that their organizations had full or considerable involvement in 
giving employees responsibility for quality control. Similarly. 53 per cent of 
respondents reported that feedback to employees on results was an important feature of 
the work practices in their organizations.
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Job design, broadly defined jobs, employee responsibility for scheduling work and 
employee responsibility tor inventory control were also found to be common practices 
in manufacturing in Britain. Thus, the percentages of respondents reporting full or 
considerable involvement in these four work practices were 35.) 30.4, 27.7 and 24.9 
respectively. Job enlargement (22.3 percent) and combined tasks (composite rules) (22 
per cent) also appear to be quite commonly well developed, with full or considerable 
involvement. Other working practices have not been widely adopted. Thus, the 
percentages of respondents reporting either full or considerable involvement in 
autonomous work groups was 19.3 per cent; employee responsibility for budgeting. 
19.1 per cent; and job enrichment, 17.6 per cent.
The introduction of some modem aspects of work organization is more limited than 
one would anticipate and many innovative practices seem to have had only a partial 
impact on work organization in Britain. However, what is clear is thai qualilv control 
anil communicating lo employees the results of their endeavours are central (o working 
practices today.
Rewards
Another key feature of modern approaches to human resource management, within 
manufacturing and elsewhere, is the system of rewards. According lo Armstrong and 
Murlis, 'reward management strategies and policies are driven by corporate and human 
resource management strategies' (1991:18). A number of pay strategies are available to 
management in the 1990s, including production-based pay, skill-based pay and 
knowledge-based pay. First, production-based pay or job-based pay is associated with 
Taylorist methods of mass production and incorporates such systems as job evaluation 
and price rates. Associated with this tradition too is the 'rate For the job' and notions of 
equality expressed now in UK public policy in the Equal Pay Act. More recently, output 
or production rather than the job has become the central focus with performance-related 
schemes dominating British practice. Second, skill-based pay allocates differentials in 
pay based on differences in skills or competencies of non-managerial employees. The 
employee's skill, not the outcome of the job, forms the basis of pay. Finally, 
knowledge-based pay is a form of skill-based pay but typically applies to managerial 
and professional employees. Pay is determined by the acquisition of knowledge, e.g. in 
terms of the depth of knowledge needed in a particular area (Lawler, 1990).
However, reward strategies not only involve remuneration but also non-monetary 
rewards. And generally the structure of the reward package is related to the job, the 
expectations of the employee and labour-market conditions. Moreover, one of the 
salient features of the 1980s and 1990s has been government intervention in the 
management of remuneration in terms of tax incentives for profit sharing and profit- 
related schemes. Their promotion in the 1980s (see Poole, 1989; Poole and Jenkins, 
1990) led to an upsurge in the take-up of such schemes. Growth has also been noted in 
harmonization policies, particularly in Greenheld sites which attempting to break away 
from the incentive-led strategies of the post-war period.
We asked respondents the extent to which their organizations were involved in a 
variety of reward practices. Table 5 shows the diversity of approaches operating in the 
respondents' organizations. The most common reward practices in manufacturing 
(using the full and considerable involvement responses) are: (I) equal pay for equal 
work (49.1 per cent); (2) skill-based pay (32.4 per cent); (3) executive share schemes 
(26.5 per cent); (4) save as you earn schemes (25.8 per cent): (5) payment by results/
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performance-related pay (24.8 per cent); (6) fringe benefits (24.7 per cent): (7) plant- 
wide bonuses (23.5 per cent): (8) production-based pay (21.3 per cent); (9) individual 
bonus schemes (21.4 per cent); (10) knowledge-based pay (20.2 per cent).
Clearly equal pay for equal work has become a significant feature of payment 
systems in the 1990s, with skilled-based pay, executive share schemes and save as you 
earn schemes being consequential approaches. Moreover, the importance of fringe 
benefits and plant-wide bonuses has not obviously waned Given Ihe importance of 
employee responsibility for quality initiatives in changes in work practices, reward for 
quality plays an insignificant role in reward management. And, in general, it is arguable 
that many distinctively human resource-style reward systems have noi been adopted as 
strongly as might have been expected in manufacturing in modern Britain.
Manufacturing and non-manufacturing
So far, then, we have examined the organization of the personnel/human resource role 
and the adoption of various human resource management practices in manufacturing 
enterprises in Britain. We now turn, more specifically, to our second theme: that is, can 
firms in the manufacturing sector be regarded as markedly different from other private 
non-manufacturing enterprises in Britain?
Taking first the organization of the personnel/human resource management role, in 
none of the instances examined is there significant difference to be observed. This 
applies to place on policy committee, title of personnel/human resources manager, 
whether the organizational unit responsible for personnel issues is at centralized 
headquarters, whether the role is organized on a functional or flexible basis and whether 
the personnel staff in the organization is likely to increase, decrease or remain the 
same.
However, in respect of employee involvement, a rather different and more complex 
pattern is evident. Using chi-squared values in respect of manufacturing/non 
manufacturing companies, based on each employee involvement item identified in our 
study, significant differences were observable for suggestions schemes (p<0.03), 
works councils (p < 0.001), productivity bargaining (p<0.00l), new technology 
agreements (p<0.05). formal collective bargaining (p < 0.001), informal collective 
bargaining (p < 0.05), management committees with employee or union representation 
(p < 0.001). and individual grievances brought by union representatives (p < 0.001). In 
all these respects, manufacturing enterprises were more likely than non-manufacturing 
enterprises to have these various forms of employee involvement.
However, the central explanation is almost certainly the higher degree of trade union 
recognition, organization and activity in manufacturing rather than non-manufacturing 
enterprises. Indeed, other types of employee involvement are neither more nor less 
likely to be present in manufacturing as opposed to non-manufacturing enterprises. 
Hence, it is not that manufacturing enterprises are more likely to have various forms of 
employee involvement as a consequence of favourable management initiatives; but 
rather, because of greater union activity, union-based forms of employee involvement 
are far more common in manufacturing concerns. Moreover, the findings reinforce the 
arguments presented earlier that the adoption of quality circles and suggestions schemes 
has been overstated in the literature. In addition, the likelihood of an association 
between union presence and certain forms of employee involvement reinforces the view 
of writers such as Sisson (1993) that, if anything, human resource management 
practices are enhanced by trade union activity.
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Training and development practices in Britain are typically similar for both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing concerns. There are slight differences in that 
continuous self-development (p < 0.001) and career path development (p < 0.005) are 
more common in non-manufacturing organizations as are accumulated learning 
programmes (p < 0.03) and coaching and menloring (p < 0.06). But for the vast 
majority of training and development practices identified in this study, there are no 
significant differences between manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
Among work practices, a similar argument applies. There is a greater propensity for 
non-manufacturing concerns to have employee responsibility for budgeting (p < 0.001) 
and for scheduling (p < 0 009) and there are smaller differences (in the same direction) 
for job design (p < 0.03) and broadly defined jobs (p < 0.05), whereas autonomous 
work groups are more likely to be present in manufacturing concerns (p < 0.03). 
However, given that so many of the work practices identified here are particularly 
associated with manufacturing, what is surprising is how similar are the patterns of 
adoption of work practices in firms across the different employment sectors.
In respect of rewards, too, the similarities between the manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing concerns outweigh the differences. Plant-wide bonuses (p < 0.001) and 
skill-based pay (p < 0.001) are more common practices in manufacturing. Meanwhile, 
performance-related pay (p < 0.001), individual bonuses (p < 0.003) and profit sharing 
through cash awards (p < 0.06) are more likely to have been adopted as reward 
practices in non-manufacturing. But the differences are not dramatic and are again best 
explained by the more common use of collective forms of remuneration in manufactur­ 
ing and individual forms of remuneration in non-manufacturing enterprises.
Conclusions
Our overall conclusion must be, therefore, that as far as the adoption of various human 
resource management practices is concerned, manufacturing per se does not greatly 
matter. In both manufacturing and non-manufacturing concerns there is likely to be:
1 participation at board level by the senior personnel officer;
2 the predominant title deployed to be personnel rather than human resources;
3 the personnel/human resources role to be organized flexibly and to be located at 
central headquarters;
4 stable employment in the personnel department hut for cases in which there is a
decline in staff to outweigh those where employment is increasing. 
Most training and development practices are just as likely or unlikely to be adopted in 
manufacturing as in non-manufacturing concerns. And, typically, the same argument 
can be applied to work practices and most forms of rewards. However, what is radically 
different is the continued use of trade union-based forms of employee involvement in 
manufacturing concerns coupled with the use of collective rather than individual reward 
systems. This may mean that the adoption of individual patterns of involvement and 
reward has proved to be more difficult to accomplish in manufacturing than non- 
manufacturing enterprises. But our view must be that, although there are interesting 
patterns of development in human resource management practices in modern Britain, 
these are typically common across the main employment sectors rather than being 
predominantly associated with manufacturing or non-manufacturing industries
themselves.
These findings have broader implications for a range of debates in the literature. 
MacDuffie (1995), in particular, was able to demonstrate the link between 'bundles' of
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innovative human resource practice and economic performance measured in terms 
of productivity and quality in automotive assembly plants. In this respect, the 
involvement of employees in such work practices as quality control discovered in the 
current study is interesting. But, on the basis of our data, the differences within 
manufacturing and services respectively appear to be far greater than the inter-sector 
differences. This may also reinforce the case that considerable differences still remain 
in the adoption of the most advanced human resource management practices in 
manufacturing internationally as well (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990).
Further debates about manufacturing have targeted such issues as manufacturing 
failure, post-Fordism, flexible specialization and globalization (see tor example, Storey, 
1994). These issues cannot be addressed at length in our conclusions but, in so far as the 
adoption of advanced human resource techniques, coupled with the abandonment of 
Tayiorislic production management arrangements, is critical to competitive success, it is 
clear (hat a transformation to 'new wave' manufacturing techniques has been only 
partially accomplished in the UK. Indeed, the movement towards greater flexibility may 
not in any event be consistent with advanced human resource management techniques, 
but rather with more numerical and financial flexibility as is evidenced by the greater 
use of part-time labour and lixed term contracts at the expense of the growth of core 
work-forces with multiple skills and competencies. Moreover, Tayiorislic methods of 
work organization not only appear to continue to persist in many parts of manufacturing 
but arguably have spread to the services Sector as well. This, in turn, may have helped 
to ensure the remarkable degree of comparability between these two sectors in respect 
of human resource management practices. Certainly this is our most central single 
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Introduction
This review article reflects on a variety of recent book publications which offer 
suggestions and insights about economic growth and the management of HR for 
business success. These publications vary in the extent of their specific focus on HR 
issues, but much of their analyses critique current business practices and present ideas 
for changing the way that contemporary organizations manage people. The authors are 
from a variety of backgrounds, including academics, consultants and business 
practitioners, and consequently draw on different perspectives to examine their subject. 
Therefore, in undertaking this review we are seeking to provide a broad exploration of 
the macro and micro imperatives which are shaping current HR practice. We are also 
keen to assess and present what is distinctive about these books in terms of the
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Abstract 
This paper looks at the extent of support for human resource management policies that link
employee performance to reward. Analyses the reasons for linking pay to performance and looks 
at the extent to which particular reward practices (profit sharing, skill-based pay, payment by 
results, etc.) are being used. Asks if structural factors (the nature of the organisation) or action 
(the choices made by managers in adopting particular strategies) is influential in the use of 
performance pay. Reports on a number of structural aspects - private v public sector, size, 
growth and also looks at the strategic role that human resource management departments play in 
their organisations. Concludes that British firms have largely adopted the idea that reward 
systems should be linked to performance, but finds a noticeable divergence between policy and 
practice. Considers the reasons for this and suggests a number of possible explanations.
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Human Resource Management and 
the Theory of Rewards: Evidence from 
a National Survey
Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins
Abstract
Tin's paper has two central aims. The first is descriptive mid entail!: tin 
examination of the extent to which firms in Britain have adopted per­ 
formance-related ('new pay') policies. The second is explanatory and involves 
the deployment of'structural'and 'acti<>n'approaches to account for ohscncd 
variations in policies mitt prttctifcs on rcinnneniiion in liritisli coinpanic'i. 
Original data hased on ii snrvcv of fellows and members of the Institute of 
Management inform the analysis. At an explanatory level, ideas are also 
presented to account for the gap between policies on remuneration and their 
implementation in actual practice.
1. Introduction
Within (lie wider human resource management debate, there has developed 
an interest in and a theoretical focus on the link between modern reward 
systems and 'high commitment management' (Wood 19%: Wood and 
Albanesc 1995). These are frequently seen to encompass socio-psycho- 
logical as well as material aspects of rewards; they are particularly associated 
with performance or contingent pay systems and, above all, they are seen to 
be rooted in the strategies of firms themselves (Lawler 1990). As has been 
argued, 'reward management strategies and policies' are 'driven by corpo­ 
rate and human resource management strategies' (Armstrong and Murlis 
1991). Corporate and human resource management strategies provide a 
stimulus for change and innovation in the management of remuneration. 
Kessler (1994), for example, has noted that performance pay has been 
increasingly used symbolically by employers as a lever for organizational 
change.
However, others have questioned the strategic and coherent nature of 
modern reward systems in Britain (Brown and Walsh 1991; Smith 1992.
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1993). Smith (1993) suggests that, compared with the USA, the develop­ 
ment of new reward systems in Britain has been much more circumscribed 
and far less coherent. Their adoption by employers is viewed as the product 
of 'management fads' — introduced into organizations often in the face of 
opposition from the personnel function; stimulated by political interven­ 
tion, particularly the introduction of financial participation schemes; and 
more prevalent in certain sectors than in others (e.g. finance). Brown and 
Walsh (1991) have also argued that changes in pay practices may have been 
more ad hoc than strategic and that apparent changes on the surface can be 
misleading. Both papers conclude that the traditional approach to re­ 
muneration in Britain of 'muddling through' continues to dominate. 
Moreover, the consistency of ad hoc approaches discloses the rhetoric of 
those claiming a new strategic and coherent focus to reward systems (Smith 
1992,1993).
Many of the issues encompassed here have also crystallized around the 
concept of the 'new pay' (Lawler 1990; Schuster and Zingheim 1992; Ulman 
1992). This is based on the notion of the 'fit' between rewards and the 
slralcgy of the firm, and between the flexibility and variability ofpay systems 
and unitarism in the decision-making processes whereby rewards are 
determined (Brown 1993; Metcalf 1993). It contrasts with the 'old pay', 
incorporating job-evaluated grade structures, payment by lime and seni­ 
ority, service-related benefits and pluralism (Heery 1996). The 'new pay' is 
also likely to encompass reward for competencies (especially skill and 
knowledge); this differs from the 'old pay', in which production or job- 
related characteristics were dominant (associated with Taylorist methods of 
mass production and piece-rate payment systems) (Heery 1996).
However, there is clearly a dearth of empirical evidence on the spread of 
new pay practices in Britain. The CBI/Hay (1996) survey, while finding that 
almost half of organizations had some change in their pay strategy or policy, 
found that the main areas of change were in salary structure and progression 
and the introduction of profit-related pay. They reported, however, that 
there was some increase in the proportion of variable pay to base pay, but 
mainly for management/professional employees and levels above and that 
this was more pronounced in the financial sector. The PSI survey (Casey et 
al. 1992) found that 81 per cent of organizations had introduced some form 
of merit pay, but again, this was concentrated in higher occupational groups 
even though it also included clerical and secretarial and sales staff. Also, the 
IMS/1PM survey (Bevan and Thompson 1991) emphasized that the policy 
approaches to managing performance were reward-led. 'Reward-driven 
integration' was the dominant mode being used in British industry. The 
emphasis on the bottom line was reaffirmed in the case-study stage of the 
research (IPM 1992; Fletcher and Williams 1992).
Against this backcloth, this paper has three central aims: (1) to set out 
explanations for the adoption of reward policies and practices based on 
'structural' and 'action' approaches; (2) to establish the extent to which 
human resource management approaches to rewards (and, by extension,
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elements of ihe 'new pay') are being adopted in British companies; and 
(3) to deploy original data from a British national survey of fellows and 
members of the Institute of Management to highlight these themes and 
issues.
2. Theories of rewards
The theoretical underpinnings of ongoing debates on developments in 
reward systems require greater sophistication. There are a range of 
explanations based on economic theory (Metcalf 1993; Ulman 1992). 
Moreover, debates on reward systems have frequently been grounded in 
contingency theory, focusing on environment-organization linkages. As 
Kessler (1995: 258) has argued, 'conceptual HRM models have highlighted 
the importance of pursuing a specific set of organisational goals as a means of 
addressing intensive competitive pressures and have suggested that reward 
is a key policy-making area or lever to be used in their achievement." But nn 
explanatory understanding of ihe adoption of different policies and 
practices on rewards rooted in 'structural' and 'action' approaches is also 
likely to prove fruitful.
The Structural Approach to Rewards
'Structural' approaches to rewards arc based on modern materialist 
approaches and entail the isolation of some of the diverse economic and 
technological conditions experienced by companies (Edwards 1986). The 
assumption is that, at any given point in time, 'material conditions" in any 
given society are dynamic and constantly changing. Some parts of the 
economy may be experiencing rapid advance while others are in terminal 
decline. The situation of large public companies is likely to be different from 
the small private concern. Moreover, the 'material' circumstances of any 
given company may well be markedly different from another in the same 
industrial sector, a situation that in turn may impact on the patterns of 
rewards adopted.
Three variables are likely to be consequential here: (1) public as opposed 
to private enterprise, (2) size of organization, and (3) whether or not the 
firm is expanding or contracting.
In a wide-ranging literature, the differences in reward systems in public 
and private enterprises have been identified (Bach and Winchester 1994). 
Of course, there may be increasing signs of 'convergence', and, in particular, 
the adoption of 'pay for performance' schemes has undoubtedly spread to 
some parts of the public sector (Beadle 1995; Elliott and Duffus 1996; 
Marsden and Richardson 1994). None the less, pay in the public sector is 
more likely to be the subject of collective agreement, and because of 
legislative constraints it is not feasible to develop profit-sharina and
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employee shareholding schemes in the publicly owned enterprise in the 
same way as in the private sector.
The effects of size of enterprise have been identified over a wide range of 
industrial relations phenomena (Millward 1994; Millward and Stevens 
1986). So far as rewards are concerned, in the larger-scale enterprise 
managements are more likely to develop sophisticated reward systems, even 
though collective rather than individual approaches to rewards are more 
common. And particularly, if the firm is publicly quoted, schemes for 
employee share ownership are likely to lie fostered (Poole and Jenkins 
19911).
'I here are also diverse rates of growth even among firms in the same 
industrial sector. The evidence certainly suggests that, in expanding firms 
with high levels of profitability, schemes for employee financial participation 
are particularly likely to emerge (Millward 1994; Millward and Stevens 
1986). But there are also strong grounds for supposing that individual 
incentives and a variety of human resource management conceptions of 
reward (including skill and knowledge-based pay) will be encouraged in the 
expanding company, where there is pressure on management to attract and 
retain high-quality employees (Kruse 1996).
The Action Approach to Rewards
'Action' approaches to the theory of rewards are linked with the notion of 
'strategic choice' (Kochan et al. 1984). The argument here is that there are a 
range of options open to management in the adoption of various policies and 
practices on rewards. These choices may be linked with diverse styles of 
industrial relations management (e.g., paternalism would be expected to be 
linked with seniority-based payment systems, 'constitutionalism' with 
collective bargaining arrangements and participative 'styles' with employee 
financial participation) (Purcell and Ahlstrand 1994). The adoption of given 
reward systems is seen greatly to depend on the choices of key managers 
(including those in personnel or human resources) and their relative power 
vis-a-vis their colleagues (and, of course, the other industrial relations 
'actors').
Potentially, there is a wide range of specific variables that may be isolated 
here, but three key areas in the literature seem to be especially relevant for 
pay and rewards: (1) the management of change; (2) strategies of the firm; 
and (3) the effects of strategy on the structure of management in the firm 
itself.
A wide-ranging literature has recently emerged on the management of 
change in organizations (Peitigrew et al. 1992; Wilson 1992). Early studies 
focused on productivity bargaining, which emerged as a consequence of 
organizations undergoing changes that were designed to make them 
increasingly competitive (Ahlstrand 1990; Flanders 1964). This was linked 
with collective bargaining, strong trade unions and pluralism. However, 
modern change processes have been seen to be increasingly concerned with
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decentralization, flexibility and consensus, and with far more variable, 
individualistic and unitarist patterns of reward (Wilson 1992).
No less important has been the focus on strategy (a central concept lo an 
action approach). Strategies may be regarded as consistent patterns in 
streams of decisions and actions (Miles and Snow 1978). Indeed, much of the 
human resource management literature has been devoted to the link 
between strategy and human resource practice (Beercr«/. 1985, Fombruner 
al. 1984; Hendry et al. 1995). In empirical research, the links between 
strategy and the key area of rewards have been increasingly recognized 
(Hendry ct al. 1995; Mabey and Mayon-White 1993). Moreover, conceptu­ 
ally, Lawler's (1990) identification of a strategic compass for pay (with a 
focus on incentive and merit pay) has been a seminal contribution. None the 
less, knowledge of the extent of the adoption of strategies on rewards in 
companies, and, in particular, their application in terms of reward practices, 
remains surprisingly circumscribed (Purcell and Ahlslrand 1994).
The choice of different management structures also is seen to depend 
greatly on the strategy adopted. Moreover, of signal importance is the 
strategic choice of key management to generate new organizational 
structures with horizontal rather than vertical characteristics (Dopson and 
Stewart 1993; Kanter 1989; Wilson 1992). Ostensibly, this has had fun­ 
damental consequences for middle management in terms of delayering and 
downsizing. In the UK delayering and downsizing is most common in large 
organizations, but half of all organizations have reported fewer levels in the 
managerial hierarchy and fewer employed (Wheatley 1992). Clearly, such 
choices are not made in all firms but are related to particular contexts. Also, 
consequences arise for the importance attached to careers and to service as 
aspects of rewards. In horizontal structures, for example, different career 
rules now apply, different experiences are required and the jumps between 
hierarchical levels are greater. Also, in terms of service, promotion is likely 
lobe rarer and lo entail greater responsibilities when accomplished (Arnold 
1997). However, Dopson and Stewart (1993) suggest that some of the more 
extreme predictions of the consequences of a movement to more horizontal 
decision-making structures for middle management and for existing reward 
systems have been exaggerated, even though some important effects can be 
detected.
Neither structural nor action approaches should be regarded as mutually 
exclusive. Indeed, both may sitape the adoption of reward systems, and the 
variables in each cluster may have a diverse impact depending on the specific 
type of reward that is under focus.
3. Tlie survey
In order lo examine reward systems as part of human resource management 
in the firm, data were obtained from a survey of fellows and members of the 
Institute of Management. Essenlially, the objective of the research was to
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discover the extent of take-up of human resource management policies and 
practices in Britain, to identify who was responsible for any given adopted 
practice, and to isolate the view of fellows and members of the Institute on 
aspects of competitive advantage.
The questionnaire was designed to shed light on a series of issues of 
relevance to the rise of human resource management. Questionnaires were 
posted to a random sample of fellows and members of the Institute of 
Management in January 1994, and, to increase the response rate, there was a 
second posting in March 1994. From the original sample of 3,000, there were 
909 usable returns (a response rate of 30.3 per cent). This is not untypical of 
postal surveys and, in absolute terms, provides a substantial number of 
respondents upon which to base our conclusions. It should be noted that the 
survey data present managerial perceptions of the state of HRM in their 
organizations; as such, responses to questions may be mediated by 
respondents' understanding and perception of, among other things, HRM 
ilself, and their image of themselves, their profession or the organizational 
context.
There is no direct evidence on the characteristics of non-respondents. But 
it is clear that respondents were over-represented in higher levels of 
management than is characteristic of firms in Britain as a whole. 
(Specifically, 73 percent of respondents reported that they were in senior or 
other higher management positions, with only 22 per cent in middle 
management and 3 per cent in junior management.) Respondents were also 
predominantly male (93 per cent), educated (96 percent reported having 'O' 
or 'A' level qualifications) and typically were employed in British-owned 
companies (84 per cent). A quarter of respondents worked in manufac­ 
turing/production, while 30 per cent were employed in public-sector 
organizations. There is a very low probability that there was a duplication of 
responses from a single organization. However, this probability may be 
higher in the public sector because of the increasing propensity of Institute 
of Management membership being employed in public-sector organ­ 
izations. These characteristics of the sample may not greatly have affected 
reported behaviour on rewards in firms; but they are acknowledged prior to 
the analysis that follows.
For further clarification, the scales used for the main 'structural' and 
'action' variables cited are described below. They include: Sector. 
\ = public sector; 2 = private company; 3 - voluntary sector; 4 = public 
limited company; and 5 = partnership/sole trader. These became 1 = 
'Public sector'; 2 = 'Private sector", including items 2, 4 and 5. ('Voluntary 
sector' was excluded from this analysis.) Size: 1 = fewer than 25 employees; 
2 = 26-50; 3 = 51-100; 4 = 101-500; 5 = 501-1,000; 6 = 1,001-5,000; 
7=5,001-10,000; 8=10,001-50,000; and 9 = over 50,000 employees. 
Expansion/contraction: 1 = growing; 2 = stable; and 3 = shrinking. HRM 
role in managing change: on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 = 'Is proactive in 
creating and managing change' and 5 = 'Responds to what management 
wants to change'. HRM role in strategic planning: on a scale of I to 5 where
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1 = 'Actively participates in strategic planning' and 5 = 'Concentrates on 
operational matters'. HRM role in supporting vertical management rather 
than horizontal: on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = 'Supports vertical manage­ 
ment of employees in typical hierarchical structure' and 5 = 'Facilitates 
horizontal management and the cultivation of all employees'.
4. Policies on rewards
This section focuses on the firm's policies on rewards where it is intended, 
first at a descriptive level, to shed light on the extent to which human 
resource management policies on rewards (and particularly the linking of 
rewards with performance) are supported in British companies. This is the 
prelude to an explanatory analysis deploying the key 'structural' and 'action' 
variables isolated earlier.
Debates on high commitment management and the 'new pay' have 
emphasized the importance of linking rewards with performance if an 
organization is to become fully competitive. In this study, a series of 
questions relevant to these debates were adopted that had been generated 
earlier in a world-wide study of human resource management conducted 
under the sponsorship of IBM and Towers-Perrin (see Sparrow et al. 1994). 
On the rewards and performance items, on five-point scales (running from 
'strongly supports' to 'strongly against'), respondents were asked: 'To what 
extent does your organization support the following HRM policies': 
(1) promote the sharing of both the rewards and risks of business; (2) focus 
on merit philosophy throughout the organization; emphasize individual 
performance; (3) encourage, recognize and reward employees for produc­ 
tivity gains; (4) encourage, recognize and reward employees for enhancing 
their own skills and knowledge; (5) encourage, recognize and reward 
employees for customer service and quality; (6) adopt performance ap­ 
praisal systems using customer ratings; and (7) provide flexible benefit 
packages.
In Table 1, the extent of support for various policies linking rewards and 
performance in British companies indicated by respondents is set out. (The 
items are ranked in terms of the level of support indicated.) Clearly, a 
substantial number of human resource management policies on rewards and 
performance are supported within British organizations. The focus on merit 
is noticeable in that 63 per cent of respondents reported that it was their 
organization's policy to either support or strongly support this policy. The 
increasing awareness of the importance of the customer is also evident in the 
finding that 54 per cent of respondents noted that their organization had a 
policy to encourage, recognize and reward employees for customer service 
and quality. The support of innovation and creativity on the one hand and 
productivity on the other was also noticeable — 52 per cent of respondents 
indicated that their organization supported or strongly supported measures 
to encourage, recognize and reward employees for innovation and
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TABLE 1
Exteni of Support for Various Human Resource Policies Linked 
wilh Rewards and Performance*
ds ttntt pc Strong- Supports Nfilher Against Strongly
ly supports rwr against
supports against
Focus on merit philosophy
throughout (be organisation;
cmphasi/e individual performance
Encourage, recognize and reward
employees for customer service and
(jualily
Encourage, recognize and reward
employees lor innovation and
creativity
Encourage, recognize and reward
employees for productivity gains
Encourage, recognize and reward
employees for enhancing their own
skills or knowledge
Promote Ihe sharing of both the
rewards arid risks of business
Adopt performance appraisal
systems using customer ratings









































* Tola! respondents = 909.
creativity, while the same proportion reported that employees were also 
encouraged and rewarded for productivity gains.
In other respects, however, the policy within UK organizations to relate 
rewards and performance is less noticeable. It is the case that the 
encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for enhancing their 
skills and knowledge is quite strong (48 per cent of respondents indicating 
that this was the policy in their organization). However, only 36 per cent of 
respondents indicated that it was the policy of their organization to support 
or strongly support the promotion of the sharing of both the rewards and 
risks of business, and only 35 percent felt that the adoption of performance 
appraisal systems using customer ratings was supported.
in Table 2, the correlation coefficients between the variables associated 
wiih policies on rewards and performance are presented. It is clear that there 
is a robust cluster of variables identifiable and that this applies particularly to 
the encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for (1) produc­ 
tivity gains, (2) enhancing skills or knowledge, (3) innovation and creativity, 
and (4) customer service and quality. This is clearly indicative of a coherent 
group of policies on rewards emerging in British companies that are linked 
with human resource management approaches.
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TABLE 2 
Correlation Coefficients between Variables Associated wilh Rewards and Performance
Kcwartts an
1. Promote the sharing of both Ihe rewards and the risks of business
2. Focus on merit philosophy throughout the organisation; emphasize individual performance
3. Encourage, recognize and reward employees for productivity gams
4. Encourage, recognize nnd reward employees for enhancing their own skills or know ledge
5. Encourage, recognize and reward employees for innovation and creativity
6. Encourage, recognize and reward employees for customer service and quality
7. Adopt performance appraisal systems using customer ratings
8. Provide flexible benefit packages
— 0.5X», 0.67,, 0.53,, (1.55,, 0.5b« 0.4:,, 0.53,,
— (1.67,, (1.57,, 0.5S,, 0.55,, 0.37,. 0.43,,
— 11.70,, 0.72,, 0.69,, 0.47,, 11-54,,
._ 0.79,, 0.70,, 0.5K, 0.54,,




, — significance 0.05. 
x, = significance 0.01. 
2 tailed.
Turning to explanations, in terms of the adoption of various policies on 
rewards and performance, there are clearly some 'structural' effects thai 
can be identified. These are set out in Table 3, where it will be seen that 
private rather than public-sector firms are more likely to promote the 
sharing of the rewards and risks of business, and to encourage, recognize 
and reward employees for both innovation and creativity and for customer 
service and quality. There are also some size effects. Above all, the 
encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for enhancing skills 
and knowledge and for productivity gains are more evident in the larger 
firms.
The hypothesis that growing firms are more likely to have policies thai 
encourage human-resource-type reward practices is particularly well sup­ 
ported. All the rewards and performance items are significantly correlated 
with an expansionary profile of companies, and this applies particularly to 
the encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for enhancing 
their skills and knowledge and for productivity gains (see Table 3).
In terms of the 'action' variables, as we ha\'e seen, information was sought 
on the extent to which the human resource management 'role' was: 
(I) proactive in creating and managing change, (2) active in participating in 
strategic planning, and (3) supportive of horizontal as opposed to vertical 
management. It is clear that a proactive human resource management role 
in creating and managing change is linked with the promotion of various
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TABLE 3
Policies on Rewards and Performance: 'Structural' Explanations
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reward employees for 
innovation and creativity
Encourage, recognize and 0.14,, 
reward employees for customer 
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, = significance 0.05.
„ — significance 0.01.
2 tailed.
* This item lias been reversed so that a positive numerical value now indicates private sector
rather than public sector.
rewards and performance policies in the firm (see Table 4). This is 
particularly noticeable in respect of the item concerning the encouragement, 
recognition and reward of employees for enhancing skills or knowledge, but 
all items are significantly related to a proactive human resource role in the 
company in creating and managing change.
An active involvement of the human resource management role in 
strategic planning is also associated with the furtherance of rewards and 
performance policies in the firm. The relevant correlations are set out in 
Table 4, where a group of consistently significant relationships are readily 
identifiable.
Finally, if the human resource management role facilitates horizontal 
management and the cultivation of all employees (as opposed to vertical 
management), again, the various rewards and performance policies 
identified in this study are likely to be promoted as well. This applies
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TABLE4 
Policies on Rewards and Performance and the 1 luman Resource Management Role
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* This item has been reversed so that a positive numerical value now indicates hori/.onlai raiher
than vertical management.
particularly to the sharing of both the rewards and the risks of business as 
well as to the encouragement, recognition and reward of employees for: 
(1) enhancing skills and knowledge, (2) innovation and creativity, and 
(3) customer service and quality (see Table 4).
5. Reward practices
In this section attention is focused on reward practices. In addition to 
information on policies, respondents were asked to indicate to what extent 
their organizations were involved in a variety of reward practices. A first 
group comprised profit-sharing and related reward systems (profit-sharing 
with cash awards, profit-sharing with shares in the organization, savc-as-
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you-earn schemes, executive-share schemes and profit-related pay). Other 
elements of (lie 'new pay' included performance-related pay, skill-based 
pay, knowledge-based pay and payment for quality. Furthermore, informa­ 
tion was sought on more traditional forms of reward including individual and 
plant-wide bonuses, production-based pay, fringe benefits and equal pay for 
equal work,
In Table 5, the extent lo which respondents reported that their organiza­ 
tions were involved in various reward practices is set out, the items being 
ranked on the basis of (he full and considerable involvement scores. Equal 
pay for equal work was found to be the most common practice (49 per cent of 
respondents indicating full or considerable involvement), followed by 
payment by results/performance-relaled pay (30 per cent), skill-based pay 
(25 per cent), individual bonus schemes (24 per cent) and fringe benefits (23 
percent).
However, in contrast with the policies of companies, many elements in the
TABLES
Respondents' Views of Ihe Hxlcnl lo which Or^aiiiz.nllon.s 
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'new pay' do not appear to have been widely adopted in practice in British 
companies. The majority of respondents thus reported that their firms had 
no involvement in individual bonus schemes (57 per cent), executive share 
schemes (68 per cent), knowledge-based pay (53 percent), save-as-you-earn 
share schemes (71 per cent), profit-sharing with cash awards (66 per cent), 
profit-related pay (70 per cent), profit-sharing with shares in the organiza­ 
tion (77 per cent), production-based pay (70 per cent), plant-wide bonus 
schemes (77 per cent) and payment for quality (73 per cent). Moreover, the 
importance attached lo equal pay for equal work almost certainly stems 
from the use of legislation by employees which was at record levels at the 
time of the survey (ACAS 1994:15-16) rather than being linked with human 
resource management policies on rewards in the firm.
Turning to the links between Ihe reward practice variables, the relevant 
items in the correlation matrix are set out in Table 6. For the most part, 
there are significant interrelationships between the main items, and this 
applies particularly to those associated with profit-sharing. Moreover, the
TAni.n.<>
Condition Mahix. o[ Reward Practices 
hems in matrix
1. Prcilil sharing (wilh cash awards)
2. Profit sharing (wilh shares in the organization)
3. Save-as-you-earn share schemes
4. Executive share schemes
5. Profit-related pay
ft. Payment by rcsiiUs/pcrformancc-rclatcd pay
7. Individual bonus schemes




12. Payment lor quality
13. Fringe benefits
14. Equal pay for equal work
Total respondents = 909.





































































































0.17,, 0.23,, 0.25,, —
0.19,, 0.13,, 0.16,, 0.20,,
x = significance 0.05.
XX = significance 0.01.
2-tailed.
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strong association between skill-based pay and knowledge-based pay is 
certainly worth mentioning; for, although only the minority of firms appear 
to have adopted 'new pay' practices, those (hat have done so seem likely to 
have encompassed more than one practice.
To explain the main variations, the 'structural' variables are first 
examined. There are first of all some important public and private-sector 
differences. Not surprisingly, this applies particularly to the various profit- 
sharing schemes and to profit-related pay (see Table 7). Also, bonus 
schemes and fringe benefits are more likely to be evident in the private- 
sector firm. Most profit-sharing schemes (with the exception of the cash- 
based type) are also more likely to be present in larger firms, as is equal 
pay for equal work, but in many cases (e.g. skill-based pay. production- 
based pay and payment for quality), (here is virtually no si/e effect (see 
Table 6).
We have seen thai an expansionary profile of companies is quite strongly 
associated with (he adoption of various awards and performance policies, 
but there are many fewer links with actual reward practices. There are 
exceptions in respect of most all-employee forms of profit-sharing, profit- 
related pay, production-based pay and payment forquaiity. But even where 
there are significant relationships, their strength is typically quite weak (see 
Table 7).
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Turning to the 'action' variables, we have shown that, at a policy level, an 
active human resource management role links quite strongly with support 
for various rewards and performance items. However, this is less evident in 
respect of actual reward practices. To be sure, there are many significant 
relationships in the hypothesized direction, but very little of the s ariance can 
be explained by this group of variables.
In more detail, the firms in which there is a proactive human resource 
management role in creating and managing change, skill and knowledge- 
based pay are likely to be enhanced as is equal pay for equal work (see 
Table 8). If the human resource management 'role' participates in strategic 
planning, a range of reward practices such as fringe benefits, payment for 
qualily, equal pay for equal work, executive share schemes and prolit- 
related pay are likely to be present in the firm. Hut again, the typically 
significant relationships involved here are not very strong. The same 
argument applies to the support for horizontal rather than vertical manage­ 
ment by the human resource management 'role'. In firms where such a 
policy is pursued, there is more likely to be profit-sharing with cash 
awards, payment for quality, profit-related pay and payment by 
results/performance-related pay. But in no case is a typically significant 
relationship greater than 0.2 (see Table 8).
TABLES 
Reward Practices and the Human Resource Management Role
Rewiinl />/wiirr.v
1. Profit sharing (with cash
awards)
2. Profit sharing (with shares
in the organi/alion)
3. Save-as-you-earn schemes
4. Executive share schemes
5. Profit-related pay
6. Payment by results/
performance-related pay
7. Individual bonus schemes
8. Plant-wide bonus schemes
9. Skill-based pay
10. Knowledge-based pay
1 1 . Production-based pay
12. Payment for qualily
13. Fringe benefits


























































* This item has been reversed so that a positive numerical value now indicates private scclor 
rather than public sector.
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6. Conclusions
So far, then, we have examined the degree of support for various reward 
policies and the extent of adoption of different reward practices within 
British companies. Furthermore, we have identified a number of structural 
variables (public/pi ivale-sector; size of organization; expanding profile of 
organization) and the influence of the human resource/personnel role in 
change, in strategy and in altering management structures in an attempt to 
explain some of (he main variations from one company to the next. It 
remains to re-state those arguments to which a special significance is 
attached and to draw out various implications for the theory of rewards more 
generally.
Our first conclusion is that, at a policy level, many items of the so-called 
'new pay' and human resource management approaches to rewards that link 
pay with performance are endorsed in British companies. Consistent with 
other surveys, there does appear to be a significant emphasis on merit and 
individual performance (Casey et al. 1992; CBI/IIay, 1996), coupled with 
the policy to design rewards systems to reinforce customer service and 
quality, innovation and creativity, and productivity. None the less, if we 
focus on actual reward practices, there is less evidence in support of the 'new 
pay' thesis. Indeed, in the case of the majority of items identified in this 
study (e.g. profit-sharing, payment lor quality), human resource manage­ 
ment reward systems have not been implemented wholesale in British 
companies. This is not of course to say that the linking of rewards with 
performance is not more common than was once the case; but it is hard to 
find evidence of the widespread adoption of many of the 'new pay' practices. 
A number of explanations can be given for this divergence between policy 
and practices. The first concerns the relationship between so-called 'rhet­ 
oric' and 'reality'. Pay is one of the central pillars of HRM and, as such, it is 
central to the 'metaphorical' narratives that have informed the development 
of human resource management in Britain (Keenoy and Anthony 1992, 
Smilh 1993). Human resource management provides legitimation for 'hard' 
practices which at one level promote ihe reduction of unit costs including 
labour, and at another legitimates the 'soft' view that employees now have 
the opportunity to participate in the success of the business (Smith 1992). 
From this viewpoint, the espoused support for new pay policies are aimed 
not so much at performance as at the creation of an organizational culture 
which emphasizes individual contributions to increasing productivity and 
profitability while practice may remain anchored in cost minimization 
(Keenoy 1997).
The second explanation can be found in the relationship between 
strategy, policy and practice which, according to Reed (1990), is best 
conceived as a dynamic relationship. At Ihe level of the firm, it arises out of 
negotiated compromise taking place across all levels of the organization. 
This dynamic situation has implications for our understanding of strategic 
human resource management role, as one of the authors has noted,
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Human resource policy choices nre not taken in a vacuum On Ihe contrary. Ihev 
depend on the strategic managerial group being sufficiently powerful to ensure 
that particular policy choices are laken along lines which are consistent wiih an 
overarching strategy, and are also reflected in actual practices within the firm 
itself. (PooleJ 990:8.)
Keeping human resource policy and practices consistent with strategic- 
objectives is a major problem for management. Indeed, Tyson (1995) has 
argued that human resource slrategies are emergent, generally unwritten 
and susceptible to rapid change. The reasons for this, according to Tyson, 
are twofold: first, to allow for the reconciliation of conflicting interest 
groups, particularly between senior managers, by making responsibility for 
the strategy unclear should it fail to succeed; and second, to enable 
management to respond rapidly to competitive pressures and opportunities. 
The modification or change to strategic objectives in human resource 
management may thus reilect the lack of coherence and integration of 
management processes because of the need to adapt to far-reaching changes 
in internal and external environments. Moreover, the implementation of 
reward policies may be restricted by opposition within management (either 
horizontally or vertically) (Marchinglon and Parker 1990), institutional 
forces such as collective bargaining, worker resistance, taken-for-granted 
assumptions about fairness and equity in rewards (Hyman and Brough 1975) 
OT simply employee cynicism (Anthony 1990).
Our second conclusion arises from the intercorrelations among both 
policy and practice reward items, and here it can be inferred that there is a 
coherence to modern payment systems. This applies particularly to Ihe 
policy items where various performance-related approaches to rewards are 
strongly interconnected. For actual practices, too, the profit-sharing items 
link closely, as do skill and knowledge-based pay. Hence it is reasonable to 
conclude that, in firms in which 'new' pay policies are developing, there is a 
coherent group of principles to be identified that may well be strategic in 
compass (Lawler 1990). Furthermore, it is likely that groups of 'new pay' 
practices tend to be advanced together rather than as single, discrete 
practices. One interpretation here is the increasing awareness that innova­ 
tive employment practices work best if introduced in internally consistent 
'bundles' rather than individually, and that they further increase effective­ 
ness if linked with the overall business strategy (Dyer and Reeves 1995; 
MacDuffie 1995).
Turning to explanations for the adoption of different policies and 
practices on rewards, we have deployed an explanatory framework based on 
'structural' and 'action' approaches. Taking first Ihe structural character­ 
istics of firms, it is clear that, in private-sector companies, more individual­ 
istic reward systems are being fostered in comparison with public-sector 
companies. There are also some size effects (particularly in terms of policies 
on rewards). Moreover, expanding companies are especially likely to 
promote performance-related reward systems. Not surprisingly, too. there
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are pronounced public-sector/private-sector variations in the adoption of 
such reward systems as profit-sharing and profit related pay as well as some 
highly significant links with enterprise size.
But an 'action'-based explanation involving an analysis of the influence 
of I lie personnel/human resource management 'role' is of considerable 
value as well. This is particularly so if we focus on policies linking rewards 
and performance. If the human resource management role is proactive in 
creating and managing change; if it actively participates in strategic 
planning and if it supports horizontal rather than vertical management, 
then the firms in which it is located are particularly likely to promote 
policies emailing the linking of rewards with performance. However, the 
relationships are weaker between the organization of the human resource 
management role and actual reward practices. This may mean that, 
although the impact of the human resource 'role' is greater at a policy level 
than has been previously thought, there may still be only a circumscribed 
influence at an operational level where 'line' management responsibility 
for most human resource management practices is typical (Poole and 
Jenkins 1996).
The findings of this study are, however, consistent with other types of 
explanatory approach. This is particularly the case for contingency theory 
(see Kessler 1995; Wood 1996). The environment-organization linkages 
identified here are evident in: (1) the role of the legislature and (2) the 
adaptation of organizations to increasingly competitive and open markets. 
Thus, legislative encouragement for the adoption of equal pay for equal 
work practices is evident from our data. Moreover, the forces of competi­ 
tion in open global markets are detectable as well. Thus, the focus (at least 
at a policy level) on customer service as a differentiating factor in reward 
systems is partly explicable in terms of the increasing emphasis on the 
market and the centrality of the consumer for modern business practice.
Overall, however, our conclusion must be that explanations for the 
adoption of different reward systems based on 'structural' and 'action' 
approaches are likely to prove lo be especially consequential. The char­ 
acteristics of enterprises (and above all if they have an expansionary 
protile) do appear lo be related to modern reward systems. But of no less 
consequence is the 'strategic choice' (Kochan el al. 1984) to adopt diverse 
policies on rewards that are closely linked with the influence of the human 
resource management role in the enterprise itself. Hence, an explanatory 
approach that combines elements of 'structural' and 'action' interpreta­ 
tions is likely to unlock a series of variables that will help industrial 
relations scholars lo understand, more fully than at present, the varied 
patterns of adoption of 'new pay' policies and practices in firms in 
contemporary Britain.
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